Month: November 2018
National defense strategy
Johns Hopkins SAIS Wednesday hosted the release of the new congressionally-mandated report on the 2018 National Defense Strategy. The report was presented and discussed by the commission’s co-chairs, Ambassador Eric Edelman, Roger Hertog Distinguished Practitioner-in-Residence at SAIS’s Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies, and Admiral Gary Roughead, USN (Ret.), Robert and Marion Oster Distinguished Military Fellow at the Hoover Institution. The discussion was moderated by Eliot Cohen, SAIS Vice Dean for Education and Academic Affairs.
1. Great power competition
The strategy focused primarily on China and Russia, laying out plans for competition with them, and contingencies for the possibility of war. US national defense strategy has come a long way since the last edition in 2014 towards accepting the return of great power competition. Iran, North Korea, and international terrorism were noted as problem areas requiring continued focus, but took a backseat to China and Russia in the discussion.
The US Could Lose a State-to-State War
One striking observation of the report was the uncertainty that the US would win in a full-scale war against Russia in the Balkans or against China in Taiwan. Until recently US policy was shaped by the assurance that superior technology granted us total control in the air and at sea. However, poor investment and upkeep on the part of the US paired with smart investments by China and Russia have shrunk the technology gap to the point where the US could feasibly lose a state-to-state conflict.
2. Technology change
Since the end of the Cold War the US has increased the military’s workload, from the war on terror to interventions in civil wars and natural disasters worldwide. While military spending has also increased, the defense strategy frames these increases as insufficient. Investment in new technologies has been hampered by the deadlock in US politics. Failure by Congress to hammer out new national security budgets has led to several continuing resolutions (CRs) over the past few years. These CRs impede the ability of the military to flexibly invest in new technology and equipment.
New technology entails risk
The net result is that the Department of Defense has adapted by trimming the fat from all investments, hoping to eliminate any “risky” spending in favor of sure bets. But reducing risk cuts investment in innovation, as it is impossible to create the next generation of military technology it. Meanwhile private sector investment in new technologies has exploded, meaning that advanced capabilities are available to anyone who has the money to pay for them. The result is that America’s military, modernized in the 1980s, has made little technological progress since then. It has ceded ground to both the private sector and our adversaries.
The call for redoubled investment extended to the need for recapitalization of America’s nuclear arsenal. Roughead emphasized that in an era of renewed great power competition, it is vital for America’s nuclear arsenal to be second to none. China and Russia have been busy modernizing, while the US has neglected even basic upkeep.
Edelman discussed the need to plan for the possibility that the US could be sucked into wars with both Russia and China at the same time. The drastic nature of this scenario only heightens the need to consider it, including its implications for America’s economy and society. They would have to be mobilized in a way they haven’t been since World War II.
The changing nature of military technology also creates new policy considerations for the economy. Questions include whether and to what degree tech companies should be required to cooperate with the Department of Defense, and whether the increasingly interconnected nature of military technology will require other countries to choose between American weapons systems or, say, Russian ones, when previously it was possible to mix and match.
3. Civilian – military imbalance
Finally the panelists highlighted the concern expressed within the 2018 strategy regarding the imbalance of power between civilian and military voices in charge of the military. Control has increasingly gone to the Joint Staff, while civilian positions such as in the Office of the Secretary of Defense have gone chronically understaffed. Without even tackling the larger disparity between the Department of Defense and the largely absent State Department, the commission believed this imbalance to be a glaring flaw within the national security system, which must soon be addressed.
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Trump is right
Donald Trump said earlier this week about the Middle East:
Now, are we going to stay in that part of the world? One reason is Israel. Oil is becoming less and less of a reason because we’re producing more oil now than we’ve ever produced. So, you know, all of a sudden it gets to a point where you don’t have to stay there.
This is more sensible than 99% of what the man says, even if I think Israel can more than take care of itself. But the main reason for US military deployments in the Middle East is oil, which is far less important than it was in the 1970s and 1980s. That is what prompted President Carter’s 1980 pledge to defend the flow of oil from the Gulf:
Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.
President Carter’s Doctrine was a response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which he feared presaged a thrust towards the Gulf. The Soviet Union is gone, Afghanistan is a mess, and the US economy is now far less dependent on oil imports and energy of all sorts than it was in 1980. The Gulf oil producers, especially Saudi Arabia, are far more dependent on oil exports, which they send predominantly to Asia, especially China, Japan, India, and South Korea.
