Month: June 2019

Peace Picks June 17-23

Posted in Nathaniel Haas - June 16, 2019 - 0 Comment

1. Transatlantic Cooperation in an Era of Crisis and Competition|June 17|3:15pm-5:00pm|Hudson Institute|1201 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Suite 400, Washington, DC 20004|Register Here

Hudson Institute will host distinguished scholars from France’s Institut Montaigne for a discussion on transatlantic relations. Founded in 2000, Institut Montaigne is a pioneering independent think tank dedicated to public policy in France and Europe. Panelists will include Michel Duclos, special advisor on Geopolitics at Institut Montaigne and former French Ambassador to Syria and Switzerland; and François Godement, senior advisor for Asia at Institut Montaigne.

Against a backdrop of surging populism in democracies and rising authoritarianism worldwide, Europe finds itself at the center of a return to great power rivalry between China and the United States. Disputes over trade and security are straining longstanding areas of cooperation even as global power centers shift and new partnerships beckon. How should policymakers in Washington, Brussels, and capitals across Europe respond to these challenges? What is the future of the transatlantic relationship in a rapidly changing world?

Speakers:

Michel Duclos, Special Advisor, Geopolitics, Institut Montaigne and former French Ambassador to Syria and Switzerland

François Godement, Senior Advisor for Asia, Institut Montaigne

Ben Judah, Research Fellow, Hudson Institute

Peter Rough, Fellow, Hudson Institute

Ken Weinstein, President and CEO, Hudson Institute

2. South Sudan’s Stalled Path to Peace|June 18|9:30am-11:30am|United States Institute of Peace|2301 Constitution Ave NW, Washington, DC 20037|Register Here

In early May, South Sudan’s ruling and opposition parties agreed to extend the pre-transitional period of the South Sudan peace agreement leading to the formation of a unified Government for an additional six months. The extension of this period presents an opportunity to reflect on the progress and challenges to establishing a just peace in the country. South Sudanese citizens are desperate for peace, but many are asking what channels exist to support a meaningful reduction of violence. Between January and March alone, 25,000 people fled the country, adding to the already two million South Sudanese refugees worldwide. Without full implementation of the peace process, national- and local-level conflicts will continue to threaten hard-won development gains and require greater investments in lifesaving humanitarian aid.

Please join USIP for a look at South Sudan’s peace agreement and the measures required to build peace in the young nation. In this live-streamed discussion, experts from USIP, the Enough Project, and Democracy International will offer concrete, evidence-based recommendations for how to mitigate conflict, promote peace and advance accountability.

Speakers

David Acuoth, Founder, Council on South Sudanese-American Relations

Brian Adeba, Deputy Director of Policy, Enough Project, @kalamashaka

Mark Ferullo, Senior Advisor, The Sentry

Morgan Simpson, Deputy Director of Programs, Democracy International

Susan Stigant, Director of Africa Programs, U.S. Institute of Peace, @SusanStigant

3. Is the US Decoupling from Asia’s Economic Architecture|June 19|9:00am-1:30pm|Center for Strategic and International Studies|1616 Rhode Island Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036|Register Here

The CSIS Japan Chair, the CSIS Simon Chair, and JETRO cordially invite you to join us for the annual CSIS-JETRO conference.

9:00-9:05        Welcoming Remarks
John J. Hamre, President and CEO, CSIS
9:05-9:35        Opening Remarks (TBD) 
9:35-10:00      Keynote Address
 Nobuhiko Sasaki, Chairman and CEO, Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO)
10:00-11:15     Regional Perspectives on Indo-Pacific Economic Integration
China:
Xinquan Tu, Dean and Professor, Center for WTO Studies, University of
International Business & Economics, Beijing
Japan:
Yasuyuki Todo, Professor, Graduate School of Economics, Waseda, University
ASEAN:
Deborah Elms, Founder and Executive Director, Asian Trade Centre,Singapore
Moderator: Matthew P. Goodman, Senior Vice President; William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy and Senior Adviser for Asian Economics, CSIS
11:15-11:30   Break
11:30-12:30   Status and Impact of U.S. Trade Policy
Charles Freeman, Senior Vice President for Asia, U.S. Chamber of Commerce
Lorraine Hawley, Senior Director, International Government Relations,Archer Daniels Midland Company
Aaron Cooper, Vice President, Global Policy, BSA | The Software Alliance  
Moderator:
Michael J. Green, Senior Vice President for Asia and Japan Chair, CSIS;Director of Asian Studies, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service,Georgetown University
12:30-13:30   Luncheon Address (TBD)                       

