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Tragedy impends

Pristina daily Koha Ditore has given me permission to republish in English Besnik Krasniqi’s in-depth interview of Ambassador Lulzim Peci, published Sunday:

Lulzim Peci has insisted that “the correction” of borders, for which the president Hashim Thaçi and his Serbian counterpart, Aleksandar Vučić, are being engaged, is a euphemism for the partition of Kosovo. He is against this option, becaues he thinks that it will cause human tragedies in the forms of masive expulsions and displacements.

Peci is the founder and the Executive Director of the Institute KIPRED, and in the past he has served as Ambassador in Stockholm, as well as the first Liasion Representative of Kosovo in Belgrade.

In an interview given to “Koha Ditore,” he spoke on the option of “the correction” of borders between Kosovo and Serbia, which was warned to be put in discussion in the final phase of the dialogue in Brussels. He told what the country will lose from this process, and he spoke on the effects that such a solution will have in the region and abroad. He argued that neither the supporters in Washington nor in Brussels will be able to manage the effects of such a solution.

Among other things, in this interview Peci has told why he considers this “innovative” policy of Brussels as a triumph of Russian foreign policy in the Balkans and in its surroundings, as well as the barriers which it will create for Kosovo in its rush to become a member of the UN and integrated into the EU.

Koha Ditore: Mr. Peci, what is the meaning for Kosovo of the fact that its President has already agreed to discuss the option of “the correction” of borders in the final phase of the dialogue with Serbia?

Peci: First of all, it should be clear to us that “the correction” of borders is a euphemism for the partitioning of Kosovo, with or without exchange of territories with Serbia. The accuracy of the borderline between Kosovo and Serbia was not contested at all, for enabling anyone to correct it, given that the borders between federal units of former Yugoslavia were determined with cadastral borders of the municipalities which were in the two sides of the respective borders. Serbia has demanded, and is demanding, the partition of Kosovo, but so far it has never contested the accuracy of the borderline. Also, based on these well-defined borders, the Mission of NATO (KFOR) was established, and the Kumanovo Agreement of June 9^th, 1999 was enforced, including the Land and Air Security Zone.

On the other hand, we should keep in mind that interstate borders can be corrected only if the mistakes acceptable for all the sides in the process of demarcation of the borderline are ascertained, and such a thing can be done only between two independent and sovereign states which do recognize each other. In the case in which it explicitly does not recognize Kosovo, it is very likely that Serbia will not interpret this “correction” as a correction of interstate borders, but as a correction of administrative ones, which will further complicate the situation. Furthermore, it is unlikely that Serbia will recognize Kosovo without taking the largest part of the North, as well as the territory of the Municipality of Raniluk in the Southeast of Kosovo, and, in the best case, it will give as a compensation to Kosovo a number of villages in the Valley, perhaps with the inclusion of the city of Preshevo. This option can have consequences not only for the Albanian population that has remained in the North – for which the political cynics can easily say that majority of them were already expelled – given that we can have further displacements, if not even the outright expulsions, of Albanians remaining on the other side of the border, as well as of the Serbs below the river Ibar.

If Serbia would accept to recognize Kosovo, by exchanging the Municipality of Preshevo with that of Leposaviq, which was appended to Kosovo in 1959, then this option could have been considered as a bilateral correction of the border, without any major consequences for both, the Albanian population in the North, and the Serbian population below the Ibar river, but we cannot believe that this option would imply the terminology of “the correction of borders” of Thaçi, or that of “razgraničenje” [delimitation] of Vučić, which was inspired by the ideas of Dobrica Čosić .

Consequently, the acceptance of Thaçi to discuss this issue in the dialogue with Serbia, does not have to do with any correction of borders between Kosovo and Serbia. It has to do with changing of borders and the partitioning of the country. Such a discussion will put in question for the first time the territorial integrity of the state of Kosovo, which was not contested by anyone until now. There is no doubt that this option will undo the results of Kosovar politics and of international support over the last two decades, including here the military intervention of NATO, and it will also pave the way for the partition of the country based on ethnic geopolitics, and, as such, it will mark the first case of change of interstate borders according to this principle in the post-Cold War Europe.

Koha Ditore: So, you are among those who oppose the negotiations on territory? What does really Kosovo lose from touching the borders?

Peci: First of all, I am against this option as a human being, given that I think that it will cause human tragedies in the form of masive displacements, of Albanians from the northern part of Kosovo, and of Serbs from the part below the river Ibar. Albanians and Serbs do not deserve something like this 20 years after the end of the war, as well as after the results which were achieved with so many difficulties – results that can, indeed, be modest, but which, nevertheless, cannot be ignored – in the creation of a democratic and multiethnic society.

