Month: August 2018
Trump’s Turkey shoot
After weeks of silence and inaction on the issue of Syria, President Trump has finally done something that will affect the outcome of the Syrian civil war. The influence will not be positive.
Using his favorite policy platform – Twitter – Trump announced Friday that as the Turkish Lira “slides rapidly downward against our very strong Dollar,” the United States will increase tariffs on Turkish steel and aluminum. As the New York Times reports, his 50 percent tariff on steel will “effectively [price] Turkish steel out of the American market, which [accounts] for 13 percent of Turkey’s steel exports.”
The run on the Lira, which has been brewing for the past few weeks, is now fully in gear. The self-fulfilling prophecy of foreign-exchange traders selling the Lira before it further loses value, hence depreciating the currency, is in full force. Investors are instead rushing to short the Lira, amplifying the detrimental effect on its value. President Trump boasting about how “strong” the dollar is – which, seeing how uncompetitive American exports are as a result, is not a good thing – does not help.
What does this mean for the countries around Turkey? In the past twenty years, through their “zero-problems” foreign policy and aim for broader strategic influence in the Middle East, Turkey has been increasing its exports to Arab states. Turkish trade with the Middle East and the Gulf increased by 22.1 percent in 2017 alone. As the Lira continues to plummet and Erdoğan continues to shake confidence in the independence of Turkey’s Central Bank, Turkey’s economic strife will have repercussions across the region. It might even cause a domino effect by rattling investor confidence in other economically struggling countries in the region, such as Jordan.
The issue here is what Turkey’s economic troubles, and President Trump’s decision to pile on at the worst possible time, mean for the conflict in Syria. This is particularly salient in the Northern region of Idlib. After Russia and the Syrian government “liberated” the south of Syria of opposition fighters in June and July, Idlib is the last region in Syria with an active Arab military opposition to Assad – IS pockets of influence in the south and the east notwithstanding. During regime attacks on rebel strongholds in Homs in 2014-15, Aleppo in 2016, and Eastern Ghouta and Deraa in 2018, many opposition militias struck deals with the Syrian regime for safe passage to Idlib in exchange for their surrender. The same goes for a significant number of internally displaced persons, who fled regime-held areas and headed for Idlib in the hopes of protection from Assad or the opportunity to leave Syria for Turkey.
The result is that the Idlib region is currently home to more than 2.5 million people, up from 750,000 before the beginning of the war. Idlib is also home to a number of Turkey-sponsored political and military groups, as Turkey hopes to maintain Idlib as a zone of influence for the foreseeable future; it has already spent considerable sums of money in reconstruction efforts, in the hopes that it can return Syrian refugees currently in Turkey to Idlib – despite the fact that most of them are not from Idlib. As the last remaining rebel stronghold, Idlib is also the next military target for the Syrian government
Speculation abounds that the only thing stopping Assad from launching his offensive on Idlib is Russian calls for restraint, as well as a Turkish “red line” warning the Syrian government not to invade Idlib. This is where Turkey’s economic woes become important, particularly as they can be attributed to American actions.
Trump’s tweet will only increase animosity between the US and an economically desperate Turkey. As a result, Turkey is likely to accelerate its turn towards economic cooperation with Russia, with whom they signed a gas pipeline deal in July. Economic cooperation, however, comes with strings attached, and it is likely that Russia will use its greater economic leverage to defuse the chances of a Syrian-Turkish conflict. This would result in Turkish withdrawal from Idlib, and – as Middle East Institute scholar Charles Lister details – a military and humanitarian crisis on a scale unlike anything seen in the Syrian civil war so far should Assad attack the overcrowded region of Idlib.
There is much to criticize about Turkey’s role in Syria. They have sponsored salafist and jihadist groups, encouraged ethnic conflict between the Arabs and the Kurds in the north, and impeded American efforts to liberate eastern Syria from IS by attacking the Kurds in Efrin in January. Trump’s administration, however, is not attempting to influence Turkey’s behavior in Syria in a positive manner, or even to punish Turkey for their actions in Syria. Instead, Trump is kicking Turkey while it is down, meaning that Trump’s first active contribution to the conflict in Syria is somehow worse than America’s inaction in the past few months. As usual, it will be the Syrian population that suffers the most.
