Month: July 2018
No thanks
I have been trying to avoid wasting time commenting on the Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies call for partition of Kosovo in its ill-considered report ironically entitled “West Side Story.” But the partition idea never seems to die. Last week’s “fake news, wishful thinking” is the latest example of the Belgrade press spinning up the idea. And more than one friend has suggested to me in private that there must be something cooking.
The CEAS report is a transparent effort to make the West more palatable to Serbian President Vucic by suggesting NATO might lead an effort to give him northern Kosovo as compensation for normalizing relations with Pristina. It fails not only as a strategic concept but also on the merits.
CEAS proposes “adjustment” of what it considers the administrative boundary with Kosovo to incorporate Northern Mitrovica, Zvecan, Zubin Potok and Leposavic into Serbia, without any exchange for Albanian populated communities in southern Serbia. This comes (and here I have to quote because the assertion makes no sense at all)
…as a consequence of the opinion that neither the West itself nor the UN have managed to clearly determine the exact amount of punishment Serbia should sustain for the crimes of Milosevic’s regime in Kosovo…
So far as the West of which I am a part is concerned, the independence of Kosovo has nothing to do with punishment for Milosevic’s crimes. The proper venue for that was the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, where Milosevic unfortunately died before the expected guilty verdict was delivered.
Serbia after the war with NATO had every opportunity to try to “make unity attractive” (in the Sudanese phrase) to Kosovo Albanians in anticipation of the decision on final status foreseen in UN Security Council resolution 1244. It failed to do anything whatsoever in that direction, and even adopted a new constitution by not counting Kosovo Albanians on the voters rolls, because if they were counted the requirement that 50% of voters come to the polls could not be realized. I won’t pretend Serbia would likely have been successful in convincing Kosovo’s Albanians that they could return safely to Serbian sovereignty. The important fact is that Belgrade after Milosevic never even tried.
After proposing its idea of uncompensated territorial partition, described as one among “small concessions to authorities in Belgrade,” CEAS is still vague about what Kosovo would get in return. It
…could possibly facilitate the process of achieving a comprehensive agreement on the normalization of Serbia’s relations with Kosovo…
It doesn’t get much airier than that, and the subsequent argument against Putin being able to use this “correction” as an argument helping him to justify the annexation of Crimea is unintelligible. The fact is he would use it, just as he has used Kosovo as justification for what he did in the first place.
Later in the report there is mention of a possible “community of Albanian municipalities in southern Serbia.” That’s rich, since Belgrade has not regarded such a community of Serbian municipalities in Kosovo as sufficient for full normalization of relations. Why would Albanians accept something Serbs have found inadequate, especially as it is something they haven’t asked for?
The CEAS report simply ignores the obvious geopolitical risks involved in its partition proposal, claiming they are “low.” It offers no discussion of
- the likelihood that Republika Srpska would try to follow northern Kosovo into Serbia or declare independence,
- the possibility that Albanian nationalists would take the opportunity to try to chase Serbs from south of the Ibar river and thereby create conditions for a greater Kosovo or greater Albania,
- the implications in Georgia for South Ossetia and Abkhazia or in Moldova for Transnistria,
- the consequences for Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk in Ukraine,
I could go further afield to Iraqi Kurdistan and Tibet, but that’s enough to show why NATO would not want to consider the West Side Story proposition as anything but an effort to butter up Vucic. It is a sign of the weakness and desperation of pro-NATO advocates in Serbia that they come up with this poorly thought through proposal. So let me help them out:
Only sovereigns can cede territory. Serbia would have to recognize and establish diplomatic relations with Kosovo before Pristina could negotiate any change in the border. This is something Presidents Vucic and Thaci understand. Pristina would not agree without getting the Albanian communities in southern Serbia in exchange. Any partition, with or without exchange, would put at risk the Serb communities and religious sites south of the Ibar. Those countries that have recognized Kosovo would oppose such an exchange, because of the risk to Serb communities and religious sites as well the irredentist implications for Bosnia, Albania, and Macedonia as well as Russian aggression in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
But we don’t have to go there, because that’s where we already are. West Side Story is shameful effort to enlist NATO in a proposal that would benefit Russia, deprive NATO of cohesion, and reduce the Balkans as well as several countries beyond once again to ethnic nationalist chaos. No thanks.
