Month: May 2019
What next for the US in Syria
I spoke today at SETA with Charles Lister, Bassam Barabandi, Geoffrey Aronson, and Kadir Ustun on Syria. Here are the talking notes I prepared. I started at number 13 and didn’t use them all. The video of the event is below:
- I find it difficult to know what to say about Syria.
- I could of course just repeat what many others have rightly said: the war is not over, Assad has not won because the country is in ruins and he lacks the means to fix it, it is all tragic and more tragedy impends because the underlying drivers of conflict have not been resolved.
- I could even go further and say that President Trump’s decision to withdraw was foolish, the US must stay in Syria, because otherwise we will have no say in its future, and that those who are trying to at least partially reverse that decision are correct.
- But I really don’t believe much of that: the policy implications for the US merit deeper examination.
- Assad has defeated any chance for a transition to democracy in Damascus: who in Syria would trust others to govern them today? Assad is demographically engineering the part of the country he controls to ensure regime security and has for most practical purposes won.
- He will keep most of the refugees out of regime-controlled Syria because he knows full well he cannot allow them back. He lacks the resources for reconstruction and fears they will threaten his hold on power.
- The Americans are not going to have much say over what happens in Syria, partly because they don’t want to. Neither President Obama nor President Trump thinks Syria is worth a candle.
- They cared about ISIS and Iran, not Syria.
- It is the Astana three that will determine Syria’s fate.
- Iran is there to stay because they have to. They think propping up Assad responds to threats from Israel and from Sunni extremists. Only regular bombing will limit Iranian power projection into the Levant. The Americans should prefer that the Israelis do it.
- The Russians are there to stay because they want to. Syria has given them not only an important naval base and now an air base, but also a toehold in Middle East geopolitics. At the very least, they can now cause trouble for the Americans in most of the region.
- The Turks are there to stay because they want to chase the PKK/PYD away from their borders and enable at least some of the refugees they host to return to Syria.
- The Syria Study Group in its interim report suggested that the Americans stay in northeastern Syria and do what is needed to enable civilians to stabilize it.
- But before a decision like that can be made, the Americans need to ask themselves what it would take. The Study Group put the cart before the horse.
- The six American civilians working there on contracting for rubble removal and a few other basic necessities like demining, water and electricity before being withdrawn by the Trump Administration were nowhere near what is required for a serious stabilization operation.
- That’s what you need if you ISIS is to be prevented from returning: governance and justice decent enough to be preferable to the caliphate.
- Experience, as Frances Z. Brown suggested in Monkey Cage last week, demonstrates that much more will be needed.
- How much more?
- Jim Dobbins is the best guide I know on this subject. For a “heavy peace enforcement” operation in a territory with, let us assume, 2.5 million people, which is my guess at how many are in northeastern Syria (and at least that many in Idlib), Jim suggests a force of more then 35,000 internationals and 13,000 locals costing almost 8 billion dollars per year.
- On top of that, you’ll need dozens if not hundreds of civilians supervising and guiding the disposition of stabilization funding.
- Sure, you can skimp or trade off locals for internationals, but not without consequences. I’ve heard little about Raqqa that suggests reconstruction there is going well there.
- The Turkish reconstruction efforts in the Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch territories, which are said to be “comprehensive” in SETA’s recent description of them, suggest Dobbins’ numbers are not far off.
- The simple conclusion is that nowhere near the required resources are likely to be available for a serious American stabilization effort in northeastern Syria.
- What about the Turks? They want a buffer zone of 30 km or so inside Syria. Could they be relied upon to do the necessary stabilization and reconstruction all across their southern border?
- The answer is likely yes, but not without consequences.
- Upwards of 600,000 Kurds live in northeastern Syria. A significant percentage of them would likely flee, as many did from Afrin during and after Olive Branch, and the PKK fighters so vital to the effort against ISIS would be forced back into the arms of the Syrian regime, which would no doubt expect them to do what they were created to do: attack Turkey.
- US troops remaining in northeastern Syria while the Turks repress the Kurds they think support the PKK and the Syrian regime supports the same Kurds to attack Turkey is not my idea of a place I would want US troops to be.
