South Sudan’s six month delay

June 18 the United States Institute of Peace held an event discussing the political, military, and humanitarian situation of South Sudan following a May agreement wherein ruling and opposition parties extended the pre-transitional period of the peace agreement by six months. Under the agreement, the ruling and opposition parties will work to form a unified Government.

The panel included David Acouth, founder of the Council on South Sudanese-American relations, Brian Adeba, Deputy Director of Policy at the Enough Project, Mark Ferullo, Senior Advisor at the Sentry, Morgan Simpson, Deputy Director of Programs at Democracy International, and Emily Koiti, a frequent representative at South Sudanese peace talks. Susan Stigant, Director of Africa Programs at the U.S. Institute of Peace, moderated the discussion.

Adeba shared general sentiments of people on the ground in South Sudan regarding the peace agreements and recent events. As violence has subsided in the wake of the peace agreement, there is a general sense of optimism in South Sudan. However, he stressed that humanitarian issues, lack of resource provision, and the lingering threat of latent military groups are still present. The biggest challenge facing the people of South Sudan is the subtle increases in militarization of certain opposition groups, despite the peace agreement. Adeba suspects that because many of these groups have access to complicated weapons, they may have connections to various politicians within the ruling party, further complicating peace proceedings.

Acouth echoed Adeba’s sentiments regarding the general attitudes of the South Sudanese regarding the peace agreement. The message of decreased violence has reached people living in camps, prompting their hasty return to the cities and homes they abandoned. This has exacerbated humanitarian and economic issues, since there is not enough food or employment in metropolitan areas. Adeba theorizes that the issues that there is a larger underlying economic and humanitarian crisis in the absence of widespread fighting. Koiti continued this line of argument, noting that a reduction in violence has not translated into amelioration of other problems in the country. People leaving camps are not aware of the challenges that they might face when they return home. In addition to economic issues and food shortage, many locales and residences are still occupied by armed groups.

Morgan believes that the decision to extend the pre-transitional period by 6 months was the correct decision. Compared to the failed peace process of 2015, there is more movement to implement the polices detailed in the peace agreement. There is also greater participation of civil society groups, scholars, and women. However, the issues of security sector reform and the redrawing of state lines are still stagnant. Morgran believes that in order to form a new, functional government, cantonment sites in civilian areas must be dismantled. Furthermore, transitional justice mechanisms are difficult to implement because of their emphasis on accountability.

Koiti is less optimistic about the situation and does not believe that ruling and opposition forces will be able to form a unified government at the end of the six-month period in November. The government is not allocating the resources needed to address pressing issues like security sector reform and cantonment sites. Furthermore, she notes that the responsible commissions are opaque about why they are unable to achieve goals.

Adeba believes the lack of reform provisions for the National Security Service of South Sudan in the peace agreement is particularly concerning. The organization is oppressive and infringes upon civil rights—often holding people indefinitely and without trial. There is also a “parallel army” emerging for the sole purpose of serving the President. On paper, it answers to the National Security Minister, but in reality they are responsible to the President and are funded through his budget. This is concerning because the president’s budget is private, making oversight of this branch of the security services difficult, and contributing to a general lack of transparency.

Regarding the future of South Sudan, Ferullo describes two areas of key importance. First is the formation of a committee to deal with the issue of drawing state boundaries. The way that boundaries are drawn will determine resource allocation, governance, and the economy of South Sudan. A focus on transparency is needed to ameliorate some of the economic woes of the country. Increases in transparency can be accomplished through building an “e-transparency” system to track financial transactions of government departments, and by providing more support to local civil society groups. He posits that civil society groups are more familiar with the needs of specific locales and can direct funding more effectively and equitably than a larger, centralized body might.