Day: June 21, 2019
Trump gets it right
President Trump got it right last night for once: he called off a disproportionate retaliatory attack on Iran. It would not, he said, have been proportionate, because it would have killed perhaps 150 Iranians in response to the Iranian downing of an unmanned drone, albeit a big and expensive on. The Iranians have claimed that a manned aircraft accompanied the drone but that they chose not to shoot it down. That public claim likely made it harder for the Americans to proceed, as the implied threat is clear: next time they won’t hesitate.
There is still a possibility of US retaliation. We may never know what Trump does, since retaliation might be covert. In addition, Washington can certainly down Iranian drones, which won’t be as big as the $180 million dollar behemoth Tehran targeted. But keeping things proportionate and giving the Iranians no excuse for further escalation is important. The Americans need to convince the Europeans, Russians, and Chinese that Iran is a threat to world oil supplies, not that the US is at fault for escalating a dangerous conflict unwisely.
The best opportunity to do that is this weekend’s G20 meeting in Osaka. The opportunity is mutual. The Europeans, Russians, and Chinese will also have an opportunity there to convince President Trump that if he wants Iran back at the negotiating table he’ll need to provide some relief from sanctions, at the very least. Tehran says it won’t talk with the Americans until they are back in the nuclear deal, but that is asking too much. They’ll need to settle for a gesture of some sort. After all, talking to the Americans doesn’t necessarily mean giving them anything substantial.
President Trump is capable of sudden 180 degree turns. Erratic comes naturally to him. He did it with Kim Jong-un. He can do it with President Rouhani. He’ll have to if he wants to get anything out of the Iranians, who are a lot more stalwart than he is. He is still bad-mouthing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, but that is mainly because it was an Obama achievement. He could rename it and add a few bells and whistles. Then go out and sell it as brand new, the way he did the North American Free Trade Agreement.
We are still a long way from that. But last night Trump got it right. Even a stopped clock is correct twice a day. I’m glad this was the moment. Now is the time to climb down the escalatory ladder, not up.
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Russia’s Venezuela Gamble
On June 20 the Atlantic Council hosted an event on “Russian Influence in Venezuela: What Should the United States Do?” with an introductory speech by Senator Rick Scott (R-FL) followed by a panel discussion. The panel featured Ambassador John Herbst, Director of the Eurasia Center at the Atlantic Council, Ambassador Paula J. Dobriansky, Senior Fellow at the Harvard University Belfer Center and former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs, Francisco Monaldi, Director of the Latin America Initiative and fellow on Latin American Energy Policy, Evelyn N. Farkas, Resident Senior Fellow at the German Marshall Fund and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia, Mark D. Simakovsky, Nonresident Senior Fellow of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, and Konstantin Eggert, a columnist for Deutsche Welle and former vice-president for public and government affairs for ExxonMobil Russia Inc. Jason Marczak, Director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, moderated.
Senator Scott painted a picture of the situation in Venezuela, describing the hunger and poverty that has driven thousands to flee into neighboring countries. Scott said Maduro’s regime is intentionally starving parts of the population, calling it a genocide. Russia is propping up Maduro and Scott believes the house of cards will fall if Russia pulls its support. Russia has sent nuclear capable bombers to Venezuela and reports of mercenaries from Russia’s “Wagner Group” are abundant. Scott called Russia’s support for Venezuela “the most aggressive Russian threat since the Cuban Missile crisis,” saying the US needs to act now to prevent a Syria in our hemisphere.
Ambassador Paula Dobriansky explained that Russia’s behavior can be explained by four principles.
- Russia’s goal is to marginalize, minimize and eradicate US power abroad.
- Putin’s statement at the 2007 Munich Security Conference that Russia doesn’t support the institutions and values that promote peace.
- The desire to reconstitute the Soviet Union or Russia’s sphere of influence and make Russia a visible global actor once more.
- The importance for Russia to find and align itself with like-minded actors, in part due to its economic troubles.
Taking these principles into account Dobriansky says Russia’s investment in Venezuela ($17 billion since 2005) is important, but its behavior is driven by the political investment: Chavez and now Maduro’s alignment with Russia and Putin. Monaldi agrees but adds that economically the collapse of Venezuelan oil production is good for Russia. Herbst added that Russia doesn’t want dictators to fall to protesters in the street, partially out of fear that such a situation could arise in Russia.
Farkas concurred. Putin needs the kleptocracy in Russia to keep himself afloat. She compares Venezuela to Syria: Russia is playing a high stakes political game at low cost, but avoids direct conflict with the US. The only way Russia would step away from Venezuela is if the US “gave them” the Ukraine. Herbst says such a notion is pure fantasy and commends American patience since Russia is bound to lose in both places in the long-term. However, Farkas warns the longer the stalemate drags on the more refugees flee Venezuela and destabilize neighboring countries, potentially forcing the US to act.
Eggert agreed but says there are limits to what Putin can do. Five years of falling take-home pay have angered the population and the expense of Crimea is vastly unpopular. Putin cannot pull of an economic miracle again to appease the Russian population. Syria is cheaper and logistically easier for Russia to deal with than Crimea. An agreement for Maduro to leave Venezuela the regime will be good for Russia down the line. Maduro knows that Russia is the only country that can exfiltrate him out of Venezuela if necessary. Dobriansky adds that while Russia wants to prevent regime change it cares more about its political investment in Venezuela and not who is in charge, which could mean the Kremlin pulling support for Maduro’s regime if it is no longer politically feasible.
