Insufficient
November 12, the Atlantic Council convened a panel to discuss the challenges of hybrid warfare. Russia and other authoritarian powers are wielding cyberattacks and active measures, campaigns of disinformation and propaganda, against the US and its allies. Ambassador Victoria Nuland, former Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs at the State Department, Thomas Rid, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced Studies, and General Riho Terras, Commander of the Estonian Defense Forces, gathered to discuss these threats in a conversation moderated by Jonatan Vseviov, Estonia’s Ambassador to the United States.
Cyberattacks and active measures are two different forms of covert action, but both are increasingly common in the digital age. The US and its allies have been slow to understand and adapt. Both often seek to exploit weaknesses arising from division and decentralization. They undermine the sovereignty of states, but there is no clear international framework to neutralize the threat or reprimand the perpetrators.
Even though active measures have a long history predating the internet, technology has drastically changed how they are carried out. As described by Rid, active measures are now more active and less measured than ever before. More active because the speed of communication and analysis allows disinformation campaigns to be fine-tuned while in motion. Less measured, as cyber infiltration techniques have increased ease of exfiltrating massive amounts of information.
According to Rid it is also easier than ever to lead journalists and activists to inadvertently aid hostile foreign initiatives. The 2016 Democratic National Committee hack in the US illustrates these changes: the stolen information was uploaded to Wikileaks in one massive dump, leaving American journalists to sort through and expose the most explosive stories. The strategic challenge for liberal states is to change the cost-benefit analysis for authoritarian states considering these measures. Potential victims must harden themselves and demonstrate a willingness to impose costs on perpetrators.
Nuland outlined reforms which the US ought to implement in anticipation of future influence campaigns. The US needs a framework to bring together its various intelligence agencies, technology experts and business leaders, similar to the coordinated restructuring on counter-terrorism implemented after 9/11. She highlighted tech companies as especially vulnerable due to the incentives against cooperation or sharing of information and design. The US government has an opportunity to build a framework to guarantee intellectual property and encourage tech companies to come together and discuss shared vulnerabilities in design, code, and supply chain that expose them to foreign exploitation.
Internationally there is need for similar coordination, allowing both flexibility and cooperation between countries. Terras noted there is no single public response which would work just as well in Estonia as it does in the US, so NATO members should retain flexibility on how best to counter disinformation and propaganda. At the same time, there is a need for greater cooperation between allied intelligence services in identifying culprits and international solidarity in ascribing blame.
The trickiest issue may be domestic political messaging. The panel discussed the importance of informing the public on hybrid warfare without overstating its effects. Publicly acknowledging and attributing foiled attacks is a key tool for discouraging future attempts. Acknowledging the problem is also a necessary step in educating the public on critical reading and cyber security skills.
At the same time, Rid warned of the risk of over-estimating the effects of foreign interference on domestic politics. In reality the effects of these methods are short-term, serving mostly to exploit existing domestic divides. Nations must maintain a faith in the efficacy of their own institutions and public discourse. The tendency to blame all domestic issues on foreign adversaries is itself characteristic of authoritarian countries.
The issue of appropriate response is more open to debate. States could counter with cyberattacks of their own. Aside from the risks of escalation, the panel discussed the risks inherent to cyber weapons: they are difficult to aim, easily attributed, and easily turned against their makers by adversaries. Other measures like sanctions and attribution of attacks to individual hackers can also deter and demoralize hybrid warfare attempts. No clear decision was reached on the most effective form of deterrence, but the panel agreed that the efforts made by the US and its allies to date have been insufficient.
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