Month: October 2018
Trapped
Secretary of State Pompeo spent Tuesday in Riyadh, where he helped the King and Crown Prince shore up their claim that they knew nothing of the disappearance of Jamal Khashoggi from the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. The King’s ignorance may be believable. Mohammed bin Salman’s is not, if the Turkish claim is true that members of his security entourage were among the Saudis who assembled at the consulate the day Khashoggi was killed and left quickly thereafter. We’ll need to await the official results of the Turkish investigation to be sure of that.
But what we know already is that the US administration has chosen to back the Saudi monarchy to the hilt. It needs the Kingdom for its efforts to counter Iran, fight Sunni extremists, keep oil prices down in the runup to next month’s election, and deliver the Palestinians to a less than satisfactory peace agreement with Israel. Even an American administration less concerned about arms sales and Saudi investments in Trump real estate might hesitate to lower the boom on the Saudis.
President Trump is all in with the Kingdom. He insists on the presumption of innocence and echoes the possibility it was a “rogue operation,” underlining as well that Jamal was a Saudi subject, not a US citizen. Trump says he wants to know what happened, but he hasn’t backed the Khashoggi family call for an international investigation. His interest in protecting journalists from the wave of violence engulfing much of the world is minimal. They are, after all, just “enemies of the people.” He wants this whole thing to blow over as quickly as possible.
Many in Congress on both sides of the aisle are saying they won’t let it happen. Some are calling for the Crown Prince’s head to roll (figuratively, not literally). Others want sanctions, freezing or ditching of arms deals, an end to US support for the war in Yemen, or withdrawal of the US ambassador. Conveniently, there is none–the Deputy Chief of Mission is Charge’ d’affaires. It would not be wise to leave the embassy in the hands of anyone below that level, not least because good communication with the Saudis is vital no matter what Washington decides to do.
None of this is likely to happen anyway. Foreign policy is largely a presidential prerogative. Trump likes the Saudis, who gave him a rousing welcome on his first trip overseas (remember the sword dance?). He also needs them. Son-in-law Jared Kushner’s peace plan isn’t likely to float no matter what, but without the Saudi backing it is nothing. Pushback against Iran using what has come to be termed an “Arab NATO” is meaningless without the Kingdom out front. Ditto the fight against Sunni extremism. The Saudis delivered $100 million for reconstruction in the US-occupied area of eastern Syria the day Pompeo arrived in Riyadh. Oil prices could go to $100 and more just before the November 6 election if the Saudis let it happen. They threatened as much the day after the word “sanctions” was uttered in Washington.
The American administration is trapped by its own objectives into supporting the King and Crown Prince, trying to minimize the fallout from Jamal’s disappearance, and forging ahead to ensure that the Kingdom remains the linchpin of Gulf security. We could still see some movement in Congress, perhaps in favor of an independent international investigation. But neither the monarchy nor the president would want that to happen.
I knew and liked Jamal Khashoggi, who struck me as someone genuinely supportive of the governing system in Saudi Arabia while advocating more space for freedom of expression. Even if he were a complete stranger, I would find it hard to imagine how anyone would want to do him harm for what he wrote in the Washington Post and elsewhere. If the current Turkish-leaked reports are true, or anything like them, what happened is simply unacceptable and those responsible should be held accountable.
The Americans aren’t the only ones who have trapped themselves: the Saudis have too, in a system that is unable to tolerate even moderate criticism. I hesitate to say dissent because Jamal was far from qualifying as a dissident, even if he expressed doubts about the wisdom of some royal decisions. At least in public and in private conversation, he accepted the Saudi governing system but wanted it to open up. The women who have been imprisoned for organizing the protests against the ban on driving are of the same ilk. For all our sakes, I hope the Kingdom will use this tragedy, whatever its reality turns out to be, to reflect on what is truly needed for state security, and what measures taken in the name of security are not only wrong but may cause serious harm. The Americans should join them in that reflection.