Simakovsky analyzed the economics of the situation. Sanctions seem to have worked and Russia hasn’t made any significant investments in terms of arms deals or loan guarantees as a result. Russia realizes its limits but also realizes US limits and the stalemate at hand. Simakovsky warns that Washington has to be careful with its sanctions so as not to alienate allies in Venezuela and push them towards Russia.
Eggert and Farkas agreed everything in Russia’s foreign policy since 2014 leads back to Ukraine. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 was the first forcible border change in Europe since WWII and represented an attempt by Russia to regain its place as a status-quo power. All panelists brought up the Wagner group as an important foreign policy tool for Russia, but Eggert mentioned how things can go wrong. This was the case in Syria when an estimated 200 Wagner mercenaries were killed attacking a coalition base. Incidents like these worry Farkas, who says they pose a greater risk of escalating into unwanted conflict than strategic nuclear bombers deployed to Venezuela. Eggert concurred. Russian posturing isn’t of concern, but a situation in which Russia feels forced to show strength in order to save face poses a real threat.
Asked what a redline in Venezuela would be for the US, Simakovksy referred to the Monroe Doctrine. If Russia pursues a Ukraine-like scenario in Venezuela the US would have to pushback. Washington wasn’t successful in preventing Russia from invading Georgia in 2008 or annexing Crimea in 2014 but it has to be clear on Venezuela. Dobriansky said the best way to keep pressure on Russia is through sanctions on Rosneft in particular, as well as calling Russia out directly for keeping Maduro in power.
The full video of the event is available on the Atlantic Council’s Youtube channel here.
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South Sudan’s six month delay
June 18 the United States Institute of Peace held an event discussing the political, military, and humanitarian situation of South Sudan following a May agreement wherein ruling and opposition parties extended the pre-transitional period of the peace agreement by six months. Under the agreement, the ruling and opposition parties will work to form a unified Government.
The panel included David Acouth, founder of the Council on South Sudanese-American relations, Brian Adeba, Deputy Director of Policy at the Enough Project, Mark Ferullo, Senior Advisor at the Sentry, Morgan Simpson, Deputy Director of Programs at Democracy International, and Emily Koiti, a frequent representative at South Sudanese peace talks. Susan Stigant, Director of Africa Programs at the U.S. Institute of Peace, moderated the discussion.
Adeba shared general sentiments of people on the ground in South Sudan regarding the peace agreements and recent events. As violence has subsided in the wake of the peace agreement, there is a general sense of optimism in South Sudan. However, he stressed that humanitarian issues, lack of resource provision, and the lingering threat of latent military groups are still present. The biggest challenge facing the people of South Sudan is the subtle increases in militarization of certain opposition groups, despite the peace agreement. Adeba suspects that because many of these groups have access to complicated weapons, they may have connections to various politicians within the ruling party, further complicating peace proceedings.
Acouth echoed Adeba’s sentiments regarding the general attitudes of the South Sudanese regarding the peace agreement. The message of decreased violence has reached people living in camps, prompting their hasty return to the cities and homes they abandoned. This has exacerbated humanitarian and economic issues, since there is not enough food or employment in metropolitan areas. Adeba theorizes that the issues that there is a larger underlying economic and humanitarian crisis in the absence of widespread fighting. Koiti continued this line of argument, noting that a reduction in violence has not translated into amelioration of other problems in the country. People leaving camps are not aware of the challenges that they might face when they return home. In addition to economic issues and food shortage, many locales and residences are still occupied by armed groups.
Morgan believes that the decision to extend the pre-transitional period by 6 months was the correct decision. Compared to the failed peace process of 2015, there is more movement to implement the polices detailed in the peace agreement. There is also greater participation of civil society groups, scholars, and women. However, the issues of security sector reform and the redrawing of state lines are still stagnant. Morgran believes that in order to form a new, functional government, cantonment sites in civilian areas must be dismantled. Furthermore, transitional justice mechanisms are difficult to implement because of their emphasis on accountability.
Koiti is less optimistic about the situation and does not believe that ruling and opposition forces will be able to form a unified government at the end of the six-month period in November. The government is not allocating the resources needed to address pressing issues like security sector reform and cantonment sites. Furthermore, she notes that the responsible commissions are opaque about why they are unable to achieve goals.
Adeba believes the lack of reform provisions for the National Security Service of South Sudan in the peace agreement is particularly concerning. The organization is oppressive and infringes upon civil rights—often holding people indefinitely and without trial. There is also a “parallel army” emerging for the sole purpose of serving the President. On paper, it answers to the National Security Minister, but in reality they are responsible to the President and are funded through his budget. This is concerning because the president’s budget is private, making oversight of this branch of the security services difficult, and contributing to a general lack of transparency.
Regarding the future of South Sudan, Ferullo describes two areas of key importance. First is the formation of a committee to deal with the issue of drawing state boundaries. The way that boundaries are drawn will determine resource allocation, governance, and the economy of South Sudan. A focus on transparency is needed to ameliorate some of the economic woes of the country. Increases in transparency can be accomplished through building an “e-transparency” system to track financial transactions of government departments, and by providing more support to local civil society groups. He posits that civil society groups are more familiar with the needs of specific locales and can direct funding more effectively and equitably than a larger, centralized body might.
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