Month: September 2018
We are all transfixed with the anonymous Times op/ed that told us nothing new and with the Kavanaugh confirmation hearing, but really the outcome there is clear: he will be confirmed, because he opposes the right to chose abortion, resists accountability for police and companies, and will vote against any attempt to subpeona this president. That’s why he was nominated, and that’s why the Republicans will confirm him.
The new news today is President Trump’s decision to keep US forces in Syria indefinitely, not only to prevent the resurgence of ISIS but also to counter Iran. This means, like it or not, that the US is committed to trying to stabilize the northeastern part of Syria that it controls with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), led by by Kurdish YPG fighters. And once it has stabilized the area it will need to reconstruct it, if conditions for withdrawal have not yet been created. We broke it and we own it, until there is a viable alternative that meets American requirements: no Iran, no ISIS.
This is classic mission creep, but that doesn’t mean it is necessarily bad. The options were these:
- Leave northeastern Syria to its fate and watch while our friendly Kurds patch things up with Damascus and go to war against NATO ally Turkey.
- Stay to deny Iran its land route to the Levant and negotiate for a political outcome in Damascus more acceptable than simple restoration of Assad’s dictatorship.
Staying entails putting US forces at risk. The current number, around 2000, will have to grow significantly to protect the stabilization and eventual reconstruction effort required to prevent the return of ISIS or some other extremist group. Staying also means trying to prevent the Kurds from attacking inside Turkey or providing assistance to their PKK compatriots there.
These are not small responsibilities. The reconstruction effort should come in part from UNDP, the World Bank , the Europeans, and the Gulf, but will in any event require a significant American contribution in dollars and personnel. Preventing the Kurds from attacking inside Turkey is partly a question of incentives: both the Turks and Kurds want the Americans to stay, so they should lay off each other. But a lot of fevered negotiation will be required to maintain the standoff, a model for which is already operating in Manbij.
Negotiation is also the key to the political outcome in Damascus. Assad is looking for total victory, assisted by Iran and Russia. But the US has some leverage if it stays in northeastern Syria. The area was Syria’s breadbasket before the war and it produced most of the country’s oil and gas. The oil is now being shipped in part to a regime-controlled refinery and fuels an electric generator serving Damascus. Assad needs the oil and gas fields back under his control, which means he and his allies may pressure the US militarily while trying to convince the Kurds that Damascus will give them a better deal.
Presidents Assad, Putin, and Rouhani agreed today to put off an assault on Idlib, giving Turkey some time to arrange withdrawal of Al Qaeda-linked extremists and thus avoiding a humanitarian catastrophe involving the 3 million civilians in the province. American pressure against the assault may have had some impact, but I suspect the Russians were hesitant to saddle their newfound Turkish friends a new influx of refugees. Best to keep Erdogan on side, in particular because he has promised to buy Russian air defenses. The Iranians and Assad will be disappointed, but they can hope Turkey will fail and the assault will only be postponed.
The new American commitment in northeastern Syria is likely to be long-term and big. The President owes the American people an honest explanation of why it is necessary and how it will be staffed and paid for. That isn’t likely to happen. Instead, Jim Jeffrey, Trump’s capable and well-informed new Syria envoy, made the announcement to a gaggle of reporters. No offense to Jim, whose experience in Turkey and Iraq make him an excellent choice for his new role, but that is not adequate for a policy change of this magnitude.
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I received today this “Statement to the Public Opinion from Syrian Political & Civil Forces”:
Supported by Russia, al-Assad Regime continues the mobilization of its forces around Idlib Governorate and its countryside, to complete the Russian plans of a military windup and fait accompli imposition.
We, being Syrian institutions, organizations and activists, condemning the statements of the Special Envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura, that plainly justify a military invasion by the Regime and its allies and call for the United Nations’ participation in the resulting forced displacement, we remind everyone that any military action on Idlib, under any designation or pretext, threatens the life and safety of more than 3 million civilians, who approximately half of them were forcibly displaced from other areas fleeing the military operations of al-Assad Regime and its allies.