PS: Here is the The Heat episode I participated in on this subject yesterday:
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Iran’s offensive defense
The International Institute for Strategic Studies hosted a panel of experts on Iran’s Regional Posture October 11. The panel consisted of Dina Esfandiary, fellow at the Century Foundation, Ambassador Barbara A. Leaf, former ambassador to the United Arab Emirates and visiting fellow at the Washington Institute, and Ali Vaez, Iran Project Director of the International Crisis Group.
Panelists revisited the nature and role of Iran today, dissecting Iran’s motivations, threats, and constraints, beyond traditional perspectives that privilege analyses based on American interests. With ethno-sectarian conflicts raging in Syria and Yemen as well as a tense political transition in Iraq, the Saudi-led Gulf states and Iran, the region’s major actors, have been embroiled in a competition of political and strategic influence.
But is it that simple? Esfandiary sought to move beyond polarity. She pointed out that Iran is not simply vying for power, but seeks to preserve its territorial integrity against Western and Gulf nations it views as aggressive. As a main center of Shi’a Islam, Iran sees itself as entitled to regional influence. Esfandiary elaborated that while religion was a foreign policy driver for the post-Revolution state’s early years, the Iranian government now leans towards nationalism as a better way to unify the nation’s people and frame its foreign policy endeavors. Elaborating on this point, Leaf said that Iran’s posture should be understood as an offensive defense, a response to the US presence and support of both the Israelis and the Saudis, which it sees as a threats to its territorial integrity and legitimate involvement in Arab affairs.
Iraq, Esfandiary said, is Iran’s highest regional priority. Tehran seeks a central government in Baghdad aligned with its interests. However, with the election of Barham Salih as Iraq’s new President, and his selection of Adel Abdul Mahdi as Prime Minister, many analysts have signaled a turn in Iraq away from the rigid ethno-sectarian politics that have dominated the post-invasion landscape. With many Iraqis disillusioned by dysfunctional governance resulting from proxy politics, Iran’s ability to sway the new government’s formation and the future of the nation’s politics are limited. Esfandiary further identified the Syrian civil conflict as Iran’s second priority, and the conflict in Yemen as its last priority, questioning whether Iran has a long-term strategic goal in Yemen at all. Leaf agreed, with Iraq as Iran’s greatest concern given the election year.
Invoking Iran’s Hezbollah model, Leaf listed the three major instruments in Iran’s toolbox:
- Creating and directing splintered proxy groups, preferably local actors, to shape civil conflicts as Tehran sees fit. In particular, supporting and directing Shiite militias in Syria and Iraq.
- Increasing its defense and intelligence architecture in Syria, part of its corridor to Israel and the Mediterranean.
- Exploiting disordered Arab states with sizeable Shi’a minorities.
Vaez added Iran’s nuclear program as another instrument of the state’s offensive defense strategy in the region: a deterrent to nuclear Israel and the aggressive Gulf states, all supported by the US.
Underscoring the constraints of current containment policies, Vaez underlined that Trump was misguided in withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal. While the goal is to deprive Iran of resources through sanctions, Iran’s regional proxy operations are not strongly correlated to sanctions, citing 2011 as a year in which Iran was able to expand its proxy operations while under increased pressure from multilateral sanctions.
With another round of harsher sanctions going into effect on November 4, Vaez fears that in the unlikely scenario of effective sanctions, Iran’s political system and elite will welcome a crisis, whipping up nationalist sentiment and acting in a less risk-averse manner throughout the region. Leaf, who submitted testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Subcomittee on Terrorism, Non-Proliferation, and Trade in support of sanctions, brought up this fear in encouraging the committee to avoid mistiming sanctions, lest they strengthen Iranian nationalism.
For Esfandiary, the Gulf Arab states’ insistence that Iran pull out as a precondition for negotiations is one of the biggest constraints in reducing conflicts in Yemen and Syria. She argued that Yemen could have been ideal for negotiations with Iran, which has made it clear it is willing to negotiate. Leaf echoed this sentiment, stating that while the fractured Gulf states have tried to bring the Houthis to the negotiating table via Oman, only Tehran can succeed. Iran has been reckless in supporting the Houthis, rapidly transferring military training and technology to them. But the Houthis are independent, often operating against Iranian wishes as in their capture of both Sa’ana and Aden. Their relationship to Iran is very different from that of Hezbollah or other proxies. Further recklessness on the part of the Houthis, such as attacks on commercial ships, could be problematic for Iran.
