Month: June 2019
South Sudan’s six month delay
June 18 the United States Institute of Peace held an event discussing the political, military, and humanitarian situation of South Sudan following a May agreement wherein ruling and opposition parties extended the pre-transitional period of the peace agreement by six months. Under the agreement, the ruling and opposition parties will work to form a unified Government.
The panel included David Acouth, founder of the Council on South Sudanese-American relations, Brian Adeba, Deputy Director of Policy at the Enough Project, Mark Ferullo, Senior Advisor at the Sentry, Morgan Simpson, Deputy Director of Programs at Democracy International, and Emily Koiti, a frequent representative at South Sudanese peace talks. Susan Stigant, Director of Africa Programs at the U.S. Institute of Peace, moderated the discussion.
Adeba shared general sentiments of people on the ground in South Sudan regarding the peace agreements and recent events. As violence has subsided in the wake of the peace agreement, there is a general sense of optimism in South Sudan. However, he stressed that humanitarian issues, lack of resource provision, and the lingering threat of latent military groups are still present. The biggest challenge facing the people of South Sudan is the subtle increases in militarization of certain opposition groups, despite the peace agreement. Adeba suspects that because many of these groups have access to complicated weapons, they may have connections to various politicians within the ruling party, further complicating peace proceedings.
Acouth echoed Adeba’s sentiments regarding the general attitudes of the South Sudanese regarding the peace agreement. The message of decreased violence has reached people living in camps, prompting their hasty return to the cities and homes they abandoned. This has exacerbated humanitarian and economic issues, since there is not enough food or employment in metropolitan areas. Adeba theorizes that the issues that there is a larger underlying economic and humanitarian crisis in the absence of widespread fighting. Koiti continued this line of argument, noting that a reduction in violence has not translated into amelioration of other problems in the country. People leaving camps are not aware of the challenges that they might face when they return home. In addition to economic issues and food shortage, many locales and residences are still occupied by armed groups.
Morgan believes that the decision to extend the pre-transitional period by 6 months was the correct decision. Compared to the failed peace process of 2015, there is more movement to implement the polices detailed in the peace agreement. There is also greater participation of civil society groups, scholars, and women. However, the issues of security sector reform and the redrawing of state lines are still stagnant. Morgran believes that in order to form a new, functional government, cantonment sites in civilian areas must be dismantled. Furthermore, transitional justice mechanisms are difficult to implement because of their emphasis on accountability.
Koiti is less optimistic about the situation and does not believe that ruling and opposition forces will be able to form a unified government at the end of the six-month period in November. The government is not allocating the resources needed to address pressing issues like security sector reform and cantonment sites. Furthermore, she notes that the responsible commissions are opaque about why they are unable to achieve goals.
Adeba believes the lack of reform provisions for the National Security Service of South Sudan in the peace agreement is particularly concerning. The organization is oppressive and infringes upon civil rights—often holding people indefinitely and without trial. There is also a “parallel army” emerging for the sole purpose of serving the President. On paper, it answers to the National Security Minister, but in reality they are responsible to the President and are funded through his budget. This is concerning because the president’s budget is private, making oversight of this branch of the security services difficult, and contributing to a general lack of transparency.
Regarding the future of South Sudan, Ferullo describes two areas of key importance. First is the formation of a committee to deal with the issue of drawing state boundaries. The way that boundaries are drawn will determine resource allocation, governance, and the economy of South Sudan. A focus on transparency is needed to ameliorate some of the economic woes of the country. Increases in transparency can be accomplished through building an “e-transparency” system to track financial transactions of government departments, and by providing more support to local civil society groups. He posits that civil society groups are more familiar with the needs of specific locales and can direct funding more effectively and equitably than a larger, centralized body might.
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Escalation as distraction
Whatever doubt there might be about the origin of recent attacks on shipping in and near the Gulf, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps has claimed responsibility for yesterday’s shoot-down of a large American Navy drone. The Iranians say it violated their airspace. The Americans say it was shot down over international waters.
Both could be true, but it doesn’t matter. The significance of the Iranian move is to confirm that we are on an escalatory ladder. President Trump has so far declined, at least in public, to retaliate for the attacks on ships. We don’t really know what Washington has done covertly. Tehran is now testing Trump further with the shoot-down of the drone. The Iranians will likely continue to take steps that either they can claim publicly are in self-defense or interfere covertly with shipping oil and oil products by other Gulf countries.
The Iranian actions demand a response, one way or another. Even doing nothing is a response, as it is likely to encourage continued Iranian attacks. Tit for tat is also a possibility: certainly the US could shoot down an Iranian drone, one of which is said to have been responsible for last night’s success. Some argue the escalatory ladder could reach the point of taking out Iran’s shore-based missiles. It might in fact go much further.
