Month: May 2019
Peace Picks May 20-24
1. #CyberspaceIRL: Rule of Law Approaches to Virtual Threats|Tuesday, May 21st|9am-5:30pm|United States Institute of Peace|2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20037|Register Here
A $600 billion black market, cybercrime has transformed the digital world into a sophisticated platform to steal and profit from personal data, undermine civil rights, manipulate elections, disseminate anti-democratic propaganda, and steal intelligence. Yet, cyberspaces remain largely unregulated. This lack of governance is a major challenge and concern for legal practitioners, human rights champions, and policymakers. To properly address the complex world of cybercrimes, these key players must work together to prioritize targeted strategies encompassing cross-jurisdictional cooperation, both locally and globally.
Join the U.S. Institute of Peace as we co-host the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative’s 2019 Annual Conference. Bringing together representatives from academia, national security, and the private and public sectors, this conference will identify rule of law strategies to more effectively address this ever-changing landscape.
#CyberspaceIRL will assess whether current approaches are sufficient in addressing the complexity of issues such as money laundering, trafficking, election security, and internet freedom, and identify the breadth of actors who must be part of devising and implementing effective strategies and solutions.
Agenda:
8:30am – 9:00am – Registration (coffee/pastries)
9:00 – 9:15 – Welcome and Introductions
David Yang, Vice President, Applied Conflict Transformation, U.S. Institute of Peace
Alberto Mora, Director, American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative
Judge Margaret McKeown, Board Chair, American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative
9:20am – 9:50am – Keynote: “Setting the Stage for the Clash of Norms in Cyberspace”
Sujit Raman, Associate Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice
10:00am – 11:15am – Breakout Sessions
Legal Frameworks and Regional Initiatives
Rob Leventhal, moderator, Deputy Office Director, Office of Anticrime Programs, U.S. Department of State
Manuel de Almeida Pereira, Senior Legal Officer, Programme Manager, Council of Europe
Kenn Kern, Chief Information Officer, Special Assistant, International Relations, New York County District Attorney’s Office
Election Security and the Erosion of Trust in Democratic Institutions
Jonas Claes, moderator, Preventing Election Violence Program Officer, U.S. Institute of Peace
Katherine Ellena, Legal Advisor, International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)
Harvey Rishikof, Visiting Professor, Temple Law, former senior policy advisor to the director of national counterintelligence at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Saleela Salahuddin, Cybersecurity Policy Lead, Facebook
11:25am – 12:15pm – Plenary: The Tipping Point: When is Cyber Incitement Responsible for Violence? (the case of Burma/Myanmar)
Lata Nott, moderator, Executive Director of the First Amendment Center at the Newseum
Molly Land, Associate Director of the University of Connecticut’s Human Rights Institute and Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law
Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Finance and Economics Expert Panel of Experts Established pursuant to UNSCR 1874
Richard Ashby Wilson, Gladstein Distinguished Chair of Human Rights and Professor of Law and Anthropology, University of Connecticut School of Law
12:15pm – 1:00pm – Lunch
1:00pm – 2:15pm – Breakout Sessions
Cybercrime Enforcement: Deterring State and Non-State Actors through Criminal Prosecutions
Steven M. Kelly, moderator, Chief of Cyber Policy of the Cyber Division at the Federal Bureau of Investigation
Luke Dembosky, Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton
Michael J. Stawasz, Deputy Chief for Computer Crime, U.S. Department of Justice, Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section
Sean Newell, Deputy Chief for Cyber, U.S. Department of Justice, Counterintelligence and Export Control Section