The US nevertheless spends about 12% of the Pentagon budget on protecting the flow of oil from the Gulf and holds a Strategic Petroleum Reserve of well over 100 days of imports, thus protecting our principal economic competitors from the effects of an oil supply disruption while they free ride on our preparations. It is true of course that an oil supply disruption would also affect the US economy, since oil prices are set in a global market and US consumers would feel the price hike in imports of goods of all sorts. But changed circumstances should affect burden-sharing: we need to do less and other oil consumers need to do more.
There are other ways in which the Middle East merits lower priority for American foreign policy. Middle East terrorism now has little impact on Americans both at home, where right-wing attackers are far more common than Islamic ones, and abroad, where relatively few Americans have suffered harm, most of them either by sheer accident or by travel into known danger zones. Nuclear proliferation is still an issue, but mainly a self-inflicted one due to American withdrawal from the nuclear deal with Iran, which is far from the giant threat the Administration is portraying it as. Even if that were not true, American deployments in the Gulf are far too close to Iran for war-fighting purposes. We would need to move them farther away in order to use them in an attack.
The problem is that withdrawal from the Middle East is as problematic as intervention there. That is what President Obama demonstrated. His restraint in Libya, Syria, and Yemen left vacuums filled by jihadis, Iranians, and Gulfies. The results have been catastrophic for each of the states in question. Intervention by middling powers without multilateral authorization and on one side or the other in a civil war is known to have little chance of success and to prolong conflicts. Where the US re-committed its forces in Iraq, whose state was in far better shape than those in Libya, Syria, or Yemen, the results were far more salutary, even if not completely satisfactory.
Part of the problem for the US is lack of diplomatic capacity. American diplomacy has become far too dependent, both physically and strategically, on military presence. Military withdrawal requires a diplomatic posture that can be sustained without the troops. Many other countries by necessity have learned the trick of hitting above their military weight with diplomatic capacity. Witness an extreme example like Norway, or a less dramatic one like Germany. These are countries that lead with their diplomatic and economic clout, not with their troops, ships and planes.
There has been to my knowledge no serious discussion of the difficulties of withdrawal and how they can be met. Part of solution lies in beefing up the political, economic, and cultural capacities of American diplomacy. But withdrawal will remain perilous anyplace a legitimate, inclusive, well-functioning state does not exist. Statebuilding has gotten a really bad name from the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, but it remains a vital component of any effort to reduce US commitments abroad. About that, both Trump and Obama have been wrong.
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Peace Picks November 26 – December 2
- How to Rehabilitate and Reintegrate Violent Extremists | Tuesday, November 27 | 10 am – 12 pm | United States Institute of Peace | 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20037 | Register Here
As the loss of ISIS territory drives thousands of “foreign terrorist fighters” to return home, and hundreds of people convicted of terrorism-related offenses are scheduled for release over the next several years, communities worldwide are faced with rehabilitating and reintegrating people disengaging from violent extremism. Often returning to the same environments and social networks that facilitated violent radicalization initially, significant psychosocial and other support will be key to addressing trauma, reducing stigma, and guarding against recidivism.
The trauma- and stigma-related barriers to help-seeking behavior, prosocial interactions, and social healing are new challenges to preventing and countering violent extremism. While there is increasing consensus on the urgency of systematic rehabilitation and reintegration programs, a realistic or concrete proposition of just what such mechanisms might look like, and how they might operate, has not been put forward. Join USIP for a discussion of how policies and programs can address trauma and reduce stigma to foster cross-cutting affiliations and social learning, enable rehabilitation, and ease reintegration for people disengaging from extremist violence.
Panelists
Jesse Morton
Founder and Co-director, Parallel Networks, and co-author of the forthcoming report, “When Terrorists Come Home: The Need for Rehabilitating and Reintegrating America’s Convicted Jihadists”
Dr. James Gordon
Founder and Executive Director, The Center for Mind-Body Medicine
Dr. Sousan Abadian
Franklin Fellow, Office of International Religious Freedom, Department of State
Stacey Schamber
Senior Program Officer, International Civil Society Action Network
Colette Rausch, moderator
Senior Advisor, U.S. Institute of Peace
2. The Role of the Business Sector in Peacebuilding in Africa | Tuesday, November 27 | 10:30 am – 12 pm | Wilson Center | 1300 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Washington, DC 20004 | Register Here
Many traditional approaches to peacebuilding in Africa have emphasized the roles of government, civil society organizations, and multilateral international organizations over that of the private sector, specifically business. While the economic power of the business sector can help to reduce unemployment and increase economic opportunity—both key factors in conflict prevention—big business has also contributed to conflict and fragility in parts of the continent. However, there is an increasing awareness that businesses can play an important role in peacebuilding efforts, but the question of what this role is, and what it should be, needs further exploration. This event will examine the landscape of business sector efforts in conflict management and peacebuilding in Africa, including the key challenges and opportunities.