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Peace Picks July 23 – 29
1. The Unmaking of Jihadism: The Current Effort to Combat Violent Extremism | Monday, July 23, 2018 | 11:00 am – 12:00 pm | CSIS | Register Here
Please join Mitch Silber (former Director of Intelligence Analysis for the New York City Police Department), Jesse Morton (the former leader and co-founder of Revolution Muslim for which he served time in prison), and Seth G. Jones (Harold Brown Chair and Director of the Transnational Threats Project at CSIS), as they discuss the ongoing effort to counter violent extremism in the United States and abroad. The discussion will surround the issues of returning foreign fighters, counter messaging, post-prison re-integration, and other efforts related to countering violent extremism. Jesse Morton and Mitch Silber now co-direct a Virginia-based nonprofit, named Parallel Networks, that focuses on the rehabilitation of radicalized individuals.
2. Verifying North Korean Denuclearization: Where Do We Go from Here? | Monday, July 23, 2018 | 1:30 pm – 4:45 pm | CSIS | Register Here
More than one month after the Singapore Summit, little headway has been made on denuclearization of North Korea. Many attribute the slow progress to disparate definitions of denuclearization on the part of the United States and North Korea. This conference brings together regional and technical experts to take stock of where we are on the four elements of the Singapore Summit and to examine the following questions: Why do the United States and North Korea have different definitions of denuclearization? Is CVID feasible? What are the appropriate standards for a verification protocol for North Korea’s denuclearization? What should be our goals in a denuclearization agreement? What are we willing to sacrifice in return? What does the road ahead look like?
WELCOMING REMARKS
Mr. H. Andrew Schwartz, Chief Communications Officer, CSIS
OPENING REMARKS
Dr. John Hamre, President and CEO, CSIS
SESSION I: Verification Standards for North Korean Denuclearization
Mr. Stephen Pomper, Program Director, United States, International Crisis Group
Ms. Rebecca Hersman, Director, Project on Nuclear Issues and Senior Adviser, International Security Program, CSIS
Mr. Richard Johnson, Senior Director Fuel Cycle and Verification, Nuclear Threat Initiative
Mr. William Tobey, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School of Government
SESSION II: Taking Stock: Where Do We Go from Here?
Mr. David Nakamura, Staff Writer, The Washington Post
Mr. Christopher Green, Senior Adviser, Korean Peninsula, International Crisis Group
General (Ret.) Walter “Skip” Sharp, Former Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea
Dr. Sue Mi Terry, Senior Fellow, Korea Chair, CSIS
3. What to Expect from Pakistan’s Election? | Tuesday, July 24, 2018 | 10:30 am – 12:30 pm | The Wilson Center | Register Here
On July 25, Pakistan will hold an election that will constitute the country’s second consecutive peaceful transfer of power. The incumbent Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz party, hit by corruption charges that have resulted in a 10-year jail sentence for former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, will try to fend off several opponents. They are led by the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf party, headed by cricket star-turned-politician Imran Khan. What might recent Pakistani political developments—including Sharif’s sentencing, dozens of parliamentarians changing their political affiliations, and the emergence of several new religious political parties—portend for the election outcome? What role, if any, might Pakistan’s powerful military be playing in the election? What implications might the election’s possible outcomes have for the United States? This event will address these questions and more.
Speakers:
Mariam Mufti, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Waterloo (Canada)
Sahar Khan, Visiting Research Fellow, CATO Institute
Tamanna Salikuddin, Senior Expert, U.S. Institute of Peace, and Former Pakistan and Afghanistan Director, U.S. National Security Council
4. The Military-Industrial Component of the U.S.-India Partnership | Tuesday, July 24, 2018 | 12:15 pm – 2:00 pm | The Stimson Center | Register Here
Please join the Stimson South Asia program for a conversation with Air Marshal M. Matheswaran, the former Deputy Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff in the Indian Ministry of Defence, who will talk about the military-industrial component of the U.S.-India partnership. Joanna Spear, Associate Professor of International Affairs at the Elliott School, and Benjamin Schwartz, Head of the Aerospace and Defense Program at the U.S.-India Business Council, will serve as discussants. Sameer Lalwani of the Stimson Center will moderate.