Signatories of this Statement call on the International Community, in general, and the United Nations and Security Council members, in particular, to undertake their responsibilities in protecting the civilians and preventing war crimes against them.
Committing ourselves into finding solutions for the protection of civilians and guarantee of their safety, we propose that the international community:
– Provide the needed support to the local actors in Idlib in order to eliminate any extremist forces in the area, in parallel with preventing al-Assad’s forces, Iran and Russia from exploiting the situation to achieve any gains on the ground and forcing them to respect the De-escalation Agreement by ceasing any land or aerial bombardments on the area.
– Support the local civic institutions, to manage the area and begin the reconstruction process, as well as to establish a free democratic model that represents the desires and expectations of the people.
The International Community and United Nations have lost many opportunities to save the Syrian People from numerous crimes committed against it, and to hold the perpetrators accountable. Despite our great frustration and lack of trust in the international entities, we still hope that these institutions and current international system undertake their responsibilities this time to save the Syrian People from further crimes and disasters.
Signatories:
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Ahl Horan
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Ahrar – The Working Group for Syria
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Al Kawakibi Organization for Human Rights
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Al Sharqia Patriotic Grouping – Political Committee
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Assyrian Democratic Organization
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Baytna Syria
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Damir Movement
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Free Syria
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General Union of Syrian Students
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Ghaith Charitable Organization
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Idlib Political Committee
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Idlib Provincial Council
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Idlib Revolutionary Movement Committee
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Local Development and Small-Projects Support (LDSPS)
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Muatana Current
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Rethink Rebuild Society
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Shaml Syria Civil Society Coalition
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Sound and Picture Organization
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Syrian Declaration for National and Democratic Change
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Syrian Democratic Coalition
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Syrian Democratic Movement
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Syrian Network for Human Rights
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Syrian Patriotic Coalition
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Syrian Patriotic Democratic Coalition
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Syrian Women Network
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Syrians Coalition
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The Day After Association
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The Patriotic Coalition of the Revolutionary Forces of Hassaka
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The Syrian Women’s Political Movement
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Together Movement for a Free and Democratic Syria
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Watan Plan
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Zaiton Magazine
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Pristina daily Koha Ditore has given me permission to republish in English Besnik Krasniqi’s in-depth interview of Ambassador Lulzim Peci, published Sunday:
Lulzim Peci has insisted that “the correction” of borders, for which the president Hashim Thaçi and his Serbian counterpart, Aleksandar Vučić, are being engaged, is a euphemism for the partition of Kosovo. He is against this option, becaues he thinks that it will cause human tragedies in the forms of masive expulsions and displacements.
Peci is the founder and the Executive Director of the Institute KIPRED, and in the past he has served as Ambassador in Stockholm, as well as the first Liasion Representative of Kosovo in Belgrade.
In an interview given to “Koha Ditore,” he spoke on the option of “the correction” of borders between Kosovo and Serbia, which was warned to be put in discussion in the final phase of the dialogue in Brussels. He told what the country will lose from this process, and he spoke on the effects that such a solution will have in the region and abroad. He argued that neither the supporters in Washington nor in Brussels will be able to manage the effects of such a solution.
Among other things, in this interview Peci has told why he considers this “innovative” policy of Brussels as a triumph of Russian foreign policy in the Balkans and in its surroundings, as well as the barriers which it will create for Kosovo in its rush to become a member of the UN and integrated into the EU.
Koha Ditore: Mr. Peci, what is the meaning for Kosovo of the fact that its President has already agreed to discuss the option of “the correction” of borders in the final phase of the dialogue with Serbia?
Peci: First of all, it should be clear to us that “the correction” of borders is a euphemism for the partitioning of Kosovo, with or without exchange of territories with Serbia. The accuracy of the borderline between Kosovo and Serbia was not contested at all, for enabling anyone to correct it, given that the borders between federal units of former Yugoslavia were determined with cadastral borders of the municipalities which were in the two sides of the respective borders. Serbia has demanded, and is demanding, the partition of Kosovo, but so far it has never contested the accuracy of the borderline. Also, based on these well-defined borders, the Mission of NATO (KFOR) was established, and the Kumanovo Agreement of June 9th, 1999 was enforced, including the Land and Air Security Zone.
