Winners should stabilize, like it or not

Throughout the two-day Stabilization Symposium – held at the Elliott School of International Affairs on June 26-27, 2018 – panels were held to provide “Perspectives from the Frontlines,” sharing witness accounts from a conflict, or recently deconflicted areas, in which a stabilization framework is most likely to be implemented. The Symposium thus hosted a panel entitled “Perspectives from the Frontlines: Syria and Iraq.” Moderated by Moises Venancio, UNDP Regional Advisor for Iraq and Syria, the panel included:

Linda Robinson – Senior Policy Researcher, RAND

Katherine Krueger – Senior Advisor, Stabilization and Development, Creative Associates International

Aya Aljamili – Al Jazeera

Robinson emphasized how important effective coordination is for the success of stabilization on the ground. Different operating partners in Raqqa, Syria – probably different branches of the US government and NGO partners of the government organizations – have differing conceptions of what stabilization meant. This apparently delayed effective implementation. Robinson also stressed the need for government actors to bring non-government actors to the planning table early on if effective stabilization is to happen. Stabilization in Raqqa had been more successful than in some other cases thanks to better communication between partners; but more could be done to improve the process.

Asked how best to go about implementing stabilization, Robinson highlighted the importance of detailed community research. We need to look at the perceptions and priorities of every demographic group, not just local leaders, when determining what is best for a deconflicted region. Gathering such information is difficult when local populations are traumatized and hostile to foreign powers, as is often the case. This is why community outreach to build relationships and trust are important facets of a successful stabilization process.

Krueger pointed out the biggest obstacle to implementing stabilization in Syria: as an inherently political process, successful stabilization requires clearly defined political objectives. The American government has failed to provide such clear political objectives, leading to what Krueger called “stabilization lite.” Implementation is further complicated by the US struggle to find a satisfactory stabilizing intermediary on the ground, with American support for Kurdish troops proving particularly controversial with local Arab populations. She also pointed out how important continued American presence is to deterring radical groups such as ISIS.

In the same vein, Krueger reminded the audience not to forget about reconstructing Mosul and dealing with the huge number of internally-displaced people in Iraq. While the Iraqi elections were reassuring in their focus on corruption and the reduced role of sectarianism, international actors still have a lot to do to ensure that ISIS does not resurge in Iraq.

According to Aljamili, stabilization can only succeed in eastern Syria if a government is formed that not only provides basic services, but also unites disparate local communities under a common banner. According to the Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR), stabilization should function through cooperation with legitimate local actors. Unless the US succeeds in fostering a local government that satisfies the needs of both the Kurds and Arabs, stabilization efforts will flounder.

Because of this, Aljamili emphasized the need to take the time to work within communities, to ascertain what the population wants, before undertaking a stabilization process and “elite bargaining” that may run counter to popular desire. It is also essential to remember that Iraq and Syria are not one entity; even within each state, regions differ substantially, meaning that stabilization processes must be highly tailored to the region in which they are to be implemented.

During the Q&A portion of the panel, I asked whether – seeing the Turkish government’s apparent opposition to the creation of an autonomous Kurdish enclave in the north-east of Syria – stabilization in eastern Syria could function without American political support for the Kurds. To this, Aljamili answered that Turkey will at some point have to face the reality of a strong Kurdish political presence in northern Syria, whether that is as part of a negotiated settlement with Assad’s government or as an autonomous enclave for the foreseeable future.

Krueger said that two possible solutions exist for northern Syria. Maybe multi-sectarian local community rebuilding could occur with the consent of Assad and Turkey. Now that President Erdoğan has won a decisive victory at home, he may reopen negotiations with the PKK from a stronger negotiating position. The other solution would be an official deal between the PYD and the US, with Russia and the US then putting pressure on Turkey to accept the facts on the ground and some form of Kurdish autonomy in Syria, as Assad may be open to such autonomy in majority-Kurdish regions.

The bottom line: it is awkward to talk about an American-support stabilization process in Syria when President Trump has been advocating full American withdrawal. All three panelists emphasized the importance of the American presence in eastern Syria and in Iraq to not just stabilizing, but also rebuilding communities in these regions once the conflict with ISIS is over. Stabilization and peace-building are vital in the aftermath of the fight with ISIS, but the Americans may abandon the effort.