Droning on won’t do
On May 21 New America held a panel discussion on violence prevention in South Somalia and possible opportunities going forward featuring Isse Abdullahi, Director of the Social-Life and Agricultural Development Organization (SADO), Pauline Muchina, Public Education and Advocacy Coordinator for the American Friends Service Committee’s Africa region, and Brittany Brown, Chief of Staff for the International Crisis Group.
The focus was on the drivers of violence: poverty, lack of education, and weak governance. Security initiatives in Somalia can only go so far without addressing these. The speakers critiqued the Somali President, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmaajo,” for putting too much focus on security efforts and not enough on building up civil society and improving governance.
The main issue the government of Somalia faces is its lack of territorial control outside the capital, Mogadishu, and its lack of funding. Many of the militias, such as the Al-Shabaab, are better funded than the government, and thus can afford not only to sustain their operations and arm themselves, but also to pay locals to join them. Many of the locals, Muchina points out, join not out of commitment to the Al-Shabaab ideology, but rather out of poverty.
Ideology is another big issue in the fight against Al-Shabaab. Abdullahi stressed that Al-Shabaab is not only a militia movement, it is also an ideology that cannot be defeated purely through drone strikes, outside intervention, and military initiatives. He points to US efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq as examples of how hard it is to defeat an ideology militarily.
Rather than using drone strikes, which both Abdullahi and Muchina say do little to defeat Al-Shabaab and even help their recruiting efforts, it would be wise to work more with local experts on the ground. They say initiatives focused youth, who make up 70% of the population, are effective in preventing violence and convincing the population to put aside rivalries and grievances and work together towards a united Somalia.
By contrast, Brown said that in her experience people on the ground in Somalia favor US airstrikes. What happens after airstrikes is especially important. Once Al-Shabaab is forced out of an area, it is of utmost importance to start rebuilding infrastructure and helping both government and civil society take root and grow.
Brown points out that the policy of drone strikes started under the Obama administration because of the lower cost and lessened risk to US personnel. Drone strikes have increased under President Trump and the strike policy has changed, allowing for longer strike durations and strikes in areas previously off-limits. In 2019 so far there have been 40 drone strikes in Somalia, close to the 45 all year in 2018 and more than the 35 in 2017. She asks why the US only has counter-terrorism missions in Africa instead of the more peaceful and cooperative missions seen elsewhere. The Executive Branch should be held more accountable.
Abdullahi recommends looking more into the effects of drone strikes and evaluating if they continue to be the best measure for fighting Al-Shabaab. He suggests looking at other options and working more with individuals on the ground. Most important is looking at the bigger picture of who is fighting whom in Somalia and who could possibly broker peace between rival factions.
Muchina agrees. She stresses the importance, and thus far unused opportunity, of using the women within the traditional Somali clan structure to help broker peace and promote talks between rival clans. Even though they are widely discriminated against, at the family level they carry a lot of influence and thus could be effective in engaging people .
The panelists agree the best way to move forward in preventing violence in Somalia is by reevaluating current foreign intervention methods and working with locals on the ground to broker peace talks. “Even if Al-Shabaab were gone tomorrow Somalia wouldn’t have peace” says Brown, highlighting the need for peacemaking efforts which go beyond just bombing militants.