Day: June 28, 2018
Elections have consequences
Here are the speaking notes I prepared for today’s noontime presentation at SETA DC:
- It wasn’t free or fair, but Erdogan has won his gamble: he has not only the enhanced presidency but also a coalition majority in parliament. He in effect controls the judiciary and press as well.
- The opposition is fragmented and likely to prove no more effective than in the last few years, though its hostility to Syrian refugees will guarantee it some support.
- Turkey looks headed deeper into one-man rule, even if Erdogan fulfills his pledge to lift the emergency.
- It would be foolish to imagine Erdogan will suddenly become generous to his enemies, end his crackdown on over 100,000 alleged coup-plotters, break with the Russians, re-focus attention on fighting Islamic extremism and qualifying for EU membership, negotiate peace with Turkey’s Kurds, or patch up the alliance with the US.
- I wonder if he would even restrain his body guards from beating up demonstrators were he to visit the US again.
- The question is what the US should do about it? How do we make it through the coming years, possibly even a decade or more, with an erstwhile ally moving in a direction it is hard to like?
- The current occupant of the White House makes these questions more difficult than they would normally be. He is on the outs with Erdogan, but not over human rights or relations with Russia. Trump and Erdogan might agree entirely on those issues.
- But President Trump has continued to insist on supporting the Syrian Kurds and hasn’t proven much help on the extradition of Gulen, which are the two things Erdogan cares about the most.
- Ironically, the best approach is one Trump might find attractive: a transactional relationship that relies less on Turkey as an ally and more on its usefulness to the US.
- The most important aspect of that usefulness is geography. The Incirlik air base is important to U.S. operations throughout the Levant. So long as it remains available, we are going to have to try to improve relations with Erdogan, who fortunately gets real benefits from those operations.
- As Syria’s northern neighbor with a long common border, Turkey is hosts the largest number of Syrian refugees. The US has spent around $600 million to support them and needs to continue.
- The immediate crunch issue is the sale of F35s to Ankara, which Congress is trying to stop. What is needed is a compromise, one that ends Erdogan’s threat to buy Russian S400 air defenses while allowing the transfer of the F35s. Secretary Mattis is said to be working a deal of that sort. I can’t help but wonder whether a Patriot sale might also still be something Erdogan still wants.
- The question of the Syrian Kurds is next. The agreement on Manbij appears to be working so far and needs to be completed with reformulation of the town’s governing body and withdrawal of YPG forces east of the Euphrates.
- Much tougher will be the issue of prisoner releases: Ankara holds dozens of Americans, apparently hoping to trade them for Gulen. It is hard to convince Erdogan that Trump does not have the same power over Gulen’s fate that Erdogan has over the Americans Turkey holds.
- If, however, a court decides in favor of extradition, I doubt the Trump administration will stand in the way.
- This, I’m afraid, is how we will need to proceed: issue by issue, looking for trades we can reasonably do that Erdogan will find attractive. It will be a hard slog, one during which concern about human rights abuses will likely find little public expression.
- I nevertheless hope the Administration will make a strong case in private against Erdogan’s continued crackdown. All but the immediate coup plotters should be freed, Kurdish political leaders and journalists should be released and amnestied or pardoned, jobs should be restored.
- The strongest potential leverage the Americans have now on human rights is economic: Turkey is headed in a bad direction that will be made much worse if secondary sanctions against Iran are instituted.
- Relief from secondary sanctions could be traded for easing the crackdown, but Trump isn’t likely to do that. Erdogan will have strong incentives to surreptitiously violate the sanctions, which he did even during the Obama era.
- Erdogan has won. Trump is in power. Elections have consequences.
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Israel’s “center”
On Monday, the Brookings Institution hosted M.K. Yair Lapid, founder of the centrist Yesh Atid party, the largest opposition party in the Knesset. Lapid shared his views about current Israeli domestic and foreign policy, including its relationship with the US, as well as his vision for the country’s future. John R. Allen, president of the Brookings Institution, gave introductory remarks, and Tamara Coffman Wittes, senior foreign policy fellow at Brookings Center for Middle East Policy, moderated the discussion. Below, I discuss key takeaways from Lapid‘s remarks.
Foreign Policy Flashpoints
At a time when regional conflict threatens Israel’s relative stability, Lapid described how his country and the international community should approach Israel’s main foreign policy challenges to ensure future Israeli security. On the Palestinian front, Lapid stressed the importance of breaking the silence that has stalled negotiations on a two state solution since the Trump embassy move. A return to dialogue represents the only road to peace. A Palestinian Jerusalem, however, is off the table. Lapid stated that “Jerusalem is a capital; if someone came to DC and asked [the US] to share it with Mexico, they would refuse.” Lapid also criticized UNRWA, arguing that having a refugee agency solely for Palestinians allows Arab countries to maintain a false moral high ground in the conflict.
Lapid blamed Hamas for the recent killing of hundreds of protestors in Gaza by Israeli snipers, saying that the violent protests threatened national security. Although it is not at fault for the violence, Israel must work quickly to solve the humanitarian crisis; after all, Gazan sewage contaminates Israeli water. However, any Israeli efforts to solve the crisis must be predicated by Hamas’ fall from power, clearing the way for humanitarian aid to reach Gazan hands without funding terrorist activities.
Lapid also used national security to defend his country’s controversial position in the Golan Heights. In addition to their strategic importance in fending off the rising Iranian and Hizbollah threat, giving the Golan Heights back to Assad is simply not an option, as it would put 22,000 Jewish lives at risk. Similarly, opening the northeastern border to Syrian Arab refugees also represents an unacceptable security risk. Instead, Lapid called on the US to recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Heights, arguing that this move would allow the US to send the message that it does not tolerate Assad’s human rights abuses.
