Day: December 19, 2018
Another red line erased
President Trump has apparently decided to withdraw US troops within 30 days from the one-third of the country they control with the help of allied Kurdish-led but partly Arab-staffed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in anticipation of a Turkish attack on the Kurds. This contradicts official statements of US policy, which claimed the troops would remain until Iranian forces were withdrawn. Pentagon and other officials are said to still be arguing against the decision to erase this red line.
If implemented, this withdrawal will leave a vacuum in northeastern Syria that the Turks, Syrian government with its Iranian allies, and various extremist factions will try to fill, while the SDF tries to hold the territory. A great deal will depend on which of these forces the Americans favor. If they plan to leave via Turkey, that will favor Ankara. I’d bet on that, because the Patriot sale approved less than 24 hours ago suggests a broader rapprochement with the Turks. If they go out by air or through Iraq, they might be able to help the SDF retain control. It is said the SDF are expected to continue to target extremists for American attack.
The outcome of this free-for-all is difficult to predict, though more than likely it will boil down to a fight between Turkey and the Syrian regime. That might end in a pact, with the Turks withdrawing in exchange for commitment from Damascus to crack down on the SDF, especially its Kurdish leadership. Alternatively, the extremists–ISIS or Al Qaeda–may end up with a de facto safe haven, only nominally controlled by the regime or Turkey. The SDF is unlikely to be able to hold its dominance for long without on-the-ground US support, even though they include some ferocious fighters.
Trump’s decision, assuming it holds, would be consistent with both his and President Obama’s assessment that Syria is not worth fighting for. But unlike Obama, Trump claims a firmly anti-Iranian stance. It is hard to square withdrawal from Syria with wanting to back Iran out of its regional efforts at power projection, unless the withdrawal is prelude to all-out war against Iran. Americans are not ready for that, but a president in domestic difficulty, including manifold legal troubles, might try it as a grand distraction. Woe if that is what is happening.
American withdrawal will deprive Washington of any diplomatic leverage in the chimerical Geneva talks on a political solution in Syria. But even with a US presence they weren’t going anywhere. The withdrawal will also limit US capabilities against extremists, especially once the SDF succumbs to Turkish and/or Syrian attacks.
Is this the right decision or the wrong one? Let’s put it this way: if the US was not going to commit itself to a serious rebuilding effort in eastern Syria, one that would provide a model of well-functioning governance for the rest of Syria, staying had little point. That project would have been a difficult and expensive one. Trump, like all his predecessors since 1989, has no stomach for “nation-building.” But if you want to avoid the resurgence of extremists, statebuilding is what is needed. Now it will be up to the Russians, Iranians, and Turks. Let’s see how well they do.
One consequence is apparent: Trump has demonstrated repeatedly that he takes strong positions and backs down from them quickly. Witness his almost simultaneous backdown on the closure of the US government due to the budget fight. Trump bluffs and caves. Those who thought Obama made a big mistake not enforcing the “red line” on chemical weapons in Syria should be screaming foul. But many of them won’t, because they are predominantly Republican. Another red line is being erased.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Between past and future
I spoke yesterday in Belgrade at a conference organized by the Forum on Ethnic Relations and the Open Society Foundation on “Serbia and Kosovo Between Past and Future.” It was run under Chatham House rules, but I regard my own remarks as suitable for public consumption:
- First a word of thanks to the Forum on Ethnic Relations and the Open Society Foundation as well as the Helsinki Committee for providing this opportunity, at a particularly fraught time, for this discussion of relations between Serbia and Kosovo.
- First, on their relations right now: we are going through a difficult period, largely caused I think by exaggerated expectations.
- I don’t know who told President Thaci that he could get what he wants in southern Serbia without giving up vital interests in northern Kosovo. I also don’t know who told President Vucic that he could get what he wants in northern Kosovo without giving up vital interests in southern Serbia. Each was willing to take, but not to give.
- I’m fine with that, because however apparently rational to two ethnic nationalist presidents, the exchange of territories based on the ethnic affiliation of their populations is a bad idea.
- It would be an admission by both that neither can offer equal protection of the law to all his citizens. That is the essence of what they need to do to become EU, and if they want, NATO members.
- It would also destabilize Macedonia and Bosnia, and strengthen Vladimir Putin both there and in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.
- It was foolhardy for both the EU and the US to entertain the proposition of land and people swaps, which are antithetical not only to EU and NATO membership but also to the Badinter principles laid down in the early 1990s that govern the dissolution of former Yugoslavia.
- Now we need to deal with the consequences of the failed swap proposition. These include Pristina’s imposition of tariffs and its decision to convert its security forces to an army, as well as Belgrade’s opposition to Kosovo’s entry into Interpol and other international organizations.
- In my view, the tariffs are a CEFTA question and need to be dealt with there. I hope its mechanisms will be sufficient both to eliminate them and fix any legitimate problems Pristina has with treatment of its exports to Serbia.
- As for the army, I find it hard to imagine how anyone thought the Kosovo Albanians would do without one after what they suffered. KFOR will not stay in Kosovo forever. Pristina needs the means to defend itself at least for a week or 10 days, so long as Serbia presents a threat.
- That it does: its prime minister has made it crystal clear that an intervention into Kosovo under the guise of protecting the Serbs there is an option. Serbia’s concerted efforts to prevent Kosovo membership in international organizations and bilateral recognitions are also hostile acts.
- NATO needs to make it clear to Belgrade that such a move would lead to a military response. At the same time, Pristina needs to make it clear that Serbs in Kosovo are not threatened. Prime Minister Haradinaj has been trying to do just that.