- What about Idlib? It looks to me as if Assad is determined to retake it, with massive consequences: millions might seek to leave. There is no real ceasefire.
- Maybe these two dire scenarios lead to a standoff? The regime might hold off in Idlib fearing that Ankara would use the occasion to go into northeastern Syria? Maybe Ankara will hold off in northeastern Syria for fear Damascus will go after Idlib in a serious way?
- Might it be possible to deploy Arab peacekeepers to both areas? Now I’m in fantasyland.
- Whatever happens, I don’t think the US presence in Syria, even if doubled or quadrupled, is adequate to the task of enabling stabilization of the territory the SDF now controls, especially as ISIS reconstitutes and the Iranians decide to test our mettle.
- We can’t get out for fear of the consequences. And we don’t want to put enough effort in to make a real difference in repressing ISIS and repelling Iranian-backed proxies. That’s not a good place for America to be.
- My recommendation would be just this: go big and fix Syria or get out and let the chips fall where they may. But neither is likely to happen.
- That will reduce us to putting US troops at risk for the sake of a possible future role in some imagined UN-sponsored peace negotiation. I argued in favor of that 18 months ago. Today it is hard to justify.
- It is fitting that Hulu has revived Catch-22 at this fraught moment.
Not exonerated
Special Counsel Mueller has spoken:
He is clear that the investigation found insufficient evidence to charge a “broader conspiracy” with the concerted Russian effort to interfere in the US election against Hillary Clinton and that the investigation did not exonerate the President of obstruction of justice, a charge that can only be pursued in the Congress through impeachment or oversight proceedings.
Insufficient evidence of conspiracy is not exoneration. Not exoneration on obstruction of justice is also not exoneration. We’ve got a President whose middle name should be not exonerated: Donald “Not Exonerated” Trump.
Peace Picks May 27-June 2
- The Role of Parliament in Today’s Britain|Tuesday, May 28th|9:45am-11:15am|Brookings Institution|Falk Auditorium 1775 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036|Register Here
On May 28, Foreign Policy at Brookings will host Speaker of the House of Commons John Bercow for a discussion of Parliament’s role in politics and policy at a pivotal time for one of the United States’ closest allies. The past year has seen a series of extraordinary developments in British politics, with the House of Commons at the center of it all. Following repeated parliamentary defeats for the government’s Brexit agreement with the European Union, the country’s scheduled departure from the EU has been delayed until October 31 and elections for the European Parliament will be held on May 23.
Brookings President John R. Allen will introduce Speaker Bercow. Following the speaker’s remarks, Thomas Wright, director of Brookings’s Center on the United States and Europe, will moderate a conversation with Bercow and Amanda Sloat, Robert Bosch Senior Fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe. Questions from the audience will follow the discussion.
This event is part of the Brookings – Robert Bosch Foundation Transatlantic Initiative, which aims to build up and expand resilient networks and trans-Atlantic activities to analyze and work on issues concerning trans-Atlantic relations and social cohesion in Europe and the United States.
2. The Arms Control Landscape|Wednesday, May 29th|8:45am-11:00am|Hudson Institute|1201 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Suite 400, Washington, DC 20004|Register Here
Hudson Institute will host the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency Lieutenant General Robert P. Ashley, Jr., for a discussion on Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons. Lt. Gen. Ashley will provide keynote remarks and engage in a discussion with Hudson Senior Fellow Rebeccah Heinrichs. This will be followed by a panel of senior government officials who will discuss the global landscape for arms control.
Speakers:
Lt. Gen. Robert P. Ashley, Jr., Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute
Dr. James H. Anderson, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans and Capabilities, U.S. Department of Defense
Tim Morrison, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Weapons of Mass Destruction and Biodefense, National Security Council (NSC)
Thomas DiNanno, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Policy, Emerging Threats, And Outreach, Bureau Of Arms Control, Verification And Compliance, U.S. Department of State
3. A Conversation with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dunford|Wednesday, May 29th| 10:30am-11:30am |Brookings Institution|Saul/Zilkha Room, 1775 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington, DC| Register Here
During his distinguished tenure as 19th chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—the nation’s highest-ranking military officer—General Joseph Dunford has been a key force at the center of America’s defense policy. He has helped redirect U.S. strategic attention to the challenges posed by great power competition, while also remaining vigilant against threats from the Korean Peninsula to the Persian Gulf and broader Middle East, and addressing rapidly evolving military technologies as well as other challenges.