The response could also be at least partially diplomatic rather than wholly military. The Iranians are claiming to be guarantors of Gulf security. They should be challenged to prove it. Once it has done, covertly or publicly, its proportional retaliation, the US should consider easing up on sanctions and allowing , Oman, Iraq, or some other relative neutral to convene a multilateral meeting on Gulf maritime security, to include Iran and the US as well as the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Even a meeting at which the parties shout at each other could serve to clear the air and begin the process of climbing down from a ladder that all too predictably leads to a catastrophic new war in the Middle East.
The current situation stems inexorably from the US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal. The aim should be to return to the status quo ante, which was surely better than what we are facing today. Trump will need some sort of face-saving process, but he is certainly capable of 180 degree policy and rhetorical reversal, a trick he successfully performed with North Korea. The US should also establish rapid military-to-military communications with Iran, since that could help to avoid unintentional provocations and support a diplomatic effort.
Congress needs to weigh in decisively at this point. The effort of the Administration to sell the existing Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) as the basis for war with Iran is not just a stretch. It relies on a claim of active Iranian support for Al Qaeda that is as dubious as Iranian claims that the US and its allies actively support Al Qaeda (the Iranians are particularly fond of quoting a dreadful interview with former Trump National Security Adviser Flynn to that effect).
The simple fact is that the US is not ready to go to war with Iran. Doing so would be a blatant effort by the Administration to distract attention from its all too serious domestic challenges. The Iranians might like war for the same reason: their economy is in a shambles, not only due to sanctions but also due to mismanagement. This is a perilous situation. Military strength has a role to play, but the way out is diplomatic.
PS: In case you don’t believe that Flynn bit, here it is:
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Reenter
President Trump has driven the United States into a cul-de-sac. Withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal (aka Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA) and re-imposition of sanctions has made it nigh on impossible for Iran to gain the economic benefits of the agreement. But rather than driving Tehran back to the negotiating table, Washington has strengthened its hardliners and given them an excuse to begin enriching uranium beyond the level permitted by the JCPOA, which they threaten to reach within the next 10 days. The Iranians may also have attacked shipping in and near the Gulf, though that is still an unverified American and British allegation.
The first law of holes applies to this situation: when you are in a hole, stop digging. Trump of course is not law-abiding, so instead he is increasing the US troop, naval, and air force presence in the Gulf. That’s simply foolish: it puts more Americans at risk. I’ll know this administration is serious about attacking Iran when it removes as much of the exposed military and civilian presence in the Gulf as possible. Much of it–including the warplanes at Al Udeid in Qatar–are within the range of Iranian missiles. They and the embassies in Muscat, Doha, Manama and likely Riyadh will need to be draw down in advance of even a limited strike.
The alternative is to reenter the JCPOA, which would have prevented Iran from developing nuclear weapons before 2025 or so and arguably thereafter. Had the US stayed in the deal and ensured that the benefits flowed to Tehran, it could now be arguing for negotiations on missiles and Iran’s regional behavior with support from Europe and perhaps even Russia.
It could also have argued for a follow-on nuclear agreement. Iran has very good reasons not to go all the way to developing nuclear weapons. Well-informed Israelis have long believed that Tehran wants to develop all the enabling technology but not build nuclear weapons or deploy them, for fear of what Israel might do if it thought Iran might do so. Even the current runup of enrichment is explicitly planned to stop before the levels needed for nuclear weapons are reached.
The only way out of America’s current cul-de-sac is to back up. Tehran has made plain that it will talk with Washington only if the US reenters the JCPOA. I imagine they might even offer some sweeteners: release of some US citizens from prison, for example, or a modicum of restraint in Yemen, where their Houthi partners are not doing brilliantly anyway. President Trump has backed up in the past with an aspiring nuclear power, when he agreed to meet Kim Jong-un in Singapore. He could do it again, with his usual triumphalist bombast about how the Iranians will be his newest best friends once they see the Trump golf courses they might acquire. The Iranians understand that the North Koreans have not yet given up anything significant in exchange for Trump’s good graces. They might hope for the same treatment.
But Tehran also might figure that Pyongyang is treated with kid gloves because it does in fact have nuclear weapons. The closer Tehran gets without triggering an Israeli reaction, the better from the point of view of the Supreme Leader. So he might just prefer that Trump continue digging his hole by putting more American military and civilian assets at risk. Iran is a country of more than 80 million people. It endured an 8-year war with Iraq, suffered enormous casualties, and continues to pride itself on “resistance.” An American air attack would strengthen Iran’s hardliners further and dismay the Europeans, Russia, and China. Why not let Trump bury himself in the hole he has dug?