All three panelists agreed that Iran’s image in the international sphere has improved significantly, regardless of its proxy activities. Esfandiary
and Vaez both pointed to the European Union’s effort to bypass US sanctions as well as the ICJ ruling in favor of Iran as indicators of a recovering international image. Despite the negative domestic impact of the war in Syria and Iraqi resistance to Iranian meddling, Iran appears uninterested in negotiating with the US in any capacity. Tehran instead is emphasizing its relationships with the EU, China, and Russia. Beijing and Moscow are especially important and have a higher level of familiarity with the Iranian economy than their Western counterparts.
Ultimately, Vaez warned of the need for a more inclusive security and intelligence architecture in the Middle East. The region needs a long-term strategy to escape the asymmetry and escalating armament in the region.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Peace Picks October 15-21
- Defusing the South China Sea Disputes: A Regional Blueprint | Monday, October 15, 2018 | 10 am – 12 pm | Center for Strategic and International Studies | 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
Please join us for the launch of Defusing the South China Sea Disputes: A Regional Blueprint by the CSIS Expert Working Group on the South China Sea, which brings together prominent experts on maritime law, international relations, and the marine environment from China, Southeast Asia, and beyond. Members of the group gathered three times between July 2017 and July 2018 to discuss issues that they consider necessary for the successful management of the South China Sea disputes, and produced blueprints for a path forward on each. The members believe these three proposed agreements add up to a robust model for managing the South China Sea disputes, one which would be both legally and politically feasible for all parties.
The working group includes a diverse set of 27 experts from claimant states and interested countries, including the United States. It is chaired by Gregory Poling, director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at CSIS. All members take part in their personal capacities, not as representatives of their home institutions. They are invited to join the group based on their subject matter expertise and willingness to reach creative compromises.
Agenda
Summary of Blueprints
Gregory B. Poling, Director, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, CSIS
Panel Discussion with Members
Bonnie S. Glaser, Senior Adviser for Asia and Director, China Power Project, CSIS
Prashanth Parameswaran, Senior Editor, The Diplomat
Amy Searight, Senior Adviser and Director, Southeast Asia Program, CSIS
This report was made possible by general funding to the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative.
2. The Evolving Iranian Strategy in Syria: A Looming Conflict with Israel | Wednesday, October 17, 2018 | 9 am – 10:30 am | Atlantic Council | 1030 15th St. NW, 12th Floor Washington, DC 20005 | Register Here
Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, the Iranian regime has spent considerable energy capitalizing on chaos in Syria to establish transit routes from Iran to the Mediterranean. Israel has followed the movements of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its proxies in Syria warily, laying out clear red lines to deter Iranian overreach. The IRGC-Quds Force rocket attack on Israeli military posts in the Golan in May 2018 instigated Israeli retaliation against Iranian-backed ground forces. Although Iran did not respond in kind, tensions along Israel’s northwestern border and in southern Syria persist, and the potential for an Israeli-Iranian conflict looms.
Please join the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft and Rafik Hariri Centers on Wednesday, October 17 from 9:00 a.m. to 10:30 a.m. for the launch of nonresident senior fellow Nader Uskowi’s issue brief on Iran’s evolving strategy in Syria and the implications for regional security. This discussion will focus on the possibility for future conflict between Iran and Israel as the Syrian conflict enters its next phase, as well as how the United States can adapt its own policies to reflect the altered power structure in the region.
A conversation with:
Nader Uskowi
Nonresident Senior Fellow
Atlantic Council
Assaf Orion
Military Fellow
Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Jennifer Cafarella
Director of Intelligence Planning
Institute for the Study of War
3. Championing the Frontlines of Freedom: Erasing the “Grey Zone” | Thursday, October 18, 2018 | 9 am – 4:30 pm | Atlantic Council | 1030 15th St NW, 12th Floor, Washington, DC | Register Here
The countries of Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine stand at a crossroads. Perched between Russia and the West, they have chosen a path of economic and political reform and closer relations with the West. They face substantial challenges dealing with the systemic legacy of the Soviet period as they pursue reform, while also confronting Kremlin interference in their affairs and occupation of their land. Once described as part of a geopolitical “grey zone,” these countries are working to instead be seen as states on the “frontlines of freedom” with futures as free, whole, and secure European states.