On the other hand, we should keep in mind that interstate borders can be corrected only if the mistakes acceptable for all the sides in the process of demarcation of the borderline are ascertained, and such a thing can be done only between two independent and sovereign states which do recognize each other. In the case in which it explicitly does not recognize Kosovo, it is very likely that Serbia will not interpret this “correction” as a correction of interstate borders, but as a correction of administrative ones, which will further complicate the situation. Furthermore, it is unlikely that Serbia will recognize Kosovo without taking the largest part of the North, as well as the territory of the Municipality of Raniluk in the Southeast of Kosovo, and, in the best case, it will give as a compensation to Kosovo a number of villages in the Valley, perhaps with the inclusion of the city of Preshevo. This option can have consequences not only for the Albanian population that has remained in the North – for which the political cynics can easily say that majority of them were already expelled – given that we can have further displacements, if not even the outright expulsions, of Albanians remaining on the other side of the border, as well as of the Serbs below the river Ibar.
If Serbia would accept to recognize Kosovo, by exchanging the Municipality of Preshevo with that of Leposaviq, which was appended to Kosovo in 1959, then this option could have been considered as a bilateral correction of the border, without any major consequences for both, the Albanian population in the North, and the Serbian population below the Ibar river, but we cannot believe that this option would imply the terminology of “the correction of borders” of Thaçi, or that of “razgraničenje” [delimitation] of Vučić, which was inspired by the ideas of Dobrica Čosić .
Consequently, the acceptance of Thaçi to discuss this issue in the dialogue with Serbia, does not have to do with any correction of borders between Kosovo and Serbia. It has to do with changing of borders and the partitioning of the country. Such a discussion will put in question for the first time the territorial integrity of the state of Kosovo, which was not contested by anyone until now. There is no doubt that this option will undo the results of Kosovar politics and of international support over the last two decades, including here the military intervention of NATO, and it will also pave the way for the partition of the country based on ethnic geopolitics, and, as such, it will mark the first case of change of interstate borders according to this principle in the post-Cold War Europe.
Koha Ditore: So, you are among those who oppose the negotiations on territory? What does really Kosovo lose from touching the borders?
Peci: First of all, I am against this option as a human being, given that I think that it will cause human tragedies in the form of masive displacements, of Albanians from the northern part of Kosovo, and of Serbs from the part below the river Ibar. Albanians and Serbs do not deserve something like this 20 years after the end of the war, as well as after the results which were achieved with so many difficulties – results that can, indeed, be modest, but which, nevertheless, cannot be ignored – in the creation of a democratic and multiethnic society.
Secondly, I think that countries that aim at monoethnicity end up as xenophobic and fascistoid, and this is in complete contradiction with my political convictions and trust in liberal democracy, and, thirdly, given that Kosova, with the option of the partition, will put in question the safety of its water and energetic sources, as well as its potential for economic development, if the Ujman (Gazivode) Lake passes under the sovereignty of Serbia.
After the proposal of Thaçi for “moratorium for the solution of Kosovo status” of the year 2003, the entry into the game of “the correction of borders” is undoubtedly his biggest political adventure, but this time this adventure can engender irreparable consequences.
Koha Ditore: More precisely, which are the borders in which you are afraid that Kosovo might end up, if the borders are put on the Brussels discussion table, and what Kosovo gains and loses from a solution based on the exchange of territories?
Peci: As I have mentioned above, I apprehend that Kosovo will lose four municipalities in the North, as well as the Municipality of Raniluk in the East of the country, in exchange for some villages inhabited with Albanian majority in the Valley, and, perhaps, the city of Preshevo. The cost of this option will be extremely burdensome, even if Serbia does explicitly recognize the statehood of Kosovo. On the other hand, we should not forget that without normalization of relations with Kosovo, Serbia cannot get membership in the EU. Therefore, we have no major reason for entering into the game of “the correction” of borders, in order to do a service to Belgrade, by working against Berlin, given that without Berlin’s approval neither Kosovo, nor Serbia, can have any European future.