The discussion will explore the role that the business sector might play, including how to better and more effectively integrate the sector into peacebuilding frameworks and post-conflict reconstruction efforts. In addition to assessing the role of international corporations, the event will also discuss the role of the African business sector—including small and medium-sized enterprises and the informal sector—in peacebuilding, address the possibility of reimagining corporate social responsibility initiatives to more effectively contribute to peace, and discuss the potential for effective private-public partnerships. The event will also provide policy-oriented options to the business sector, as well as policymakers and practitioners, to make the business sector a more effective partner for peacebuilding in Africa.
Speakers
Introduction
- Jane Harman Director, President, and CEO, Wilson Center
- Mr. Eddie C. Brown, CFA Founder, Chairman and CEO, Brown Capital Management
Moderator
- Dr. Monde Muyangwa Africa Program Director
Speakers
- Dr. Raymond Gilpin Academic Dean at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University
- Ms. Mary Porter Peschka Director, Environment, Social and Governance, International Finance Corporation
- Ms. Viola Llewellyn Co-Founder and President, Ovamba Solutions, Inc.
- Mr. Stephen D. Cashin CEO and Founder, Pan African Capital Group, LLC
3. Europe in 2019 | Tuesday, November 27 | 2 pm – 3:30 pm | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
A multitude of challenges confront the EU in 2019. The Brexit deadline at the end of March, uncertainty over Italy’s economic situation, and the forthcoming European Parliament elections in May are key determinants shaping the direction of the European project. On top of these flashpoints, looming challenges such as the continued spread of populism and illiberalism, fragmentation of European cooperation, and a changing security landscape add further complexity. How European leaders address these developments over the course of the next year will have far-reaching consequences. Join a panel of experts to discuss the future of Europe and its wider implications.
FEDERIGA BINDInonresident scholar in the Europe Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace working on European politics, EU foreign policy, and transatlantic relations.
ERIK BRATTBERG director of the Europe Program and a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. He is an expert on European politics and security and transatlantic relations.
KAREN DONFRIED president of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Before assuming her current role in April 2014, Donfried was the special assistant to the president and senior director for European affairs on the National Security Council at the White House.
PIERRE VIMONTsenior fellow at Carnegie Europe. His research focuses on the European Neighborhood Policy, transatlantic relations, and French foreign policy.
JONATAN VSEVIOV Estonia’s ambassador to the United States since August 2018. This is his third diplomatic posting in Washington, DC.
4. Soft Power in a Sharp Power World: Countering Coercion and Information Warfare | Wednesday, November 28 | 9 am – 10 am | United States Institute of Peace | 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20037 | Register Here
Global adversaries, especially states like Russia, China and Iran, use sharp power tools of coercion, disinformation and proxy campaigns to achieve their geopolitical goals and weaken Western influence. This new way of doing business threatens the post-Cold War stability that fostered peace, freedom and development around the globe.
Former U.S. ambassadors Rep. Francis Rooney (R-FL) and Rep. Don Beyer (D-VA) will discuss their views on how soft power tools can and should be used to counter sharp power employed by global adversaries at USIP’s seventh Bipartisan Congressional Dialogue on Wednesday, November 28 from 9:00-10:00 a.m. Rep. Rooney is the vice chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and former U.S. ambassador to the Holy See. Rep. Beyer is the vice ranking member of the Science, Space and Technology Committee and former U.S. ambassador to Switzerland and Liechtenstein.