Israeli-US Relations: Troubling Times Ahead?
While Lapid lauded the Trump administration’s goodwill towards Israel, he expressed concern that positive relations on the executive level are papering over fissures that will emerge after Trump leaves office. Chief among these is American Jewry’s increasing disinterest in Israel. Orthodox Jews in Israel have criticized American Reform Jews too much, causing them to feel alienated. Increasing anti-Israel discourse on US college campuses has prevailed over American Jews’ ties to their ancestral homeland. Lapid also linked heightened partisanship under Trump to the erosion of the bipartisan support Israel has enjoyed in the past. As a consequence, bilateral relations could deteriorate during the next democratic administration, leaving Israel more exposed than ever to national security threats from within the Arab world.
Careful Optimism: A Winning Call?
As he discussed his chances for beating Netanyahu in the next parliamentary elections, Lapid emphasized that Israelis are more hesitant about large political shifts than US voters. For that reason, Lapid argued that emphasizing satisfaction with the status quo while calling for gradual crackdowns on corruption and moving towards a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict will be a winning call in 2019. In addition, Lapid advocated for a move away from using empty rhetoric to avoid confronting issues head-on, saying that “we need a government that actually does stuff, not [one] that just eloquently describes the problem.” While his strategy of emphasizing continuation and subtle changes might mean that Yesh Atid does not differentiate itself enough from Likud enough to win in 2019, Lapid hopes that centrist success in Germany and France might bode well for Israel.
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Winners should stabilize, like it or not
Throughout the two-day Stabilization Symposium – held at the Elliott School of International Affairs on June 26-27, 2018 – panels were held to provide “Perspectives from the Frontlines,” sharing witness accounts from a conflict, or recently deconflicted areas, in which a stabilization framework is most likely to be implemented. The Symposium thus hosted a panel entitled “Perspectives from the Frontlines: Syria and Iraq.” Moderated by Moises Venancio, UNDP Regional Advisor for Iraq and Syria, the panel included:
Linda Robinson – Senior Policy Researcher, RAND
Katherine Krueger – Senior Advisor, Stabilization and Development, Creative Associates International
Aya Aljamili – Al Jazeera
Robinson emphasized how important effective coordination is for the success of stabilization on the ground. Different operating partners in Raqqa, Syria – probably different branches of the US government and NGO partners of the government organizations – have differing conceptions of what stabilization meant. This apparently delayed effective implementation. Robinson also stressed the need for government actors to bring non-government actors to the planning table early on if effective stabilization is to happen. Stabilization in Raqqa had been more successful than in some other cases thanks to better communication between partners; but more could be done to improve the process.
Asked how best to go about implementing stabilization, Robinson highlighted the importance of detailed community research. We need to look at the perceptions and priorities of every demographic group, not just local leaders, when determining what is best for a deconflicted region. Gathering such information is difficult when local populations are traumatized and hostile to foreign powers, as is often the case. This is why community outreach to build relationships and trust are important facets of a successful stabilization process.
Krueger pointed out the biggest obstacle to implementing stabilization in Syria: as an inherently political process, successful stabilization requires clearly defined political objectives. The American government has failed to provide such clear political objectives, leading to what Krueger called “stabilization lite.” Implementation is further complicated by the US struggle to find a satisfactory stabilizing intermediary on the ground, with American support for Kurdish troops proving particularly controversial with local Arab populations. She also pointed out how important continued American presence is to deterring radical groups such as ISIS.
In the same vein, Krueger reminded the audience not to forget about reconstructing Mosul and dealing with the huge number of internally-displaced people in Iraq. While the Iraqi elections were reassuring in their focus on corruption and the reduced role of sectarianism, international actors still have a lot to do to ensure that ISIS does not resurge in Iraq.
According to Aljamili, stabilization can only succeed in eastern Syria if a government is formed that not only provides basic services, but also unites disparate local communities under a common banner. According to the Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR), stabilization should function through cooperation with legitimate local actors. Unless the US succeeds in fostering a local government that satisfies the needs of both the Kurds and Arabs, stabilization efforts will flounder.
Because of this, Aljamili emphasized the need to take the time to work within communities, to ascertain what the population wants, before undertaking a stabilization process and “elite bargaining” that may run counter to popular desire. It is also essential to remember that Iraq and Syria are not one entity; even within each state, regions differ substantially, meaning that stabilization processes must be highly tailored to the region in which they are to be implemented.
During the Q&A portion of the panel, I asked whether – seeing the Turkish government’s apparent opposition to the creation of an autonomous Kurdish enclave in the north-east of Syria – stabilization in eastern Syria could function without American political support for the Kurds. To this, Aljamili answered that Turkey will at some point have to face the reality of a strong Kurdish political presence in northern Syria, whether that is as part of a negotiated settlement with Assad’s government or as an autonomous enclave for the foreseeable future.
Krueger said that two possible solutions exist for northern Syria. Maybe multi-sectarian local community rebuilding could occur with the consent of Assad and Turkey. Now that President Erdoğan has won a decisive victory at home, he may reopen negotiations with the PKK from a stronger negotiating position. The other solution would be an official deal between the PYD and the US, with Russia and the US then putting pressure on Turkey to accept the facts on the ground and some form of Kurdish autonomy in Syria, as Assad may be open to such autonomy in majority-Kurdish regions.
The bottom line: it is awkward to talk about an American-support stabilization process in Syria when President Trump has been advocating full American withdrawal. All three panelists emphasized the importance of the American presence in eastern Syria and in Iraq to not just stabilizing, but also rebuilding communities in these regions once the conflict with ISIS is over. Stabilization and peace-building are vital in the aftermath of the fight with ISIS, but the Americans may abandon the effort.
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