Day: February 25, 2019
Good and bad news
The good news is that the UK Labour Party is signaling it will back a second Brexit referendum. The bad news is that Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif, partly responsible for negotiating the nuclear deal, has resigned.
Brexit: It has been apparent for some time now that the United Kingdom will be far worse off after it leaves the European Union. In fact, it is unlikely even to remain the United Kingdom, as Scotland and Northern Ireland could have good reasons for breaking up Her Majesty’s realm. Factories and financial institutions are fleeing. It is inconceivable that London can get a better trade deal with the US–or anyone else–acting alone rather than as a part of a more than 500-million person free trade area. Britain’s geopolitical weight is also vastly magnified inside the European Union compared to what it would be outside.
The problem has been how to cancel Brexit without defying the 2016 advisory referendum that launched it. Prime Minister May has been promising to deliver what the vote asked for by a margin of about 3.5 percentage points. Polls now indicate that Brexit might well be defeated in another referendum, if only because of demographic changes in the last three years. But a lot also depends on wording and the (unpredictable) political and economic circumstances in which a second referendum takes place. Nor is it clear yet whether Labour has the support in parliament to call a new referendum, though the defection of members from both Labour and the Conservatives in recent days increases the odds.
Zarif: The Iranian Foreign Minister resigned the same day he failed to appear in a video of Bashar al Assad meeting with the Supreme Leader. Whether that caused the resignation, or he had already resigned, is not clear, but Zarif was the relatively outward-looking face of the Iranian regime. His resignation will raise doubts about whether Iran intends to continue to comply with the nuclear deal, despite the American withdrawal and the failure of Europe to deliver the economic benefits anticipated. With Zarif out, a move by Tehran to abrogate the deal entirely is a step closer.
Some Americans would welcome that, as it might enable Washington to get the Europeans back in line and squeeze Tehran harder with sanctions. But it also opens the possibility of an Iranian push to develop nuclear weapons, sooner rather than later. Certainly anyone watching how well President Trump treats nuclear-armed Kim Jong-un could argue that Iran would be better off with a nuclear deterrent. The problem with that notion is Israel, which not only has nuclear weapons but might be inclined to use them to prevent Iran from getting close to a deployable nuclear weapon. Yes, it is possible that a deterrence relationship might emerge, but in the meanwhile the world could become a very dangerous place.
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Have the Taliban changed?
The Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted a discussion on February 21 about understanding what the Taliban wants, with former Ambassador Omar Samad, Nonresident Senior fFellow with the Atlantic Council. He was joined by William Maley, professor of diplomacy at the Asian-Pacific College of Diplomacy, Candance Rondeaux, professor in the School of Politics and Global Studies at Arizona State University, and Ahmed Majidyar, Senior Fellow and Director of Iranobserved at MEI.
Samad gave an overview of the emergence of Taliban twenty-five years ago, emphasizing that it is not known how they evolved and gained support inside and outside Afghanistan. Nor is it known how much control Pakistan has over them, their agenda, and their connection with terrorism. Taliban leaders reside outside Afghanistan; some of them go back and forth. The group grew from madrasa system in Afghanistan and Pakistan, supported by foreign fighters from Central Asia and the Caucasus. While they have updated their beliefs on women rights, democracy and governance, the Taliban’s current intentions remain to be tested and verified. They are proclaiming victory, claiming to have won the war and thus wanting to have a say in any future political settlement in Afghanistan.
Maley thinks the US as a wrong approach to the Taliban based on a Western model of leadership. he Taliban wanted to negotiate directly with the US and other international interlocutors to delegitimate the Afghani government. But since the death of Mullah Omar, the Taliban no longer have a leader whose word will bind the rest of the group. Little is known about what is needed now to negotiate effectively with the Taliban.
Evolving in a network of networks, Rondeaux thinks the Taliban do have a strong command structure, as demonstrated during the recent ceasefire. They gave a pledge and kept it, which showed they have control over their groups. Their command and control has grown, with lines of communication stretching from Peshawar to the interior of Afghanistan as well as to Doha and Turkey. This is considerable progress compared to 2001 and 2012, when they were on their back foot and fleeing across the borders. Now they have military courts and a justice system. Because of their cohesiveness, they are having meetings with the UN, ICRC, and other stakeholders.
Majidyar claims that after the US intervention in Afghanistan the Taliban military structure has become more decentralized and shifted from a disorganized insurgent movement to an organized shadow government. Having their leadership inside Pakistan, the Taliban counts on a cabinet that includes a Ministry of Education, a Ministry of Religious Affairs, and a Ministry of War, among others. They have also set up shadow governors and different committees running the day-to- day affairs. Along with the help of NGOs and the UN, they attend to the needs of the population in terms of health, education, and other sectors. Taliban recruitment comes from refugees inside Pakistan, madrasas, and the local community. Their area of influence has expanded from the south and east all across Afghanistan. With growing legitimacy, the Taliban had deepened ties with Russia, China, and the Gulf States.
According to Majidyar, the Taliban have not changed their connection with national and international terrorist groups. Despite the pledges given to the US, they still maintain ties with Al Qaeda active in the region. While pledging to respect human rights and international law once in power, the Taliban’s views on women’s and other human rights have not changed.
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Distracting and caving
President Trump is getting ready to cave: having scheduled a Summit with Kim Jong-un for next Wednesday and Thursday in Hanoi he is now talking about another with Xi Jingping next month. Both Summits are intended to distract from judicial investigations and portend deals: with Kim on North Korea’s nuclear weapons and with Xi on trade.
Get ready, America. Your pocket is going to be picked.
No doubt there will be a flashy announcement or two. Kim might agree to destroy some nuclear facilities and sign a peace agreement formally ending the Korean war, which is something he, his father, and grandfather have assiduously sought. President Trump will tout it as a great victory. With new tariffs postponed until the summit, Xi can easily agree to buy more US soybeans, another great victory. But that is the penny ante stuff.
Real concessions would have to include Kim accounting for all his fissionable material, agreeing to dismantle and surrender his nuclear weapons, and allowing International Atomic Energy Agency inspections permanently. Xi would have to end Chinese insistence on technology transfer from US companies and cyber theft of intellectual property. There is no sign that these US goals will be achieved. They may even be unachievable.
In Venezuela, too, Trump is losing, at least for now. His effort to weaponize US aid by assembling it on the borders and daring President Maduro to prevent it from entering ended Saturday in violent confrontation. Despite the defection of dozens of Venezuelan troops, only two trucks managed to get into the country. The Venezuelan security forces are so far remaining mostly loyal.
The Americans are threatening Maduro with consequences, but at least for now his hold on power seems tight. Trump has pretty good support from across the political spectrum for his effort to unseat Maduro, but any move towards military intervention would quickly shatter the consensus. Trump may not cave to Maduro, but it is unclear whether he can somehow get the Venezuelan President to step aside without a serious rift over war powers in the US Congress.
Trump’s effort to distract attention from various judicial investigations with international summits is not likely to work. Special Counsel Mueller, despite the rumors, is not yet finished. He needs to do something about Donald Jr. and likely Jared Kushner before folding his tent. Mueller continues to hide his hand on the Russia investigation: all the pertinent material was redacted last Friday from the sentencing memo he submitted concerning former campaign chair Paul Manafort, whose connections to Moscow are manifold.
So what we’ve got is an Administration trying hard with Venezuela, North Korea, and China to distract attention, even if that means far from satisfactory negotiating outcomes with Pyongyang and Beijing as well as a perilous game of chicken with Caracas.
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