Russia’s Venezuela Gamble

On June 20 the Atlantic Council hosted an event on “Russian Influence in Venezuela: What Should the United States Do?” with an introductory speech by Senator Rick Scott (R-FL) followed by a panel discussion. The panel featured Ambassador John Herbst, Director of the Eurasia Center at the Atlantic Council, Ambassador Paula J. Dobriansky, Senior Fellow at the Harvard University Belfer Center and former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs, Francisco Monaldi, Director of the Latin America Initiative and fellow on Latin American Energy Policy,  Evelyn N. Farkas, Resident Senior Fellow at the German Marshall Fund and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia, Mark D. Simakovsky, Nonresident Senior Fellow of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, and Konstantin Eggert, a columnist for Deutsche Welle and former vice-president for public and government affairs for ExxonMobil Russia Inc. Jason Marczak, Director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, moderated.

Senator Scott painted a picture of the situation in Venezuela, describing the hunger and poverty that has driven thousands to flee into neighboring countries. Scott said Maduro’s regime is intentionally starving parts of the population, calling it a genocide. Russia is propping up Maduro and Scott believes the house of cards will fall if Russia pulls its support. Russia has sent nuclear capable bombers to Venezuela and reports of mercenaries from Russia’s “Wagner Group” are abundant. Scott called Russia’s support for Venezuela “the most aggressive Russian threat since the Cuban Missile crisis,” saying the US needs to act now to prevent a Syria in our hemisphere. 

Ambassador Paula Dobriansky explained that Russia’s behavior can be explained by four principles. 

1. Russia’s goal is to marginalize, minimize and eradicate US power abroad. 
2. Putin’s statement at the 2007 Munich Security Conference that Russia doesn’t support the institutions and values that promote peace. 
3. The desire to reconstitute the Soviet Union or Russia’s sphere of influence and make Russia a visible global actor once more.
4. The importance for Russia to find and align itself with like-minded actors, in part due to its economic troubles.

Taking these principles into account Dobriansky says Russia’s investment in Venezuela ($17 billion since 2005) is important, but its behavior is driven by the political investment: Chavez and now Maduro’s alignment with Russia and Putin. Monaldi agrees but adds that economically the collapse of Venezuelan oil production is good for Russia. Herbst added that Russia doesn’t want dictators to fall to protesters in the street, partially out of fear that such a situation could arise in Russia. 

Farkas concurred. Putin needs the kleptocracy in Russia to keep himself afloat. She compares Venezuela to Syria: Russia is playing a high stakes political game at low cost, but avoids direct conflict with the US. The only way Russia would step away from Venezuela is if the US “gave them” the Ukraine. Herbst says such a notion is pure fantasy and commends American patience since Russia is bound to lose in both places in the long-term. However, Farkas warns the longer the stalemate drags on the more refugees flee Venezuela and destabilize neighboring countries, potentially forcing the US to act.

Eggert agreed but says there are limits to what Putin can do. Five years of falling take-home pay have angered the population and the expense of Crimea is vastly unpopular. Putin cannot pull of an economic miracle again to appease the Russian population. Syria is cheaper and logistically easier for Russia to deal with than Crimea. An agreement for Maduro to leave Venezuela the regime will be good for Russia down the line. Maduro knows that Russia is the only country that can exfiltrate him out of Venezuela if necessary. Dobriansky adds that while Russia wants to prevent regime change it cares more about its political investment in Venezuela and not who is in charge, which could mean the Kremlin pulling support for Maduro’s regime if it is no longer politically feasible.

Simakovsky analyzed the economics of the situation. Sanctions seem to have worked and Russia hasn’t made any significant investments in terms of arms deals or loan guarantees as a result. Russia realizes its limits but also realizes US limits and the stalemate at hand. Simakovsky warns that Washington has to be careful with its sanctions so as not to alienate allies in Venezuela and push them towards Russia.

Eggert and Farkas agreed everything in Russia’s foreign policy since 2014 leads back to Ukraine. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 was the first forcible border change in Europe since WWII and represented an attempt by Russia to regain its place as a status-quo power. All panelists brought up the Wagner group as an important foreign policy tool for Russia, but Eggert mentioned how things can go wrong. This was the case in Syria when an estimated 200 Wagner mercenaries were killed attacking a coalition base. Incidents like these worry Farkas, who says they pose a greater risk of escalating into unwanted conflict than strategic nuclear bombers deployed to Venezuela. Eggert concurred. Russian posturing isn’t of concern, but a situation in which Russia feels forced to show strength in order to save face poses a real threat.

Asked what a redline in Venezuela would be for the US, Simakovksy referred to the Monroe Doctrine. If Russia pursues a Ukraine-like scenario in Venezuela the US would have to pushback. Washington wasn’t successful in preventing Russia from invading Georgia in 2008 or annexing Crimea in 2014 but it has to be clear on Venezuela. Dobriansky said the best way to keep pressure on Russia is through sanctions on Rosneft in particular, as well as calling Russia out directly for keeping Maduro in power.

The full video of the event is available on the Atlantic Council’s Youtube channel here.