Month: June 2018
The Levant: from bad to worse
The Wilson Center hosted a panel yesterday entitled “The Middle East: A Region in Chaos?” to discuss the current situation in the Middle East and the U.S. government’s reaction to this situation. Jane Harman, Director, President, and CEO of the Wilson Center, introduced the speakers before the moderator, Michael Yaffe, Vice President, Middle East and Africa at the U.S. Institute of Peace, provided a brief summary of the many developments in the region in 2018. The panel included:
Robin Wright – USIP-Wilson Center Distinguished Fellow
Bruce Riedel – Senior Fellow and Director, Brookings Intelligence Project, Brookings Institution
Mona Yacoubian – Senior Advisor, Syria, Middle East and North Africa, U.S. Institute of Peace
Aaron David Miller – Vice President for New Initiatives and Middle East Program Director, Wilson Center.
This post will focus on the panel’s analysis of recent developments in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and the Syrian Conflict. A previous post focused on the Iran/Saudi Arabia dimension.
As the conversation shifted to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Miller painted a bleak picture of future prospects for a two-state solution. At a time when Syria, Iraq, and Egypt – traditional, vocal allies of the Palestinian cause – are projecting less power across the region because of unrest at home, the US-Israel relationship has reached unprecedented strength. This realignment is a central premise of Jared Kushner’s peace plan strategy. Kushner hopes that aligning fully with Israel on previous roadblocks, such as the governance of Jerusalem, will take these issues off the table while heaping pressure on Netanyahu to accept concessions made to the Palestinians. At the same time, Palestinian demoralization with the current state of affairs will push them back to the negotiating table if any unexpected compromises are made. Miller argued that Kushner’s moves will have the opposite effect; Palestinian trust in America to be an honest broker has evaporated over the last six months, leaving them less inclined than ever even to engage with the United States to find a viable two-state solution.
Miller and Yacoubian also highlighted the diminishing US leadership as power vacuums emerge across the region due to the dysfunction of many Arab states. As Trump continues the Obama administration’s hands-off approach to the region, these voids are being filled by Russia, Turkey, Israel, and non-state actors. US aversion to conflict has also allowed Iran to dramatically increase its influence in Syria, leading to direct military engagement between Israel and the Islamic Republic. Yacoubian argued that a possible Israeli airstrike on Iranian positions close to the Syria-Iraq border could mean that more escalation is on the horizon. Paradoxically, continued hostilities could drag the United States into a proxy war between Israel and Iran fought in Syria and Iraq.
On the southern front, the Syrian Arab Army’s ongoing siege of Dera’a and Al-Quneitra provinces could force even more refugees to flee to Jordan. The Hashemite Kingdom is already reeling from the political blowback to tax hikes designed to combat the country’s ailing economy, and another refugee influx would further inflame internal tensions. Yacoubian argued that recent US inaction in Syria suggests that the State Department’s promise for “firm and appropriate measures” in response to cease fire violations in Southern Syria is also bluster, so Jordan is on its own. Yacoubian also revealed that efforts to convince the Kurds to leave Manbij and move east of the Euphrates in northern Syria could easily derail, leading to more violence, while Trump’s desire to quickly withdraw US. troops could leave a power vacuum that ISIS would exploit.
The Bottom Lines: The political situation in the Levant has gone from bad to worse over the last six months. Increased US support of Israel at the expense of Palestinian goodwill appears to have driven them away from the negotiating table completely, at least for now. In Syria, immediate US withdrawal will only lead to further destabilization. While the train has left the station for Trump to intervene in the south to limit further economic and political strain on Jordan, maintaining a presence in the east could prevent a resurgence of ISIS in this sparsely populated, US-controlled region.
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Middle East chaos: the Saudi-Iranian axis
Since the four following panelists last met at the Wilson Center on December 5, 2017 (click here for that event’s summary), turmoil and chaos in the Middle East seem to have only increased in range and intensity. Faced with developments across the region, the Wilson Center hosted a follow-up panel entitled “The Middle East: A Region in Chaos?” to discuss the current situation and the US government reaction. Jane Harman, Director, President, and CEO of the Wilson Center, introduced the speakers before the moderator, Michael Yaffe, Vice President, Middle East and Africa at the U.S. Institute of Peace, provided a brief summary of the many developments in the region in 2018. The panel included:
Robin Wright – USIP-Wilson Center Distinguished Fellow
Bruce Riedel – Senior Fellow and Director, Brookings Intelligence Project, Brookings Institution
Mona Yacoubian – Senior Advisor, Syria, Middle East and North Africa, U.S. Institute of Peace
Aaron David Miller – Vice President for New Initiatives and Middle East Program Director, Wilson Center.