Furthermore, I doubt very much that the EU’s five non-recognizers will recognize Kosovo, even if Serbia recognizes it explicitly, after the change of borders based on ethnic geopolitics, given that for the partition of territories in which their numerous minorities live, this can be interpreted as a precedent that is even more dangerous then the Kosovo’s independence itself. I can only imagine how can such a “historical agreement” be interpreted by Cyprus, Slovakia, or Romania, regardless of the fact that with their non-recognition of Kosovo they have contributed themselves for the opening of such an option, by emboldening Serbia, as well as by hindering Kosovo’s European future. Therefore, I fear that with “the correction of borders” Kosovo will lose both, the territory, and the perspective for the membership in the EU.
Koha Ditore: Does the President have the mandate to represent Kosovo in the final phase of the dialogue and to negotiate the borders of the state without the blessing from the Assembly? If not, do you see any actions that should be taken against him?
Peci: Nobody in Kosovo has the mandate to negotiate its borders, given that this is in contradiction with the Constitution of the country, from the point view of the territorial integrity, as well as of the territorial claims against any other country. On the other hand, I think that the President has no explicit constitutional obstacles to represent the country in the dialogue with Serbia, but he must represent the country and the unity of the people in this dialogue, first of all by building political unity – which he has abused and destroyed by bypassing the Assembly and the Government, as well as by talking, in opposition with the Constitution, for changing the borders of the country. So far as the opening of the issue of the changing of borders of the country in the dialogue with Belgrade is concerned, I think that there is sufficient space for treating the constitutionality of this Thaçi’s action by the Constitutional Court.
For me, it is very surprising how can Thaçi push with such a zeal his already common agenda with Vučić for “the correction of borders,” given that I assume that he knows how unlikely it is that it will be approved at the Assembly of Kosovo. But he is perhaps calculating exactly on the small-minded interests of the politicians from the position and opposition, which were shown so successful so far in the execution of the partition of Kosovo. We should not forget that with this type of political action Thaçi has kept himself effectively in power during the last 11 years. We should not exclude here Thaçi’s possible attempts to manipulate the passing of this option by bypassing the Assembly of Kosovo by asking for the opinion of the Constitutional Court. Regardless of the fact how difficult this is to be realized, it should not be neglected as a possible scenario.
On the other hand, the option of the approval of this agreement through referendum is absurd, given that this cannot be done, not only because Kosovo has no law on referendum – which Thaçi has a mandate to sponsor, but because the change of the Constitution of the country, including here of its borders, can be done only through parliamentary procedures which demand the approval of the two-thirds of the deputies, including the two-thirds of the deputies of non-majority communities. The epilogue of these actions leaves only two options to Thaçi: to be considered as the biggest Don Quixote of the Kosovar politics, or as a genius of political skills, and I don’t believe that there is any middle solution here.
Koha Ditore: How do you see the role of institutions and of political subjects regarding this development, and is there any danger that the Assembly will arrive in a stage in which it will deliver the North to Serbia, together with Ujman (Gazivoda), a part of Trepça, etc.? Read more
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1. Tensions with Turkey: A Calleo Series Panel on Turkey and the West | Tuesday, September 4, 2018 | 5:30 pm – 7:00 pm | Johns Hopkins SAIS | Rome Auditorium, 1619 Massachusetts Avenue NW | Register Here
The SAIS European and Eurasian Studies (EES) Program cordially invites you to our Fall Seminar Series at the Washington campus. In tribute to his many contributions and support, series is named in honor of Professor David P. Calleo, who continues to inspire EES scholars through his research and engagement. View the series schedule and RSVP at https://calleoseminars.eventbrite.com.
