Month: December 2018
Make Plan A work
I’ve had several requests from Balkan publications for my end-of-year views on the situation in the region. I’ve so far passed them up, but a few words here seem appropriate.
The Balkans are at peace and far more prosperous than they were in the early 1990s, when war ripped apart former Yugoslavia. Now European Union members, Slovenia and Croatia were then fighting for survival as Serbia tried by force to hold the Federation together, or at least hold on to territory it regarded as “Serb.” Bosnia suffered three and a half years of war, ethnic cleansing, and eventually genocide. Kosovo endured less, but only because NATO was prepared to intervene sooner. Macedonia and Montenegro mostly escaped war, but only with difficulty and international help.
Things are much better now. Per capita income is markedly higher. Ethnic nationalism barks a lot but seldom bites. No army in the Balkans is capable of sustained warfare and no public would support it. All the region’s citizens except Kosovo’s can travel visa-free throughout the European Union. All the remaining non-members of the EU have been promised an opportunity to join the EU. All have signed agreements with Brussels that provide many of the trade and financial benefits of membership, along with ample pre-accession funding.
People in the Balkans are nevertheless dissatisfied. Resurgent ethnic nationalism plagues Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Economic growth is slow, corruption is endemic, and the prospect of European Union accession distant. Big issues remain unresolved. Approval of Macedonia’s far-reaching Prespa agreement with Greece is uncertain. Kosovo and Serbia are far from normalization of their relations, despite years of negotiations. Governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina is increasingly dysfunctional, due to a peace settlement that is difficult to change. Complaints rather than satisfaction are dominant 25 years after the Dayton peace agreements began to bring an end to the Balkan wars of the 1990s.
I think it is wrong to be discouraged. The post-war Balkans region is uniquely advantaged. Its proximity to Europe brought it far more attention and assistance than is typical after conflict. Think of Syria, which will get precious little Western help after far more destructive wars than anyone in the Balkans suffered. Each of the Balkan countries emerged from the 1990s with the prospect of democratic, even if illiberal and imperfect, governance. Only one of the Arab Spring countries, Tunisia, comes even close to that. Except for Iraq and Israel–each imperfect and illiberal in its own way–none of the Middle East can come even close to the freedom of expression and association Balkan citizens today enjoy.
So my message, argued at length in From War to Peace in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Ukraine, is that Plan A is far better than any conceivable Plan B.
The path into EU and NATO for those who want it is getting steeper. But neither has closed its doors. I can well understand those in Kosovo who are discouraged because Brussels has delayed giving the country visa-free status, even though it met all the manifold requirements. But 2020, when the EU says it will be ready to proceed, is just around the corner. It would be a colossal error not to stay on track. Montenegro, already in NATO, seems to understand that and is likely to qualify next for EU membership. Serbia needs to clean up its courts and free up its media, in addition to meeting the technical requirements of the acquis communautaire and normalizing its relations with Kosovo. Skopje and Athens need to maintain their agreement, even if it faces a setback in one of their parliaments. Bosnia and Herzegovina will be the last piece of the Balkans puzzle to find its proper place, but it will do so if it focuses on making the Sarajevo government capable of negotiating and implementing the acquis.
There is nothing insoluble in the Balkans. 2019 should be devoted to making Plan A work. There is no better Plan B.
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Risk rises
2019 has a particular significance: it is the year Republicans need to decide whether they will go into the 2020 presidential election with Donald Trump as their candidate, or not.
There is no serious possibility of a primary challenge or an internal party coup. Trump has demonstrated complete command of the party apparatus, including its major funders. He has given them enough of what Republicans traditionally want: judges who can be relied upon to protect property, law enforcement, and fetuses as well as tax cuts for the very wealthy and white nationalism (aka supremacy) for the hoi polloi. It’s a powerful combination because it finds support in less populated states and rural areas that are overweight in the Electoral College.
There are two other possibilities:
Amendment 25* of the constitution, which allows the vice president to lead an effort to remove a president for inability to carry out the functions of the office, provided the effort can win support from half the cabinet and a 2/3 vote in each house of Congress. Trump is dottering: unable to walk the 250 yards from the White House to Blair House across Pennsylvania Avenue, inarticulate to the point of incoherence, and obviously overweight and unhealthy.
But Trump’s cabinet is loyalist, especially with the departure of Secretary of Defense Mattis (and the earlier departure of Secretary of State Tillerson). Ben Carson would join a risky rebellion in the cabinet? Matthew Whitaker, the unqualified acting Attorney General who couldn’t tell the truth about his college academic achievements? Mike Pompeo, who has pledged he’ll keep fighting for conservative social issues until the Rapture?