Speakers
Rep. Francis Rooney (R-FL)
19th Congressional District of Florida, U.S. House of Representatives
@RepRooney
Rep. Don Beyer (D-VA)
8th Congressional District of Virginia, U.S. House of Representatives
@RepDonBeyer
Nancy Lindborg, moderator
President, U.S. Institute of Peace
@nancylindborg
5. The Commission on the National Defense Strategy | Wednesday, November 28 | 9 am | Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies | 1740 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
The Dean’s Forum has partnered with Strategic Studies to host the Commission on the National Defense Strategy’s presentation of its newly released, congressionally-mandated report. Established by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, the NDS Commission, co-chaired by Eric Edelman and Gary Roughead, is a panel of bipartisan national security experts appointed by Congress to review and evaluate the NDS, which Secretary of Defense James Mattis announced in January 2018 at SAIS.
The Commission’s final report offers recommendations for ensuring the U.S. maintains the strong defense the American people deserve and expect, taking into account current and prospective circumstances as well as the broader geopolitical environment. Following opening remarks from Dr. Mara Karlin, Dr. Eliot Cohen will moderate a discussion with the Commission’s co-chairs on the report’s observations and recommendations.
Keynote Speakers
Ambassador Eric Edelman
Roger Hertog Distinguished Practitioner-in-Residence at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies, appointed by Rep. Mac Thornberry (R-TX) to the NDS Commission
Admiral Gary Roughead, USN (Ret.)
Robert and Marion Oster Distinguished Military Fellow at the Hoover Institution, appointed by Rep. Adam Smith (D-WA) to the NDS Commission
Moderator
Dr. Eliot Cohen
SAIS Vice Dean for Education and Academic Affairs and Robert E. Osgood Professor of Strategic Studies
Opening Remarks
Dr. Mara Karlin
Acting Director of the Strategic Studies Program and Executive Director of The Merrill Center for Strategic Studies
6. Building Peace from the Bottom Up | Thursday, November 29 | 10 am – 11:30 am | United States Institute of Peace | 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20037 | Register Here
Do postwar peacebuilding interventions work to keep peace? How do we measure the effectiveness of such international interventions? Join former USIP Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow Pamina Firchow as she discusses her findings on how to measure the impact of local-level interventions on communities affected by war.
Firchow shows in her book “Reclaiming Everyday Peace: Local Voices in Measurement and Evaluation after War” that efforts by international organizations to implement peacebuilding interventions are often ineffective, overly focused on reconstruction, governance, and development assistance while paying significantly less attention to rebuilding local community relations.
Firchow presents empirical evidence from villages in Uganda and Colombia on local level peacebuilding effectiveness using community generated indicators that reflect how people measure their own everyday peacefulness. Firchow develops a new way of establishing accountability of international and domestic actors to local populations and opening more effective channels of communication among these groups.
Speakers
Kevin Avruch, Opening Remarks
Dean, The School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University
Kathleen Kuehnast, Introduction
Director, Gender Policy and Strategy, U.S. Institute of Peace
Pamina Firchow
Assistant Professor, The School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University
David Connolly
Director, Learning, Evaluation & Research, U.S. Institute of Peace
Roger MacGinty
Professor, School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University, United Kingdom
Anthony Wanis-St. John
Associate Professor, School of International Service, American University
7. China’s Power: Up for Debate | Thursday, November 29 | 8:15 am – 5 pm | Center for Strategic and International Studies | 1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
The challenges and opportunities presented by China’s rise are hotly contested. ChinaPower’s annual conference features leading experts from both China and the U.S. to debate core issues underpinning the nature of Chinese power.
8:15 a.m. Opening/Greeting
Bonnie S. Glaser Director, China Power ProjectSenior Adviser for AsiaCSIS
8:30 a.m. Morning Keynote: TBD
9:15 a.m. Proposition: U.S. engagement policy toward China has failed.
FOR: Ely Ratner Executive Vice President and Director of StudiesCenter for a New American Security (CNAS)
AGAINST: J. Stapleton Roy Former U.S. Ambassador to ChinaFounding Director Emeritus and Distinguished ScholarKissinger Institute on China and the United States, Wilson Center
10:25 a.m. Coffee break
10:40 a.m. Proposition: China is an illiberal state seeking to reshape the international system in its own image.
FOR: Pei Minxin Tom and Margot Pritzker ‘72 Professor of GovernmentGeorge R. Roberts FellowClaremont McKenna College
AGAINST:Wu Xinbo Professor and Dean, Institute of International StudiesDirector, Center for American StudiesFudan University
11:50 a.m. Proposition: Made in China 2025 and China’s broader industrial program pose a threat to global innovation and the world economy.