Secondly, I think that countries that aim at monoethnicity end up as xenophobic and fascistoid, and this is in complete contradiction with my political convictions and trust in liberal democracy, and, thirdly, given that Kosova, with the option of the partition, will put in question the safety of its water and energetic sources, as well as its potential for economic development, if the Ujman (Gazivode) Lake passes under the sovereignty of Serbia.

After the proposal of Thaçi for “moratorium for the solution of Kosovo status” of the year 2003, the entry into the game of “the correction of borders” is undoubtedly his biggest political adventure, but this time this adventure can engender irreparable consequences.

Koha Ditore: More precisely, which are the borders in which you are afraid that Kosovo might end up, if the borders are put on the Brussels discussion table, and what Kosovo gains and loses from a solution based on the exchange of territories?

Peci: As I have mentioned above, I apprehend that Kosovo will lose four municipalities in the North, as well as the Municipality of Raniluk in the East of the country, in exchange for some villages inhabited with Albanian majority in the Valley, and, perhaps, the city of Preshevo. The cost of this option will be extremely burdensome, even if Serbia does explicitly recognize the statehood of Kosovo. On the other hand, we should not forget that without normalization of relations with Kosovo, Serbia cannot get membership in the EU. Therefore, we have no major reason for entering into the game of “the correction” of borders, in order to do a service to Belgrade, by working against Berlin, given that without Berlin’s approval neither Kosovo, nor Serbia, can have any European future.

Furthermore, I doubt very much that the EU’s five non-recognizers will recognize Kosovo, even if Serbia recognizes it explicitly, after the change of borders based on ethnic geopolitics, given that for the partition of territories in which their numerous minorities live, this can be interpreted as a precedent that is even more dangerous then the Kosovo’s independence itself. I can only imagine how can such a “historical agreement” be interpreted by Cyprus, Slovakia, or Romania, regardless of the fact that with their non-recognition of Kosovo they have contributed themselves for the opening of such an option, by emboldening Serbia, as well as by hindering Kosovo’s European future. Therefore, I fear that with “the correction of borders” Kosovo will lose both, the territory, and the perspective for the membership in the EU.

Koha Ditore: Does the President have the mandate to represent Kosovo in the final phase of the dialogue and to negotiate the borders of the state without the blessing from the Assembly? If not, do you see any actions that should be taken against him?

Peci: Nobody in Kosovo has the mandate to negotiate its borders, given that this is in contradiction with the Constitution of the country, from the point view of the territorial integrity, as well as of the territorial claims against any other country. On the other hand, I think that the President has no explicit constitutional obstacles to represent the country in the dialogue with Serbia, but he must represent the country and the unity of the people in this dialogue, first of all by building political unity – which he has abused and destroyed by bypassing the Assembly and the Government, as well as by talking, in opposition with the Constitution, for changing the borders of the country. So far as the opening of the issue of the changing of borders of the country in the dialogue with Belgrade is concerned, I think that there is sufficient space for treating the constitutionality of this Thaçi’s action by the Constitutional Court.

For me, it is very surprising how can Thaçi push with such a zeal his already common agenda with Vučić for “the correction of borders,” given that I assume that he knows how unlikely it is that it will be approved at the Assembly of Kosovo. But he is perhaps calculating exactly on the small-minded interests of the politicians from the position and opposition, which were shown so successful so far in the execution of the partition of Kosovo. We should not forget that with this type of political action Thaçi has kept himself effectively in power during the last 11 years. We should not exclude here Thaçi’s possible attempts to manipulate the passing of this option by bypassing the Assembly of Kosovo by asking for the opinion of the Constitutional Court. Regardless of the fact how difficult this is to be realized, it should not be neglected as a possible scenario.

On the other hand, the option of the approval of this agreement through referendum is absurd, given that this cannot be done, not only because Kosovo has no law on referendum – which Thaçi has a mandate to sponsor, but because the change of the Constitution of the country, including here of its borders, can be done only through parliamentary procedures which demand the approval of the two-thirds of the deputies, including the two-thirds of the deputies of non-majority communities. The epilogue of these actions leaves only two options to Thaçi: to be considered as the biggest Don Quixote of the Kosovar politics, or as a genius of political skills, and I don’t believe that there is any middle solution here.

Koha Ditore: How do you see the role of institutions and of political subjects regarding this development, and is there any danger that the Assembly will arrive in a stage in which it will deliver the North to Serbia, together with Ujman (Gazivoda), a part of Trepça, etc.?