5. Eighth Annual South China Sea Conference | Thursday, July 26, 2018 | 9:00 am – 4:45 pm | CSIS | Register Here
This full-day conference will provide opportunities for in-depth discussion and analysis of developments in the South China Sea over the past year and potential paths forward. The event will feature speakers from throughout the region, including claimant countries. Panels will address recent developments, legal and environmental issues, the strategic balance, and U.S. policy.
9:00 am: Morning Keynote
Representative Ted Yoho, Chair, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific Committee on Foreign Affairs
United States House of Representatives
9:45 am: Panel: State of Play in the South China Sea over the Past Year
Bill Hayton, Associate Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme
Chatham House
Colin Willett, Asia Section Research Manager
Congressional Research Service
Sumathy Permal, Fellow and Head of Centre for Straits of Malacca
Maritime Institute of Malaysia
Feng Zhang, Fellow, Department of International Relations
ANU College of Asia and the Pacific
Moderator:
Amy Searight, Senior Adviser and Director, Southeast Asia Program
Center for Strategic and International Studies
11:15 am: Panel: Dispute Resolution in the South China Sea and Beyond
Commodore Lalit Kapur (Retired), Senior Fellow
Delhi Policy Group
Charles I-hsin Chen, Visiting Senior Fellow
Institute for Taiwan-America Studies
Bec Strating, Lecturer
La Trobe University
Thanh Hai Do, Senior Fellow
Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam
Moderator:
Gregory Poling, Director, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative; and Fellow, Southeast Asia Program
Center for Strategic and International Studies
12:30 pm: Lunch Served
1:15 pm: Lunch Keynote
The Honorable Randall G. Schriver, Assistant Secretary for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs
United States Department of Defense
2:00 pm: Panel: Environmental Issues in the South China Sea
Vo Si Tuan, Senior Scientist
Institute of Oceanography, Nha Trang
Carmen Ablan Lagman, Professor
De La Salle University
Rashid Sumaila, Director, Fisheries Economics Research Unit
University of British Columbia
Moderator:
Brian Harding, Deputy Director and Fellow, Southeast Asia Program
Center for Strategic and International Studies
3:30 pm: Panel: The Military Balance in the South China Sea
Collin Koh Swee Lean, Research Fellow, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Nanyang Technological University
Hideshi Tokuchi, Distinguished Non-Resident Fellow
Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA
Richard Heydarian, Fellow
ADR-Stratbase Institute
Bonnie Glaser, Senior Advisor and Director, China Power Project
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Moderator:
Andrew Shearer, Senior Adviser on Asia Pacific Security and Director, Alliances and American Leadership Project
Center for Strategic and International Studies
6. Identifying – and Isolating – Jihadi-Salafists through their Ideology, Practices, and Methodology | Thursday, July 26, 2018 | 12:00 pm – 1:00 pm | The Heritage Foundation | Register Here
In order to win the war against the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, the United States must understand the enemy. Yet the problem of knowing the enemy has never been more acute, and the lack of consensus around this issue has never been more debilitating, for American foreign policy.
Without a clear vision of who the U.S. is fighting, the government and military will not be able to distinguish ordinary Muslims from the extraordinary extremists, will be incapable of devising effective strategies for military and political efforts, and will not know which allies can be safe partners and which need to be avoided for being too close to the extremists. While there are many reasons for a lack of understanding the enemy, one of the most important is a deep disagreement about the role that Islam plays in motivating al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.
This event will explore the notion that while a marginal version of Islam is the driver of extremism, it is possible to distinguish the jihadi-salafists from the majority of Muslims. A close examination of the jihadi- salafists’ belief system and methodologies will help the U.S. and allied governments formulate strategies to stop their spread.
