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Between past and future

I spoke yesterday in Belgrade at a conference organized by the Forum on Ethnic Relations and the Open Society Foundation on “Serbia and Kosovo Between Past and Future.” It was run under Chatham House rules, but I regard my own remarks as suitable for public consumption:

1. First a word of thanks to the Forum on Ethnic Relations and the Open Society Foundation as well as the Helsinki Committee for providing this opportunity, at a particularly fraught time, for this discussion of relations between Serbia and Kosovo.

2. First, on their relations right now: we are going through a difficult period, largely caused I think by exaggerated expectations.

3. I don’t know who told President Thaci that he could get what he wants in southern Serbia without giving up vital interests in northern Kosovo. I also don’t know who told President Vucic that he could get what he wants in northern Kosovo without giving up vital interests in southern Serbia. Each was willing to take, but not to give.

4. I’m fine with that, because however apparently rational to two ethnic nationalist presidents, the exchange of territories based on the ethnic affiliation of their populations is a bad idea.

5. It would be an admission by both that neither can offer equal protection of the law to all his citizens. That is the essence of what they need to do to become EU, and if they want, NATO members.

6. It would also destabilize Macedonia and Bosnia, and strengthen Vladimir Putin both there and in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.

7. It was foolhardy for both the EU and the US to entertain the proposition of land and people swaps, which are antithetical not only to EU and NATO membership but also to the Badinter principles laid down in the early 1990s that govern the dissolution of former Yugoslavia.

8. Now we need to deal with the consequences of the failed swap proposition. These include Pristina’s imposition of tariffs and its decision to convert its security forces to an army, as well as Belgrade’s opposition to Kosovo’s entry into Interpol and other international organizations.

9. In my view, the tariffs are a CEFTA question and need to be dealt with there. I hope its mechanisms will be sufficient both to eliminate them and fix any legitimate problems Pristina has with treatment of its exports to Serbia.

10. As for the army, I find it hard to imagine how anyone thought the Kosovo Albanians would do without one after what they suffered. KFOR will not stay in Kosovo forever. Pristina needs the means to defend itself at least for a week or 10 days, so long as Serbia presents a threat.

11. That it does: its prime minister has made it crystal clear that an intervention into Kosovo under the guise of protecting the Serbs there is an option. Serbia’s concerted efforts to prevent Kosovo membership in international organizations and bilateral recognitions are also hostile acts.

12. NATO needs to make it clear to Belgrade that such a move would lead to a military response. At the same time, Pristina needs to make it clear that Serbs in Kosovo are not threatened. Prime Minister Haradinaj has been trying to do just that.

13. But managing the immediate threat doesn’t solve the longer-term problem.

14. What is needed is normalization, so that Serbia doesn’t represent a threat to Kosovo and Kosovo does not represent a threat to the Serbs who live there.

15. That will require much more extensive cross-border relations than exist today, including but by no means limited to diplomatic recognition and exchange of ambassadorial-level representatives.

17. But, some say, what does Serbia get? How can you expect Belgrade to accept Kosovo’s sovereignty and independence without a quid pro quo?

• If Serbia is seriously concerned with the Kosovo army, it might get some concessions on its size and capabilities.
• It will get nothing if it waits to just before accession to recognize Kosovo, since then all the leverage will be with the EU members.

18. Let me remind you of a page from US history: our most threatening enemy for about 100 years after independence was Great Britain, whose Canadian territory had the longest border of any country with the US.
19. Today, both Canada and Great Britain are two of America’s key allies.
20. But 100 years is too long to wait in the 21^st century. The time to end the enmity between Kosovo and Serbia, to the advantage of both, is now. It can be done, but only on the basis of mutual recognition and respect.