At this conference, the Atlantic Council will convene a group of experts to discuss topics such as the historical origins of the so-called “grey zone,” the Kremlin’s use of frozen conflicts, transatlantic policy toward the region, and democratic progress in these states.
This event will include a spotlight address from the Hon. A. Wess Mitchell, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, on US strategy in Central and Eastern Europe.
Agenda
Introduction
Mr. Damon Wilson, Executive Vice President, Atlantic Council
Keynote Remarks
The Hon. Roger Wicker, US Senator for Mississippi, US Senate
Address: The Historical Origins of the Frontlines of Freedom
Dr. Serhii Plokhii, Director, Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University
Address: “Grey Zone” Past and Future
The Hon. Kurt Volker, US Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations, US Department of State
Fireside Chat
Dr. Serhii Plokhii, Director, Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University
The Hon. Kurt Volker, US Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations, US Department of State
Moderated by: Mr. Mark Simakovsky, Senior Fellow, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council
Panel I: Frozen Conflicts and the Kremlin’s Agenda
Mr. Denis Cenusa, Researcher, Institut für Politikwissenschaft, Justus-Liebig-Universität
Ambassador John Herbst, Director, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council
Minister Tinatin Khidasheli, Former Defense Minister, Republic of Georgia
Ms. Maria Snegovaya, Adjunct Fellow, Center for European Policy and Analysis; Research Associate, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland
Ambassador James Warlick, Partner and Senior Policy Adviser, Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev & Partners
Moderated by: Dr. Michael Carpenter, Senior Director, Penn Biden Center for Diplomacy and Global Engagement; Senior Fellow, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council
Spotlight Address: Strategy in Central and Eastern Europe
The Hon. A. Wess Mitchell, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, US Department of State
Introduced by: Mr. Damon Wilson, Executive Vice President, Atlantic Council
Panel II: Transatlantic Policy Towards the Region
H.E. David Bakradze, Ambassador of Georgia to the United States
Mr. David Kramer, Senior Fellow, Vaclav Havel Program for Human Rights and Diplomacy, Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs, Florida International University
Mr. Alex Tiersky, Senior Policy Adviser, US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Mr. Damon Wilson, Executive Vice President, Atlantic Council
Moderated by: Ms. Melinda Haring, Editor, UkraineAlert, Atlantic Council
Panel III: Democratic Progress in the Frontlines of Freedom
Mr. Carl Gershman, President, National Endowment for Democracy
Dr. Laura Jewett, Senior Associate and Regional Director for Eurasia, National Democratic Institute
Mr. Stephen Nix, Regional Director, Eurasia, International Republican Institute
Moderated by: Ms. Eka Gigauri, Executive Director, Transparency International Georgia
4. Restraining Great Powers: Soft Balancing From Empires to the Global Era | Thursday, October 18, 2018 | 2 pm – 4 pm | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
Countering traditional notions of balance-of-power theory, smaller states have not joined together militarily to oppose the United States’ rising power at the end of the Cold War, Chinese aggression in the South China Sea, or Russian offensives along its Western border. Instead, balance-of-power politics has taken a different form.
In a new book, Restraining Great Powers: Soft Balancing from Empires to the Global Era, T.V. Paul argues that leading powers have engaged in “soft balancing,” which seeks to restrain threatening powers through the use of international institutions, informal alignments, and economic sanctions. Placing the evolution of balancing behavior in historical context, Paul examines how subtler forms of balance-of-power politics can help states achieve their goals against aggressive powers without wars or arms races. Paul will be joined in conversation by Richard Fontaine and Ellen Laipson. Carnegie’s Ashley J. Tellis will moderate. Copies of the book will be available for sale.
T.V. PAUL
T.V. Paul is James McGill Professor of International Relations in the department of Political Science at McGill University.