This post will focus on the panel’s analysis of Iran and Saudi Arabia; a following post will consider the topics of Syria and Israel/Palestine.
Wright began by emphasizing how the past six months have seen the worst domestic turmoil in Iran since President Rouhani was elected in 2013. Economically, Iran has been on the defensive, with stubbornly low prices and the Trump Administration’s re-imposed sanctions creating a “vulnerable moment.” Iran has also been on the defensive politically; President Rouhani is failing to fulfill two of his campaign promises – preserve the JCPOA, and improve the economic situation.
Diplomatically, Iran has actually gone on the offensive by campaigning to convince the five other signatories of the JCPOA – France, the UK, Germany, China, and Russia – to uphold the agreement, despite U.S. sanctions for businesses investing in Iran. Militarily, Iran has been surprisingly restrained in the Persian Gulf, with incidents involving the Iranian navy at a record low. Iran has however ramped up its involvement in Syria, especially as a military confrontation with Israel in the south becomes likelier.
Wright concluded by speculating that the Trump Administration may be quietly pushing for regime change in Iran, although the prospect of such change is dim. While President Trump won 46% of the votes in an election with a 56% voter turnout, President Rouhani and his government were elected with 57% in an election with a 73% voter turnout. He thus commands a broad swath of popular support, despite the protests. The current system will be difficult to displace, especially by a hostile power such as the United States.
Riedel noted that in recent times, Saudi foreign policy has been characterized by recklessness, unpredictability, impulsiveness, and capriciousness, in a manner unprecedented in Saudi history. The best example of this is the civil war in Yemen, which King Salman and his son, Muhammad bin Salman (MbS), expected to be quick and painless. It has now dragged on for more than three years with no end in sight. It may now be reaching a more decisive stage with the ongoing battle for the port of Hodeida. Current Saudi recklessness is also evident in its blockade – or, as Riedel put it, the “siege” – of Qatar.
In the past six months, however, Riedel sees a trend away from recklessness and interventionism. The April 2018 Jerusalem Summit and the June 2018 Mecca Summit put King Salman at the center-stage at the expense of MbS, who seems to be getting sidelined as Saudi Arabia returns to a more risk-averse, conservative style of foreign policy.
As for the US, Riedel noted that while Saudi Arabia is happier dealing with the Trump Administration than with Obama’s, the Kingdom seems to pay little heed to American interests and advice – especially when it comes to the Qatar blockade, which the U.S. sees as playing into the hands of the Iranians. Riedel concluded by calling the legalization of women driving in Saudi Arabia a big deal, although the accompanying repression of female activists shows that there is no room for political dissent in the government’s Vision 2030 program.
The Bottom Line – the most interesting contrast between these two panelists was the way in which they qualified current Saudi-Iranian tensions. Riedel saw them as being based in sectarianism, with political tensions the way in which this sectarianism manifests itself, while Wright instead tried to avoid the usual “tribalist trap” by reminding the audience that there is more to Saudi-Iranian disputes than the Shi’a-Sunni divide. As traditional regional powerhouses – Egypt, Syria, Iraq – lose influence in the region, Saudi-Iranian relations will become one of the main determinants of Middle Eastern politics for years to come.
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Chemical weapons: how and who
The deployment of chemical weapons in Homs, Syria by the Assad regime in late 2012 ended a 20-year freeze on state employment of chemical weapons. Since then, the use of these weapons of mass destruction has exploded, with over 200 attacks reported in Syria alone, in addition to incidents in Iraq, Malaysia, and the United Kingdom.
One week before the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OCPW) meets to discuss multilateral methods to enforce accountability for users of chemical weapons, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) convened a group of chemical weapons experts to share their ideas for enforcing accountability for users of chemical weapons. Ahmet Üzümcü, Director-General of the OCPW, gave the keynote address before a panel moderated by Rebecca Hersman, Director of the Project on Nuclear Issues at CSIS, discussed the issue of chemical weapons proliferation. The panel included:
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance
Samantha Job, Counsellor for Foreign and Security Policy, British Embassy Washington
Nicolas Roche, Director of Strategic, Security and Disarmament Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Üzümcü detailed the successes of his tenure as OPCW Director-General, which included the elimination of 96 percent of declared chemical weapons stockpiles worldwide. He also delved into the challenges the OPCW faces in the coming years, emphasizing that increased chemical weapon attacks in Syria and elsewhere call for heightened international coordination to reinforce nonproliferation. However, Russia’s enabling attitude towards Syria’s chemical weapons use has actually eroded this norm. In recent years, Russia has vetoed UN Security Council resolutions to condemn Assad’s actions. Putin has also led a defamation campaign against the OPCW’s investigation methods. In the face of this challenge to the OPCW and its mission, the Director-General advocated for member states to give the organization the power to conduct investigations to identify the perpetrators of chemical weapons attacks.