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Dear Ms Mogherini,
To my delight, civil society organizations from Serbia and Kosovo (I count 38 of them) are protesting any division of Kosovo in a joint letter to EU High Representative Federica Mogherini:
Dear Ms Mogherini,
Civil society organizations from Serbia and Kosovo are urging you to make an unambiguous statement against the division of Kosovo or the exchange of territories between Kosovo and Serbia on an ethnic principle. More frequent mentions of the possibility of redrawing the borders send a very dangerous message to the citizens of Serbia and Kosovo, as well as to the entire region, that there is a real possibility of legitimizing a dangerous propaganda of ethnic ownership over the territory – a principle that has pushed the region on several occasions into bloody conflicts.
Such developments would inevitably produce a chain reaction in other Balkan states and lead to numerous requests for changes in the borders in the Balkans, which opens the door to new conflicts. Also, this would send a message to most Serbs in Kosovo living south of the Ibar that they should move to “their” ethnic state, which could lead to another exodus of the population in the Balkans.
Civil society organizations have been trying for decades to improve contacts and cooperation between the two communities, primarily looking at the welfare of people living in Serbia and Kosovo and the future of the entire region. It is necessary to establish a lasting peace in the region and to accept interculturality and multi-ethnicity as a prerequisite for development. The ethnically clean countries, the outdated 19th-century model, must not be the goals of any policy, nor should they be tolerated and supported by representatives of the international community.
You, like other representatives of the international community, have a special responsibility to prevent this issue from reaching the agenda of the negotiations. All mediators, in particular the European Union and the United States, are obliged to abide by the rules established by the Badinter Commission in 1991. Those rules that recognize the boundaries of the constituent elements of the former federation and deny the ethnic principle of division must extend to Kosovo as a special case in the process of the dissolution of the SFRY.
Civil society organizations invite all actors, domestic and international, to actively oppose attempts to introduce the ethnic principle as the supreme in the building of states in the Balkans. Any state that is based on discrimination and divides citizens on any ground is pre-sentenced to failure. A society that develops on values opposed to respect for basic human rights is condemned to nationalism, isolation, and hopelessness. More and more young people are already leaving our countries, and the territories for which national and political elites are battling today will struggle without the driving democratic forces.
Civil society organizations invite the international community, but above all the authorities in Serbia and Kosovo to devote themselves to the creation of the best possible living conditions for all inhabitants of Kosovo (including the freedom of movement, business and international cooperation) during the negotiations, ensuring that the crimes from the past never happen again (including finding the missing persons as a primary task for both countries) and creating conditions for the development of legal and democratic government systems in Kosovo and Serbia. Only such negotiations are a guarantee for a safe and dignified life for all people, regardless of national or any other differences.
Centar za praktičnu politiku
Građanske inicijative
Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava
YUCOM
Beogradski centar za ljudska prava
Fond za humanitarno pravo
Inicijativa mladih za ljudska prava
Sandžački odbor za ljudska prava
Kulturni centar Damad
Urban In
Akademska inicijativa Forum 10
Centar za nove medije Liber
Centar modernih veština
Dijalog Valjevo
Generator Vranje
Udruženje žena Peščanik
UG Za zdravu opštinu Stara Pazova
Centar za ljudska prava Niš
Centar za kulturnu dekontaminaciju
Integra Pristina
Syri i Visionit
Youth Initiative for Human Rights – Kosovo
GAIA Kosovo
NVO Aktiv
Let’s Do It Peja
CRDP
STIKK
IKS
Kosovo Association Chopin
Lumbardhi Foundation
Centre for Social Groups Development– CSGD
CDF
Trentino con il Kossovo
Kosovo Women’s Network
Kosova Democratic Institute
X40-bunarfest
Numismatic association “Demastion”
Disability Development Centre
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Three* months hence
The main conclusion to be drawn so far from the current trial of Trump campaign chair Paul Manafort is just this: the President of the United States has extraordinarily poor judgment about the people he surrounds himself with. Manafort defrauded banks, failed to report income and foreign accounts to the IRS, and accepted a lot of money from a Putin-linked oligarch.