13:30              Adjourn

4. 2019 Atlantic Council-East Asia Foundation Strategic Dialogue|June 19|9:30am|Atlantic Council|1030 15thSt NW, 12thFloor, Washington, DC 20005|Register Here

Please join the Atlantic Council’s Asia Security Initiative, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, for the 2019 Atlantic Council-East Asia Foundation Strategic Dialogue. This day-long conference will explore the current state of the United States and Republic of Korea’s ongoing negotiations with North Korea and the broader strategic picture developing in the Indo-Pacific. The Strategic Dialogue will feature keynote addresses by US Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun and ROK Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs Do-hoon Lee. This will be H.E. Lee’s first public address in the United States, as well as the first time both Special Representatives will speak on the same stage.

One year ago, President Donald Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un met in Singapore for an unprecedented, historic summit that concluded with a promise to deliver lasting peace to a denuclearized Korean peninsula. Today, the question remains: will this promised future become a reality? Will the coming months see a continued stalemate in negotiations, a major crisis, or a dramatic breakthrough? Ultimately, how will developments on the peninsula shape the Republic of Korea’s role in the broader Indo-Pacific under intensifying US-China strategic competition?

Breakfast and lunch will be provided.

Agenda:

WELCOME REMARKS (9:30 a.m. – 9:50 a.m.)

Mr. Barry Pavel, Senior Vice President, Arnold Kanter Chair, and Director,Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council

Minister Sung-hwan Kim, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea; Board Member, East Asia Foundation

KEYNOTE REMARKS (9:50 a.m. – 10:50 a.m.)

The Hon. Stephen Biegun, US Special Representative for North Korea,US Department of State

H.E. Do-hoon Lee, ROK Special Representative for Korean PeninsulaPeace and Security Affairs,ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs

PANEL DISCUSSION: SEEKING A POST-HANOI BREAKTHROUGH ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA(11:00 a.m. – 12:30 p.m.)

Dr. Toby Dalton, Co-Director, Nuclear Policy Program,Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

H.E. Jong-dae Kim, Member, 20th National Assembly; Head of the Foreign Affairs and Security Division;Member of the National Assembly’s National Defense Committee;Head of the Foreign Affairs and Security Division; Member, Justice Party

H.E. Jae-jung Lee, Member, 20th National Assembly; Spokesperson, Democratic Party of Korea

Amb. Joseph Yun, Former US Special Representative for North Korea Policy, US Department of State; Senior Adviser, Asia Program, United States Institute of Peace

Mr. Barry Pavel (Moderator), Senior Vice President, Arnold Kanter Chair, and Director,Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council

LUNCH CONVERSATION (1:00 p.m. – 1:45 p.m.)

Amb. Paula J. Dobriansky, Former US Under Secretary of State; Senior Fellow, The Future of Diplomacy Project, JFK Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University

Dr. Chung-in Moon, Special Adviser to the President for Unification, Foreign, and National Security Affairs, Republic of Korea

PANEL DISCUSSION: CHARTING KOREA’S ROLE IN US-CHINA STRATEGIC COMPETITION IN THE INDO-PACIFIC(2:00 p.m. – 3:30 p.m.)

The Hon. Ami Bera, US House of Representatives (D-CA); Chair, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Foreign Affairs Committee; Co-Chair, Congressional Caucus on Korea

H.E. Ihk-pyo Hong, Member, 20th National Assembly; Vice Chairman of the National Assembly’s Public Administration and Security Committee; Chief Spokesman, Democratic Party of Korea

Prof. Jaeho Hwang, Director of Global Security Cooperation Center, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies

H.E. Sun-suk Park, Member, 20th National Assembly; Member, National Assembly’s Science, ICT, Future Planning, and Communications Committee,Member, Bareunmirae Party

The Hon. Ted S. Yoho DVM, US House of Representatives (R-FL), Lead Republican, Subcommittee on Asia, The Pacific, and Nonproliferation; Member, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade, House Foreign Affairs Committee 

Dr. Miyeon Oh (Moderator), Director and Senior Fellow, Asia Security Initiative,Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council

CLOSING REMARKS (3:30 p.m. – 3:45 p.m.)