FOR: Scott Kennedy Deputy Director, Freeman Chair in China StudiesCSIS
AGAINST:Mu Rongping Director-General, Center for Innovation and DevelopmentChinese Academy of Sciences (CAS)
1:00 p.m. Lunch
1:40 p.m. Proposition: China is likely to be the leader of the coming artificial intelligence revolution.
FOR: Edward Tse Founder and CEO
Gao Feng Advisory Company
AGAINST: Samm Sacks
Cybersecurity Policy Fellow
New America
2:50 p.m. Proposition: China has the capability to control the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States.
FOR: Bryan ClarkSenior Fellow
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
AGAINST: Peter Dutton Professor and Director, China Maritime Studies InstituteU.S. Naval War College
4:00 p.m. Coffee break
4:15 p.m. Afternoon Keynote (VTC)
Admiral Philip S. Davidson 25th Commander of United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM)
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Security and trade post-election
The Center for Strategic and International Studies November 14 hosted two panels on the midterm elections’ implications for the trans-Atlantic agenda and trade policy. The first featured a discussion with Senator Chris Murphy (D-CT) and the second a conversation between CSIS experts Louis Lauter, Vice President for Congressional and Government Affairs, and William Alan Reinsch, Senior Adviser and Scholl Chair in International Business. Heather A. Conley, Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic and the Director of the Europe Program at CSIS, moderated.
President Trump’s current threat to leave the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty set the tone for the first discussion. Murphy framed the move as consistent with a broader agenda from the anti-institutionalists in the Administration to withdraw from multilateral organizations, with the spotlight on NATO after the President’s threatening comments last summer.
Murphy highlighted that there is a tendency in Congress to separate the President’s actions and statements from the Administration. While the President is launching rhetorical assaults against NATO, under the surface NATO cooperation continues. Many Republican colleagues have favored this approach, creating an atmosphere complacency. Murphy cautioned that the President should be taken at his word. Congress should prevent an executive withdrawal from NATO. The Senator introduced a failed bill back in July that would have required Congressional consent. There might be more interest in the Democratic-controlled House once Congress reconvenes.
Murphy warned that US foreign policy has become too sanctions dependent. There is a need to create and use alternative Congressional foreign policy instruments, a recommendation echoed by Lauter in his recent study on Congressional foreign policy preferences. The Senator recently introduced the European Energy Security and Diversification Act to finance energy infrastructure in Europe as a means to promote independence from Russia. He also pointed to the need to fund fragile democracies in the region.
Trump’s distancing the US from its NATO allies should be seen as part of a general trend towards isolationism and nationalism, in contrast to French President Macron’s vision for multilateralism and internationalism to solve global problems. Trump’s America First message still resonates with large swaths of the country, prompting Murphy to state that until we fix our domestic politics and economy, politicians will be able to sell Trump’s message in regions that have seen losses in jobs such as manufacturing.
While Reinsch pointed out that trade is low on the average voter’s motivations, Murphy underlined the connection between global institutions/alliances and the strength of the American economy and jobs. Trump’s threatening posture towards NATO does not exist in an economic vacuum. Macron has been urging Europe to become more militarily and technologically autonomous, in part by favoring European defense contractors over American ones, in response to Trump’s criticism of NATO. The steel and aluminum tariffs imposed on the EU make the situation worse.
The political divide between skeptics and supporters of liberalized international trade rests more within parties than between them, according to Reinsch and Lauter’s recent studies. Lauter’s study of the pre-election Congress’ foreign policy preferences found that Congress was fairly internationalist, with Reinsch elaborating that trade was less a partisan issue and more a regional one. The coasts tend to be pro-trade while skeptics dominate the Midwest, as demonstrated in the mixed reactions to Trump’s tariffs on the EU.
A post-election survey of incoming Democrats looked at their public statements on the issue. Twenty-four of fifty-five surveyed said nothing about trade following the election. Twenty-one made pro-trade statements, and eight anti-trade statements. While Democrats may hold the USMCA (the NAFTA replacement) hostage for political reasons, Reinsch predicted that the new Congress will include many pro-trade representatives. It is too soon to write a general obituary for trade agreements.
