20 years on

I spoke today at a conference in Pristina commenmorating the 20th anniversary of the NATO deployment in Kosovo. These were my speaking notes, but time restriction meant I started around point 11.

I underlined in addition that solid US/EU agreement is vital to getting things done in the Balkans. It does not exist for swapping people and territory on an ethnic basis, as the Americans have said they would entertain the idea but Germany and the UK have ruled it out.

1. It is a pleasure to be back in Pristina, a city I have known since it was under Serb control.
2. Whatever your preoccupations today—and I know they are many—let me assure you that this is a far more lively, free, interesting, youthful, and energetic place than it was in 1998.
3. The Kosovo state that exists today is a product of an amazing, unlikely, and entirely unpredictable series of events. In addition to Kosovo’s own hard work, it involved
   • Albanian nonviolent and violent rebellion,
   • Serbian repression,
   • the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia,
   • state collapse in Albania,
   • NATO intervention,
   • U.S. and EU support,
   • Russian weakness, and
   • ample international assistance and UN administration.
4. Without one or another of these ingredients, it might never have occurred, and certainly not in the surprising way that it did.
5. I underline this point for a reason: those who think they can predict the future of Kosovo, or of the region, are unlikely to be correct. That includes me.
6. But I do think that we can hope to identify some factors that will either contribute to or detract from regional stability and sustainable peace.
7. The Prespa agreement, for example, clearly improved regional stability, as it ended any prospect of partition there and opened the door to NATO membership for North Macedonia.
8. I think normalization of relations between Pristina and Belgrade is the next important step towards sustainable peace.
9. But like the Prespa agreement it needs to be done in a way that respects regional requirements, not only the desires of Belgrade and Pristina.
10. This is one of many reasons why I believe all transfers of territory, except those technically required in the border demarcation process, need to be ruled out.
11. Exchange of people and territory on an ethnic basis would not only demonstrate that neither Pristina nor Belgrade is able to treat all its citizens correctly. It would also destabilize Bosnia as well as Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Only President Putin could welcome such a move.
12. Land swaps would even cast doubt on the future of the Serbs south of the Ibar River and of remaining Albanians in southern Serbia.
13. None of us should want to take such risks.
14. So what is the alternative?
15. First, Kosovars need to be patient. Pristina’s leverage will increase as Belgrade approaches EU accession. To get a good deal, you need to be able and willing to walk away from a bad one.
16. But you also need to be prepared to put something on the table that Belgrade finds attractive. I’ve made several suggestions: limits on the capabilities of the Kosovo army, enhanced protection for Serb sites south of the Ibar, implementation of an Association of Serb Municipalities consistent with the Kosovo Constitutional Court decision.
17. You also need to get the Pristina/Belgrade dialogue restarted, because the Americans and Europeans want it and you need it.  
18. Here I am going to offend, in a single sentence, both your President and your Prime Minister: you need to forget about ethnic territorial division and get rid of the tariffs on Serbian goods.
19. To your President I say this: Vucic cannot give you what you want in southern Serbia and you cannot give him what he wants in northern Kosovo. Neither parliament nor a referendum in either country will approve such a deal.
20. To your Prime Minister I say this: the tariffs have succeeded in getting you back into the dialogue, but now you should stand on the well-crafted Platform that the political parties have generated. The tariffs have served your purpose and need at least to be suspended.
21. But you should expect something in return: the EU should implement the visa waiver and the Serbs should end their campaign against Kosovo membership in international organizations. CEFTA should open a serious discussion of Kosovo’s concerns with trade barriers in Serbia.
22. A mini-package of that sort could restart the dialogue on a more realistic basis, which means ending the discussion of territory but beginning the process of demarcating the border.
23. A final appeal: you are going to need the Americans to cut a deal with the Russians for your UN membership, a deal that may involve serious sacrifice on the part of Washington.
24. The Americans will only be ready and willing if you can carry over the incredibly friendly spirit of these two days celebrating the NATO deployment in Kosovo to the dialogue.
25. That is one more reason for ending talk of ethnic division and tariffs and thereby making sure that the Americans will be ready to do whatever is necessary to ensure your UN membership.