Roche focused on France’s desire to combat chemical weapons use by strengthening multilateral institutions. He stressed the importance of international partnerships for information gathering and sharing, as well as the need for a stronger OPCW with the power to identify perpetrators of chemical weapons violence. In what could be seen as a slight to both the US and Russian behavior vis-a-vis international institutions over the last year, Roche emphasized that a multilateral regime for addressing the attribution gap in chemical weapons investigations is a greater good. France will move forward with multilateralism in combating the chemical weapons threat, regardless of who is on board.
Poblete agreed that multilateralism should be at the forefront of the fight against chemical weapons proliferation, but argued that bilateral negotiations between states should also play a role. International approaches fail when compromise becomes the enemy of the good. Poblete defended president Trump’s bilateral strategy with North Korea, repeating multiple times that the administration was well-informed going into the Kim summit. Trump’s failure to mention Kim’s chemical weapons program in the buildup or the aftermath of the meeting in no way indicated that dismantling North Korean stockpiles was off the table.
Job took the point about the need for multilateralism a step further, focusing on the critical role OPCW plays in strengthening the international norm against chemical weapons proliferation. Job emphasized the need to combat Russia’s attacks on the legitimacy of the Chemical Weapons Convention’s regulatory body, arguing that member countries should appoint permanent representatives to the OPCW to accomplish this goal. OPCW also needs increased funding to face the threat of chemical weapons attacks by non-state actors. Like Roche, Job also explicitly endorsed giving the OPCW the power to fill the attribution gap that currently exists in the prosecution of chemical weapons crimes.
Bottom Line: The international community is currently at a crossroads when it comes to dealing with the rejuvenated threat of chemical weapons attacks. Our European allies have already decided on the way forward: multilateralism. The United States is still welcome at the international negotiation table, but like with the JCPOA, France and other European powers will not capitulate to the US preference for bilateralism. The United States must present a united front with its allies on the chemical weapons issue, both for the sake of nonproliferation and for prevention of further erosion of American credibility in the current international framework.
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Less heat, more light
@JonEHecht tweeted yesterday:
Kelly: We need to do it for security, but the kids will be fine, don’t worry.
Trump: We’re only doing this cause Democrats made us do it.
Sessions: The Bible told us to do it.
Miller: Hell yeah we’re doing it.
Nielsen: We’re not doing it! Fake news!
The Administration has dug a deep hole for itself since early spring by separating “unlawful” immigrant children from their parents. It appears to be doing this not only for people who cross the border illegally, but also for those who present themselves to border officials seeking asylum, claiming a well-founded fear of persecution if they return to their homelands. The above justifications, while not quotes, are reflections of what different Administration officials have said to justify a policy most of the US views as inhumane and unjustified, even if a Republican plurality supports it.
The underlying political purpose is all to clear: President Trump is using the separation and detention of children as leverage to get Congress to pass an immigration bill that is consonant with his priorities: funding for the border wall, an end to family reunification (he calls that “chain migration,” aka what his wife did to get her parents into the US), and replacement of the visa lottery (which ensures diverse immigrants) with a new system of “merit-based” (i.e. as white as possible) immigration. These changes are unlikely to pass before the November election, but if they don’t the Administration will use immigration issues to mobilize turnout of its increasingly loyal base.
There is room for lots of debate on immigration, which has always been a sensitive issue in the US and elsewhere. But it is important to distinguish between those who come illegally into the US and those who come seeking refuge, either as refugees or asylum-seekers. Neither are unlawful immigrants: they are people seeking to avail themselves of humanitarian provisions in US and international law. There are also remarkably few of them who make it to the US. This year we may not take in more than half the 45,000 refugees that the Administration has set as a ceiling. This is a small fraction of the about 1 million legal immigrants to US admits yearly.
