Iraqi trends

The Washington Institute on Near East Policy hosted a panel on emerging political trends in Iraq’s post-election period on November 27th. The panel featured Munqith Dagher, CEO of Baghdad-based Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies (IIACSS), Ahmed Ali, program officer at the National Endowment for Democracy, and David Pollock, Berinstein Fellow at the Washington Institute and director of its Fikra Forum.

While many Americans are tired of Iraq, Pollock reminded that it is still of strategic importance to American interests, which include preventing the country from incubating terrorism and tipping the region in a hostile, pro-Iran direction. It is also a potential demographic, economic, and religious powerhouse in the region. Iraqi oil exports are half those of the Saudis. Because of the 2003 invasion, the success of Iraq reflects on America’s political clout in the region, with many people seeing Iraq as a US responsibility.

Pollock pointed out the importance of public opinion polling in Iraq, a powerful but underutilized tool. The rise of the Islamic State in 2014 and the divisions arising from Kurdistan’s 2017 independence referendum were in line with Dagher’s polling at the time. To avoid being taken by surprise in the post-election space, public opinion-informed policy is crucial.

Dagher stated that we are at a crossroads in Iraqi attitudes, with three transformative shifts in public opinion.

1. A shift in inter-sectarian dynamics

For the first time since 2003, Sunnis are overall happier than Shi’a and Kurds. More specifically, they have more trust in the central Iraqi government than their Shi’a counterparts, an increase from 20% in 2016 to 50% today. Sunni Arabs have been reluctant to participate in the political process since Saddam’s ousting, and Dagher emphasized that this moment should be capitalized on to get them involved in the political process.

2. From inter to intra-sectarian conflicts 

Iraq has a long history of sectarian politics. We are finally seeing a shift towards interest-based politics. Sectarian identity as the most important source of identity has dropped to below 10% for all three groups. It was as high as 61% in 2013 among Kurds. Iraqi citizenship as the most important source of identity has increased significantly among Shi’a. While it is still very low for Kurds at 6%, there are so signs of further decrease. Across various polling questions, namely if Iraq is heading in the wrong direction, geography is playing a more important role than ever. For example, Sunni Arabs in Mosul are significantly more likely to believe that the country is heading in the wrong direction (69%) than Sunni Arabs in general (55%), as are the Shi’a Arabs of Basra than Shi’a at large.

3. Less international polarization

The ability of regional actors to take advantage of Iraq’s traditional sectarian divisions has also diminished. Iran’s popularity, when asked if it is a reliable partner, has dropped from 75% to 44% among Shi’a Arabs in the last two years alone. The most significant drop was between 2017 (70%) and today (44%), which Dagher attributed to the protests in Basra as well as the visible interference of both the US and Iran in the recent election. Access to information has increased as a result of growing internet use among Iraqis. It jas increased from 40% in 2014 to 80% today. Ninety per cent of Iraqi youth have at least one social media account. Among Sunni Arabs, favorable views of Saudi Arabia have decreased from 90% in 2012 to 61% today.

These trends are overshadowed by more alarming shifts under the surface. The population thinks the country is heading in the wrong direction more than ever, with 80% of respondents agreeing compared to 50% in April 2012. The most recent election has been marred by the fact that less than 1 in 5 respondents thought it free and fair. Dagher warned that lack of trust in the democratic political system might explain why 66% prefer a “strong leader who doesn’t care about Parliament nor elections,” accompanied by dramatic decreases in voter turnout. Ali attributed this legitimacy crisis to the gulf between politicians’ and the public’s views. He cited the Basra anti-corruption protests, which were predictable, and the lack of serious response from the Iraqi government.

For Ali, the big area for policy makers is post-ISIS reconstruction. Addressing grievances in post-ISIS regions and reunifying the country requires institutional governance reforms. Most importantly, the electoral process needs to be transparent and accountable to improve public trust, as demonstrated by post-election fraud allegations. The new Iraqi government has its work cut out for it.