peacefare.net

Watch the pot

The pot is boiling once again in North Africa. Sudanese President Bashir, in power since 1993, is under arrest and his country under de facto martial law. Algerian President Bouteflika has resigned after almost 20 years in power. Libyan General Haftar is trying to take Tripoli by force. The smart money is betting he will bog down in a stalemate with opposing militias from Western Libya.

Not everyone is in turmoil. Morocco and Tunisia, which both embarked on political reforms in the wake of the Arab Spring, are at least for now continuing in that direction. Egypt’s President and former Field Marshall Sisi has restored its military dictatorship, cracked down hard on both Islamist and secular opposition, and embarked on some economic reforms.

Less visible in all these countries is the role of the Gulf potentates. The United Arab Emirates has backed both Sisi and Haftar, hoping to they will eradicate Islamists from their polities. Qatar has backed the Muslim Brotherhood in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. The Saudi-led coalition fighting against the Houthis in Yemen has used mercenary Sudanese troops, thus indirectly supporting Bashir. Iran has backed the Houthis but has not engaged heavily in North Africa, since there are few Shia there. Tehran’s interests are much stronger in Syria and Iraq.

American engagement in North Africa has been sporadic and targeted mainly against violent Islamist extremism, especially in Libya and more indirectly in Egypt. President Trump has said Libya is Europe’s problem, which makes a lot of sense since Spain, France, and Italy all have strong stakes in North Africa due to migration as well as oil and gas supplies. The problem is that the Europeans have found it hard to combine their efforts. Instead they compete for influence and undermine each other. It is unlikely that they will find a way to use their considerable clout to good effect.

The result will likely be that the North Africans will be left to find their own way. That might not be the worst of all possible worlds, even if it is fraught with risks. Libya’s downward spiral after its 2011 revolution does not suggest much indigenous capacity to manage without international help. But Libyans have always resisted it and are now vitiating the latest UN efforts to unify its state structures and begin the process of recovery from civil war.

Sudan and Algeria have better prospects. Their revolutions have so far been mostly nonviolent (apart from the force the police and military have indulged in). Nonviolent revolutions have a much higher probability of generating peaceful and democratic outcomes. But in both places the strong role of the military runs the risk of a detour to autocratic rule, as in Egypt. That is a contingency the demonstrators will have to guard against, so as not to fall into the Sisi trap.

The trick is to bring the pot to boil, but not let it boil over. If it does, extremists will exploit the situation. North Africa is not immune to Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and more localized jihadist organizations. Derna in Libya, where the US marines fought “on the shores of Tripoli,” has seen several revivals of extremists since Qaddafi fell, though Haftar for now seems to have things there under control. Tunisia has likewise generated lots of foreign fighters for the extremists, despite its so far successful political transition.

Let’s keep an eye on this pot.