RICHARD FONTAINE
Richard Fontaine is the president of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS).
ELLEN LAIPSON
Ellen Laipson is the director of the Master’s in International Security degree program and the Center for Security Policy Studies at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University.
ASHLEY J. TELLIS
Ashley J. Tellis holds the Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs and is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
5. Breaking Rules to Build Peace: The Role of Leadership and Accountability in Peacebuilding | Thursday, October 18, 2018 | 3 pm – 5 pm | US Institute of Peace | 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20037 | Register Here
Why do peacebuilders sometimes succeed and sometimes fail, even within the same country? Why can organizations not guarantee the same results from the same policies? Peacebuilders struggle to answer these questions and create programs with consistently positive results. Join the U.S. Institute of Peace as we discuss policy recommendations drawn from new research highlighting unexpected solutions to a long-standing challenge.
Organizations that work to build peace in fragile states often fail to meet the stated goals of the programs they design to resolve violent conflict. In her newly published book, Global Governance and Local Peace: Accountability and Performance in International Peacebuilding, Susanna Campbell dives into why peacebuilding organizations often fail and presents one of the keys to success: local actors that force organizations to stay accountable to local peacebuilding goals. Join experts as they discuss Campbell’s findings and how country-based staff can sidestep normal accountability procedures and empower local actors to push for innovative solutions to local problems.
Speakers
Susanna Campbell
Assistant Professor, School of International Service, American University
Michael Barnett
Professor, International Affairs and Political Science, The George Washington University
Mike Jobbins
Senior Director of Partnerships and Engagement, Search for Common Ground
Kate Somvongsiri
Acting Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency for International Development
Leanne Erdberg, moderator
Director, Countering Violent Extremism, The U.S. Institute of Peace
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Jamal’s fate
We still don’t know precisely what Jamal Khashoggi’s fate is: was he abducted in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul? Did he die there or elsewhere? Was he murdered or was his death unintentional?
What we know is that he has disappeared. The last sighting was his entry into the consulate. That makes his fate an issue for the Saudis to clarify. They haven’t bothered. Beyond denying responsibility for his disappearance, Riyadh has said almost nothing.
Others are saying a lot. President Trump, while declaring he will get to the bottom of the disappearance, initially emphasized that Jamal was not a US citizen and that his (grossly exaggerated) $110 billion in arms sales to Riyadh will have to go ahead no matter what. Under pressure, the President is now promising “severe punishment” if Saudi Arabia killed Khashoggi. The Congress is pressing the Administration for an investigation and threatening sanctions against Saudi Arabia.
Turkey is busily leaking videos of suspicious movements of Saudis into and out of Istanbul and the consulate, as well as letting on that they have audio and video of what happened inside the consulate. Jamal’s Washington Post employers and many other news outlets are devoting valuable space to insisting on clarification and expressing their dismay that it has not been forthcoming. Many Washington think-tank colleagues are publishing vociferous protests and testimonials to a courageous journalist.
The paucity of hard facts makes it difficult to say more. Ankara and Riyadh have agreed to a joint committee to pursue the investigation. But there is little likelihood it will come up with anything if the Saudis don’t want it to. That perhaps is the most damning signal at present. If Jamal were alive, or had left the consulate alive, why would Saudi Arabia not have demonstrated that already?
The brouhaha over Jamal’s disappearance is unlikely to amount to much more than verbal protest. Turkey can do little damage to Saudi Arabia, with which it is already at odds. The Trump Administration has wedded itself to the Kingdom, which it needs for the campaign against Iran. Washington still has lots of issues with Turkey, even after the release Friday of an American pastor arrested two years ago. Trump will stick with the Kingdom as his favored ally in the Gulf. He has no real alternative.