William Lyne, Liaison Officer, National Crime Agency, British Embassy to the United States
When Bitcoin Goes Bad: How Virtual Currencies Challenge the Rule of Law
Adam Zarazinski, moderator, CEO, Inca Digital Securities
Elisabeth Poteat, Attorney, Department of Justice, National Security Division
Michael Sachs, Chief, Investigative Division, New York County District Attorney’s Office
Yaya J. Fanusie, Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
2:30pm – 3:45pm – Breakout Sessions
Internet Freedom: Protecting the Good Guys while Catching the Bad Guys
Heather West, moderator, Senior Policy Manager at Mozilla
Andrea Little Limbago, Chief Social Scientist of Virtru
Bill Marczak, Research Fellow at Citizen Lab, and a Postdoctoral Researcher at UC Berkeley
Robyn Greene, Privacy Policy Manager, Facebook
Trafficking in the Digital Age
Jessie Tannenbaum, moderator, Legal Advisor, Research, Evaluation, and Learning Division, ABA ROLI
Danielle Kessler, Senior Policy and Outreach Manager, International Fund for Animal Welfare
Evan Ratliff, Journalist and author of The Mastermind: Drugs, Empire, Murder, Betrayal
Robert E. Bornstein, Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Criminal Division, Branch 1 of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Washington Field Office
3:45pm – 4:30pm – Closing Keynote Session: “Shaping the Future of the Cyber Landscape”
Glenn S. Gerstell, General Counsel, National Security Agency
Judge James E. Baker, ROLI Board & Syracuse University
4:30pm – 5:30pm – Reception
2. Visegrad Countries in the Transatlantic Alliance – Common Security, Shared Challenges|Tuesday, May 21st|10:30pm-12:00pm|Heritage Foundation|Lehrman Auditorium, 214 Massachusetts Ave NE, Washington, DC 20002| Register Here
The event cohosted by the Heritage Foundation and the Antall József Knowledge Center in Budapest, Hungary, will explore the diplomatic, economic, military and political importance of the V4. A special focus of the event will be relations between the Visegrád and the United States, how the region can one day develop into an anchor of U.S. engagement in Europe and continue contributing to robust transatlantic cooperation.
Panel:
Dušan Fischer, Project Manager, Air Force and Counter-Air Defense Projects Unit, Modernization Department, Ministry of Defence, Slovak Republic
Dominik P. Jankowski, Political Advisor & Head of the Political Section at the Permanent Delegation of the Republic of Poland to NATO
Hynek Kmoníček, Ambassador of the Czech Republic to the United States
László Szabó, Ambassador of Hungary to the United States
Moderated by:
Péter Stepper, Research Fellow, Editor, Antall József Knowledge Center
Hosted by:
James Carafano, Ph.D., Vice President and E.W. Richardson Fellow, Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy
Veronika Antall-Horváth, Deputy Director Antall József Knowledge Center
3. Violence Prevention in Southern Somalia|Tuesday, May 21st| 1pm-2:30pm|New America|740 15thSt NW #900, Washington, DC 20005|Register Here
New America’s International Security Program and Peace Direct invite you to join them for a lunchtime panel discussion on violence prevention in southern Somalia. In March 2019, the capital city of Mogadishu saw seven terrorist attacks by Al-Shabaab in a single week. That, coupled with a recent uptick in counterterrorism ground, air, and drone strikes by the United States in cooperation with the government of Somalia, has called into question what it will take to establish peace in the southern part of the country.Peace Direct’s partner organization in Somalia, Social-Life and Agricultural Development Organization(SADO), has been working in the region for over two decades, looking at sustainable, people and community-centered development.
Topics that will be covered during the session include:
- What are the current obstacles and opportunities for peace in Somalia?
- Perspectives and recommendations from local peacebuilders on advancing peace in Somalia.
- What does practical violence prevention work in Somalia look like?
- What is the role of women in violence prevention?
- What is the role of U.S. policy in Somalia and what are recommendations for improving U.S. engagement?