Mr. Barry Pavel, Senior Vice President, Arnold Kanter Chair, and Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council

5. Sixth Annual Building a Competitive U.S.-Mexico Border Conference|June 20|8:30am-4:30pm|Woodrow Wilson Center|1300 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Washington, DC 20004|Register Here

The Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute and the Border Trade Alliance invite you to save the date for our sixth annual high-level “Building a Competitive U.S.-Mexico Border” conference, which will focus on improving border management in order to strengthen the competitiveness of both the United States and Mexico. Topics covered at the conference will include the USMCA (the renegotiated NAFTA), strengthening security and efficiency at border ports of entry, the impact of tariffs and reduced staffing on trade, and growing crossborder cooperation for regional economic development.

Confirmed Speakers*

Senator John Cornyn (R-TX)

Congressman Will Hurd (R-TX 23)
Ambassador Martha Bárcena, Ambassador of Mexico to the United States

C.J. Mahoney, Deputy United States Trade Representative 

John Sanders, Acting Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection

Gustavo de la Fuente, Executive Director, Smart Border Coalition

Lance Jungmeyer, President, Fresh Produce Association of the Americas

Mario Lozoya, Executive Director, Greater Brownsville Incentives Corporation

Federico Schaffler, Director, Texas Center for Border Economic Enterprise Development, Texas A&M International University

Christopher Wilson, Deputy Director, Mexico Institute, Wilson Center

Britton Clarke, President, Border Trade Alliance

6. Russian Influence in Venezuela: What Should the United States Do?|June 20|9:00am|Atlantic Council|1030 15thSt NW, 12thFloor, Washington, DC 20005|Register Here

As a wave of public support for democratic transition is sweeping Venezuela and the international community, Moscow continues to stand by Nicolás Maduro. Displays of military force, Rosneft’s ownership of 49.9 percent of CITGO shares, and billions in loans to Maduro, showcase Russia’s rooted geopolitical and economic interests in Venezuela and the hemisphere.

What drives Russian support for Maduro? What is its role in the unfolding humanitarian, economic, and political crisis? How can the United States counter Russian involvement in Venezuela?

Join the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and Eurasia Center on Thursday, June 20, 2019 from 9:00 to 10:30 a.m. for a public event that will discuss the extent of Russian involvement in Venezuela, Moscow’s motivations and possible next moves, and how the United States should react.

Breakfast will be provided.

Speakers to be announced.

7. The Global Peace Index 2019 Launch|June 20|9:00am-10:30am|Center for Strategic and International Studies|1616 Rhode Island Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036|Register Here

The Human Rights Initiative of CSIS invites you to a public launch event of the 2019 Global Peace Index (GPI). The Global Peace Index is the world’s leading measure of global peacefulness, ranking 163 countries and territories according to their level of relative peacefulness. Created by the Institute for Economics and Peace, the report presents the most comprehensive data-driven analysis to-date on trends in peace and its economic value.

The report findings will be followed by a panel discussion considering the implications of closing civic space and inequality for peace. It will look particularly at the factors that IEP has found to be necessary preconditions for peace in its Positive Peace Report, many of which rely on an active civil society and limits on inequality.

This event is made possible by the Institute of Economics and Peace (IEP).

Featuring:

Stephen Lennon, Senior Policy Adviser to USAID’s bureau of Democracy Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs (DCHA)

Shannon Green,Senior Director of Programs at the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC)

Jonathan Drimmer, Senior Adviser at Business for Social Responsibility (BSR)

Laurie Smolenski, Outreach and Development Officer, Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)

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Your Saturday video

Posted in Daniel Serwer - June 15, 2019 - 1 Comment

President Trump this week reached a new low saying that he would take dirt on an electoral opponent from a foreign government. I found this video a particularly good treatment of the legal and moral issues this presidential commitment to collusion raises:

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20 years on

Posted in Daniel Serwer - June 12, 2019 - 2 Comments

I spoke today at a conference in Pristina commenmorating the 20th anniversary of the NATO deployment in Kosovo. These were my speaking notes, but time restriction meant I started around point 11.