Manafort’s sidekick Rick Gates, who worked for Trump throughout the campaign and until the Inauguration, has confessed to helping the illegal shenanigans as well as embezzling money from Manafort by means of fraudulent expense claims. Both men have the unenviable distinction of having worked for Viktor Yanukovych, the pro-Russian former president of Ukraine, whose corrupt behavior is legendary.
I admit that anyone can be victim of fraud. I suffered such an instance once in my career, when an employee took a kickback in connection with renting an office. He was caught, charged, and plea-bargained. But Trump’s record is incredible: he has lost at least half a dozen more or less cabinet-level officials to scandals, not counting firings of people he regarded as disloyal, like Sally Yates and James Comey. The list of offenses by Trump Administration officials would be far too long to enumerate, but it includes blatant abuse of government funds and employees, in addition to wife and alcohol abuse.
This is not bad luck. It is the result low moral standards at the top, combined with failure to properly vet appointees. More than one has been dropped before even assuming the posts for which they were already named. This does not happen to everyone. It happens to bosses who themselves display abusive behavior and tolerate it in those close to them. In my view, the President himself is fleecing taxpayers by frequenting his own golf clubs with a large entourage and encouraging use of his hotels by foreign governments. I have little doubt but that we will eventually learn of illicit expenditures and abuse of employees for private purposes, as Trump makes no distinction between his personal and official activities.
Nor does he show any compunction about marital infidelity, which no longer seems to offend anyone. Do we really think he has stopped courting porn stars?
All the misbehavior by and surrounding the president opens him and his minions not just to accusations of abuse but also to blackmail. The Russians have demonstrated how capable they are of gathering data from US institutions. They and the Chinese no doubt know all about malfeasance in the Trump Administration and will be using it already to intimidate officials into doing their bidding. Trump’s poor judgment thus creates multiple national security vulnerabilities. American intelligence collection capabilities will guarantee that the Chinese and Russians are not the only ones who are in the know. Our own intel will show up traces of whatever the foreigners discover.
That I suppose is the silver lining. Trump can’t hope to hide malfeasance forever. He has now admitted that his son’s meeting with Russian operatives was intended to gather dirt on Hillary Clinton, after many months of denials and false claims that it was to discuss Moscow’s bar on adoption by Americans to retaliate for sanctions levied on Russia. He says what his son did was not illegal. I’ll be delighted to let a court decide that.
Admittedly the bar has been raised, so that just a little abuse–say a flirtation with a White House intern–would not attract much attention, as we’ve all been inured to far worse. But every once in a while America still proves capable of recoiling. Trump’s failure to stand up to Putin in Helsinki unquestionably hurt him outside his still substantial base. But when and how will the country finally react to a grossly incompetent and corrupt administration? I don’t know, but I hope it happens before November 6, just three* months hence.
*I managed somehow to publish this initially as “Two months hence.” My readers know better. Apologies.
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Havoc impends
Here are some of the reactions I’ve gathered to President Thaci’s “border correction” proposal, in addition to the comments on my Thursday post:
Veton Surroi writes from Pristina:
Evidently, the Macedonian referendum on Greek accord will be hard hit by discussions on border changes. The vote relies heavily on Albanians in Macedonia, and they are a target of this maneuver. “If Preshevo can why can’t Tetovo”- that’s an immediate question that arises in a debate that should be actually about North Macedonia becoming a NATO member! (Hint: I don’t doubt someone is smiling in Moscow right now)
Sinisa Vukovic at Voice of America says:
Postavlja se pitanje i da li je to rešenje u skladu sa strateškim interesima obe strane, a odgovor je ne. Pre svega ne treba smetnuti sa uma da se na severu nalaze resursi za Prištinu poput vodosnabdevanja. Drugo, opšte je poznato da većina Srba živi južno od Ibra, dakle problematizuje se budućnost manjina”,rekao je on.