Introductory Remarks:
Bridget Moix, U.S. Senior Representative and Head of Advocacy, Peace Direct
Panelists:
Isse Abdullahi, Director, Social-Life and Agricultural Development Organization (SADO)
Pauline Muchina, Public Education and Advocacy Coordinator for the American Friends Service Committee’s Africa region
Moderator:
Melissa Salyk-Virk, Policy Analyst, New America’s International Security Program
4. Is the Venezuela Crisis Becoming a Proxy Conflict?|Tuesday, May 21st|3:30pm-5pm|Carnegie Endowment for International Peace|1779 Massachusetts Ave NW|Register Here
Join Carnegie and the Inter-American Dialogue for a timely conversation about the geopolitical implications of the Venezuela crisis. Top Trump administration officials have repeatedly criticized Cuban, Russian, and Chinese backing for the Maduro regime, but they are struggling to change the situation on the ground. What is the strategic calculus propelling outside powers’ involvement in Venezuela? What risks does deeper foreign intervention in the crisis pose for the fate of the Venezuelan opposition led by interim President Juan Guaidó and the region as a whole?
Speakers:
Rebecca Bill Chavez, nonresident senior fellow at the Inter-American Dialogue and former deputy assistant secretary of defense for Western Hemisphere affairs
Alexander Gabuev, senior fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center
Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue
Francisco Toro, founder of Caracas Chronicles and opinion columnist for the Washington Post
5. Europe after the European Election|Wednesday, May 22nd|1pm-2:30pm|American Enterprise Institute|Auditorium, 1789 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036|Register Here
While populism continues to be a dominant factor shaping Europe’s politics, the simplistic overuse of the label often obfuscates Europe’s actual political dynamics. Rather than populism, what makes the 2019 European election so significant is the degree of political fragmentation that will likely characterize the results. In all likelihood, power will continue to shift away from the once-dominant political families on the center right and the center left. How will that affect the composition of the future European Commission? Will it make the EU more difficult to govern? And why should Americans care?
Join Amb. Santiago Cabanas, Ben Judah, and Yascha Mounk— alongside AEI’s Dalibor Rohac and Stan Veuger— as they discuss Europe’s challenges and the way forward.
Agenda:
12:45 PM
Registration
1:00 PM
Welcome:
Dalibor Rohac, AEI
1:05 PM
Panel discussion
Panelists:
Santiago Cabanas, Ambassador of Spain
Ben Judah, Hudson Institute
Yascha Mounk, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies
Dalibor Rohac, AEI
Moderator:
Stan Veuger, AEI
2:10 PM
Q&A
2:30 PM
Adjournment
6. Managing Forced Displacement in Africa: How Collective Efforts Can More Effectively Address the Surge of Refugees and Displaced Persons|Thursday, May 23rd|9am-11am|United States Institute for Peace|2301 Constitution Ave NW, Washington, DC 20037|Register Here
Africa hosts more than one-third of the world’s refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). This growing phenomenon impacts not only those fleeing conflict, but also the host communities and countries who now face complex logistical and humanitarian challenges. A comprehensive response to this problem must seek to address root causes, thereby preventing further displacement, and also find durable solutions for the many millions already displaced.
Join the U.S. Institute of Peace, the African Ambassadors Group, and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars for a discussion on forced displacement in Africa. The panel conversation will highlight African policy responses to displacement at the national, regional, and continental level, discuss current and anticipated challenges, and brainstorm innovative approaches. Follow the conversation with #AfricaDayUSIP.
Light refreshments will be provided.
Speakers:
H.E. Soorooj Phokeer, opening and closing remarks, Ambassador of the Republic of Mauritius
Carol Thompson O’Connell, opening remarks, Acting Assistant Secretary for Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Department of State
Ger Duany, Regional Goodwill Ambassador for the East and Horn of Africa, UNHCR
H.E. Wilson Mutagaywa Kajumula Masilingi , Ambassador of the United Republic of Tanzania
H.E Mull Ssebujja Katende, Ambassador of the Republic of Uganda
Nancy Lindborg, moderator, President, U.S. Institute of Peace
7. Powering the US-Japan Alliance| Thursday, May 23rd|11:30-1pm|Atlantic Council|1030 15thSt NW, 12thFloor, Washington, DC 20005|Register Here
Please join the Atlantic Council’s Asia Security Initiative, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and the Global Energy Center for a discussion of how energy dependence on the Middle East is shaping Japan’s quest for energy security, prospects for US-Japan strategic cooperation, and the future of energy security in Asia.