On May 29, Brookings will host General Dunford for a discussion with on the national security landscape facing America, the state of the nation’s armed forces, and key defense choices for the future, moderated by Brookings Senior Fellow Michael O’Hanlon.
Questions from the audience will follow their conversation.
4. EU Elections 2019: The Future of the European Project|Wednesday, May 29th |12:00pm-2:00pm|Atlantic Council|1030 15thSt NW, 12thFloor, Washington, DC 20005|Register Here
Please join the Atlantic Council on Wednesday, May 29, 2019, from 12:00 p.m. to 2:00 p.m. for a conversation on “EU Elections 2019: The Future of the European Project.”
In the wake of the 2019 EU elections, the Future Europe Initiative will host a number of experts to discuss their insights on the results. They will provide analysis on the election results, the outcome on individual nations and regions within the EU, and the impact on Europe and the European project as a whole.
Mr. Antoine Ripoll, the Representative of the EU Parliament in Washington, DC, will provide opening remarks with Dr. Frances G. Burwell, Distinguished Fellow with the Future Europe Initiative at the Atlantic Council, moderating the conversation.
Additional speakers will include Dr. Emiliano Alessandri of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, Dr. Célia Belin of The Brookings Institution, Ms. Katerina Sokou of Kathimerini and SKAI TV, and Mr. Bart Oosterveld of the Atlantic Council.
To share the perspective on the ground, Mr. Jeremy Cliffe of the Economist and Ms. Sophia Besch of the Centre for European Reform will join us via webcast from Brussels and Berlin respectively.
5. A New Opening for Peace in Ukraine?|Wednesday, May 29th|2:00pm-4:00pm|Carnegie Endowment for International Peace|1779 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036| Register Here
After five years of war, the conflict in Ukraine is effectively stalemated. Join Carnegie for a timely conversation on whether the arrival of a new Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelenskiy, can help break the deadlock. How should the Trump administration and its European allies respond to this new political reality and continued provocative Russian actions in eastern Ukraine?
U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations Amb. Kurt Volker will deliver a keynote address, followed by a panel discussion with leading experts and former government officials.
Travel for participants in this event was made possible with the support of the Embassies of Lithuania and Poland.
Panelists:
Charles Kupchan, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and Professor of international affairs at Georgetown University
Marek Menkiszak, Head of the Russia Department at the Centre for Eastern Studies in Warsaw, Poland.
Oxana Shevel, Associate Professor in Political Science, Tufts University
Amb. Petras Vaitienkūnasis, former Foreign Minister of Lithuania and Ambassador to Ukraine (2010 to 2014), Adviser to the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council
Moderator:
Andrew S. Weiss, James Family chair and Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
6. Russia’s Resurgence in the Middle East: How does US Policy Meet the Challenge?|Thursday, May 30th|2:00pm|Atlantic Council||1030 15thSt NW, 12thFloor, Washington, DC 20005|Register Here
Russia is once again a major player in the Middle East. Moscow has notably backed the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, while it has a growing footprint in Iran, Turkey, and the Gulf. Russia’s return to the region has posed significant challenges for transatlantic policymaking in this era of renewed great-power competition. The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security will bring together a panel of experts to discuss Russia’s growing role in the region and its economic, political, and security implications. This event is intended to qualify as a widely-attended gathering under the Executive Branch and Congressional gift rules.