I underlined in addition that solid US/EU agreement is vital to getting things done in the Balkans. It does not exist for swapping people and territory on an ethnic basis, as the Americans have said they would entertain the idea but Germany and the UK have ruled it out.

  1. It is a pleasure to be back in Pristina, a city I have known since it was under Serb control.
  2. Whatever your preoccupations today—and I know they are many—let me assure you that this is a far more lively, free, interesting, youthful, and energetic place than it was in 1998.
  3. The Kosovo state that exists today is a product of an amazing, unlikely, and entirely unpredictable series of events. In addition to Kosovo’s own hard work, it involved
    • Albanian nonviolent and violent rebellion,
    • Serbian repression,
    • the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia,
    • state collapse in Albania,
    • NATO intervention,
    • U.S. and EU support,
    • Russian weakness, and
    • ample international assistance and UN administration.
  4. Without one or another of these ingredients, it might never have occurred, and certainly not in the surprising way that it did.
  5. I underline this point for a reason: those who think they can predict the future of Kosovo, or of the region, are unlikely to be correct. That includes me.
  6. But I do think that we can hope to identify some factors that will either contribute to or detract from regional stability and sustainable peace.
  7. The Prespa agreement, for example, clearly improved regional stability, as it ended any prospect of partition there and opened the door to NATO membership for North Macedonia.
  8. I think normalization of relations between Pristina and Belgrade is the next important step towards sustainable peace.
  9. But like the Prespa agreement it needs to be done in a way that respects regional requirements, not only the desires of Belgrade and Pristina.
  10. This is one of many reasons why I believe all transfers of territory, except those technically required in the border demarcation process, need to be ruled out.
  11. Exchange of people and territory on an ethnic basis would not only demonstrate that neither Pristina nor Belgrade is able to treat all its citizens correctly. It would also destabilize Bosnia as well as Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Only President Putin could welcome such a move.
  12. Land swaps would even cast doubt on the future of the Serbs south of the Ibar River and of remaining Albanians in southern Serbia.
  13. None of us should want to take such risks.
  14. So what is the alternative?
  15. First, Kosovars need to be patient. Pristina’s leverage will increase as Belgrade approaches EU accession. To get a good deal, you need to be able and willing to walk away from a bad one.
  16. But you also need to be prepared to put something on the table that Belgrade finds attractive. I’ve made several suggestions: limits on the capabilities of the Kosovo army, enhanced protection for Serb sites south of the Ibar, implementation of an Association of Serb Municipalities consistent with the Kosovo Constitutional Court decision.
  17. You also need to get the Pristina/Belgrade dialogue restarted, because the Americans and Europeans want it and you need it.  
  18. Here I am going to offend, in a single sentence, both your President and your Prime Minister: you need to forget about ethnic territorial division and get rid of the tariffs on Serbian goods.
  19. To your President I say this: Vucic cannot give you what you want in southern Serbia and you cannot give him what he wants in northern Kosovo. Neither parliament nor a referendum in either country will approve such a deal.
  20. To your Prime Minister I say this: the tariffs have succeeded in getting you back into the dialogue, but now you should stand on the well-crafted Platform that the political parties have generated. The tariffs have served your purpose and need at least to be suspended.
  21. But you should expect something in return: the EU should implement the visa waiver and the Serbs should end their campaign against Kosovo membership in international organizations. CEFTA should open a serious discussion of Kosovo’s concerns with trade barriers in Serbia.
  22. A mini-package of that sort could restart the dialogue on a more realistic basis, which means ending the discussion of territory but beginning the process of demarcating the border.
  23. A final appeal: you are going to need the Americans to cut a deal with the Russians for your UN membership, a deal that may involve serious sacrifice on the part of Washington.
  24. The Americans will only be ready and willing if you can carry over the incredibly friendly spirit of these two days celebrating the NATO deployment in Kosovo to the dialogue.
  25. That is one more reason for ending talk of ethnic division and tariffs and thereby making sure that the Americans will be ready to do whatever is necessary to ensure your UN membership.  
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Too big to fail or bail

