Day: July 17, 2018
Coup failure and civilian control
The SETA Foundation convened a panel yesterday discussing how the July 15, 2016 coup attempt has affected civil-military relations in Turkey. Panelists were:
- Sener Akturk, Associate Professor, Koç University Department of International Relations
- Edward Erickson, Scholar-in-Residence in the Clark Center for Global Engagement, State University of New York at Cortland
- Mark Perry, Author and Foreign Policy Analyst.
Kadir Ustun (Executive Director, The SETA Foundation at Washington DC) moderated the conversation.
Ustun underlined that the events of July 2016 were an attack on Turkey’s democracy. Erdogan’s leadership in the coup’s aftermath allowed the Turkish people to “reclaim their democratic institutions.” Akturk furthered this point, claiming that Turkey actually faced two assaults on its democracy, one from the “bolshevik” PKK in July 2015 and the other from Fethullah Gulen’s “Messianic cult” in July 2016.
Erdogan’s reforms, Akturk said, posed an existential threat to each group by eroding the credibility of their grievances with Turkish society. The creation of a government-sponsored Kurdish TV channel in 2009 significantly reduced the PKK claim that Erdogan marginalized the Kurds. The lifting of the headscarf ban for public employees in 2013 eroded the Gulen Movement’s argument that the government limited religious freedom of expression.
As a result, both groups resorted to violence to achieve their political objectives. Akturk emphasized that these groups, not Erdogan, represent the real threat to Turkey’s democracy. While Erdogan championed Morsi’s democratically-elected government in Egypt, Gulenists encouraged the coup that brought it down in 2013. Further, the PKK’s constitution reveals its Bolshevik-leaning tendencies, while the governing style of its Syrian affiliate, the PYD, betrays the PKK’s preference for totalitarianism.
Akturk also remarked that the attempted coup shifted the Turkish civilian-military balance firmly in favor of civilian oversight over the military. As a result of the coup attempt, the military became subordinate to civilian rule, forcing the Turkish armed forces to delink themselves from politics and occupy themselves only with fighting. Finally, Akturk revealed that any doubts surrounding Turkey’s military capability following Erdogan’s dismissal of 42% of its commanders after the coup were swiftly silenced with the success of Operation Euphrates Shield in the Fall of 2015.
Erickson argued that the coup failed because of a generational change in the military. The staunch Kemalists who held the office of Chief of the General Staff during Turkey’s coup-riddled 20th century had largely been replaced by younger officers by 2016. Many of these officers received their educations abroad or had served on NATO assignments, exposing them to the view that the military should not interfere with domestic politics. Further, many had witnessed the aftermath of the 1980 coup, which resulted in over 600,000 arrests. As a result, the coup failed. Instead of siding with the plotters, the Chief of the General Staff in 2016, Hulusi Akar, sided with Erdogan.
The significance of the coup for Turkey’s democracy, Erickson argued, is that it brought about Turkey’s second republic, which began with the adoption of the presidential system this year. Importantly, the presidential system brought about one of Samuel Huntington’s key elements of a functioning democracy: civilian control over the military. In Erickson’s view, while Turkey’s politics may swing towards authoritarianism in the short term under Erdogan, the establishment of the military as a force used purely for fighting represents a gain that will strengthen Turkey’s democracy in the long term.
In his remarks, Perry cautioned against using American standards to measure the legitimacy of Turkey’s military, and to instead appreciate that Turkey’s establishing civilian control over the military is a huge accomplishment. Perry claimed that Hulusi Akar’s decision to side with Erdogan during the coup reveals that “Turkey does not need coups anymore.” But the Turkish military still has a long way to go before it is viewed as a legitimate institution by all Turks. So long as not all elements of Turkish society feel represented by the Turkish armed forces, some Turks will continue to struggle to see it as a legitimate implementer of Turkish national interests abroad.
Caveat emptor: All of the panelists agreed that the failure of the attempted coup strengthened Turkey’s democracy by paving the way to firmer civilian control of the military. The panelists, however, chose to gloss over the reality that these gains will likely only become visible after Erdogan and his authoritarian agenda leave office.
America last
The general reaction to yesterday’s Helsinki summit between Presidents Putin and Trump was even more dramatic than my own. Here’s a sampling:
- treasonous
- collusion in public
- nauseating
- most embarrassing performance by american president ever seen
- incredibly weak
- a personal and national embarrassment
- beyond disgraceful to dangerous
- most serious mistake of his presidency
- pathetic and weak display of American leadership
Many of those comments are from Republicans. Trump’s indication that he continues to believe Putin’s denials about interference in the 2016 campaign won the most disapproval, though that is something he has said repeatedly in the past. Saying it in front of Putin, and looking admiringly at the Russian president through several slams against the United States, got to people.
I can almost hear the tectonic plates of the world order shifting.
Putin is the big winner out of this summit, as he reasserted Russia’s claim to being a global power equal to the US. He came to the meeting well-prepared but late enough to show Trump who is boss. His people have declared that the summit exceeded all Russian expectations. Trump did nothing to take Putin down a peg or two: on Ukraine they agreed to disagree, on Syria Moscow is dominant, and on many other issues Putin asserted Russia’s claim to being America’s indispensable partner, even though the country has a GNP the size of Spain’s and the moral standing of those little figures you find at the bottom of a Hieronymous Bosch painting, roasting in hell.
The US in the past week has proven itself weak and unreliable as an ally. All Europeans should understand that when Trump says you are a foe, he means it and will try to do you serious harm, in particular on trade. Europe needs to stand up for itself, not only vis-a-vis Russia. The Americans are providing a fabulous opportunity to unify and strengthen the European Union, its military capabilities, and its soft power. Brexit will be a blow–the UK has been an important contributor to EU strength–but Europe will still be the largest economy in the world. Use the position wisely and the Americans will soon be begging for their alliance back.
