National defense strategy

Johns Hopkins SAIS Wednesday hosted the release of the new congressionally-mandated report on the 2018 National Defense Strategy. The report was presented and discussed by the commission’s co-chairs, Ambassador Eric Edelman, Roger Hertog Distinguished Practitioner-in-Residence at SAIS’s Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies, and Admiral Gary Roughead, USN (Ret.), Robert and Marion Oster Distinguished Military Fellow at the Hoover Institution. The discussion was moderated by Eliot Cohen, SAIS Vice Dean for Education and Academic Affairs.

1. Great power competition

The strategy focused primarily on China and Russia, laying out plans for competition with them, and contingencies for the possibility of war. US national defense strategy has come a long way since the last edition in 2014 towards accepting the return of great power competition. Iran, North Korea, and international terrorism were noted as problem areas requiring continued focus, but took a backseat to China and Russia in the discussion.

The US Could Lose a State-to-State War

One striking observation of the report was the uncertainty that the US would win in a full-scale war against Russia in the Balkans or against China in Taiwan. Until recently US policy was shaped by the assurance that superior technology granted us total control in the air and at sea. However, poor investment and upkeep on the part of the US paired with smart investments by China and Russia have shrunk the technology gap to the point where the US could feasibly lose a state-to-state conflict.

2. Technology change 

Since the end of the Cold War the US has increased the military’s workload, from the war on terror to interventions in civil wars and natural disasters worldwide. While military spending has also increased, the defense strategy frames these increases as insufficient. Investment in new technologies has been hampered by the deadlock in US politics. Failure by Congress to hammer out new national security budgets has led to several continuing resolutions (CRs) over the past few years. These CRs impede the ability of the military to flexibly invest in new technology and equipment.

New technology entails risk

The net result is that the Department of Defense has adapted by trimming the fat from all investments, hoping to eliminate any “risky” spending in favor of sure bets. But reducing risk cuts investment in innovation, as it is impossible to create the next generation of military technology it. Meanwhile private sector investment in new technologies has exploded, meaning that advanced capabilities are available to anyone who has the money to pay for them. The result is that America’s military, modernized in the 1980s, has made little technological progress since then. It has ceded ground to both the private sector and our adversaries.

The call for redoubled investment extended to the need for recapitalization of America’s nuclear arsenal. Roughead emphasized that in an era of renewed great power competition, it is vital for America’s nuclear arsenal to be second to none. China and Russia have been busy modernizing, while the US has neglected even basic upkeep.

Edelman discussed the need to plan for the possibility that the US could be sucked into wars with both Russia and China at the same time. The drastic nature of this scenario only heightens the need to consider it, including its implications for America’s economy and society. They would have to be mobilized in a way they haven’t been since World War II.

The changing nature of military technology also creates new policy considerations for the economy. Questions include whether and to what degree tech companies should be required to cooperate with the Department of Defense, and whether the increasingly interconnected nature of military technology will require other countries to choose between American weapons systems or, say, Russian ones, when previously it was possible to mix and match.

3. Civilian – military imbalance

Finally the panelists highlighted the concern expressed within the 2018 strategy regarding the imbalance of power between civilian and military voices in charge of the military. Control has increasingly gone to the Joint Staff, while civilian positions such as in the Office of the Secretary of Defense have gone chronically understaffed. Without even tackling the larger disparity between the Department of Defense and the largely absent State Department, the commission believed this imbalance to be a glaring flaw within the national security system, which must soon be addressed.