China is the regional challenge that will likely continue to enjoy bipartisan support, evidenced in the reaction to the Administration’s 301 report on China. The question will be how this is handled moving forward in light of Trump’s relationship with the WTO. While he has rejected appointments of new judges for its dispute appellate body and is willing to go beyond the WTO to achieve policy goals, Reinsch emphasized that the Europeans and Japanese want to address concerns over China within the context of the WTO.
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Midterms and foreign policy
I gave a talk this morning at the Italian International Affairs Institute (IAI) on “The 2018 American Midterm Elections: What Do They Signify for the US and for Europe?” Here are my notes for the occasion, which I pretty much used as written:
- It is a pleasure to be back at IAI, which has been kind enough to host my talks many times over the 25 years since I left Rome as Charge’ d’affaires ad interim of the American Embassy.
- Let me start with some basics: the elections are “midterm” because they fall in the middle of a Presidential mandate. They are multiple, that is elections rather than election, because more than one institution is contested: all of the House of Representatives, about one-third of the Senate, and many governorships, state legislatures, and local positions.
- They are also multiple in another sense: even elections for Federal offices in the US are run by the 50 states, not by the Federal government. While all the states elect members of the House from single-member districts with approximately the same population as well as two Senators (no matter what the population of the state), the rules governing who is eligible to vote, design of the ballot, polling procedures, opening times, counting, tabulating, and ultimately deciding the outcome vary quite a bit from state to state and even from county to county.
- Quite a few of our states have trouble getting it all done, especially when the margins are narrow. There are still a few seats undecided.
- Nevertheless, the general shape of the outcome is clear: Democrats have won control of the House of Representatives; Republicans have maintained control of the Senate, widening their margin by a couple of seats.
- What does this mean for the future, especially for American foreign policy and relations with Europe, including Italy?
- First thing to understand is that the election was not about foreign policy. The two biggest issues were health insurance for Democrats and immigration for Republicans. Trade, national security, nuclear nonproliferation, arms control, the Middle East, Iran, China, Russia and all the other issues IAI and I care about were virtually absent from the pre-electoral discourse.
- It was vigorous and led to a high turnout by American standards: about 50% of registered voters. That will sound very low to you, but it is not low in the US, where about 60% turn out for presidential elections and midterms generally draw about 40%.
- There are many reasons for this. Americans move frequently and die pretty much at the rate of everyone else. There is no national procedure for updating registration lists, and virtually no one unregisters when they move out of a community to another one. So some of the low turnout is a statistical artefact.
- The resulting anomalies have led to Republican claims that there is a great deal of fraudulent Democratic voting in US elections. There is no evidence for that. To the contrary, the evidence demonstrates concerted efforts by Republicans in many states to suppress voting by their opponents with ID requirements, closing polling places, and other tricks of the trade.
- The higher turnout this time around occurred among both Democrats and Republicans, but the Democrats have more to gain because their relatively young voter population normally turns out much less than the older Republican voter population.
- What looked like a modest shift the day after the election turned into a considerable Blue Wave as more results are finalized. The shifts from the last midterms in 2014 are notable:
under 30, +11D to +35D
women, +4 to +19
Latinos, +26 to +40
Asians, -1 to +54
college grads, -3 to +20
independents, -12 to +12
single, +13 to +24
not white evangelical, +12 to +34
- Rural areas voted heavily for Republicans. Suburbs, which have generally leaned Republican, turned bluer this time, mainly because of the votes of college-educated women.
- In short: Americans are divided, perhaps more than they have been since World War II.
- On one side, we have a modest, but bigger than normal for midterms, recovery of the Obama coalition, despite a House of Representatives gerrymandered in favor of Republicans and a Senate “map” that incidentally favored Republicans.
- Some high-profile progressives like Beto O’Rourke—a challenger for Ted Cruz’s Senate seat in Texas—and Andrew Gillum—the black Democrat who ran for governor of Florida—lost, but their showings were respectable enough to make them serious future candidates.
- On the other side, we’ve got a Trump-dominated Republican party, which will be more radical than in his first two years. Many of the relative moderates are not returning to Congress. The Republicans there will be whiter, more male, and more rural than before.
- The big winners in this election were those who want America divided and immobilized. That includes Presidents Putin and Xi. America will be consumed for most of the next two years with the 2020 presidential election. The Mueller investigation and oversight hearings will increase the noise and divisiveness, perhaps even to the point of impeachment.
