The Yemeni quagmire

Hudson Institute held a panel discussion April 18 about the crisis in Yemen and its strategic threat to US interests and allies. The panel included Michael Doran, Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute, Fatima Abo Alasrar, Senior Analyst at Arabia Foundation, Bernard Haykel, Professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University.

Haykel gave an overview about the Houthis (who call themselves Ansar Allah), a group belonging to a particular caste of Yemeni society who ruled the country for a thousand years. Before rising again in 2000, They were marginalized since the late 1960s and displaced in 1992 with the revolution. Hussein El Houthi, founder of the group is influenced by Iranian ideology and draws inspiration from Ayatollah Khomeini. El Houthi and the Supreme Leader share the view that the US and Israel are enemies of Yemen, the Arabs, and Islam. This ideological connection was cemented from the middle of 1990s between the Zaydis (a Shia sect which the Houthis belong to) and Lebanese Hezbollah, which provided military, ideological and media training.

Although a small group in Yemen, the Houthis are the most disciplined, best trained and most ideologically motivated group. They are unlikely to be defeated military. Haykel urges that other ways of dealing with Houthis be conceived. Yemen, a poor country, has never been integrated into the labor market of the Gulf. A broad strategy that encompasses development and socioeconomic elements is needed. But Riyadh is not going to be easily convinced to end the war because the Saudis see the Houthis as a Hezbollah-like force on their southern border.

Alasrar argues that neither a military solution nor a political one has worked so far in Yemen. Incentives for the Houthis to come to the table are insufficient. Even when they do negotiate, they are not sincere, due in large part to the ideological alignment with Hezbollah and Iran. The Houthis are likely to remain the de facto authority on the ground given the reluctance of the international community to solve this issue military or politically. The Houthi’s core belief is legitimacy through force. Yemen’s future is therefore bleak. ,

But Alasrar also argues that many in Yemen recognize that the state marginalized the Houthis. Younger Yemenis would like to see a political reconciliation process to help the Houthis become a legitimate political actor. The Houthis did not subscribe to the national reconciliation process conducted in the aftermath of Yemen’s “Arab Spring.” They seized power easily at a vulnerable time when the transitional government after had no army. Weapons and ballistic misled smuggled to Houthis created a means for Iran to attack Saudi Arabia.

Doran stated that the US as a super power has to create a stable regional order in the Middle East. The Khashoggi murder was immoral and ugly, but the campaign to shift US policy on Saudi Arabia is wrong. Its roots lie in President Obama’s outreach to Iran, which he hoped would become a partner in establishing regional stability, which meant down-grading US relations with Saudi Arabia and Israel. There are only two American allies who are contesting Iranians on the ground: Israelis in Syria and the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. The argument that Mohammed bin Salman is unacceptable morally does not mean US should end its support for the Yemen war, which would weaken Saudi Arabia vis-a-vis Iran and leave a Hizbollah-like force on the Red Sea threatening shipping and hitting Saudi Arabia with ballistic missiles. Ending support to Saudi Arabia is not going to improve the Yemen situation or get the Iranians out.