Impeachment and conviction isn’t much more likely. The new House majority will be Democratic and might easily find the votes to impeach (accuse) Trump of “high crimes and misdemeanors.” But the Senate, where a 2/3 majority would be required to convict, remains solidly in Republican hands. Impeachment without conviction and removal from office is not a winning wicket. The Republicans tried that with Bill Clinton and found themselves with the short end of the stick.
But there is an added factor in 2019: Special Counsel Mueller’s investigation. We don’t know what it will eventually produce, or when, but we do know what it has produced already: five Trump aides, including his first National Security Adviser, have struck plea deals and a couple of dozen Russian operatives have been indicted, in addition to the conviction of Trump’s campaign chair on non-campaign related financial charges. Some will try to deflect attention from the guilty pleas by saying they are “only” for lying to the FBI. That’s silly. We all know it is a crime to lie to the FBI. If someone does, it means he is willing to risk years in jail to avoid telling the truth. Lying to the FBI suggests an underlying felony.
The role of the president in all this is still unclear, and in any event Justice Department guidance does not permit indictment of a president in office. But that does not mean Mueller can’t recommend indictment in the report he is expected to file. The indictment won’t go forward–Whitaker or his replacement is there to stop it–but the recommendation itself would have a dramatic political impact. Even a strong conclusion could do likewise. New York State’s attorney general has already concluded that the Trump Foundation demonstrated “a shocking pattern of illegality.” What if it turns out his campaign was likewise a criminal enterprise, one that allowed or even encouraged a foreign power to subvert the 2016 election?
So I’m thinking we don’t really know what 2019 will bring. The government shutdown is already scrambling the political scene. Trump is sending distress signals and looking for a deal, by lowering the definition of a border wall as well as how much money he needs for it. The Democrats aren’t biting, yet. Nor are the Chinese, whose retaliation against Trump’s tariff war is devastating soybean and other farmers who supported Trump in 2016. Faced with pressure from Trump not to raise rates, the Fed has asserted its independence and proceeded. The stock market is “in correction” and highly volatile. The economy looks like it is heading for the end of the slow but steady Obama boom.
January will bring the launch of multiple House investigations into the Administration’s malfeasance as well as the 2016 campaign. A quick pullout of US troops from Syria this winter could lead to a major clash there between Turkey and Syria, with Arab and Kurdish paramilitaries allies respectively. The proposed drawdown of troops from Afghanistan could embolden the Taliban and wreck the prospects for a negotiated end to its 17-year war. Continuation of the trade wars will raise prices to American consumers and lower US exports, slowing an economy already towards the end of the business cycle.
I dare not go past that to the spring. While the US remains safer and more prosperous than ever before, the uncertainties Trump generates are also greater than ever before. 2019 looks to be a year of rising risk.
*I originally said “Article.” Apologies for the error. There’s a reason I’m not a lawyer.
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The disgrace
A presidency that has known few happy days is at a nadir, though it may well go lower. Russia and Iran are celebrating the American withdrawal from Syria, which President Trump decided to please Turkey. Ankara will now attack the Kurds who allied themselves with the US to fight ISIS successfully. The President has consequently lost a universally respected Defense Secretary as well as a capable lead for the diplomatic campaign against ISIS.
The economy is shaky. The stock market is correcting and the Fed is raising rates. Recession before the 2020 election is increasingly likely. The trade wars with China and Europe continue with no end in sight, devastating American agriculture and some American manufacturing. The budget deficit is exploding due to an ill-conceived tax cut for the very wealthy. Trump hasn’t spent already appropriated funds for border security, but he is demanding more for an unnecessary and extraordinarily expensive wall on the Mexican border, partly closing down the government through Christmas.
This is a record of unparalleled chaos and failure, even without mentioning the new North Korean missile sites and the Iranian refusal to discuss either their missiles or Tehran’s regional power projection until Trump reverses his decision to exit the Iran nuclear deal. Pyongyang and Tehran represent serious threats to US interests that Trump has no strategy to counter.
Nor has he been any more effective in changing Russian behavior, which the Congress and his Administration continue to sanction without any admission by the President of Moscow’s wrongdoing. The “deal of the century” Trump promised on Palestine his negotiators have botched completely. America’s diplomacy and international reputation have rarely known worse, more incoherent and less effective, moments.
What can be done?
Little is the serious answer. Even when the Democrats take control of the House little more than a week from now, they will have no ability to fix 90% of what ails the country. Their main role will be oversight: making clear to the public what the real situation is through hearings and reports. Beyond that, they can refuse to sign on to stupidities like the border wall, but no legislation can pass the Senate without a good bit of Republican support, especially if overriding a veto will be necessary. The Democrats cannot force the US back into the Iran nuclear deal, the Paris climate change agreement, or the Trans Pacific Partnership, all of which held substantial advantages for the US.
