Bad assumptions make bad policy

The Post recently published Jamal Khashoggi’s “It’s time to divide Syria.” A few assertions that Khashoggi made jump out as pertinent examples of biases and assumptions that can often be found in Western media reports about Syria. Here are a few examples of this:

To bring about a permanent peace in Syria, the southern part of the country must be protected. Victory for Assad there is not a complete solution so much as it is a pause. The territories governed by Assad are ruled by fear and a loss of hope for prosperity.

Assad has been responsible for the murder of hundreds of thousands of his own people. He has chemically attacked his compatriots and will go down in history as one of the cruellest and bloodiest despots in modern history. This can lead people to assume that he has managed to stay in power only by keeping the population under his control in a constant state of fear and oppression. It is this assumption – that Assad’s dictatorship commanded little or no popular support – that led international actors, particularly regional powers such as Turkey and Qatar, to believe that Assad’s regime would collapse quickly in 2011.

They were ultimately proven wrong. Syrian sectarian tensions, as well as the government’s historical use of clientelism and patronage to foster elite support, provided Assad with broad support from some ethnic minorities in Syria – particularly his own group, the Alawis. In addition, many non-minority Sunnis see Assad as the sole source of stability in the country. Judging and condemning Assad for the way in which he has treated his people is justified and right. It is, however, a tenuous and possibly counter-productive justification for intervention, particularly if we repeat the mistakes of Iraq in failing to properly plan for the aftermath.

The United States should propose partition in Syria. Assad can keep what he controls, and the rebels can form local governments and establish a new entity. With international recognition and support, it would be possible to hold elections for local councils [and] curtail radicalized individuals […].

Portraying Islamist and jihadist rebels as “radicalized individuals” makes them sound like a few bad apples within a more moderate rebel ensemble. Yet broad swathes of the Syrian opposition are radical, with the salafist Ahrar al-Sham or the jihadist Tahrir al-Sham among the largest and most effective opposition groups in Syria today. These are not just individuals but unavoidable strategic actors, determined power players, who will have a role to play in Syria for years to come.

The ideological composition of the opposition, and its fragmented nature, mean that distinguishing between “radical” and “moderate” elements is near-impossible. Curtailing radical groups would not only require more military power than any international actor is willing to currently provide, it would also require a level of insight and decisiveness in determining who needs to be curtailed and who should participate in governing a new Syria that no foreigners currently possess.

The assertion that we can – and should – eliminate radical elements of the opposition also underestimates the support these groups command within the population. American hostility and distaste for radical Islam clouds the fact that for many Syrians, particularly those who are Sunni Arabs, these groups are a viable and even desirable alternative to Assad’s rule. Many also see them as a necessary evil to counter creeping Iranian influence in Syria, a sort of counter-Hezbollah that will fight fire with fire.

What would Khashoggi recommend if his elected local councils installed radical Muslims in power? More generally, Western commentators should not assume that radical elements in Syria will be “curtail[ed]” by the Syrian population once it votes.

Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State will always be threats, but they will likely be rejected by the local Syrian community if there are international and regional forces supporting Syrian aspirations for moderate civilian rule.

Many Syrians want peace and stability more than they want “moderate civilian rule;” many fear that a transition to a more democratic form of government would prove a new source of chaos and instability, as it was in Iraq after 2003 and Egypt after 2012.

The assumption that democracy is something people inherently yearn for has plagued Western interpretation of Middle Eastern political crises for decades. It was particularly visible during the “Arab Spring” uprisings of 2010-11, when news organizations such as The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal heralded the popular desire for democratic rule in the region.

Of course there are large numbers of local activists and citizens who call and hope for more popular representation and participation across the Middle East; but assuming this a basic and widespread concern for everyone is misleading. Not because they are inherently attached to strongman rule or too passive for civic participation, but because democracy is for many a privilege that comes after security and prosperity. If foreign powers intervened in Syria assuming that its citizens are on the same page as they are about what Syria should look like post-civil war, they could be in for a big surprise.

We should stop making assumptions and generalizations that we can’t back up with evidence. Western powers have too often intervened in Middle Eastern politics – often with destructive consequences – because of false assumptions and an inflated belief in the obviousness and infallibility of their liberal and democratic values.

The United States could do a lot to help the Syrian population today: more humanitarian assistance to the displaced Syrians in the South, and more political support to ensure that Syrian Kurdish interests are represented in negotiations about the future of Syria, for instance. For productive American involvement in the Syrian conflict to happen, however, it can’t be obscured by flashier plans based on misleading statements; they may sound more appealing, but are not grounded in reality. Accurate information should be a prerequisite, not an afterthought, of American foreign policymaking in the Middle East.