I know a number of Syrian asylum seekers who have been here for years. While their cases have not yet been adjudicated, let there be no doubt: each of them would be at risk if forced to return to Bashar al Assad’s Syria. The defected diplomats and the leaders of early non-violent demonstrations for democracy in Syria would be obvious targets for persecution. The day may come when they can return, but only to a Syria where democracy and rule of law have replaced the brutality of a cruel and unforgiving personal dictatorship. There is no sign of that on the horizon.
In the meanwhile, my Syrian friends and many others who are admitted as refugees or seek asylum in the US are benefiting our country enormously: they help us all to understand what is going on abroad, they work hard to support their families once they get work permits, they pay their taxes, and they enrich our cultural and social life. They are people trying to survive a period of exile that will surely last longer than they would like, but that redounds to our benefit.
The bigger immigration issue concerns people who cross the border illegally, often for economic reasons. I understand people who worry about that, but the number of unauthorized people living in the US has declined since the beginning of the Obama Administration (which coincided with the depths of the financial-crisis induced recession). And they are not responsible for a disproportionate share of crimes, which are committed more often by those born in the US. To talk of them as “infesting” the US, as the President did today, is an effort to mobilize the Republican base, not an effort to encourage a reasonable approach to a difficult issue. Immigration needs less heat and more light.
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Funding foreign policy
I’ve decided to crib today. Here is the American Foreign Service Association testimony on State and USAID funding prepared for the Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Committee on Appropriations of the the United States Senate. Read it to see why I would rely on others so unashamedly:
If there is one thing that unites Americans, it is support for maintaining our country’s global
leadership role. In fact, polls consistently show that 9 in 10 Americans support strong U.S.
global leadership. Such leadership is unthinkable without a strong professional Foreign Service
deployed around the world protecting and defending America’s people, interests, and values.
Each day, American leadership is being challenged anew by rivals who hope to out-compete us
and adversaries who want to see us fail. We cannot let that happen. If the United States retreats,
we leave a vacuum that will be filled by others who do not share our values or interests.
Walking that back–reclaiming American global leadership, once lost–would be a daunting and
uncertain task, in short, a grave risk we should not take.
The United States has enjoyed a position of unprecedented global leadership in our lifetimes. This
leadership was built on a foundation of military might, economic primacy, good governance,
tremendous cultural appeal–and the diplomatic prowess to channel all that power, hard and soft, into global leadership that has kept us safe and prosperous at home. For a tiny percentage of the overall budget, the Foreign Service builds the relationships that get America’s business in the world done and keeps threats at bay, whether forming alliances to combat terrorism, protect our
borders, or open markets.
The President makes the case clearly in the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS): “The United
States faces an extraordinarily dangerous world, filled with a wide range of threats that have
intensified in recent years.” The NSS goes on to conclude that the United States “must upgrade
our diplomatic capabilities to compete in the current environment.” Despite the acknowledgement of the heightened threats our country faces and the recognition of the need for upgraded diplomatic capability to prevail in this environment, the 2019 State/USAID budget request proposes cutting the State Department by 28 percent. Such a drastic cut would amount to a voluntary retreat from the world stage and a diminution of American global influence.
AFSA has consistently made the case that maintaining robust diplomatic capability is vital to preserving the global leadership role Americans overwhelmingly support. Congressional
appropriators agreed and rejected plans to slash the 2018 State/USAID budget. AFSA is extremely grateful for those expressions of support from members of Congress and we are encouraged that both chamber’s FY19 302(b) allocations also reject deep cuts and restore funding to previous year’s levels. We would like to see these funding allocations upheld throughout the budget bill’s markup and possible passage into law. With all the threats facing our country, now is not the time to abandon the field and forfeit the game to our adversaries.
Despite the rejection of deep cuts to the State Department’s overall budget, State’s Congressional
Budget Justifications for the fiscal years 2008-2016/2017 show that spending on core diplomatic
capability, i.e., the reporting, analysis, and advocacy our diplomats perform overseas, has declined over the last decade. If we compare FY2008, the last full year of the Bush 43 Administration, to FY2016 and FY2017, the decline in funding is significant—from one dollar in 2008 to just 77 cents in 2016 and 2017, in non-inflation adjusted terms. This erosion of America’s core diplomatic capability must be reversed to avoid ceding America’s global leadership role to rising powers, such as China (which increased spending on diplomacy by 40% over the past five years, while ours decreased by 33 percent, from $7.4 billion in 2013 to $4.9 in 2018.)