Introduced by:
William F. Wechsler, Director, Middle East Programs, Atlantic Council
Keynote address by:
Kathryn Wheelbarger, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, US Department of Defense
Panelists:
Mark N. Katz, Professor, Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University
Becca Wasser, Policy Analyst, RAND Corporation
7. How to Advance Inclusive Peace Processes: Mobilizing Men as Partners for Women, Peace and Security|Thursday, May 30th|2:00pm-3:30pm|United States Institute of Peace|2301 Constitution Ave NW, Washington, DC 20037|Register Here
Efforts to develop more inclusive peace processes are making progress. Yet, 20 years after the passage of U.N. Security Resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security, very few women are currently part of formal peace processes. This gap is exemplified by the recent struggles of Afghan women to be included in peace talks and U.N. reports that showed between 1990 and 2017, women constituted only 2 percent of mediators, 8 percent of negotiators, and 5 percent of witnesses and signatories in major peace processes. A new initiative from Our Secure Future, “Mobilizing Men as Partners for Women, Peace and Security,” seeks to remedy this by calling on men in gatekeeping positions throughout the defense, diplomacy, development, civil society, faith-based, and business sectors to commit to ensuring women are an equal part of peace processes and decision making.
Join the U.S. Institute of Peace for an event exploring how men in leadership positions are organizing as partners to identify, encourage, and mobilize collective voices in the support of women’s engagement in the pursuit of peace. By bringing global citizens more fully into this campaign, these stakeholders can step away from the sidelines of the women, peace, and security movement and more fully stand alongside—and empower—the women leading the effort. Take part in the conversation on Twitter with #MobilizingMen4WPS.
Reception to follow.
Speakers
Sanam Naraghi-Anderlini, Founder and Executive Director, ICAN
Honorable Ed Royce, Former U.S. Representative from California
Ambassador Donald Steinberg, Fellow, Our Secure Future
Ambassador Steven McGann, Founder, The Stevenson Group
Ambassador Melanne Verveer, Executive Director, Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security
Ambassador Rick Barton, Co-director, Scholars in the Nation’s Service Initiative, Princeton University
Rosarie Tucci, moderator, Director, Inclusive Peace Processes, U.S. Institute of Peace
Sahana Dharmapuri, Director, Our Secure Future
Dean Peacock, Senior Advisor for Global Policy, Promundo
8. Line on Fire: India-Pakistan Violence and Escalation Dynamics|Thursday, May 30th|2:00pm-3:30pm|Carnegie Endowment for International Peace|1779 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036|Register Here
Over the last decade, firing by Indian and Pakistani troops across the Line of Control in Kashmir increased dramatically, but did not escalate to general conflict. Meanwhile, the February 2019 terrorist attack in Pulwama sparked a sharp, albeit short, military confrontation between India and Pakistan that saw the first aerial combat between the two since 1971. What explains the patterns of violence along the Line of Control and what are the chances that conflict could escalate and involve nuclear weapons?
Join Carnegie for a conversation with Happymon Jacob on this question and more. In his new book Line on Fire: Ceasefire Violations and India-Pakistan Escalation Dynamics, Jacob analyzes new empirical data to examine the causes of India-Pakistan violence along the Kashmir border and the relationship with potential crisis escalation.
Panel:
Happymon Jacob, Associate professor of Disarmament Studies at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.
Tamanna Salikuddin, Senior Expert at the U.S. Institute of Peace
George Perkovich, Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Chair and Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, overseeing the Technology and International Affairs Program and Nuclear Policy Program.
Droning on won’t do
On May 21 New America held a panel discussion on violence prevention in South Somalia and possible opportunities going forward featuring Isse Abdullahi, Director of the Social-Life and Agricultural Development Organization (SADO), Pauline Muchina, Public Education and Advocacy Coordinator for the American Friends Service Committee’s Africa region, and Brittany Brown, Chief of Staff for the International Crisis Group.
The focus was on the drivers of violence: poverty, lack of education, and weak governance. Security initiatives in Somalia can only go so far without addressing these. The speakers critiqued the Somali President, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmaajo,” for putting too much focus on security efforts and not enough on building up civil society and improving governance.
The main issue the government of Somalia faces is its lack of territorial control outside the capital, Mogadishu, and its lack of funding. Many of the militias, such as the Al-Shabaab, are better funded than the government, and thus can afford not only to sustain their operations and arm themselves, but also to pay locals to join them. Many of the locals, Muchina points out, join not out of commitment to the Al-Shabaab ideology, but rather out of poverty.
