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Bravo, but Kosovo can wait

On the eve of today’s 11th anniversary of its independence, Kosovo has published its “Platform for Dialogue on a Final, Comprehensive and Legally Binding Agreement on Normalization of Relations Between the Republic of Kosovo and the Republic of Serbia.” There are a lot of things to like in this document, including:

1. A clear statement of Kosovo’s negotiating goals, which has been lacking: Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign and independent state.
2. Re-assertion of the validity of the Kosovo constitution on the state’s entire territory and explicit rejection of any cession of part of that territory.
3. Reciprocity: for Albanians in Serbia to be treated as well as Serbs in Kosovo, for war crimes committed by Serbs to be treated like war crimes committed by Albanians, including in a special tribunal.
4. Refusal to create any layer of government between the central one and municipalities (read any association of Serb municipalities with governing authority or responsibility).
5. Approval of the ultimate agreement in a referendum and by parliament in both Kosovo and Serbia.
6. Provisions for transparency, inclusivity, and accessibility of the state negotiating team.
7. Settlement of outstanding wartime issues (accounting for missing persons, return of displaced people, return of property, compensation, reparations, division of sovereign debt, etc.).
8. An end to UN Security Council resolution 1244 and approval of the final agreement in the Council and the General Assembly.
9. Conditioning of progress in EU accession on implementation of the final agreement.

All good. So what’s missing?

Two things:

1. Clarity on how and when UN membership will occur. It may be implicit in the reference to UNSC approval of the agreement, but it will need to be explicit before the negotiations are concluded. The controlling powers are China and Russia: how will they be brought around to allow a breakaway province to enter the UN? China won’t like it because of Tibet. Russia may like it but will want a quid pro quo in Crimea and possibly also South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transnistria.
2. Any indication of what Serbia might get in the deal. It is not Pristina’s responsibility to worry about this in the first instance, but it will need to worry about it in due course. What would be helpful is for Serbia to publish a similar platform. It has never been clear what Belgrade wants from the talks with Pristina, other than convincing Washington and Brussels that Serbia is willing to talk. That itself does have value, especially as it has been done on an equal basis that implicitly acknowledges that Kosovo has a legitimate and independent governing structure (already also recognized in the April 2013 “Brussels agreement”).

Of course Belgrade has also appeared to want territory, especially the majority-Serb municipalities north of the Ibar River. The Platform however is unequivocal in seeking “recognition of Kosovo’s independence and statehood within the existing borders.”

There are outstanding issues that might have value for Serbia: the composition and capabilities of the Kosovo army, the functions (other than governing) of the not yet created Association of Serb Municipalities, and Kosovo’s assumption of its share of Yugoslavia’s debt (mentioned in the Platform). But I doubt these will be sufficient to lead to an early agreement. More likely, Serbia will not engage seriously until the failure to reach an agreement with Kosovo noticeably slows its progress toward EU accession. Then it will be too late: all the leverage in the endgame of EU accession lies with the individual member states, which have to ratify accession, not with the candidate country.

One member state has dared to say what we all have known for years but no one wanted to say out loud. At the Security Council 10 days ago Christoph Heusgen, the German representative, said bluntly in a prepared (therefore cleared in Berlin) statement:

The only way that Serbia will enter the European Union will be with a successful normalization dialogue, with the recognition of Kosovo.

Belgrade would be wise to enter a serious negotiation sooner rather than later, while it can hope to still get something in exchange for recognizing Kosovo. Now that it has made its position clear, Pristina can afford to wait, as its EU accession is much further in the future.