Join us Tuesday, September 4, 2018 as we kick off the 2018-2019 academic year with a panel discussion on “Tensions with Turkey: A Calleo Series Panel on Turkey and the West.”
Confirmed speakers include:
Nicholas Danforth – Senior Analyst at Bipartisan Policy Center
Amanda Sloat – Robert Bosch senior fellow, Brookings Institution
Ambassador Eric Edelman – Johns Hopkins SAIS
Lisel Hintz – Assistant Professor of IR and European Studies, Johns Hopkins SAIS
RSVP and a valid JHU or government-issued ID is required for entry. Appetizers and drinks are served.
2. China’s “War on Terrorism” an the Xinjiang Emergency | Wednesday, September 5, 2018 | 12:00 pm – 1:30 pm | Hudson Institute | Register Here
For the last sixteen years, the Chinese Communist Party has been telling the Chinese people and the world at-large that it is waging its own “war on terrorism” in the Uyghur homeland of Xinjiang, known to Uyghurs as “East Turkestan.” Xinjiang has since become the most heavily garrisoned and surveilled part of the People’s Republic of China. As many as one million Uyghurs are now detained in Communist Party “political re-education” camps, where they have been subject to torture, medical maltreatment, and other abuses. Meanwhile, the “stability” of the region has become essential for PRC’s strategic “One Belt, One Road” initiative, and the Communist Party has used its influence around the world to stifle criticism of the human rights emergency in Xinjiang that it has created.
What is at stake for the Chinese Communist Party in Xinjiang? How has the PRC’s conduct and repression in Xinjiang affected its foreign relations, including with Pakistan, the countries of Central Asia, and the Middle East? What do we know about the policy debates among Chinese authorities and the people of China concerning Xinjiang and what, if any, are the dissenting views? What does the PRC’s conduct in Xinjiang tell us about the nature of the Communist Party’s power and the PRC’s ambitions to transform itself into a superpower?
On September 5, Hudson Institute will host a discussion on the PRC’s “war on terrorism.” The panel will include Dr. Michael Clarke, associate professor at the Australian National University; Louisa Greve, director of external affairs for the Uyghur Human Rights Project; Andrew Small, a senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund; Sean Roberts, an associate professor at George Washington University; and Rushan Abbas, a former Uyghur Service journalist with Radio Free Asia. The discussion will be moderated by Hudson senior fellow Eric Brown.
3. Securing a Democratic World – A Case for a Democratic Values-Driven U.S. Foreign Policy | Thursday, September 6, 2018 | 9:00 am – 10:30 am | Center for American Progress | Register Here
Liberal democracy around the world is under threat. The waves of democratization of the 1980s and 1990s have stalled. Democracies from Hungary to Turkey and Poland to the Philippines are backsliding. Autocracies such as China and Russia are attempting to undermine democracies from within. And here in the United States, democratic institutions face an unprecedented series of threats from the very leaders chosen to safeguard democracy.
It is increasingly clear that the future of U.S. national security and a liberal democratic world depends on America embracing democratic values, locking arms with its democratic allies to stem the rise of authoritarianism, and growing the community of democratic nations. This is the focus of an upcoming Center for American Progress report, “Securing a Democratic World: The Case for a Democratic Values-Driven U.S. Foreign Policy.”
To discuss the state of U.S. support for democracy around the world, the importance of democratic values in foreign policy, and what the United States should do going forward, please join CAP for a conversation with former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.
Sen. Chris Murphy (D-CT) will share his perspective on the importance of democratic values in American foreign policy in a keynote address.
Speakers:
Keynote Remarks: Sen. Chris Murphy (D-CT)
Madeleine K. Albright – former U.S. Secretary of State
Kelly Magsamen – Vice President, National Security and International Policy, Center for American Progress
4. After Elections, What’s Next for Pakistan? | Thursday, September 6, 2018 | 9:30 am – 1:00 pm | United States Institute of Peace | Register Here
With the votes now counted and new assembly members sworn in, Pakistan’s July 25th elections have ushered in a change of civilian governments and a new coalition led by the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf party and its leader Imran Khan. Opposing parties, particularly the previous national incumbent party, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, and the Pakistan People’s Party, have challenged the election results with claims of rigging, intimidation, and military influence.