The Chinese must be chortling. Putin is just an inconvenient and annoying neighbor to them, one that seems unable to produce all the natural gas it promises to export. But Putin has done Beijing a big favor by distracting Washington from the Asia Pacific, where the US should be doing far more to maintain its friends and allies. They are the first line of defense against a rising rival hegemon as well as against North Korea. But Washington is doing nothing to counter China’s South China Sea militarization, it has abandoned the Trans Pacific Partnership, and it has made a hash of the effort to get Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons. China’s claim to restoring its position as the “Middle” Kingdom, that is the central one, is now closer to being realized.
On the home front, Trump has embarrassed Republicans, but they aren’t going to do anything about it. Few are parroting the White House’s talking points about the Summit, and some have even directly criticized the President. But mostly they are staying mum or issuing mild critiques. The Democrats are having a field day, but that won’t matter to Trump. Only a serious rebellion within his own party could cause him to rethink, or maybe better to say think. That isn’t happening yet.
Mueller still has a month or so to indict Americans for their roles in the Russian election hacking. That is the next shoe to drop. Then he needs to hold back for the two months preceding the election, in accordance with Justice Department rules. Then the only effective antidote to Trump’s surrender of American interests to Putin is at the polls in November. We can hope that it is finally dawning on most Americans that this is a president who puts the United States last, not first. The rest of the world already knows.
Stabilizing Iraq and Syria post-ISIS
The National Press Club last Wednesday hosted the Foreign Policy Research Institute‘s launch of the latest issue of their journal, Orbis, entitled “Stabilizing the Fertile Crescent after the Fall of the Caliphate.” The papers aim to analyze the current state of ISIS as well as society in Iraq and Syria, and to assess and recommend possible guidelines and tactics for American action in the region. To accompany the issue’s launch, FPRI invited the following speakers to discuss the topic of stabilization in Syria and Iraq:
Moderator: Samuel Helfont – Assistant Professor, Naval War College, Monterey
Tally Helfont – Director of Program on the Middle East, Foreign Policy Research Institute
Barak Mendelsohn – Associate Professor, Haverford College
Assaf Moghadam – Adjunct Associate Professor, Columbia University
Mendelsohn asserted that to deal with global jihadi movements like al-Qaeda and ISIS we need to more accurately assess the scope of their threat and capacities. The challenge they pose to local and American security is often overblown. Focusing on jihadi terrorist attacks is counter-productive. A single successful terrorist attack can lead to the impression that the jidadis are “winning,” when the situation is often more complex. Terrorism is an instrument for political, not strategic or military objectives. Jihadi movements consistently fail to achieve their political objectives – for instance, setting up a sustainable ISIS caliphate – through terrorism.
Mendelsohn also emphasized the systemic challenges that constrain the threat posed by transnational jihadi movements. National and subnational identities, which are usually of national or ethnic nature, constrain the appeal of transnational movements based on religious identity. It is not sufficient to practice Islam to find religious political leadership appealing. Political as well as religious or social affiliation is needed. As transnational political movements, cross-border logistical coordination is also an issue for jihadi groups. Finally, they are plagued by infighting, further reducing their capacity to operate effectively.
Moghadam agreed with Mendelsohn on the constraining factors jihadi groups face. He hoped, however, that policy-makers would not confuse “jihadism constrained” with “jihadism declining.” While their threat might often be overblown, jihadi groups will not disappear any time soon. Their ideology continues to appeal to some people. Jihadi movements are by nature highly decentralized. Their lack of a “center of gravity” means they cannot be easily eradicated with a precise military attack.
Decentralization also means that jihadi groups’ constituent parts are adaptable and innovative. Key individuals play an oversized role, making jihadi groups capable of reacting to changing environments. In addition, the conditions that gave rise to jihadi groups such as ISIS are still in place. In Syria especially, regions devastated by ISIS will face governance and resource issues for decades to come, providing fertile ground for radical military groups to thrive.
Moghadam concluded by predicting that we will witness a shift in the global jihadi movement from a “bipolar” structure – centered around the poles of ISIS and al-Qaeda – to a “multipolar,” localized structure, with smaller groups gaining influence in a greater number of locations. This will make it harder to fully eradicate the threat of jihadism. When it comes to counter-terrorism, he advocated for a less reactionary stance. Jihadi groups use terrorism to provoke Western governments into over-reacting, thus alienating Muslim communities and reinforcing the appeal of the groups Western states are trying to combat. He called for better cooperation with Muslim communities in Europe and the US.
Tally Helfont focused on what Gulf states can do to counter the influence of jihadi groups in the Middle East. These states are worried about the appeal of transnational jihadism in the Gulf, but are also seeking to counter Iranian influence and fill the vacuum left by American political withdrawal. Gulf states’ counter-terrorism strategy has focused on stopping “men, money, and ideas.” This means increasingly trying to curb the radical messages and influence of local religious leaders as well as stopping financial flows to terrorists from private citizens in the Gulf.
Countering jihadi ideas is especially important, both in education and in mosques. Helfont asserts that Gulf states – particularly Saudi Arabia and UAE – have begun to see the appeal of critical thinking and want to create new generations of citizens who are capable of thinking for themselves and innovating with the best on the international stage.
Caveat emptor: It was hard to decipher useful lessons from the panelists’ statements. While the jihadi threat is often overblown, it is essential for the American government to portray ISIS as a genuine threat to national security to justify continued involvement in Syria and Iraq. A Muslim terrorism group is also a useful foil in electoral campaigns. Doubts should be raised about the capacity of stabilization to succeed without subsequent peace-building and reconstructing projects afterwards. There’s still a lot to consider before we can get a clear idea of how to durably stabilize the Fertile Crescent.