Japan’s newest strategic energy plan promises to address domestic structural energy issues in the context of broader shifts in global energy trends. If successful, the new strategy will deliver significant improvements in efficiency, emissions, cost, and self-sufficiency by 2030, and again by 2050. At the same time, Japan, like much of Asia, continues to depend heavily on the Middle East for hydrocarbon imports. How is energy dependence on the Middle East shaping Asian geopolitics and strategic prospects for the US-Japan alliance? How feasible are Japan’s efforts to reduce its dependence on energy imports, and what does it mean for Japan’s relationships with the Middle East? How are infrastructure projects under China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy re-shaping energy geopolitics between both regions? Ultimately, what can the US-Japan alliance do to ensure energy security in a rapidly changing Indo-Pacific?
Lunch will be provided.
Featuring:
Prof. Koichiro Tanaka, Keio University and President of the Japanese Institute of Middle Eastern Economies
Ms. Jane Nakano, Senior Fellow Energy and National Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies
Mr. Mikkal E. Herberg, Senior Advisor National Bureau of Asian Research
Dr. Miyeon Oh, Director and Senior Fellow of the Asia Security Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security
8. Negotiating with China during Peacetime, Crisis and Conflict|Thursday, May 23rd|2:30pm-4pm|American Enterprise Institute|Auditorium, 1789 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036|Register Here
While there is no shortage of discussion about how war between the US and China could break out, few have asked how such a war might end. During crisis or conflict, how can we draw China to the negotiating table? How has China historically ended its wars, and how might this inform how the US approaches China diplomatically in peacetime, crisis, and war?
In her new book, “The Costs of Conversation: Obstacles to Peace Talks in Wartime” (Cornell University Press, 2019), Oriana Skylar Mastro asks: How can we get from fighting to talking? Join Dr. Mastro, Susan Thornton and Tom as they discuss US diplomacy with China in an era of great-power competition.
Agenda:
2:15 PM
Registration
2:30 PM
Welcome and summary of the book:
Oriana Skylar Mastro, AEI
2:45 PM
Panel discussion
Participants:
Thomas J. Christensen, Columbia University
Susan A. Thornton, Yale University
Moderator:
Oriana Skylar Mastro, AEI
3:30 PM
Q&A
4:00 PM
Adjournment
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What most American Jews think
I received this note from J Street President Jeremy Ben-Ami yesterday. It may be important to note that American Jews on the whole favor Democrats and support a two-state solution as well as the Iran nuclear deal.
Since our founding over ten years ago, J Street has battled to overturn the false “conventional wisdom” that American voters want their leaders to take a conservative, right-leaning approach to Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
This old school playbook argued that candidates for president should not in any way criticize Israeli government policies, sympathize with the legitimate needs of Palestinians alongside those of Israel or talk about the need to end the occupation.
For years, our election day polling of Jewish voters has demonstrated that this way of thinking is completely out of touch with the reality in our community.
Now a new, first-of-its-kind nationwide poll that we’ve commissioned of likely Democratic primary voters across the country shows that the outdated conventional wisdom doesn’t apply to them either.
While there’s been a great deal of media hype about a major Democratic division on Israel, our poll demonstrates that there is actually a clear consensus among the large majority in support of pro-Israel, pro-peace positions and a proactive, even-handed approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Here are some of the key takeaways:
- Democratic voters are supportive of Israel — but not its current leadership; and these two positions aren’t mutually exclusive. While Israel had a strong +25 percent favorability rating, Prime Minister Netanyahu is underwater at -27 percent. An overwhelming 81 percent believe that “someone can be critical of Israeli government policies and still be pro-Israel.”
- They reject the false dichotomy between “pro-Israel” and “pro-Palestinian.” In addition to their positive views of Israel, voters are mostly favorable towards Palestinians as well (+13 percent). The vast majority (75 percent) said they would be most likely to vote for a candidate who supported both Israelis and Palestinians, rather than one who sided exclusively with either.