Join USIP on September 6th for two panels that will explore the election results, the factors that influenced them, as well as looking forward towards their implications for the new government – its opportunities, challenges, and the future of Pakistan’s democracy. The first panel will examine the main electoral outcomes, including the role of gender, political parties and opposition forces in the election. The second panel will address the influence of actors outside the formal electoral system, including the role of the judiciary, military, religious parties, and electoral violence dynamics. Speakers will include academic experts and policy professionals. Join the conversation on Twitter with #USIPPakistan.
Agenda
9:30am – 11:00am – Panel 1: Analyzing the Main Electoral Results
- Colin Cookman – Program Officer, U.S. Institute of Peace
- Sarah Khan – Postgraduate Associate, Yale University
- Mariam Mufti – Assistant Professor, University of Waterloo
- Sahar Shafqat – Professor, St. Mary’s College of Maryland
- Moderator: Jumaina Siddiqui, Senior Program Officer, U.S. Institute of Peace
11:15am – 12:45pm – Panel 2: Analyzing the Non-electoral Factors
- Sahar Khan – Visiting Research Fellow, CATO Institute
- Yasser Kureshi – PhD Candidate, Brandeis University
- Niloufer Siddiqui – Assistant Professor, University of Albany
- Joshua White – Associate Professor, Johns Hopkins University
- Moderator: Tamanna Salikuddin, Senior Program Officer, U.S. Institute of Peace
5. The Enablers: How Western Professionals Import Corruption and Strengthen Authoritarianism | Thursday, September 6, 2018 | 10:00 am – 11:30 am | Hudson Institute | Register Here
As globalization began breaking down divisions between Western elites and their counterparts in the Eastern hemisphere, some American legal, financial, and communications professionals sought new opportunities among clients with fortunes of dubious provenance.But instead of carrying the rule of law into corrupt societies, networking between U.S. professional services providers and kleptocrats linked to authoritarian regimes has undermined American values, democracy, and national security. Some of the most distinguished and influential professions have become importers of dirty money and underhand practices.
On September 6, 2018, join Hudson Institute’s Kleptocracy Initiative for a discussion of “The Enablers: How Western Professionals Import Corruption and Strengthen Authoritarianism,” a new report examining what policies are needed to close the loopholes commonly exploited by foreign kleptocrats and their professional facilitators in the United States.
Speakers:
Charles Davidson – Executive Director, Kleptocracy Initiative, Hudson Institute; Publisher, The American Interest
Elise Bean – Former Staff Director and Chief Counsel, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, U.S. Senate
Mark Hays – Anti-Money Laundering Campaign Leader, Global Witness
Ben Judah – Research Fellow, Kleptocracy Initiative, Hudson Institute
Nate Sibley – Program Manager, Kleptocracy Initiative, Hudson Institute
6. The Future of the U.S.-Turkey Relationship in the Trump Administration | Thursday, September 6, 2018 | 11:00 am – 12:30 pm | Turkish Heritage Organization | The City Club of Washington – President Room, 555 13th Street NW, Washington, DC 20004 | Register Here
The mutual endorsement of the Manbij roadmap was a positive step forward, since then the relations between the U.S. and Turkey have been nothing but hostile. From Pastor Andrew Brunson being rejected an appeal for release, U.S. sanctioning two Turkish officials and imposing tariffs on Turkish goods, Turkey reciprocating in the same manner with freezing assets of two U.S. officials, as well as ordering sanctions against U.S. products. Meanwhile, Congress has delayed the delivery of F-35s to Turkey. With a number of major developments in the relationship of the two strategic allies, we ask ourselves what comes next?
Please join THO on Thursday, September 6 to hear from our distinguished panel of experts as they analyze the Future of the U.S.-Turkey Relationship.