Ideology is another big issue in the fight against Al-Shabaab. Abdullahi stressed that Al-Shabaab is not only a militia movement, it is also an ideology that cannot be defeated purely through drone strikes, outside intervention, and military initiatives. He points to US efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq as examples of how hard it is to defeat an ideology militarily.
Rather than using drone strikes, which both Abdullahi and Muchina say do little to defeat Al-Shabaab and even help their recruiting efforts, it would be wise to work more with local experts on the ground. They say initiatives focused youth, who make up 70% of the population, are effective in preventing violence and convincing the population to put aside rivalries and grievances and work together towards a united Somalia.
By contrast, Brown said that in her experience people on the ground in Somalia favor US airstrikes. What happens after airstrikes is especially important. Once Al-Shabaab is forced out of an area, it is of utmost importance to start rebuilding infrastructure and helping both government and civil society take root and grow.
Brown points out that the policy of drone strikes started under the Obama administration because of the lower cost and lessened risk to US personnel. Drone strikes have increased under President Trump and the strike policy has changed, allowing for longer strike durations and strikes in areas previously off-limits. In 2019 so far there have been 40 drone strikes in Somalia, close to the 45 all year in 2018 and more than the 35 in 2017. She asks why the US only has counter-terrorism missions in Africa instead of the more peaceful and cooperative missions seen elsewhere. The Executive Branch should be held more accountable.
Abdullahi recommends looking more into the effects of drone strikes and evaluating if they continue to be the best measure for fighting Al-Shabaab. He suggests looking at other options and working more with individuals on the ground. Most important is looking at the bigger picture of who is fighting whom in Somalia and who could possibly broker peace between rival factions.
Muchina agrees. She stresses the importance, and thus far unused opportunity, of using the women within the traditional Somali clan structure to help broker peace and promote talks between rival clans. Even though they are widely discriminated against, at the family level they carry a lot of influence and thus could be effective in engaging people .
The panelists agree the best way to move forward in preventing violence in Somalia is by reevaluating current foreign intervention methods and working with locals on the ground to broker peace talks. “Even if Al-Shabaab were gone tomorrow Somalia wouldn’t have peace” says Brown, highlighting the need for peacemaking efforts which go beyond just bombing militants.
Pelosi and Iran
President Trump sandbagged Speak Pelosi and Senate Minority leader Schumer Wednesday. That’s when someone hits you from an unexpected direction. Trump invited the Democrats to the White House to discuss infrastructure, then stormed out in a premeditated fury to denounce her at a podium set up in advance for the purpose. He criticized Pelosi for claiming he was engaged in a “coverup” and then confirmed her claim by insisting the House couldn’t continue to investigate him and legislate at the same time.
That of course is not true. Congressional oversight does not get suspended in order to allow for legislation. Even during the impeachment proceedings against Presidents Nixon and Clinton legislation got passed and sent to them for signature. Trump, in his signature style, is denying what is evident to all: he is desperate to keep his tax returns and business affairs out of the public eye. It is hard to imagine he would go to the lengths he has if there weren’t something incriminating to hide.
We already know that in the 1990s he lost fabulous quantities of money in ill-conceived projects. We also know he paid little or no income taxes for many years. And we know that he lied about the value of his assets to banks and regulatory authorities and violated campaign finance laws by paying off mistresses. Whatever he is trying to hide, it is worse than all those things. My guess is that a) he is not as rich as he claims, b) he is a tax cheat on a grand scale, and c) he has laundered money for Russian oligarchs.
Whether any of this will make any difference to his supporters, who include virtually all Republican members of Congress and 90% of their loyal voters, is unclear. That’s why Pelosi, who only too clearly thinks Trump should be drummed out of office as soon as possible, wants to be sure before moving in that direction that it won’t hurt the Democrats’ chances in the 2020 election. The best guarantee of that would be a bipartisan impeachment proceeding, like the one against Nixon and unlike the one against Clinton. Failing Republican support for impeachment in the Senate, the election is crucial to getting Trump out of the White House.