The larger significance of Jamal’s still undetermined fate is this: the spirit of open inquiry and freedom of expression that he practiced and championed is evaporating. Russia’s use of chemical weapons against “turncoats” in Britain, Duterte’s murderous rampage against drug dealers in the Philippines, Iran’s arming of Hizbollah, the Houthis, and Shia militias in Syria and Iraq, and Trump’s denunciations of the press as “enemies of the people” are creating new norms: states can violently attack their opponents whenever and wherever they like. Unless they are caught red-handed murdering innocents, the consequences are likely to be minimal. Maybe I should say even if they are caught red-handed.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Video of the week
This somewhat skeptical Washington Post version of the Turkish-provided videos purporting relevance to Jamal Khashoggi’s disappearance is worth a look:
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Differing agendas
Delvin Kovač of the online Vijesti.ba asked questions; I responded:
- Kako biste ocijenili rezultate Općih izbora u Bosni i Hercegovini?
SERWER: Rezultati još uvijek nisu potvrđeni, ali nisu bili ni dobri. Imam osjećaj da oni predstavljaju volju većine Bosanaca, koji se ipak ne slažu oko mnogo čega. U FBiH je došlo do značajnog usitnjavanja političke scene, ali mi je i dalje nejasno šta će to značiti za formiranje vlasti, koje je u parlamentarnim sistemima često otežano i prolongirano.
2. U naredne četiri godine dužnost članova Predsjedništva BiH obnašat će Šefik Džaferović, Željko Komšić i Milorad Dodik. Vaš komentar?
SERWER: Kao i na prethodnim izborima u BiH, rezultati su bili dvosmisleni. U Predsjedništvo su se vratili ljudi sa vrlo različitim programima. Dodik i Komšić su na suprotnim krajevima nacionalnog političkog spektra. Džaferović se, pod pretpostavkom da će nastaviti Izetbegovićevom linijom, nalazi negdje između.
3. Kakva budućnost očekuje BiH s Dodikom u njenom Predsjedništvu? Smatrate li da će on blokirati put BiH ka evropskim i NATO integracijama?
SERWER: Dodik će učiniti sve što je u njegovoj moći da odvoji Republiku Srpsku, ali će to raditi djelomično pokušavajući i pripremiti RS za članstvo u EU. Stoga se nada da će pridobiti simpatije i podršku u Briselu za ideju o odvajanju RS-a od FBiH. Neće ništa učiniti u pogledu članstva BiH u NATO-u i pokušat će da to spriječi ukoliko nekim čudom dođe do takvog scenarija.
Šta bi po Vašem mišljenju mogao biti naredni potez Dodikovog koalicionog partnera Dragana Čovića, nakon što je poražen u trci za člana Predsjedništva BiH iz reda hrvatskog naroda?
SERWER: Pretpostavljam da će Čović pokušati koristiti poziciju HDZ-a da bude kočničar. Ustav BiH pruža mu mnoge mogućnosti u tom pogledu.
Here it is in English:
1. How did you see the Bosnian 2018 elections results in general?
Results still aren’t confirmed, but they weren’t pretty. My sense so far is that they represent the will of most Bosnians, who don’t agree on a lot of things. There was considerable scatter to non-major parties in the Federation. It is not clear to me yet what this will mean for government formation, which is often difficult and prolonged in parliamentary systems.
2. In the next four years, we will have Željko Komšić, Šefik Džaferović and Milorad Dodik as it’s tripartite Presidency members? What is your comment?
Like previous elections in Bosnia, the results were ambiguous: for the presidency, they returned people with very different agendas. Dodik and Komsic are at opposite ends of the ethnic nationalism political spectrum. Dzaferovic, assuming he will continue Izetbegovic’s line, is somewhere in between.
3. How bright is Bosnian future with Milorad Dodik being member of it’s Presidency? Do you think he is going to try and block Bosnia and Herzegovina on it’s path towards European union and NATO integrations?
Dodik will do everything he can to establish RS’s separateness, but he will do that in part by trying to prepare the RS for EU membership. He thereby hopes to win sympathy and support in Brussels for the idea of separating from the Federation. He will do nothing for NATO membership and try to obstruct it if by some miracle it starts to happen.
4. Since Dodik’s coallition partner Dragan Čović lost the elections and is no more a Presidency member, what do you think will be the next Čović’s move?
I assume Covic will try to use the HDZ’s position as a spoiler. The Bosnian constitution may provide him with ample opportunities to do that.
RSS - Posts