Speakers:
Moderator: Dr. Mark Meirowitz – Associate Professor, SUNY Maritime College; THO Advisory Board Member
Joel Rubin – Former Deputy Assistant Secretary for House Affairs, State Department
Molly Montgomery – VP at Albright Stonebridge Group, Former State Department and White House Senior Official
Akif Kirecci (via Skype) – President, Ankara Center for Political and Economic Research (ASEM)
7. War or Peace: The Struggle for World Power | Thursday, September 6, 2018 | 12:00 pm – 1:00 pm | Heritage Foundation | Register Here
The Pax Americana – the global order established after the collapse of the Soviet Empire – is increasingly being challenged especially by former imperial behemoths China and Russia. There is a growing chorus questioning the so-called “Washington Consensus” in favor of a “Beijing Consensus” in economic policy. As the United States ceases to be the sole superpower willing and able to maintain a global PAX, today there is an increasing global “disorder.”
Deepak Lal offers a study of the causes and consequences for this disorder, examining alternative claims for a desirable future economic policy. He argues that the origins of this increasing disorder lie, in part, in the great economic recession of 2008 in the United States, which has tarnished the free market based capitalism of the West. He examines how the U.S. (and its European outpost, the E.U), China, Russia, India and, potentially, Japan will be involved in this new “Great Game” and how their strategic decisions will determine whether we see a repeat of the past, with potentially another completely unnecessary world war, or if they will succeed in avoiding a reversion to their earlier types.
8. Rethinking Human Rights and Islam | Thursday, September 6, 2018 | 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm | Atlantic Council | Register Here
Please join the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East for the launch of a new report, “The Islamic Tradition, Human Rights Discourse & Muslim Communities,” and a wide-ranging discussion of human rights issues facing Muslim communities around the world.
From the niqab ban in Denmark, to de-facto bans on freedom of expression in some Muslim majority countries, to the so-called Muslim Ban in the United States, Muslim communities around the world are faced with numerous challenges to human rights and attacks on personal freedoms. Still, contemporary conversations on Islam often question the compatibility of Islamic and Western values. Today, with millions of Muslims on the receiving end of numerous human rights violations at the hands of both Muslim majority and non-Muslim states, the current discourse is proving to be outdated and restrictive.
With generous support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, Atlantic Council Nonresident Senior Fellow Dr. H.A. Hellyer engaged dozens of scholars, grassroots activists, and religious leaders on four continents on issues surrounding the human rights discourse and Muslim communities worldwide. The content of these critical engagements is captured in the new report: “The Islamic Tradition, Human Rights Discourse & Muslim Communities.”
To examine the issues addressed in the report, the Atlantic Council will bring together a panel of experts to discuss and offer their own perspectives on rethinking the dominant narrative on human rights and Islam.
Speakers:
Moderator: Adbul-Rehman Malik – Associate on Middle East Studies, Coordinator of the Muslim Social Justice Leadership Lab at the Dwight Hall Center for Social Justice, Yale University
Dr. Hisham A. Hellyer – Nonresident Senior Fellow, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Atlantic Council
Dr. Dalia Fahmy – Associate Professor of Political Science, Long Island University
Dr. Mohammad Fadel – Associate Professor, Canada Research Chair, Law & Economics of Islamic Law, University of Toronto
Dr. Peter Mandaville – Professor of International Affairs, George Mason University ; Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution
9. Iran and Al Qa’ida: The View from Abottabad | Friday, September 7, 2018 | 12:15 pm – 1:45 pm | New America | Register Here
In May 2018, President Trump announced that the Iran deal would be terminated. In doing so he accused Iran of supporting Al Qa‘ida. But what is the true relationship between Iran and Al Qa‘ida? In her new report Al-Qa‘ida’s Contested Relationship With Iran: The View from Abbottabad, New America Senior Fellow Nelly Lahoud cuts through the politicized discourse with an examination of almost 300 of Al Qa‘ida’s own documents regarding its relationship with Iran.