- The Democrats, who are mostly moderates, have limited powers to influence foreign policy. Their main lever of power will be oversight: the power to convene House hearings and subpoena witnesses. The Senate will continue to rubber stamp Trump’s nomination of judges and ambassadors.
- That said there has been considerable agreement in the current Congress between Democrats and Republicans on maintaining the foreign affairs budget and toughening up against China, Russia, and North Korea. There are disagreements on the Iran nuclear deal, which Democrats favor, and on the defense budget, which Republicans traditionally favor.
- In the Middle East, we are likely to see a continued US effort in eastern Syria, some effort at rapprochement with Turkey, and Congressional pressure to stop the war in Yemen as well as sanction Saudi Arabia for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. The Administration will resist that pressure but may give in on Yemen, which would bring Washington into closer alignment with most Europeans.
- It remains to be seen whether the consensus in favor of funding defense, development and diplomacy that existed in Congress since 2016 will be maintained. The Administration itself has signaled an intention to cut defense. Many newly elected Republicans will want to cut development and diplomacy. Democrats will defend both, but compromises should be expected. There is nothing popular about the foreign affairs budget in the US, though most Americans do favor continuing commitments abroad.
- On NATO and the EU, I don’t think much will change. Trump has made it clear he thinks little of NATO and less of the EU. The Congress and the American people are more favorable to both and will try to insist on maintenance of the Alliance. Trump’s hostility to the EU will, however, find some resonance among protectionist Democrats and Republicans. The steel and aluminum tariffs seem destined to stay, at least for now.
- Macron and Merkel notwithstanding, there are of course many in Europe who are sympathetic to their own version of Trump’s nationalism: make Italy, Hungary, Poland, or Denmark great again by blocking immigration, protecting domestic industries, rallying anti-minority sentiment, and undermining the rule of law. Berlusconi after all was an Italian invention.
- I’m afraid the only thing that will sober some of Trump’s American supporters will be a major economic downturn, and even then they may prefer to blame it on someone other than the incumbent, most likely minorities, immigrants, Europeans, and terrorists.
- That said, I think we have passed the moment I would call “peak Trump.” Even without a recession, most Americans—3 million more of whom voted for Hillary in 2016 and haven’t approved of Trump since—are now fed up. Unlike 2016, that majority has spread into red suburbs and states and mobilized more effectively. Democrats won the popular vote for Congress by about 7%. That could be a landslide in a presidential election.
- Trump has a difficult road ahead. But that should be little comfort. If I had to guess, his fall might be at least as painful as his rise. He will resist accountability and transparency to the last.
- Europe has a tremendously important role to play during the next two years. Merkel and Macron have already done great work in maintaining the vision of a united and liberal Europe. So long as Germany and France remain on that line, I can hope the rest of Europe and the US will eventually find their way back from ethnic nationalism.
- But they and those of you who agree with that vision are going to have to do much more. Here are a few concrete suggestions:
• The NATO allies really do need to meet the 2% goal by 2024. Failing to keep on the tracks plays directly into Trump’s malicious hands. If they do so by joining together to form Macron’s European army, I have no objection.
• A negotiated resolution of the trade dispute is highly desirable. Even better would be returning to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which offered big economic benefits.
• The US and Europe need to hang together on Russia and China or hang separately as Ben Franklin said to his fellow revolutionaries. US gas supplies should help on the Russian front.
• On Iran, I see no hope of a US/EU accommodation so long as the US stays out of the nuclear deal. But I don’t really see how it can re-enter under this president. Some issues will have to wait for 2021, when discussing a follow-on deal will be needed anyway.
• On Syria, prospects are better. The US and Europe seem to be on the same wavelength in withholding reconstruction aid until there is a credible and irreversible political transition under way. That is the way to succeed, but pressures on Europe will be great.
• On Libya, the Americans are hoping Italy and France will work together to end the civil war and put the country back on a sustainable path.
- There are lots of other issues, but the overall strategy should be this: hang together where possible, help each other out, and hope to get to 2021 in good enough shape to return to the trajectory most of us would prefer: a Euro-Atlantic community whole and free, though wiser and better, from Vancouver to Vladivostok.
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Brexit in sign language
This sign language interpreter definitely merits the Saturday video spot:
If that put you in a good mood, don’t watch this, which leaves open the question of the Crown Prince’s involvement but details in words and pictures what is known about the murder of Jamal Khashoggi.
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