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How the UN serves US interests
The Center for Strategic and International Studies June 13 hosted a panel on “US Interest and Leadership in the United Nations” featuring Catherine Bertini, former Executive Director of the United Nations World Food Programme, and Bill Richardson, former Governor of New Mexico and former US Ambassador to the United Nations. Daniel F. Runde, Senior Vice President and William A. Schreyer Chair and Director of the Project on Prosperity and Development, moderated.
Asked why the US should keep investing in and care about the UN and what the UN does for the US, Bertini said the UN has a responsibility for peace and security. Given the US veto power in the Security Council, Washington has a lot of leverage to pursue American interests. Richardson made a case for multilateralism, saying the US needs international support to advance American goals. With rising populism and anti-institutionalism, bipartisan support is needed to maintain the UN, which surveys show a substantial number of Americans support.
Due to member states (the US included) not paying some or all of their dues, the UN is in a financial crisis. If the US doesn’t pay UN dues it loses leverage and sets a bad example for other nations, who also refuse to pay, causing more harm to US interests in the long run. An audience member pointed out that when the US paid its peacekeeping dues for 8 years straight reforms were made, many peacekeeping missions were completed successfully, and troops could be withdrawn with a solid exit strategy.
Runde asked if the UN is a vehicle for burden sharing, which Bertini affirmed. Washington pays 22% of regular dues and 28% of peacekeeping operations. The peacekeeping operations are vital and decided on by the Security Council. The benefit for the US is that the troops on the ground are not Americans. It would cost the US eight times as much if they were all American soldiers.
Runde listed several common critiques of the UN such as anti-Israel moves, corruption, the human rights commission, and millions of dollars in unpaid parking tickets by UN officials in New York. Richardson said the answer is not to focus on the negatives but to work on marketing and politics, especially aimed at the younger generations. Changing the system right away isn’t going to work, therefore the focus should be on the positives instead of individually rebutting each critique.
Bertini agreed, saying that while some critiques are valid they are only a small piece of the picture. The UN also saves the lives of children, helps feed people, and protects refugees. The UN is also involved in many things such as food safety, copyright law, and postal rules that many people never think about but are part of the international social order.
Richardson also pointed out that UN sanctions brought North Korea to the negotiating table and that the UN World Food Program remains an important humanitarian link that could lead North Korea to reform. Called upon from the audience by Runde, former State Department official Pat Kennedy mentioned that issues such as unpaid parking tickets in New York are often overstated in tabloid media.
Richardson suggested that both a lack of US public understanding of the UN and a perception around the world that Washington dominates the P5 cause lack of support for the UN. He suggests the UN needs more women and people from underrepresented regions in leadership positions at the same time as an updated selection and transition process to ensure that qualified people are hired. Bertini agrees that currently support for transition from one official to another is lacking. Richardson also suggests expanding the Security Council to include Germany and Japan as permanent members without veto power and revamping the rotation system for the regional spots on the UNSC.
Her is a full video of the event:
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Humanitarian challenges in North Korea
June 11 the Cato Institute hosted an event on North Korea giving a humanitarian perspective from individuals who have worked in North Korea. The panel featured Heidi Linton, Executive Director of Christian Friends of Korea, Randall Spadoni, North Korea Program Director for World Vision, and Daniel Jasper, Public Education and Advocacy Coordinator for Asia for the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC). The panel was moderated by Doug Brandow, a senior fellow at Cato.
Jasper gave an overview of the AFSC’s 66-year effort in North Korea since the organization first answered calls for NGOs to help with reconstruction in 1953, shortly after the cease-fire was agreed upon. Jasper said food security is integral to the current conflict, but sanctions put in place to pressure North Korea restrain humanitarian missions. Travel is disrupted and organizations need to apply for special waivers, which are costly and take up to several months to receive. More than ten million North Koreans are estimated to be food insecure. Jasper also touched on cultural exchanges, reuniting families, and returning the remains of fallen soldiers from the Korean war as efforts that can help build bridges and improve relations without much cost. AFSC recommends removing travel restrictions, adhering to humanitarian exemption clauses, and seeing humanitarian issues as bridges instead of a stick.
Heidi Linton shared personal stories from her recent trip to North Korea with the Christian Friends of Korea, during which she helped set up a hepatitis-B clinic and treat over 360 patients. She too emphasized the unintended consequences of sanctions on ordinary civilians. Last fall’s flooding caused widespread infrastructure damage. Replacement parts for construction and farm equipment are limited due to sanctions. Linton said the US has the capability to help the suffering population through humanitarian missions and show North Koreans that America has good intentions.