Two Federal judges have now ordered that Trump financial records be turned over to Congressional committees. They rejected the Trump Administration’s arguments to the contrary as specious. That likely made the President even more anxious to end the Congressional investigations, which will now have red meat to pick on. Pelosi’s accusation of a “cover-up” was nowhere near provocative enough to rouse the President to the ire he demonstrated Wednesday.
Sandbagging is a cardinal sin in Washington. I remember when Pelosi excoriated former Secretary of State Baker and former Congressman Hamilton during a meeting to discuss the Iraq Study Group, which had been funded outside “regular order” and therefore without her knowledge. They were in no way responsible–the group had been funded many months before in a last-minute budget maneuver by former Virginia Congressman Frank Wolf. But she felt sandbagged and let them know it in no uncertain terms.
Trump is depending on being able to escalate the conflict with Pelosi more than she can. That is doubtful. Yesterday he said she is “a mess” and doesn’t know what she is doing. She suggested his staff and family mount “an intervention.” Today Trump tweeted a fake video of Pelosi slurring words. She will not respond in kind but will have a few choice words. She may not favor impeachment proceedings yet, but she is not going to back down on pursuing oversight that the Democrats think will prove even to Republicans that this president is a fraudster flim-flam man.
What does all this have to do with foreign policy? I hope nothing, but the temptation of a president under siege domestically to lash out against foreign adversaries is well-documented. Trump is no doubt looking for whatever will rally at least his base behind him and chase the Congressional investigations from the front pages. He has alread revved up an investigation of the court-authorized surveillance of some of his campaign workers and is charging Wikileaks publisher Julian Assange with espionage, a move intended to inhibit all media from publishing leaked material.
War with Iran could also help Trump protect himself . He has been more hat than cattle when it comes to military action, but even a small military incident could serve his current purposes well. There are certainly enough hot heads in Iran to provide Trump with just what he needs.
The last error
Pantelis Ikonomou, a former IAEA nuclear inspector, thinks out loud:
- Though nuclear proliferation is a paramount global threat, super powers fail to demonstrate sufficient competence in responding.
- World expectations based on the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that nuclear weapons states will preserve global peace in accordance with their responsibilities are plainly becoming wishful thinking.
- The authority and competence of the world’s nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, has been downgraded by its founders and historical proponents, the nuclear weapons states.
- Denuclearization of North Korea is going nowhere. The pendulum-like rhetoric on both sides, Washington and Pyongyang, combined with the risk of miscalculation or a military error, enlarges the dangerous vicious cycle.
- Washington might seriously consider the mitigation of Pyongyang’s fears for its security, as Beijing suggests, rather than playing the military threat card. This was after all the prevailing approach in the 2015 Iran nuclear deal
- US withdrawal from JCPOA (2018) and Iran’s recent announcement of partial withdrawal from it lead to new risky situations. Tomorrow, no one should be surprised.
- At the same time, US National Security Strategy (2017) and the Pentagon’s Nuclear Posture Review (2018) both stated that American nuclear capability will be strengthened and its nuclear arsenal modernized. Reason given: deterrence of Russia.
- On a precisely equivalent level are President Putin’s repeated statements (2018-2019): Russia needs to maintain its super power status through advanced nuclear capabilities.
- The rest of the “legal” nuclear club – China, the UK, and France – follow suit. Why not? – they might ask.
- In parallel, the de facto non-NPT nuclear weapons states, India, Pakistan, most probably Israel and now North Korea, keep developing their nuclear arsenals and ballistic capabilities.
- Moreover, more nuclear candidates, are getting ready for their geopolitical nuclear race.
- Unfortunately, nuclear issues are complex, making a sound solution of nuclear crises difficult even for strong, authoritarian, and ambitious world leaders.
- Nuclear armaments are not a financial or political game. They are the leading global threat to human civilization.
- It is time to getting serious. The speed of developments makes derailing of constraints on nuclear weapons control likely. That would be the last human error.