Speakers:
Dr. Mary Habeck, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Georgetown University, and American University
Zainab Al-Suwaij, Executive Director, American Islamic Congress
Moderator:
Robin Simcox, Margaret Thatcher Fellow, The Heritage Foundation
7. Faith and Fragile States: Political Stability and Religious Freedom | Friday, July 27, 2018 | 11:00 am – 2:30 pm | USIP | Register Here
Religion influences both peace and conflict worldwide. Violent extremism is often framed in religious terms, and religious discrimination continues to increase as both a driver and symptom of conflict. But, religion drives peace and coexistence as well and religious actors are essential for advancing religious freedom. Efforts to engage religious actors in countering violent extremism (CVE) and interfaith peacebuilding must take this dichotomy into account. Join the International Republican Institute, Search for Common Ground, and the U.S. Institute of Peace on July 27 for two panel discussions that explore the nexus of international religious freedom, CVE, and interfaith peacebuilding.
Opening Remarks
Rep. Frank Wolf (R-VA), Former U.S. Representative from Virginia
Tony Garrastazu, Senior Director, Center for Global Impact, International Republican Institute
Panel 1: Religious Engagement in CVE
Shaykh Abdallah Bin Bayyah, President, Forum for Promoting Peace in Muslim Societies
Humera Khan, President, Muflehun
Moderator: Nancy Lindborg, President, U.S. Institute of Peace
Panel 2: Interfaith Peacebuilding
Cardinal Onaiyekan, Catholic Archbishop of Abuja, Nigeria
Mike Jobbins, Senior Director of Partnerships and Engagements, Search for Common Ground
Susan Hayward, Senior Advisor, Religion and Inclusive Societies, U.S. Institute of Peace
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What an embarrassment!
Israel’s new “basic” law shifts the country away from the liberal democratic ideals (as in “all men are created equal) of its mostly secular and Socialist Zionist founders. Instead, Israel is now an ethnic state, the homeland of the Jewish people committed mainly to their welfare and only secondarily to the welfare of the 20% or so of the country’s population that is not Jewish. The symbols of the state include not only the Star of David flag, a 19th century invention intended to be entirely secular, but also the seven-branch menorah looted from the second Temple by the Romans, an explicitly religious symbol. Arabic is no longer an official language and segregated all-Jewish communities will be encouraged. On top of the move of the US embassy to Jerusalem, this legislation deepens the already deep chasm between Israel and its Arab citizens.
This is inconsistent with the Five Books of Moses (Torah), whose most frequent injunction is to treat the stranger who lives among you the way you treat your own. It is inconsistent with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and I don’t know how many other conventions Israel has signed. It is inconsistent with Israel’s security, which requires that its Arab citizens feel they have a stake in the state and do not turn in the direction of extremists.
But I don’t expect any of those arguments to win the day with those who rejoice at this awful legislation. Maybe though they will think twice if they consider what academic scholarship tells us about states that exclude part of their population.
The evidence is strong: they tend to fail. This is partly for economic reasons: essential ingredients ingredients for prosperity include accountability and responsiveness to all a state’s citizens, and their willing participation in an integrated economy. But it is partly also for political reasons: states that build inclusive civil society, avoid language segregation, and provide public goods to citizens regardless of ethnicity do better. Inclusion is the key to cohesion in states that emerge from civil war (which Israel did, 1948). Social capital is vital to peaceful, successful states.
External factors can also be important. It is going to be much harder for Israel’s Sunni Arab neighbors to deal cooperatively with an explicitly Jewish state than with a civil one that treats its Arab citizens as equals. Palestinians both inside Israel and in the West Bank and Gaza could be a vital link with the Arab world, but only if they are treated equally. It is also going to be much harder for Israel to find support in the US, where most people who identify as Jews are secular and liberal.
Prime Minister Netanyahu has led Israel in an ethnic nationalist direction that gratifies his more religious supporters and coalition partners, but it cannot be healthy in the long term. Even in the short term it leads in awful directions. Witness the spectacle of his embracing would be Hungarian autocrat and anti-Semite Viktor Orban. What an embarrassment!
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Montenegro is not alone
I did this interview on Montenegro yesterday for Ian Masters of KPFK (Los Angeles):
The main point is not only about Montenegro but also about the Article 5 mutual defense guarantee: Trump has made it doubtful not only for Podgorica, but for all the other allies as well.
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Fake news, wishful thinking
That’s the best response to the report that US Ambassador to Kosovo Delawie has opened the door to partition of Kosovo. Here is the text of the original interview with Adriatik Kelmendi, whose relevant section reads this way:
AK: We discussed in the previous interview with you, there are many ideas going around about how the final solution of the agreement would look like between Kosovo and Serbia and many are saying that maybe some exchange of territories or partition of Kosovo can again come into the table. What is the U.S. stance on it?