This Google translates as
The question arises whether this solution is in line with the strategic interests of both parties, and the answer is no. First of all, one should be disturbed by the fact that in the north there are resources for Pristina, such as water supply. Second, it is widely known that most Serbs live south of the Ibar, so the minority’s future is being problematized.
Father Sava, the Abbott of Decani monastery, tweets:
Ripple Effects already – Bosnian Serbs Seek Same UN Status as Kosovo
An old friend writes from Pristina:
I think you already pointed out reasonably so many arguments against partition. There is nothing new to add there. It is a lose/lose situation that has been elaborated so many times.What I am worried about is the third party: the international community that is mirroring the strange world we live in. Neither Thaci,nor Vucic will ever dare to open the partition issue if this was not silently endorsed in some form or another. This is what worries me.Another thing is that I guess two presidents are somehow moving ahead with their agenda, and that’s not only partition. Partition could be a fog for many other issues, like the association of Serb municipalities or some sort of Republika Srpska, the general amnesty for all crimes in and around Kosovo, etc.Petritsch’s reaction worried me a lot: correction of borders with few villages.I believe the point should be why at all somebody would have opted for partition in principle when this was so many times elaborated as nonstarter agenda?
Question for Petritsch and Company: why is a small correction of borders needed? Is this to save face for Vucic? Why would a few villages of Kosovo save the face of a Serbian President?And definitely a question for Washington and Brussels if they support partition or “correction of borders” agenda? They need to declare themselves in public. Have Brussels and Washington abandoned their previous red lines? Prishtina and Belgrade are not talking for the first time…So, what is happening now?
And a little reminder: was all this famous “normalization” dialogue started as technical dialogue? Now that Serbia is a front-runner for EU Integration, the so called Copenhagen criteria (that nobody dares to mention in Brussels because of the 5 non-recognizers), Prishtina has to play a technical role of the dancing partner that will not be qualified. But, how can Prishtina save the face of Vucic who wants to go in Europe but needs “few villages” of Kosovo to sell a historic deal back home? Before the mandate of Mogherini and friends end their mandate, because who knows later?And let’s say everything will be OK and Serbia gets a green light for the EU. Who can than guarantee that Kosovo can have its wanted UN seat? Brussels? Belgrade? Not sure.
There is also a Special Court issue that obviously is postponed for some time, or better to say after the negotiations are concluded. Why?
The US and EU working together have a superb track record in the Balkans. Local ownership has a truly terrible track record there, especially when it comes to issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity, not to mention treatment of minorities and rule of law more generally. Someone in Washington needs to wake up. Havoc impends.
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Peace Picks – August 6 – 13
1. Building the Bench for Inclusive U.S. Foreign Policy: Civil Society Leading by Example | Monday, August 6, 2018 | 4:00 pm – 6:00 pm | Open Society Foundations | Register Here
The Open Society Foundations, in collaboration with other partners, has supported research to better understand how civil society can drive inclusive innovation in foreign policy and national security. To this end, a new report, Advancing Diversity and Inclusion in the Foreign Policy Sector, demonstrates how think tanks and nongovernmental organizations can empower a diverse pool of experts to solve the world’s greatest challenges.
Civil society, as the core pool for expertise in government service, can address deficits in cultural, linguistic, and religious lived experiences to offer powerful insight and cultural competency for foreign policy. Experts will discuss best practices and recommendations for the field on how to draw from the United States’ tapestry of diverse communities to gain strategic contributions to diplomacy and national security outcomes.
Please join us for the Washington, D.C., launch of Advancing Diversity and Inclusion in the Foreign Policy Sector, in conversation with Vestige Strategies and the Truman National Security Project.
The panel discussion will be followed by a reception.
Speakers:
Moderator: Alex Johnson – Senior Policy Advisor for Europe and Eurasia, Open Society Foundations, Washington D.C.
