Day: August 12, 2018
Peace picks – August 13 – 19
1. Discussion – Indian Railways and coal: An unsustainable interdependency | Monday, August 13, 2018 | 3:30 pm – 5:00 pm | Brookings Institution | Register Here
Coal is a key part of the equilibrium of Indian Railways since passenger fares don’t cover all the costs. Unfortunately, this equilibrium is at risk. Already the average distance of coal travelled has fallen 30 per cent in five years. Raising coal freight fares disproportionately compared to its distance and volume has led to higher cost of coal delivered and therefore to higher electricity costs for consumers – by approximately 10 paise/kWh across India. This is unsustainable.
Even more worryingly for the equilibrium is the rise of renewable energy and improved efficiency of power plants – these will lead to historical growth of coal transport coming down measurably. Indian Railways business model of “overcharging” coal while keeping passenger fares low could lead to coal (and thus thermal electricity) becoming uncompetitive.
This is a public event. RSVP pkamboj@brookingsindia.org to attend.
Speakers:
Moderator: Rahul Tongia – Fellow, Brookings India
Rakesh Mohan – Distinguished Fellow, Brookings India; former Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India; and formerly Chairman, National Transport Development Policy Committee
Vivek Sahai – Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation; and former Chairman, Railway Board
Girish Pillai – Member (Traffic), Railway Board
2. Iran: Protests, Sanctions, and Regime Viability | Wednesday, August 15, 2018 | 12:00 pm – 1:30 pm | Hudson Institute | Register Here
On August 6, President Trump officially snapped back sanctions on Iran as part of his “Maximum Pressure” campaign on the country. This is the second concrete step taken by the administration this year, following their formal withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in May. The restored sanctions prohibit transactions by countries and private entities involving everything from dollar notes and gold to commercial aircraft. The decision to reimpose these sanctions has drawn opposition from Iran and U.S. allies alike.
Given recent protests in the country over economic woes and ineffective government, the sanctions come at a particularly challenging time for Iran. What remains to be seen is whether new economic pressure will prompt Iran to revive its nuclear ambitions or pressure Tehran into renegotiating a nuclear accord.
On August 15, Hudson Institute will host a panel to discuss Iran, the effectiveness of the U.S. “Maximum Pressure” campaign, the regime’s ability to navigate sanctions, and the country’s widening protests. Panelists will include Michael Pregent, Hudson Institute senior fellow; Alireza Nader, an independent Iran scholar; Behnam Ben Taleblu, a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies; and Mariam Memarsadeghi, co-founder and co-director of Tavaana.
3. Brazil’s Election Takes Shape | Thursday, August 16, 2018 | 10:00 am – 10:45 am | Atlantic Council | Register Here
Note: Conference call dial-in information will be sent to participants two days prior to the event.
Latin America’s largest democracy officially kicks off one of its most consequential presidential contests on August 16. Over 14 candidates are vying for the presidency, with five standouts. How might the campaign take shape in the lead-up to the first round on October 7?
Join us via conference call on the day that the campaign officially begins—Thursday, August 16—for a conversation from 10:00 to 10:45 a.m. EDT, in partnership with the Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI), on what to look for during the campaign and how Brazil’s next president may tackle some of the key issues necessary for Brazil to enter a new era of growth and stability.
For a preview of our conversation, keep an eye out for Ricardo Sennes’ Spotlight publication, to be launched on August 9, where he dissects the potential implications of political and economic reform, foreign direct investment, and security policies laid out by Jair Bolsonaro, Marina Silva, Ciro Gomes, Geraldo Alckmin, and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva as the PT nominee.
Speakers:
Roberta Braga – Associate Director, Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, Atlantic Council
Ricardo Sennes – Nonresident Senior Brazil Fellow, Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, Atlantic Council; Co-Founder, Prospectiva Consulting
Roberto Teixeira da Costa – Member, Board of Trustees, Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Henrique Rzezinski – Member, Board of Trustees, Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
4. Turkey Sanctions – Navigating a Historic Bilateral Crisis | Thursday, August 16, 2018 | 12:00 pm – 2:00 pm | The Washington Institute for Near East Policy | Register Here
Earlier this month, the Trump administration issued sanctions against Turkey for its continued detention of American pastor Andrew Brunson. Ties between the two governments have been under strain for years, but the latest incident has seemingly touched off the most severe crisis in recent memory, including a plunge in Turkish economic indicators. As the historic dispute unfolds, what are the future prospects and pitfalls for the bilateral relationship?
To discuss these issues, The Washington Institute is pleased to host a Policy Forum with Amanda Sloat, Max Hoffman, and Steven Cook, moderated by Institute senior fellow Soner Cagaptay.
Amanda Sloat is a Robert Bosch Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Center on the United States and Europe. Previously, she served as deputy assistant secretary for Southern Europe and Eastern Mediterranean affairs at the State Department.