- Voters want the US to act as a fair and impartial broker to achieve peace — and push both sides to make compromises and stop harmful actions. 74 percent said they want the US to act as a fair and impartial broker for peace negotiations. 61 percent said they were less likely to support a candidate who believes that the US “must stand behind all of [PM] Netanyahu’s policies.”
- The Iran deal remains very popular. While the Trump administration continues to dangerously increase the prospects for a new war of choice, 72 percent of Democratic voters support the US re-entering the JCPOA nuclear agreement.
- Most voters have never even heard of BDS — but they oppose legislation designed to penalize BDS supporters. While the boycott, divestment and sanctions movement has received a ton of media attention, only 36 percent of voters have even heard of it, and only 12 percent support. Voters are also clearly against heavy-handed attempts to pass legislation that punishes BDS supporters and infringes on free speech rights — 54 percent oppose, while just 22 percent support.
…These results are invaluable for J Street as we work to shape our national foreign policy conversation for the better and permanently bring an end to the old, outdated playbook.
We’re sending a message to 2020 hopefuls: Pro-Israel, pro-peace, diplomacy-first positions are very popular politically. Democratic voters want to see their next president embrace constructive, diplomatic solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Iranian nuclear threat.
If candidates can make clear that they respect the legitimate rights and needs of both Israelis and Palestinians, that they support Israel but not Netanyahu and that they won’t give a free pass to destructive actions by leaders on either side, they can unite their party behind them and help chart a bold and effective new course for American leadership in the Middle East.
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“Maximum pressure”
Mohammed Ataie published this interview with me in the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA):
- Today, President Rouhani declared that the remaining signatories to the nuclear agreement–the United Kingdom, France, Germany, China and Russia –had 60 days to implement their promises to protect Iran’s oil and banking sectors from US sanctions. How do you see Rouhani’s carful statement which reiterated Tehran’s continued commitment to the JCPOA and NPT?
A: Rouhani is trying hard to avoid taking the blame for the collapse of the JCPOA and to project an image of reasonableness, in particular to Europe, Russia, and China.
2. President Rouhani said that if the Europeans fail to compensate for the unilateral American sanctions, in 60 days Iran will end the limits on the enrichment of uranium. Do you think that within this period the European signatories to the nuclear agreement would take practical steps to counter Trump administration’s unilateral sanctions?
A: I doubt there is much the Europeans can do. Their companies are not willing to buck the US sanctions, because there is so much more business for them to do in the US than in Iran.
3. The European Union has vowed to counter Trump’s renewed sanctions on Iran, including by means of a new law to shield European companies from punitive measures. Do you think that France, Germany and Britain have done enough in the past 12 months to save the agreement?
A: They’ve done what they can, but more slowly than required. It is virtually impossible to shield the European companies from punitive US measures if those companies want to do business with and in the US.Reuters has quoted French officials that the EU would impose sanctions on Iran if Tehran announces actions concerning the JCPOA.
4. How do you see this French position in the context of the EU powers’ inaction to protect Iran’s economic interests against the US unilateral sanctions?
A: The French are warning that Tehran could drive the Europeans back into the arms of the US. Iran is trying to signal moderation in its response to the sanctions, while insisting on getting the benefits promised in the deal. It is not an easy road to go down, not least because of criticism from those inside Iran who would be happy to restart the nuclear program.
5. President Trump claims that the JCPOA is not able to prevent Iran from developing a military nuclear program. Do you think that his maximum pressure policy would prevent Iran from developing a military nuclear program?
A: The maximum pressure policy is far more likely to give Iran incentives to restart the nuclear program and proceed as rapidly as possible to acquire all the technology needed for building nuclear weapons. Of course the sanctions limit the availability of financial resources to Tehran, but top priority programs will always get the resources they need. The result will be further weakening of the Iranian economy, but little impact on the nuclear and missile programs or Iran’s interventions in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Those programs will get priority, not least because the sanctions strengthen the political position of hardliners in Tehran.