Stefanie Brown James – Chief Executive Officer and Founding Partner, Vestige Strategies
Anthony Robinson – Director of Training and Public Engagement, Truman Center for National Policy and Truman National Security Project
2. Israel’s Nation-State Law: Consequences and Costs | Tuesday, August 7, 2018 | 10:00 am – 11:00 am | Wilson Center | Register Here
Last month, the Nation-State law enshrining the principle that Israel is the “national home of the Jewish people” became one of Israel’s Basic Laws, giving it a quasi-constitutional status. The new law, which polls indicate a majority of Israeli Jews support, has generated enormous controversy at home and abroad, alienating and angering Palestinian citizens of Israel and the Druze community with its focus on Jewish primacy.
What are the consequences of the new law for comity, politics and governance in Israel?
Join us as three veteran observers of Israel’s politics and policies discuss the new law and its consequences.
U.S. toll-free number: 888-942-8140
International call-in number: 1-517-308-9203
Participant passcode: 13304
Speakers:
Introduction: Jane Harman – Director, President, and CEO, Wilson Center
Moderator: Aaron David Miller – Vice President for New Initiatives and Middle East Program Director, Wilson Center
Ayman Odeh – Head of the Joint List, the third largest parliamentary group in the 20th Knesset
Anshel Pfeiffer – Correspondent, Haaretz; author, Bibi: The Turbulent Life and times of Benjamin Netanyahu
Shibley Telhami – Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and Development, University of Maryland, College Park
3. Pakistan: After the Elections | Tuesday, August 7, 2018 | 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm | Hudson Institute | Register Here
Pakistan has spent almost half of its 70 years as a nation under military rule and the rest under a semi-authoritarian democracy. Since 2008, Pakistan has ostensibly had civilian rule with a peaceful transfer of power in 2013. Analysts are hopeful that Pakistan’s 2018 election on July 25 will continue this trend of democratization.
Elections do not make a democracy. Yet free, fair, and inclusive elections are one of the pillars of a democratic nation. Most observers and analysts, both within and outside the country, have raised concerns about the influence of Pakistan’s military intelligence establishment on the July 25 general election.
On August 7, Hudson Institute’s South and Central Asia Program will host a panel to discuss Pakistan’s 2018 elections. Panelists will include Professor C. Christine Fair, Provost’s Distinguished Associate Professor in the Peace and Security Studies Program at Georgetown University; Dr. Muhammad Taqi, a columnist for The Wire; and Ambassador Husain Haqqani, former Ambassador of Pakistan to the United States and director of South and Central Asia at Hudson Institute.
4. Pakistan Elections: What Now? | Wednesday, August 8, 2018 | 9:30 am – 11:00 am | United States Institute of Peace | Register Here
Pakistan’s national elections on July 25 ushered in a new government, with the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) party now set to head a new governing coalition and former cricket star Imran Khan expected to become prime minister. After a controversial campaign period, the incumbent Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N)—whose former leader Nawaz Sharif was imprisoned just days before the elections—has alleged rigging, military manipulation, and media censorship. Several political parties have also challenged the results of the elections. Should the results stand, the PTI appears to have swept races around the country, and now faces the challenge of governing.
To discuss the outcome of the elections, the shape of the next government, and the complaints and challenges to the outcome, USIP will hold a conversation with senior representatives from Pakistan’s top three political parties (PTI, PML-N and the Pakistan Peoples Party) via Skype along with experts Daniel Markey, Kiran Pervez and Moeed Yusuf in Washington, D.C. The event will take place from 9:30am – 11:30am on Wednesday, August 8, 2018 at the U.S. Institute of Peace. Join the conversation on Twitter with #PkElectionsWhatNow.
Speakers:
Moderator: Moeed Yusuf – Associate Vice President, Asia Center, U.S. Institute of Peace
Syed Tariq Fatemi (via Skype) – Special Assistant to the Prime Minister
Daniel Markey – Senior Research Professor, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University
Kiran Pervez – South & Central Asia Regional Chair, U.S. Department of State
Shah Mahmood Qureshi (via Skype) – Vice Chairman, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf
Sherry Rehman (via Skype) – Leader of the Opposite of the Senate, Pakistan
5. U.S. Arms Transfer Policy – Shaping the Way Ahead | Wednesday, August 8, 2018 | 10:30 am – 12:30 pm | Center for International and Strategic Studies | Register Here
The Trump Administration released its new Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) policy and Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) export policy in April 2018. It constitutes the first update to the CAT policy since January 2014.