AMB: I’m not going to get at what could be the elements of a deal, of an agreement, at this point. I don’t think that is really helpful. Especially when I’m trying to encourage people in Kosovo to take on that responsibility and participate in the discussion. So I’m not going to say who I think should be in the room, I’m not going to talk about the shape of the table, I’m not going to talk about what should be the elements of the final agreement. I can say that Kosovo politicians, Kosovo citizens, are fully capable of making these decisions on the negotiating positions themselves, and the United States will be standing by them as they talk about these things. Our support for Kosovo is consistent, it’s unalterable, it will continue into the future. I think those are the elements of what a deal might look like, are elements that are more appropriately discussed by people in Kosovo.
AK: It’s been almost three years since you arrived in Kosovo, did you notice any change of U.S. policy towards Kosovo and the Balkans in these last three years, from the beginning up till now while we are talking?
AMB: People react as things change, there was this terrific deal between Macedonia and Greece, so our position changes when things change. We celebrate good news like that. So regarding U.S. support for Kosovo, I sense no change. Our commitment to Kosovo has been bipartisan, it has continued since the 90’s. I have no hints from the new administration of any change in that position.
AK: I note, up till now the U.S. policy towards Kosovo was Kosovo was independent, Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is the one that should be respected by all sides, partition is never to be discussed, so now are you hesitant to say that, to repeat this again?
AMB: First of all, Americans support for Kosovo’s independence is unshakable and will continue. The other questions you ask relate to the elements of a final deal and I’m still not going to get at those right now for the reasons I’ve already mentioned.
AK: But you exclude partition, or you do not exclude that?
AMB: I am saying that I’m not going to talk about what an element of the final deal will be, I’m not going to talk about who I think should be leading this discussion in Brussels, and I’m not going to talk about ancillary details like what room it should be in or the shape of the table. Especially I think we are getting ahead of the discussion that really needs to take place here, and needs to have more participation from Kosovo’s political parties. Everybody needs to get in the game to talk about these things.
AK: Does this mean that for the U.S. administration every deal that can be reached between Kosovo and Serbia will be okay with America?
AMB: I’m still not going to answer that question, I’m sorry, you are very creative in asking several different ways. But it’s still the same question. I don’t want to bore the audience and I’m not going to get at the elements of the deal today.
AK: But you answered these kinds of questions before. Something has changed.
AMB: Today, this week, I’m focused on encouraging Kosovo political parties, Kosovo politicians, to try to get together and work on what are Kosovo’s goals. I think we are getting ahead of things if we talk about what’s going to happen at the end of the game. Kosovo needs to figure out what its goals are, it needs to try to achieve some kind of consensus on those goals, and that is what I am focusing on right now.
AK: There should not be redlines?
AMB: I don’t think it’s really helpful for me to talk too much about redlines, it’s up to Kosovo to figure out what its goals are. I think Kosovo is facing a unique moment in its history when it can help determine what the future is going to be for Kosovo, for Kosovo’s children, and to put aside the nervousness, the tension, the controversy that has characterized the relationship between Kosovo and Serbia these last several years. I think it’s important to focus on how to make the future better for all of Kosovo’s citizens, for Serbia’s citizens as well, and to find out a way to get to this normalization that we’ve been working on for a long time.
I might have wished, with the infinite wisdom of hindsight, that he had handled the partition issue differently by saying that the US continues to support the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Kosovo, but Greg was clearly in this interview trying to stay our of the substance. He didn’t discuss partition at all. His main purpose was to encourage broader participation of Kosovo’s political forces in the process. He said unequivocally there is no change of US policy. For people in Belgrade to say there is, based on this interview, is wrong.
Kosovo Prime Minister Haradinaj quickly rejected the idea of exchange of territory with Serbia:
Division means war for me, and I say that without hesitation. It’s risky to speak about the partition…there is no victory, exchange of territory, or changes the borders. That’s dangerous and something we should not try to do in these circumstances.