Max Hoffman is the associate director of national security and international policy at the Center for American Progress, focusing on Turkey, the Kurdish regions, and U.S. defense policy, among other issues.
Steven Cook is the Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. An expert on Turkish politics, he has appeared in numerous international media outlets, including as a columnist with Foreign Policy magazine.
This event will be held at The Washington Institute, 1111 19th Street NW, Suite 500, Washington, DC, 20036. It will also be broadcast live on our website.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Trump’s Turkey shoot
After weeks of silence and inaction on the issue of Syria, President Trump has finally done something that will affect the outcome of the Syrian civil war. The influence will not be positive.
Using his favorite policy platform – Twitter – Trump announced Friday that as the Turkish Lira “slides rapidly downward against our very strong Dollar,” the United States will increase tariffs on Turkish steel and aluminum. As the New York Times reports, his 50 percent tariff on steel will “effectively [price] Turkish steel out of the American market, which [accounts] for 13 percent of Turkey’s steel exports.”
The run on the Lira, which has been brewing for the past few weeks, is now fully in gear. The self-fulfilling prophecy of foreign-exchange traders selling the Lira before it further loses value, hence depreciating the currency, is in full force. Investors are instead rushing to short the Lira, amplifying the detrimental effect on its value. President Trump boasting about how “strong” the dollar is – which, seeing how uncompetitive American exports are as a result, is not a good thing – does not help.
What does this mean for the countries around Turkey? In the past twenty years, through their “zero-problems” foreign policy and aim for broader strategic influence in the Middle East, Turkey has been increasing its exports to Arab states. Turkish trade with the Middle East and the Gulf increased by 22.1 percent in 2017 alone. As the Lira continues to plummet and Erdoğan continues to shake confidence in the independence of Turkey’s Central Bank, Turkey’s economic strife will have repercussions across the region. It might even cause a domino effect by rattling investor confidence in other economically struggling countries in the region, such as Jordan.
The issue here is what Turkey’s economic troubles, and President Trump’s decision to pile on at the worst possible time, mean for the conflict in Syria. This is particularly salient in the Northern region of Idlib. After Russia and the Syrian government “liberated” the south of Syria of opposition fighters in June and July, Idlib is the last region in Syria with an active Arab military opposition to Assad – IS pockets of influence in the south and the east notwithstanding. During regime attacks on rebel strongholds in Homs in 2014-15, Aleppo in 2016, and Eastern Ghouta and Deraa in 2018, many opposition militias struck deals with the Syrian regime for safe passage to Idlib in exchange for their surrender. The same goes for a significant number of internally displaced persons, who fled regime-held areas and headed for Idlib in the hopes of protection from Assad or the opportunity to leave Syria for Turkey.
The result is that the Idlib region is currently home to more than 2.5 million people, up from 750,000 before the beginning of the war. Idlib is also home to a number of Turkey-sponsored political and military groups, as Turkey hopes to maintain Idlib as a zone of influence for the foreseeable future; it has already spent considerable sums of money in reconstruction efforts, in the hopes that it can return Syrian refugees currently in Turkey to Idlib – despite the fact that most of them are not from Idlib. As the last remaining rebel stronghold, Idlib is also the next military target for the Syrian government
Speculation abounds that the only thing stopping Assad from launching his offensive on Idlib is Russian calls for restraint, as well as a Turkish “red line” warning the Syrian government not to invade Idlib. This is where Turkey’s economic woes become important, particularly as they can be attributed to American actions.
Trump’s tweet will only increase animosity between the US and an economically desperate Turkey. As a result, Turkey is likely to accelerate its turn towards economic cooperation with Russia, with whom they signed a gas pipeline deal in July. Economic cooperation, however, comes with strings attached, and it is likely that Russia will use its greater economic leverage to defuse the chances of a Syrian-Turkish conflict. This would result in Turkish withdrawal from Idlib, and – as Middle East Institute scholar Charles Lister details – a military and humanitarian crisis on a scale unlike anything seen in the Syrian civil war so far should Assad attack the overcrowded region of Idlib.
There is much to criticize about Turkey’s role in Syria. They have sponsored salafist and jihadist groups, encouraged ethnic conflict between the Arabs and the Kurds in the north, and impeded American efforts to liberate eastern Syria from IS by attacking the Kurds in Efrin in January. Trump’s administration, however, is not attempting to influence Turkey’s behavior in Syria in a positive manner, or even to punish Turkey for their actions in Syria. Instead, Trump is kicking Turkey while it is down, meaning that Trump’s first active contribution to the conflict in Syria is somehow worse than America’s inaction in the past few months. As usual, it will be the Syrian population that suffers the most.
RSS - Posts