Randall Spandoni’s work in North Korea focuses on disaster relief and providing clean water to North Korea’s population, of which 40% does not have regular access to clean water. By building water wells, time is freed up for individuals to work on trade or business and spend time with their families. The health implications of access to clean water are significant. Spandoni echoed his fellow panel members’ view that sanctions and import restrictions hamper NGO humanitarian efforts in North Korea, saying his organization’s latest shipment of well-building equipment took 1.5 years to approve.
Asked in what way the missions have been hampered or restricted by the North Korean government, Linton said that everything done in North Korea is managed by North Korean counterparts and that trust and freedom to act have been built slowly over the past decades. Spandoni added that the general lack of trust makes everything take longer than it would elsewhere. “The bureaucratic system in North Korea is just not structured well to receive aid,” Spandoni noted, adding that the US also imposes many hurdles.
Asked to what extent the aging infrastructure and lack of services is due to capacity issues and to what extent the government just prioritizes other projects, no one on the panel had a clear answer, but Linton restated that the lack of resources, money, and general know-how definitely play into it.
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Paying later will cost even more
I spent last week in Kosovo, where the presidency hosted Bill Clinton and Madeleine Albright for a celebration of the country’s liberation by NATO forces 20 years ago. For the 90% of the population that is Albanian, half of whom were expelled in 1998 and 1999, the NATO deployment was a source of great joy, enabling them to return en masse. For Serbs and Roma, the moment was terrifying, as some returning Albanians sought revenge on them for Serbian President Milosevic’s depredations.
The main event last week consisted of speeches in the main square, followed by lunch in the fine Swiss Diamond Hotel and a stroll down Mother Teresa Street to dedicate a bust of former Secretary of State Albright, followed by a motorcade to a statue of former President Clinton. I skipped the Clinton statue, as it was beastly hot and sunny, and I needed to prepare for the evening’s conference on Balkans security 20 years after the NATO/Serbia war.
The Kosovars were out in force for the stroll, anxious to show their affections for the United States. American flags were at least as apparent as Kosovo flags, and chants of “USA” broke out with enthusiasm. President Clinton enjoys pressing the flesh and did it with a big smile on his face. Kosovo President Thaci got far less attention and a few boos. Secretary Albright was in good spirits I knew from a chat we had getting off the plane from Munich, but to tell the truth I rarely caught a glimpse of her short stature during the celebration due to the surrounding crowd.
The mood in Pristina these days is anxious. Talks with Belgrade have been going nowhere. European Union member countries, especially France, have been trying to slow progress towards any further enlargement in the Balkans. Montenegro is too small and too far advanced in accession negotiations to stop, I think, but the consensus needed to open accession talks with Macedonia is not solid. Albania is likely blocked for now. Europe’s hesitation darkens the mood throughout the Balkans and perhaps especially in Kosovo, where NATO and EU membership are the country’s strategic goals.
Reaching them is far off. Kosovo legislation must be compatible with EU requirements, but implementation often lags and EU responsiveness is declining. Even after fulfilling elaborate requirements, Kosovo has not been given the EU visa waiver it was promised. President Thaci and Prime Minister Haradinaj, both products of the wartime Kosovo Liberation Army, are at odds, mainly over how to approach “normalization” with Belgrade. Thaci had indicated he was ready to exchange some Serb-populated territory for Albanian-populated territory in Serbia, but that deal has evaporated under examination by critics (including me). Haradinaj opposed Thaci’s unconsummated deal and has imposed tariffs on Serbian goods imported into Kosovo, stalling the talks with Belgrade. Meanwhile, governance in Kosovo is lamentably corrupt and young people are leaving (as they are from most other countries in the Balkans).
So the celebration of NATO liberation was happy, but Kosovo is not. I was stopped in the street one night by three strangers, two brothers and a cousin, and asked to chat with them in a cafe. They lamented the current situation and tried to convince me that all Kosovo’s ills would be solved by union with Albania. They were uninterested in my questioning whether they would be happy to be governed from Tirana, whose politics are even more contentious than Pristina’s. Nor did they want to discuss my suggestion that neither Kosovo’s politicians nor Albania’s were likely to agree to move their capital. They were content with the notion that Serbs would need to move out of Kosovo if Greater Albania comes into existence.
I am not. There is no reason why, if governed fairly, Serbs and Albanians can’t both enjoy a future in Kosovo. But the current international mood–ethnic nationalism and xenophobia–piled on top of Kosovo’s history of the same is making a liberal democratic outcome there and in the rest of the Balkans less likely than at any time during the past 25 years. Europe and America need to find a way of renewing their promises or face the loss of the statebuilding projects in Kosovo as well as in Bosnia and Herzegovina on which they have spent a good deal of time, money, and effort. Their collapse will certainly cost a great deal more.
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