Meanwhile, Special Counsel Mueller’s investigation has produced indictments, guilty pleas, and convictions of high-ranking Trump campaign and administration officials as well as Russian intelligence operatives. There is no longer even a slight doubt that Moscow campaigned in 2016 in favor of Donald Trump, likely tipping the balance in his favor in key Midwest states and Pennsylvania. Trump is obsessed with legitimacy, as well he should be. He is not a fairly elected president, even if we accept the inequities of the Electoral College. He is the product of blatant, widespread, and illegal foreign assistance. We need barely mention Trump’s own illegal campaign contributions as well as his criminal use of Trump Foundation resources.
I doubt though that we have reached bottom. Still to come are revelations about massive Russian and Saudi financing for Trump real estate, as well as indictments of his co-conspirators in stealing and publishing emails. Trump really hasn’t hidden these things, but a report from Mueller that details them will be more than interesting. It will raise questions about whether a felon should be sleeping and watching TV in the White House, where he does little else except brood. If his former National Security Adviser can go to prison for years, why can’t the President be indicted and tried?
The short answer is that the toadies he picks as Attorney General won’t allow it, claiming that Justice Department regulations they could change prohibit it. Trump can no longer, with a Democratic majority in the House, avoid impeachment, if the Mueller report suggests it. But in the Senate he still has not only a majority, but one that hesitates to criticize, never mind convict. Trump has humiliated Mitch McConnell and his cohort repeatedly, but the Senate Republicans remain steadfastly loyal. It is hard to picture how conviction would gain a 2/3 majority it needs in the upper chamber.
The only remedy for this shambolic and bozotic presidency is likely at the polls, less than two years hence. There are no guarantees, but Trump’s path to re-election is narrowing, especially if recession happens. The disgrace is in the White House, not in the country.
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The missing piece
President Trump’s sudden decision to withdraw ground troops from Syria has prompted widespread condemnation as well as the resignations of Defense Secretary Mattis and top anti-ISIS coordinator McGurk. Jim Jeffrey, Syria envoy, can’t be far behind. Certainly the manner of the decision merits dismay. Challenged by Turkish President Erdogan to get out of the way of a Turkish operation against Syrian Kurds whom the US has armed and used against ISIS, Trump pulled the plug on the several thousand US special forces in eastern Syria without any serious consultation with his national security advisers or America’s allies and against their collective wisdom. The message to American allies and adversaries alike is that Washington is unreliable and weak. Tehran and Moscow are gleeful. ISIS has already launched a major attack against the Kurds.
In evaluating this decision, we need to distinguish its manner from its substance. The way Trump did this is not just reprehensible but irresponsible. But whether it was better for US interests to stay in Syria or leave is far less clear.
The US gained control of one-third of Syria, along with its Kurdish and Arab allies in the Syrian Democratic Forces, as a consequence of its operations against ISIS, in particular in Raqqa. The result was a devastated city. Staying would have meant stabilizing and eventually reconstructing it and other population centers. That process had begun, but hadn’t gotten very far, before the President’s announcement on Saturday. The Administration had gotten the Saudis and others to ante up several hundred million dollars for the purpose, but more than that was eventually going to be needed. Withdrawal avoids that responsibility.
Jim Jeffrey’s strategy, as I understood it, was to try to make Raqqa and the surrounding area livable and even attractive relative to the regime’s autocratic control of most of the rest of Syria. That would have given the US continued opportunities to do damage to ISIS as well as leverage over the political process, enabling Washington to trade withdrawal for commitments from the regime, Turkey, Iran, and Russia. Jim was aiming for complete Iranian withdrawal and beginning of a political transition, but likely would have had to settle for less. A longer stay in Syria would also have given the US time to make arrangements with Turkey and the Kurds to avoid their clash in the aftermath of withdrawal and continued commitment to the fight against ISIS.
This was a pretty good strategy, even if the US were to be forced to settle for much less than its stated goals. We might at least have gotten something on release of prisoners, accounting for the disappeared, protection of civilians, withdrawal of non-Arab Shia militias, and maybe something on revising the constitution to reduce the powers of the Syrian security agencies and holding internationally supervised elections.
President Trump preferred an abrupt withdrawal. In this he is not unlike his predecessor. President Obama did not want to go into Syria and tried to limit the numbers of American troops there. He withdrew from Iraq before it had been adequately stabilized. American presidents do not like what they pejoratively call “nationbuilding.” It is admittedly a difficult, expensive, and time-consuming process. Witness Afghanistan, from which Trump is said to have decided to withdraw much of the American troops presence. The war there started 17 years ago. No one would pretend that Kabul is yet capable of containing the Taliban and extremist presence there.
Avoiding long-term commitments of this sort is understandable, especially if the maneuver is done with adequate preparation, without undermining friends and allies, and without emboldening enemies. The way to achieve those prerequisites is through diplomacy. That’s what’s missing here.