Peci: Kosovo has never before had a politics that is more unserious and dangerous than the recent political scene. The Assembly of Kosovo is the institution that has failed completely in this process, firstly in the achievement of the political consensus regarding the dialogue with Serbia, and with its own passivity and destructivism it has enabled Thaçi to privatize the dialogue with Serbia. On the other hand, Haradinaj, while he first refused to engage in leading the dialogue, by leaving it “in the hands” of Thaçi, is now declaring himself against the option of “the correction of borders”  with Serbia. But in his capacity as the Prime Minister, he has never put this issue in the agenda of the Government of Kosovo. Given the descent of the Kosovar political scene and its institutions, I would not be surprised if eventually they will be enforced to act according to the logic “let’s save what’s left,” and to accept the partition, the loss of strategic resources, and to plunge the country into the process of its undoing.

Koha Ditore: If any agreement on changing the borders, that is, on exchanging the territories, is achieved, will the Constitution based on international principles embodied in Ahtisaari’s Plan remain?

Peci: If such an agreement is approved by the Kosovo Assembly, there is a great possibility that the Ahtisaari’s principles will remain in power, given that the reduction of the rights of non-majority communities will not be accepted, and this can be done only with the regular parliamentary procedure, which the majority of the deputies of non-majority communities should approve. Furthermore, I would not be surprised if in such a scenario Serbia would further demand an association of municipalities with Serbian majority that will remain in Kosovo, as well as the special status for the facilities of the Serbian Orthodox Church.

Koha Ditore:  What was that which has made Washington and Brussels to consider as acceptable a solution which “corrects” borders through ethnic lines, and how possible it is to achieve an agreement on this when we already know the position of Berlin and London?

Peci: This was achieved by the joint lobbying for this option of Thaçi and Vučić in Washington and with Mogherini, and it has met acceptability on behalf of “reality-politics,” despite of the fact that it is in complete contradiction with Western and European values. Supporters in both, Washington and Brussels can accept this option, but I am not sure how will they manage its effects in both Kosovo and the region, as well as in the countries that are suffering from violence in the neighborhood of Russia, given that it can endanger the long-term security and stability of the region and Europe.

On the other hand, for being feasible, such an agreement should have the acceptance of Germany, as a key state of the EU, given that without its support no country can join the EU, as well as the approval of Great Britain as a member of the Security Council of the UN. Therefore, given the absence of unity among the key countries of the West, Serbia can only win, without losing anything, and Kosovo can only lose, with really small chances of winning anything.

For this reason, regarding the dialogue with Serbia, Kosovo needs strategic patience, given that the achievement of any agreement with Belgrade will produce antagonisms among the supporters of our country, and this means defeat in foreign policy and loss of support for further consolidation of our country by the allies we have had so far. We should first ensure support of all the key allies for our options, and only then we should negotiate with Serbia, not vice versa. However, with this political and institutional leadership, we have very small chances to achieve this. Therefore, I think that it is necessary to have new general elections as soon as possible, the change of political scene and of institutional carriers, if we want to escape from the uncertainty with which we are confronted, and to move towards a more secure and prosperous future.

Koha Ditore: Mr. Peci, you have mentioned some from the effects that the potential change of borders in the region will create, but can you mention any others? Do you see that even the opening of this issue for the discussion can have effects, regardless of whether there will eventually be any exchange of territories?

Peci: I am not in a situation to foresee fully the effects that this can produce in the region, but I am sure that it will increase the demands of nationalist extremists for changing of borders and for creation of ethnic states, similar to those of Dodik’s Republika Srpska, who has already started to raise his voice in demanding “the correction of borders” between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia.

But what concerns me much more here is the very political myopia of Brussels for isolating the effects of eventual change of borders, which was “articulated” last week by the Commissioner Johannes Hahn in the European Forum of Alpbach, through the “requests” to not allow the possible change of borders between Kosovo and Serbia to be used as a reason for changing other borders in the region, with the reasoning that a bilateral agreement should not endanger the general stability of the region, and that it should produce more stability in the region. Such a statement, in my opinion, neglects the fact that it was the very rigidity of the borders of federal units of former Yugoslavia that has brought stability in the region after almost a decade of armed conflicts and human tragedies initiated by Serbia, which was aiming exactly to change these borders according to ethnic lines, and it also depreciates the very core of the ideas of European integrations and of European Union, which have liberal-democratic, multiethnic, and multicultural societies as their foundation.

I am very interested to know how Hahn will stop Dodik and other extremist nationalists in the region in their efforts to “correct the borders,” once after this happens between Kosovo and Serbia. And what can he say then for the countries that have suffered aggression and illegal annexation of territories by Russia? I do not consider this “innovative” politics of Brussels to be anything more or less than the total triumph of the foreign policy of Russia in both, the Balkans and its neighborhood, and I am convinced that this will have long-term consequences for the European security.