Trust but verify

On May 29 the Hudson Institute hosted Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency Lieutenant General Robert P. Ashley Jr., who talked about the arms control landscape in regard to Russia and China, focusing on the modernization of their nuclear arsenals. Lt. Gen. Ashley’s remarks and the audience Q&A were followed by a panel discussion featuring Dr. James H. Anderson, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans and Capabilities, U.S. Department of Defense, Tim Morrison, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Weapons of Mass Destruction and Biodefense, National Security Council (NSC), and Thomas DiNanno, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Policy, Emerging Threats, and Outreach, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, U.S. Department of State.

Ashley explained how Russia has been upgrading the capacity of its nuclear forces. In addition to a growing stockpile of nuclear weapons Russia has been adding new capabilities to its arsenal, especially non-strategic nuclear weapons with greater range, accuracy and lower yield. The DIA estimates Russia has up to 2000 of these new non-strategic warheads. Russia has also explored new nuclear delivery systems, such as nuclear powered and nuclear armed underwater drones and nuclear armed cruise missiles. Furthermore, Russia’s new 9M729 intermediate range ballistic missile violates the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.  

Russia has also worked on their upload capability. Currently the New START treaty between the United States and Russia limits the number of deployed nuclear warheads to 1,550, and the number of platforms deployed to 700. Russia, Ashley says, has been working on delivery systems with additional warhead capacity, allowing them to quickly go beyond the New START limit of 1550 warheads if needed. Russia prioritizes its nuclear programs over others, having increased the ROSATOM (the State Nuclear Energy Corporation) budget by over 30% in recent years. Russia sees nuclear weapons as the ultimate war fighting tool and considers “nuclear use to compel and end a conventional conflict.” This modernization is not only aimed at deterring the United States, but also at China and its growing nuclear arsenal.

China, Ashley says, will at least double its nuclear stockpile in the next decade and launched more ballistic missiles last year than the rest of the world combined. Had China been a signatory to the INF their DF-26 and DF-21 missiles, which could be used regionally in the South China Sea, would have been in violation of the treaty. They are also working on new road and silo-based ICBMs as well as new nuclear submarines and nuclear bombers, completing their nuclear triad. China may well be preparing nuclear test sites for year-round use and their behavior is inconsistent with the rules and intent of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Ashley says.

Ashley pointed out that Russia does not have a “no first-use policy” and considers the first use of nuclear weapons an opportunity to control escalation. A translated phrase from an interview with Russian officials comes out to “escalate to win.”

During the panel discussion, Tim Morrison explained that the world has moved on from the Cold War and limited bilateral treaties and needs better and wider arms control. China should now be included in nuclear arms treaties. Russian violations of the INF treaty compel the US to consider if it can afford to be the only country bound to it. The biggest obstacle to effective arms control is the need for verification measures and rules for timely and consequential punishment for treaty violations and non-compliance. 

DiNanno echoed Morrison’s sentiment that more effective verification and enforcement measures are needed. This is only possible if there is trust among the US, Russia, and China. Quoting President Reagan, DiNanno said the US should “trust but verify.” The US should withdraw from the INF treaty in early August if Russia is not in compliance by then.

Anderson discussed the differences between the US, Russian, and Chinese modernization programs. Russia has an estimated 2000 warheads not covered by the New START treaty. Moscow’s talk about nuclear weapons as well as actions in Georgia and Ukraine are troubling. Similarly, Beijing is rapidly expanding its arsenal and is closing in on the nuclear triad following President Xi’s call for China to acquire a first-tier military.

In contrast, US modernization is not nearly as far along as Russia’s, which is almost 80% complete. The US is not building new nuclear weapons, has run no nuclear tests since the 1994 agreement, and is still using older equipment. Anderson says:

The US is in the infancy of its modernization. The Ohio-class nuclear submarines, first introduced in 1981, are set to be replaced in 2031 after 50 years in service. The Minuteman III ICBM was first deployed in 1970 and is only due for replacement in 2029. The B-20 program will eventually replace the aging B-52 and B-2a bomber fleet but is set to augment them first. More importantly, unlike Russia and China the United States has been very transparent about its nuclear arsenal.

 Anderson also mentions the importance of US modernization for deterrence, establishing a backbone for US efforts and “giving our diplomats a strong hand in negotiating arms control.

 With the advancement of Russian and Chinese missile technology the panelists brought up the necessity for the US to continue to develop and improve its missile defense systems. Russia and China, however, routinely complain about them.  Anderson pointed out the double standard in their critique: China and Russia are both interested in missile defense themselves, with Russia having set up 68 missile defense batteries around Moscow alone. Heinrichs asked why the US has not increased its missile defense budget to counter the threats from Russian offensive nuclear arsenals and capabilities. Anderson spointed to work being done in cooperation with NATO allies to increase missile defense through newer technologies such as boost-stage defense and lasers.

The biggest takeaway arose from discussion of Russia’s nuclear test sites and their interpretation of the 0-yield nuclear testing norm. Morrison said he would not conduct diplomacy in public but also commented “Russia has taken actions, not preparations, which run counter to its public statements.” Neither Ashley nor the panel members would directly state that Russia has tested nuclear weapons recently, but all confirmed it with their responses. Everyone agreed that now more than ever good faith negotiations and working multilateral treaties are needed to prevent further escalation and a renewed nuclear arms race.