peacefare.net

No way out

A few weeks ago, the second round of UN-led peace talks between Morocco and the Polisario independence movement ended in Geneva without substantial progress that would bridge the parties’ contradicting positions. Morocco insists on a form of autonomy for the Western Sahara territory under its sovereignty, while the Polisario Front clings to a referendum on self-determination.

A former Spanish colony, Morocco annexed the mineral-rich Western Sahara in 1975. Sixteen years of bloody war between Morocco and Polisario Liberation Front ended with a UN-brokered ceasefire in 1991, enabling a self-determination referendum for the Saharawi people to choose between independence or integration into Morocco. The UN mission for the referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) deployed to supervise the democratic transition. Yet the referendum has not taken place due in large part to the parties’ disagreement over who gets to vote, as well as the “winner takes all” solution.

In March 1997, the then UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, appointed James Baker, former US Secretary of State, as a personal envoy to Western Sahara. Baker put forth two additional proposals: The Baker plan I in 2001(also known as the Framework Agreement) and Baker Plan II in 2003. Although his last plan won Security Council endorsement, neither got both parties’ approval. In 2004, Baker resigned, lacking the full support from the Security Council to enforce a solution. UN mediators who came afterward were doomed to failure, putting the issue in the textbook of frozen conflicts.

In 2007, Morocco offered an autonomy plan that would give the Saharawi people the power to run their executive, legislative and judicial affairs under Moroccan sovereignty. Polisario Front put forth a parallel proposal: a referendum on self-determination giving wide guarantees to Moroccan settlers if it lead to independence. The seemingly irreconcilable proposals stalled negotiations in 2012, undermining the efforts of the then UN mediator, former US ambassador, Christopher Ross. The deadlock continued for over six years. This stagnant situation has prompted recurrent tensions between the parties on the UN-monitored buffer zone between Moroccan- and Polisario-controlled territory. The possibility of war looms.

Last December, in a speech at the Heritage Foundation displaying the Trump administration’s new Africa strategy, National Security Advisor John Bolton made clear the US would like to see a self-determination referendum take place. This new US approach to the conflict was also reflected at the level of the Security Council when the US shortened MINURSO’s periodic one-year mandate to six months, tying its renewal to progress on the ground. The US representative at the UN stated “there is no business as usual” regarding this issue, signaling the US willingness to push towards a final solution to the conflict.

The current active US involvement in the long-standing dispute has generated momentum. After six years of deadlock, the UN Special Envoy to Western Sahara, former German President Horst Kohler, has been able to bring the parties to the table. Yet the parties’ views are fundamentally diverging; Morocco seeks no solution beyond sovereignty over the territory, while the Polisario Front is committed to the principle of self-determination.

Based on the current UN paradigm, a “realistic, practicable and enduring solution based on a compromise which would provide the Saharawi people for self-determination” seems impossible to achieve. Morocco sees autonomy as a practicable and realistic form of self-determination, while Polisario Front considers giving the people the right to decide their future as the most viable and realistic solution. Since 2001, no single plan has so far won the parties agreement.

Shortening MINURSO’s mandate to six months has broken the deadlock, but it is still not enough to yield positive results. Without an existential threat–such as expelling MINURSO, which would trigger a war the parties cannot handle–there is no “zone of possible agreement.”

There are two other possible options:

• Compelling the parties to accept a tailored compromise in which they either both win or both lose.
• A drastic change in the region, bringing new governments seeking regional integration and willing to end this conflict.

Something like the latter is already underway in Algeria. But unless something more serious starts to happen in Morocco, the low -intensity conflict in Western Sahara is likely to remain a frozen conflict.