Congress can begin to shore up underfunded core diplomatic capability by first looking at increasing the deployment of our diplomats abroad. The State Department has taken steps to free
up talented mid-level officers who had been in Washington roles supporting the many special
envoys that had proliferated in the Department in recent years. Now, it’s time to shift those officers and positions back out to the field where they can be most effective and where they can
fulfill the Department’s mission. With just an additional $100 million in the “overseas programs” line item of the Diplomatic & Consular Programs account, State could fully fund the overseas deployment costs of 300 existing mid-level Foreign Service officers.
The National Security Strategy is also crystal clear on the vital role of diplomats: “Our diplomats must be able to build and sustain relationships where U.S. interests are at stake. Face-to-face
diplomacy cannot be replaced by technology. Relationships, developed over time, create trust and shared understanding that the United States calls upon when confronting security threats, responding to crises, and encouraging others to share the burden for tackling the
world’s challenges.“ Our nation’s diplomats and development professionals belong in the field
promoting the rule of law and improving legal frameworks that would enable American
companies to compete and thrive, defending against pandemics, and so much more of the high value diplomacy that keeps the United States safe and prosperous.
We would like to partner with our congressional supporters to ensure that today, and 15 or 20
years from now, U.S. diplomats are still on the field, deployed around the world, protecting and
promoting U.S. interests. Diplomatic presence is the outward manifestation of America’s intention to lead not just militarily, but economically, politically, and culturally as well. We erode our nation’s diplomatic power at our own grave peril. We should not, in a dangerous world, abandon the field to our adversaries.
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What Iranians want to know
Mohammed Ataei of the Iranian Republic News Agency last week asked some questions. I answered. The interview was published in Farsi today:
1. President Trump asserted that his decision to abandon the JCPOA had already changed Iran’s regional policies. Do you think his statement is based on any factual evidence or is it just a political statement in response to internal and international criticisms of his withdrawal from the Iran nuclear agreement?
A: I know of no factual evidence for this. Iran remains forward deployed and engaged in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq and Bahrain. Much as I might hope that Tehran would pay more attention to the welfare of Iranians and less to its military adventures in the region, I don’t think it is happening.
2. Since the election of President Trump, we have seen many reports about Israeli and Saudi lobbying campaign to undermine the Nuclear Agreement with Iran. They openly welcomed President Trump’s decision to withdraw the United States from the agreement. To what extent was Trump’s decision influenced by Benjamin Netanyahu and Bin Salman?
A: I think both Netanyahu and MbS were influential, even if I don’t understand what either one gains from the withdrawal.
3. President Obama always said that he had been able to create an international consensus against Iran. Now some observers argue that President Trump’s unilateral policies have unwittingly brought Russia, China and India closer together. How would you see the efficiency of the US sanctions on Iran in the context of the US unilateralism in international affairs? Do you think Secretary Pompeo can persuade the international community to rebuild the sanctions coalition against Iran?
A: In a word: no. Even if the Europeans are compelled by secondary sanctions to observe the U.S. restrictions, China, Russia, India and others will not. There will be no voluntary international consensus, as there was in the lead-up to the JCPOA.
4. President Trump said that he would target any third party which violates the US sanctions against Iran. There are reports that the EU has threatened to take the US to the World Trade Organization. Don’t you think that Trump is isolating the US rather than isolating Iran?
A: He is definitely isolating the U.S. more than he is isolating Iran, as you saw yesterday at the G7 Summit. But the WTO is a slow mechanism and big European companies are not likely to defy the U.S.
5. How would you explain the challenge of the US extraterritorial sanctions to international agreements and the UN Security Council’s resolutions such as 2231?
A: I’m not a lawyer, but I do think the U.S. has the right to limit use of its own financial system. It just isn’t wise to do so. The U.S. is clearly in violation of UNSC res 2231. But who is going to enforce it?
6. The EU vowed to stop European companies from leaving Iran despite the renewed threat of U.S. sanctions. However, major European companies have already announced that they would end business with Tehran. Do you think that the European leaders have done enough to save the JCPOA?
A: Not yet. They will have to be very tough with the U.S. to save it. Iran will also need to be flexible.
7. How does the US withdrawal from the JCPOA affect the worldwide nuclear disarmament? How would you see the future of NPT?
A: U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA undermines nuclear non-proliferation efforts worldwide. We’ll have to wait and see what Iran does, but if it proceeds now with its nuclear program without restraints, we could also see quite a few other countries proceed in the same direction.
PS: Mohammed followed up with a phone call in which he asked about the differences between a treaty and other executive agreements, how the Europeans might maneuver around secondary sanctions, as well as a few other things.
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