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The elephant in the room
Tuesday, Carl Gershman (President, National Endowment for Democracy (NED)), Andrew Wilson (Executive Director, Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE)), Daniel Twining (President, International Republican Institute (IRI)), Kenneth Wollack (President, National Democratic Institute (NDI)), and Shawna Bader-Blau (Executive Director, Solidarity Center) convened at CSIS to discuss “Promoting Democracy in Challenging Times.” Daniel Runde (Senior Vice President; William A. Schreyer Chair and Director, Project on Prosperity and Development, CSIS) moderated the panel.
In recent years, the world has experienced a democratic recession. Civil societies have suffered amidst authoritarian resurgences in countries that previously displayed shifts towards democracy. Established democracies have also endured setbacks amidst populist groundswells that enabled the rise of authoritarian-friendly leaders like Trump. From the outset, Runde made it clear that Trump’s recent cozying up to totalitarian leaders would not feature prominently in the discussion, imploring the panelists to “tell him something they are optimistic about” in their democracy promotion work.
With this in mind, Gershman opened by pointing out that NED was founded in the midst of Huntington’s third wave of democratization in the 1980’s. In this sense, the democratic backsliding of the last 12 years should be seen less as a permanent phenomenon and more as a temporary setback. Despite this challenging environment for democracy promotion, however, Gershman highlighted that NED enjoys unprecedented bipartisan congressional support. Abroad, recent democratic gains in The Gambia, Colombia, Malaysia, Armenia, and Tunisia reveal that democracy remains an appealing option worldwide. Gershman reminded the audience to never underestimate the power of the people, pointing to the January protests in Iran as evidence that citizens there are tired of their country’s “failed system.”
Bader-Blau said her organization’s efforts to stand in solidarity with workers around the world recently convinced the ILO to enshrine freedom from harassment at work as a human right. The Solidarity Center’s efforts have also led to the unionization of 200,000 garment workers in Bangladesh. Wilson highlighted CIPE’s recent progress in Bangladesh. The creation of the Bangladesh Women’s Chamber of Commerce with CIPE’s help allowed 10,000 women in that country to receive loans to start or expand their businesses. CIPE’s work has also encouraged international corporations to look beyond profits and place more importance on their role in society, particularly in the developing world.
For Twining, a major source of optimism lies in IRI’s work to strengthen governments in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the Balkans. Beyond addressing the institutional vacuums that foment violent extremism, Twining revealed that this work also strengthens societies to prevent destabilizing refugee flows from occurring. Twining also emphasized IRI’s positive influence in Europe, where its efforts to expose foreign influence in domestic politics are helping to curb Russian disinformation campaigns in the region.
Wollack also chose to focus on the Middle East, highlighting positive developments in Jordan, Morocco, Lebanon, and Tunisia. For him, reforms among these Middle Eastern “liberalizers, reformers, and transformers” continually prove that they can handle economic and political problems better than autocrats. Another source of optimism is the fact that NED and its affiliates exist today, in contrast to 35 years ago, when no funds for democracy promotion existed in OECD countries.
The five panelists agreed that the work of democracy promotion matters because people, if given a realistic choice, will choose this system of government because they want to be free. After all, this is the premise upon which the NED and its four affiliates were founded during the Cold War. However, what happens when that choice is eroding in the United States, the country historically seen as the beacon of democracy?
The erosion of democratic norms in America has turned what Gershman described as a recession into a democratic crisis that severely erodes the credibility of the NED family of organizations abroad. President Trump counters and corrupts the efforts of NED and its affiliates every day, both outside and inside the United States. IRI’s efforts to counter Russian disinformation campaigns are undermined when the president attacks the free press. Things could get worse if Putin begins using force to pick off countries at the periphery of NATO with the confidence that mutual defense has become obsolete. Further, Trump’s performance in Helsinki raises the question of whether the US president has been co-opted by the very country that threatens these nations.
Wollack revealed that NDI was founded based on the principle that “if democratic politics fail, the entire democratic system is put in jeopardy.” This rings true today, though in a way that NDI’s founders would probably never have imagined. The democratic system’s legitimacy is threatened by our president, the elephant in the room. The NED organizations do not have the authority to act here at home, but an intervention is badly needed. Let’s hope that it comes through the power of the people this November.
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