- But managing the immediate threat doesn’t solve the longer-term problem.
- What is needed is normalization, so that Serbia doesn’t represent a threat to Kosovo and Kosovo does not represent a threat to the Serbs who live there.
- That will require much more extensive cross-border relations than exist today, including but by no means limited to diplomatic recognition and exchange of ambassadorial-level representatives.
- But, some say, what does Serbia get? How can you expect Belgrade to accept Kosovo’s sovereignty and independence without a quid pro quo?
- If Serbia is seriously concerned with the Kosovo army, it might get some concessions on its size and capabilities.
- It will get nothing if it waits to just before accession to recognize Kosovo, since then all the leverage will be with the EU members.
- Let me remind you of a page from US history: our most threatening enemy for about 100 years after independence was Great Britain, whose Canadian territory had the longest border of any country with the US.
- Today, both Canada and Great Britain are two of America’s key allies.
- But 100 years is too long to wait in the 21st century. The time to end the enmity between Kosovo and Serbia, to the advantage of both, is now. It can be done, but only on the basis of mutual recognition and respect.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
From war to peace
I spoke at the Media Centre in Belgrade yesterday about my recently published Palgrave MacMillan book, From War to Peace in the Balkans, the Middle East and Ukraine. Here are my speaking notes for the occasion:
- It is a pleasure to be back in Belgrade, and a particular pleasure to give my first talk about this book here in a Media Center that witnessed so many of the pivotal events of the 1990s wars in the Balkans. Many thanks to Dusan Janjic for providing the opportunity!
- Many of you will remember that period: the US and Europe fumbling for years in search of peaceful solutions in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo only to find themselves conducting two air wars against Serb forces, first in Bosnia and later in Kosovo.
- But Americans have mostly forgotten this history. Europeans too often believe there were no positive results. Here in the Balkans, many are convinced things were better under Tito.
- I beg to differ: the successes and failures of international intervention in the Balkans should not be forgotten or go unappreciated.
- That’s why I wrote my short book, which treats the origins, consequences, and aftermath of the 1995, 1999 and 2001 interventions that led to the end of the most recent Balkan wars.
- In my view, conflict prevention and state-building efforts thereafter have been partly successful, though challenging problems remain in Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Serbia.
- The book examines each of these on its own merits, as well as their prospects for entry into NATO and the EU, whose doors are in theory open to all the Balkan states.
- Bottom line: I believe all states that emerged from Yugoslavia as well as Albania are closer to fulfilling their Euroatlantic ambitions than they are to the wars and collapse of the 1990s.
- They were making decent progress when the financial crisis struck in 2007/8. The decade since then has been disappointing in many different respects:
- Growth slowed and even halted in some places.
- The Greek financial crisis cast a storm cloud over the EU.
- The flow of refugees, partly through the Balkans, from the Syrian and Afghanistan wars as well as from Africa soured the mood further.
- Brexit, a symptom of the rise of mostly right-wing, anti-European populism, has made enlargement extraordinarily difficult.
- The repercussions in the Balkans have been dire:
- Bosnia’s progress halted as it slid back into ethnic nationalist infighting.
- Macedonia’s reformist prime minister became a defiant would-be autocrat.
- Kosovo and Serbia are stalled in the normalization process.
- Russia has taken advantage of the situation to slow progress towards NATO and the EU.
- Now the question is whether the West, demoralized and divided by Donald Trump and right-wing populists, can still muster the courage to resolve the remaining problems in the Balkans and complete the process of EU and, for those who want it, NATO accession.
- I think Plan A is still viable. I also don’t see a Plan B that comes even close to the benefits of completing Plan A. Only three big obstacles remain.
- First is ending the Macedonia “name” issue. Skopje and Athens are on the verge of doing just that. New leadership was required to make it happen.
- For those who claim the West is prepared to tolerate corruption and state capture, I suggest a chat with Nikola Gruevski. If there is a viable liberal democratic option, the West will support it.
- Second is normalization between Belgrade and Pristina, the subject of the conference that will open within the hour.
- I’ll have more to say then, but let me say here that Serbia has already abandoned its claim to sovereignty over all of Kosovo, both in the April 2013 Brussels agreement and in opening the question of partition along ethnic lines.
- I think that is a terrible idea, for many reasons I will outline later, but it confirms that Belgrade has no intention of ever again governing the Kosovo Albanians.
- The third issue that needs to be resolved in the Balkans is the dysfunctional state structure that the Americans imposed on Bosnia and Herzegovina at Dayton.
- It has kept the peace for close to 25 years, but it needs reconfiguration to enable the Sarajevo government to negotiate and implement the acquis communautaire.
- These three are serious problems, but not insoluble ones. The road ahead is shorter than the road already traveled. Doubling back is a bad idea.
- My book proceeds after the Balkans to apply lessons learned to the Middle East and Ukraine, which also face identity-based conflicts challenging sovereignty and territorial integrity, lie close to the Balkans, and share more Ottoman history than is generally acknowledged.
- The lessons are these: leadership is key to starting, preventing, and ending wars; early prevention can work, with adequate resources; ethnic partition will not; international contributions can be vital; neighborhood counts; power sharing and decentralization can help.
- This accessible treatment of what makes war and how to make peace will appeal to both scholarly and lay readers interested in how violent international conflicts can be managed. It is available free, worldwide, courtesy of my generous employer, the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. To get it, click on the book cover at www.peacefare.net
RSS - Posts