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Fubar squared
Donald Trump’s unanticipated (at this particular moment) but still not surprising (because we all knew he wanted to do it) announcement of quick withdrawal of US troops from Syria has consequences:
- The vacuum the Americans are opening in eastern Syria will be filled, with the Turks coming from the north and Syrian government forces (with Shia allies) from the south and west. The result could be still another major clash in Syria, unless Ankara and Damascus come to some sort of mutual accommodation.
- The Syrian Kurds and Arabs who have been fighting ISIS with US support under the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) rubric now have to run for shelter. Best bet is that the Arabs seek safe haven with the Turks, who will be willing to support them. The Kurds, who are affiliated with Kurdish rebels inside Turkey, will seek shelter with the Syrian regime.
- The Kurds have already indicated they may release several thousand ISIS prisoners they hold, thus ensuring problems for whoever gains control over the SDF territory or part of it. The Kurds will also presumably try to hold on to the oil production facilities in the east, to use as a bargaining chip with the regime.
- Moscow is gleeful, Ankara pleased, and Iran satisfied, even if President Trump is tweeting that they are unhappy because now they will have to fight ISIS without the Americans. Each for different reasons disliked the US role in Syria, and now their diplomatic leverage has been vastly improved. None were as concerned about ISIS as the US was.
- What remains of the Syrian opposition is dismayed and demoralized. Many had some hope the SDF territory would provide a viable and even attractive alternative to Assad’s Syria.
- American allies in Europe and elsewhere are horrified that a presidential tweet announced a major policy decision without any consultation or advance notice and in contradiction to what Washington has been telling them for months. This will be particularly galling to the French (pun intended) and make the British croak (also intended), since both have special forces in eastern Syria fighting alongside the Americans.
- Trump’s national security apparatus may be even more undone, as National Security Advisor Bolton, Secretary of State Pompeo, and Secretary of Defense Mattis had all advised against this move. Republican national security stalwarts in Congress are beside themselves.
- Jim Jeffrey, the very capable retired foreign service officer who had finally put in place a coherent American policy on Syria that depended for its negotiating leverage on keeping Syria’s northeast, will be feeling vertigo as his platform falls out from under him.
It is entirely possible that Trump will reverse or mitigate this disruptive decision, perhaps by continuing the American air campaign against ISIS, which contrary to the President’s tweeting has not been defeated completely. But that will only compound the confusion that friends and adversaries are feeling.
The situation is fubar squared.
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Opening gambit
Kosovo Prime Minister Haradinaj has circulated a 30-page draft comprehensive agreement between his own Republic and Serbia. It contains a lot of things I might like, including extensive arrangements for cross-border cooperation, protection of Serbs and Serb monuments in Kosovo, and implementation of the many technical agreements already reached between Pristina and Belgrade.
But there are some obvious problems. This paper is essentially to an opening negotiation proposal. From that perspective, it incorporates serious negotiating errors that should be fixed before any encounter with Belgrade. On first reading, I see two glaring problems:
- The agreement foresees entry into force before Kosovo membership in the United Nations. Since that can be blocked by Russia or China even if Belgrade is prepared to allow it, Kosovo could find itself out on a limb, having committed to give Serbia the substantial benefits contained in the agreement without getting a big part of the quid pro quo. It is inadvisable to run that risk. UN membership should come first. Only after that is finalized should a comprehensive agreement of this sort be signed.
- The draft agreement includes a long list of unilateral concessions to Serbia on governance arrangements in Kosovo at both the central and local levels. All such concessions should be proposed as reciprocal, not unilateral. There is no reason why Kosovo should not ask for the Albanian-inhabited areas of southern Serbia whatever arrangements are provided to Serbs in Kosovo.
Admittedly reciprocity is not provided for in the Ahtisaari agreement (from which many of these governance and other provisions are derived) but that is now overtaken by events, because Serbia refused to sign on. A sovereign state should not make unilateral concessions in its own proposal, unless it is certain they will be appreciated. The way to determine whether Serbia is really interested is to see if they are prepared to pay the price of reciprocity. If so, fine. If not, why should Kosovo concede even before the negotiation starts?
I see other potential concerns as well. The draft agreement includes a dispute settlement mechanism that relies on the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. Why not the International Court of Justice? The draft agreement omits reference to cross-border cooperation between the countries’ security forces. This should be included: no two countries sharing a fortified border, which for the foreseeable future this one will be, can afford not to have regular consultations on national security issues as well as dialogue between their chiefs of staff. Kosovo does not yet have a full-fledged army, but cooperation of this sort should be starting sooner rather than later.
I am told that the Kosovo parliament, in creating a new negotiation team, has ruled out border changes. That is certainly a good thing.
I’m pretty sure I’ll find additional wrinkles in this opening gambit, but that will have to suffice for now. Anyone want to join me in offering suggestions and comments?
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