Nelly Lahoud is a Senior Fellow with New America’s International Security Program. She holds a Ph.D. from the Research School of Social Sciences — Australian National University. Her research has focused on the evolution and ideology of Al-Qa’ida (AQ) and the ‘Islamic State’ (ISIS/ISIL). She was previously an associate professor at the Department of Social Sciences and senior associate at the Combating Terrorism Center at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point; and assistant professor of political theory, including Islamic political thought, at Goucher College.
Join the conversation online using #AQIran and following @NewAmericaISP.
Moderator: Peter Bergen – Vice President, New America; Director, International Security Program, New America
Speaker: Nelly Lahoud – Senior Fellow, New America International Security Program; Author, Al-Qa’ida’s Contested Relationship with Iran: The View from Abottabad
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Tags :
Al Qaeda, Authoritarianism, China, Democracy and Rule of Law, Election, Human Rights, Iran, Islam, Pakistan, Peace, Terrorism, Turkey, United States
Those who favor a still ill-defined but all too real “border correction/land swap” between Serbia and Kosovo are justifying it on grounds that it would be legal. I think they are right: I don’t know of anything that prohibits sovereign states from exchanging territory and people, even if it has not been done a lot lately. But let’s be clear about two things:
- The swap would exchange human beings as well as the land they live on. That’s fine for the Serbs in northern Kosovo and the Albanians in southern Serbia. But there are also Albanians who live in the parts of northern Kosovo Serbia wants, and Serbs who live in the parts of southern Serbia that Kosovo wants. Tens of thousands are going to end up moving.
- Mutual recognition of sovereignty and territorial integrity would have to come before the exchange. A state not recognized as sovereign would be crazy to attempt a swap with a non-recognizer.
The arguments against the land swap are not legal. They are practical and realist.
Defenders of the proposition on the Pristina side are saying it would also have to include UN membership. That is something Belgrade cannot guarantee. Only the permanent members of the Security Council could do so. I haven’t heard anything yet that suggests Russia or China is prepared to let Kosovo’s UN membership through the Security Council. Russia will seek a quid pro quo, most likely US recognition of the annexation of Crimea as well as the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Russian puppet states inside Georgia. China will hesitate because of what it perceives as Tibetan independence aspirations. The only thing worse than Kosovo independence for Beijing would be rearranging its territory on an ethnic basis.
There are also good reasons inside Serbia and Kosovo to doubt that this swap is viable. Kosovo’s main water supply is in the Serb-controlled north. Would it be prepared to see that transferred to Serbia? Serbia’s main outlet to the sea is the north/south road through southern Serbia to Thessaloniki. The Serbian army has always wanted to keep not only the road but as much territory surrounding it as possible. Are the generals suddenly willing to give in?
Any land/people swap would also raise questions about the Serb population in Kosovo south of the Ibar river, where the majority live close by the most important Serb religious sites. That population is already aging. A land swap would undermine any confidence the Kosovo Serbs south of the Ibar have in their future. It would also create temptations for radical nationalist Albanians, since they will see any land swap as prelude to union with Albania, which is what the political movement that got the second largest number of votes in the last Kosovo election wants. That movement has split, but a land swap will vastly increase the appeal of its more radical faction.
I hardly need rehearse again all the other arguments against the swap proposition: Russian President Putin would welcome it. The liberal democratic ideals of the EU and US would be weakened. Not to mention that it would put Bosnia and Herzegovina at serious risk: Republika Srpska President Dodik has made it clear he is prepared to declare independence if a land swap occurs. Serbia won’t recognize the RS as independent because that would destroy its EU ambition, but Dodik won’t care. He’ll be happy to rule a Russian-sponsored satrapy like South Ossetia and Abkhazia, so long as Moscow provides the needed rubles.
What is the alternative to a land swap? Kosovo and Serbia need to institute the political and economic reforms required for EU membership. That is far more urgent, and popular in both countries, than a land swap. The closer Serbia gets to EU membership, the greater the pressure it will feel to recognize Kosovo, without a land/people swap. That’s good enough for me.
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