I would add that the Trump Administration is begging for talks with Iran. So far, Tehran is signalling that it is unwilling unless and until the US rejoins the JCPOA. I don’t really see that happening, as Trump has boxed himself in, but some kind of secret communication is possible, and perhaps even likely.
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Bluff to talk
Claiming that it is responding to Iranian attack planning, the Trump Administration has added military threat to its “maximum pressure” campaign against Tehran. The President has denied what I take to be intentional leaks of a plan to deploy more than 100,000 troops, saying that he would deploy many more if it comes to that. Another American official suggested that Trump might rain 500 cruise missile per day on Iran for an extended period. Non-essential US government personnel have been ordered out of Embassy Baghdad. A carrier battle group and B52s have been deployed to the Gulf.
So far, this is escalatory bluff. The B52s flew from Al Udeid airfield in Qatar, which is too close to Iran to serve as a wartime facility. The war craft are serving statecraft: sending a signal. The Iranians, if they are planning attacks, won’t limit their targets to Iraq. Al Udeid would get its share of incoming. Real war preparations would require removal of aircraft from Al Udeid as well as withdrawal of at least families and other non-essential embassy personnel from throughout the Gulf. Deployment of 100,000 troops is far too many if the plan is for cruise missile strikes and far too few to mount an invasion of even part of Iran, a country of more than 80 million people. It would require months of visible and extensive logistical preparation.
Nor is there any sign at home that Trump is preparing for war. He might try to ignore the requirement for Congressional approval, but you can be sure the Democrats would be making much more noise if they thought he would attempt that. The stock market would also be signaling concern. American public opinion will not favor war with Iran, which would be a much bigger enterprise than the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The President was elected because he pledged to end US over-commitment in the Middle East, not expand it.
So what is all this about? Trump and Secretary of State Pompeo have made themselves clear for months: they want Tehran back at the negotiating table. The President has even offered to send his telephone number through the Swiss, who represent US interests in Tehran. National Security Adviser Bolton prefers war, but he has lost that debate on North Korea and Venezuela. He is likely to lose again.
The Iranians are reluctant to talk with the Americans, as they want the US back in the nuclear deal before agreeing to talk with the Americans again. Their internal politics require it. I spent a couple of hours yesterday on news outlets discussing the situation with Iranian thinktankers. They are unconcerned with the American military threat an recognize it as bluff.
So what will happen?
War could happen, more by accident rather than intention of the President or the Supreme Leader. Both the Iranians and the Americans have friends who might create an incident. The Iranian-backed Houthis have allegedly launched a drone attack on a Saudi pipeline. The Saudis have responded with belligerence. The attack on four oil tankers off the coast of the UAE’s Fujairah coast elicited a softer response. The Emirates have extensive trade and financial exchanges with Iran and have not identified the perpetrators. Israel could escalate its attacks on Iranian assets in Syria or elsewhere in ways that Iran might think require a response.
It is also possible the Americans and Iranians will do what they have done in the past: talk in secret. That is how the Obama Administration began its push for the nuclear deal. Tehran might prefer it that way, since otherwise it will be seen as abandoning “resistance” and giving in to the Great Satan. Such secret talks might leak, so anyone in Tehran who conducts them should anticipate being fired if they do. But if they lead to some relief from sanctions, the Supreme Leader might be prepared to run the risk.
Trump speaks loudly and carries a little stick. He is bluffing. He wants to talk.
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Confusion and distrust
The Trump Administration is in a remarkable period of serial failures. Denuclearization of North Korea is going nowhere. Displacement of Venezuelan President Maduro has stalled. The tariff contest with China is escalating. Even the President’s sudden shift to backing Libyan strongman Haftar’s assault on Tripoli seems to have fizzled.
The domestic front is no better: Trump is stonewalling the House of Representatives but must know that eventually the courts will order most of what the Democratic majority is requesting be done. Special Counsel Mueller himself will eventually testify and be asked whether his documentation of obstruction of justice by the President would have led to indictment for any other perpetrator. A dozen or so other investigations continue, both by prosecutors and the House. These will include counter-intelligence investigations, which Mueller did not pursue, with enormous potential to embarrass the President and his close advisers.