Please join CSIS as we host a public event to discuss the Administration’s new CAT policy. The event will commence with keynote remarks by Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Tina Kaidanow. Following these remarks, a moderated panel consisting of government, think tank, and industry experts will contextualize and discuss challenges in implementation, as well as opportunities presented for U.S. strategy and U.S. business as a result of this policy update.
Speakers:
Ambassador Tina Kaidanow – Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Alex Gray – Special Assistant to the President for the Defense Industrial Base, White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy
Laura Cressey – Deputy Director for Regional Security and Arms Transfers, U.S. Department of State
Jeff Abramson – Senior Fellow, Arms Control Association
Keith Webster – President, Defense and Aerospace Export Council, U.S. Chamber of Commerce
Melissa Dalton – Deputy Director, International Security Program and Director, Cooperative Defense Project, CSIS
Dak Hardwick – Assistant Vice President, International Affairs, Aerospace Industries Association
Andrew Philip-Hunter – Director, Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group and Senior Fellow, International Security Program, CSIS
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A bad idea whose time should not come
Kosovo President Thaci has made it clear he intends to discuss changing Kosovo’s borders with Serbian President Vucic. He denies this means ethnic partition of Kosovo and calls it a correction of the border, a euphemism intended to mean an exchange of territory:
If the Kosovo-Serbia border correction and the final agreement on mutual recognition are achieved, if such an agreement is of bilateral and balanced, meaning a win-win for both parties, then no one would be against it.
Presumably he is open to trading some or all of Kosovo’s Serb-majority northern municipalities for Albanian-majority territory in southern Serbia. The deal would of course have to include, prior to the land swap, mutual diplomatic recognition. Only sovereign states can exchange territory.
This idea has been widely circulated in recent weeks, but Thaci’s remarks are the first clear confirmation from the Albanian side of the equation. It would not be happening without US and European concurrence. Brussels and Washington have apparently decided that integrating the northern Serb municipalities with the rest of Kosovo is just too difficult, so they have dropped their previous firm opposition.
The border correction, or whatever you call it, is a bad idea, for many reasons:
- The majority of the Serbs in Kosovo as well as the more important Serb monasteries and other religious sites are not in the north. Those south of the Ibar River will be at risk, both short term and long term, if territory is exchanged.
- The exchange would increase support for those Albanians in Kosovo who favor union with Albanian and for those in Macedonia who would like to join such a Greater Albania, potentially destabilizing Macedonia as well.
- Republika Srpska, the Serb-controlled 49% of Bosnia and Herzegovina, will want to follow suit, declaring independence and seeking to join Serbia. That will precipitate a comparable Croat move to have the Croat-majority cantons of Bosnia join Croatia.
- The Russians will point to this correction of borders as precedent for what they would like to do with South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, Transnistria in Moldova, and Donbas as well as Crimea in Ukraine.
- They may even like the idea enough to allow Kosovo into the United Nations, which would be a Pyrrhic victory if it then joins Greater Albania, or if China decides still to veto Kosovo membership.
I am still hoping agreement on this bad idea will prove difficult to achieve. Serbia has good security reasons not to give up territory in southern Serbia that lies adjacent to its main outlet to the sea. The Serb Orthodox Church stands to a big loser if this “correction” proceeds. Kosovo has good reason not to precipitate a series of claims to international border corrections that are unlikely to be peaceful. Nor will Pristina’s current politicians thrive in an environment in which Kosovo’s population is anticipating the end of the country’s statehood by merger into Albania. Vetevendosje, a movement that has advocated the option to join Albania, will be the big winner.
A democratic Kosovo and a democratic Serbia should be able to come to terms on protection of their respective minority populations without this perilous exchange of territory and populations. Of course that is precisely the problem: neither is a consolidated democracy and both are run by ethnic nationalists who still lack adequate respect for minorities. It shouldn’t be a big surprise that an ethnic nationalist administration in the US and an EU in which ethnic nationalism has gained lots of ground weaken in their commitment to democracy and the rule of law, but it is not a welcome development. This is a bad idea whose time should not come.
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