The result is utter confusion in US foreign policy. Secretary of State Pompeo today postponed a meeting with President Putin and is stopping instead in Brussels to crash a meeting the UK, Germany, and France had convened to talk about how to preserve the Iran nuclear deal. This is happening on the same day that President Trump is meeting with Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán, whose anti-democratic maneuvers have made him unwelcome in London, Berlin, and Paris.
Pompeo will be pitching hostility to Iran, based on the presumption that it is responsible for attacks on tankers over the weekend off the coast of Fujairah, one of the (United Arab) Emirates located outside the Gulf of Hormuz. Tehran has denounced the attacks, which may or may not indicate something. The perpetrators are unknown. While concerned about the attacks, the Europeans will want the US to tone down the hostility towards Iran, with which they want to maintain the nuclear deal from which the US has withdrawn.
Germany is likely to be particularly annoyed with the Americans, not least because Pompeo last week canceled at the last minute a scheduled meeting with Chancellor Merkel in order to go to Iraq, where he failed to convince Baghdad to join the sanctions against Iran. She has become the strongest defender of liberal democracy and the rules-based international order that President Trump has so noisily and carelessly abandoned, while at the same time displeasing the US Administration by continuing the Nord Stream 2 natural gas deal with Russia.
In diplomacy, holding on to your friends is important. Washington under Trump has elected not to accommodate the more powerful Europeans and Iraq but rather to support the would-be autocrats in Hungary and Poland, as well as the Brexiteers in the UK and the Greater Israel campaigners who also advocate war with Iran. All of this was completely unnecessary, since it would have been possible to pursue additional agreements with Iran on regional and other issues without exiting the nuclear deal.
The Administration has thrown away the friends it needs and acquired a few it does not. It has lost the key Europeans and has nothing whatsoever to show for it. It has gotten nowhere with Putin, despite the President’s obsequious fawning. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which are both crying foul about the tanker attacks, are unreliable. They have been known to purvey fake news in the past (especially in initiating their conflict with Qatar), so might they be doing so again?
The result is monumental confusion and distrust. America’s friends are offended. Her enemies are encouraged. Elections have consequences.
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It’s all about him
Rarely has an Administration compiled a clearer record of losing than this one is doing right now:
- President Trump’s best friend Kim Jong-un is busily launching short-range missiles while the US holds the door open for negotiations.
- The push to replace Venezuelan President Maduro with Interim President Guaido has stalled after several attempts.
- The “maximum pressure” policy on Iran is pushing Tehran towards restarting part of its nuclear program while alienating America’s European allies.
- The “Deal of the Century” between Palestinians and Israelis is stillborn.
- The tariff war with China is escalating.
The Administration knows only one negotiating tactic: squeezing hard to cause pain, while offering economic benefits if only the adversary will give in. Other peoples’ national pride, interests, and values are not taken into account. It is just assumed that “they” are just like us and want all the same things, mainly nice hotels.
That’s not how diplomacy works. To change an adversary’s behavior, you have to consider not your own value function but theirs. Kim Jong-un doesn’t want foreign investment or economic benefits he cannot control. Maduro isn’t interested in leaving Venezuela, even if the Americans leave him an escape route to Cuba. Iran has withstood sanctions before and will do so again. The Palestinians won’t take money instead of a state. Chinese President Xi Jinping isn’t going to weaken the Communist Party’s grip on the economy to please Donald Trump.
Of course Donald Trump will never admit defeat on any of these issues. Whatever happens, he’ll announce victory, exaggerating his own prowess and role. It really doesn’t matter what the truth of the matter is. After lots of sound and fury, Trump readily settles for half a loaf or less, as he did on the “renegotiation” of the North American Free Trade Agreement. His primary concern is not getting a good deal for America but rather ensuring that he looks strong to his domestic constituency and can count on them to go to the polls. It’s not about America. It’s all about him.
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