Posted in Nathaniel Haas - June 10, 2019 - 0 Comment

On June 4 the American Enterprise Institute hosted a panel discussion titled “Europe’s Populist and Brexit Economic Challenge” moderated by Alex J. Pollock of the R Street Institute and featuring Lorenzi Forni (Prometeia Associazione), Vitor Gaspar (International Monetary Fund), Desmond Lachman (AEI) and Athanasios Orphanides (MIT). The panel discussion was centered around Italy’s rising populism and economic woes, with a short discussion about the possibility of a no-deal Brexit causing damage to the European economy.

Gaspar showed that only 24% Europeans polled believe in the political system at both the national level and at the European level, while 38% of people said neither works. Voter turnout in both national and European parliament elections is going down, while the share of votes going to populist parties has increased. The mainstream parties are losing votes. In 2019 there was almost a 50/50 split between votes for populist parties and those for establishment parties. With parliament more fragmented than ever, coalitions of at least 4 parties are needed to get a majority, which makes governing difficult. The 2014 and 2019 voter maps of Germany show virtually no change, while Italy’s map shifted solidly populist. “Support for populism in Western Europe is strongly correlated with exposure to the shocks of globalization,”Gaspar said. Europe needs risk-sharing mechanisms.

Orphanides sees Europe stuck between two competing narratives. The technocratic elite believes the EU has been an economic success in the past decade or two. Others think the prescriptions by the technocratic elite have not served the European population as a whole and have instead acted for the benefit of one or two member states. In the latter view, the mainstream parties of the past have to be kicked out of government and replaced by new parties that will serve the people better. 

Orphanides believes there is some truth in both narratives, but people presenting them fail to talk directly with each other, causing tension. “Europe is not a club of equals” he said, citing mismanagement of the euro crisis as the root of many present crises such as Brexit. Elites in Brussels and Frankfurt drive the agenda and have to acknowledge what has gone wrong. “Instead,” Orphanides said, “they are still in the denial phase.”

Moving on to Italy, Orphanides declared “the fact that the euro has been a disaster should be acknowledged.” Italy is a rich country and has been running a primary surplus for twenty years, so there is no reason for the Italian economy to be doing as poorly as it is. Lachman agreed a primary surplus is necessary but said the current 1% surplus is nowhere near sufficient and has to be closer to 3-4% to have a noticeable impact.

Forni disagreed, saying Italy joined the European Union because its public finances, inflation, and debt were out of control in the 1980s. You should not take averages when looking at Italy’s economy over the past twenty years. The 2008 financial crisis and the euro crisis in 2011 were damaging. Since 2013, things have gotten better and Italy has strengthened its position.

In Forni‘s view, Italian economic performance was poor because the productive structure of Italy in 1998, built on small, family-owned businesses with limited IT capabilities, was not ready for globalization. Add an aging population and brain drain, and it is easy to see why Italy suffered economically. Italy’s current debt is sustainable given no further crises the likes of 2008 or 2011, but Lachman cautioned that the Italian debt issue has to be addressed because Italy is ten times the size of Greece and bailing it out in a crisis would be a massive undertaking. “We might find ourselves in a situation in which Italy is too big to fail, but too big to bail” Lachman said. 

Forni then mentioned three things Italy needs to thrive in Europe: A debt target of 90% of GDP (Italy’s debt to GDP ratio was 132.20% in 2018), a plan of structural reforms to address issues of tax evasion and corruption, and an increase in risk-sharing at the European level. Safe assets, the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), and an increase in labor mobility could help reduce and share risks. 

Lachman noted he was pessimistic about Europe’s future for 4 reasons: 

  • Disappointing economic and political developments;
  • Fundamental flaws in the euro which he doesn’t believe can be fixed;
  • Major challenges in Italy and Brexit;
  • The limited room for policy maneuver in Europe.

Lachman also addressed the north-south economic divide in Europe, showing that Italy’s per capita income is lower now than it was twenty years ago while Germany’s has risen. Unemployment in the southern parts of Europe remains much higher than in the north. These differences cause political resentment between the north and the south which, combined with the weakened center in EU politics and the fragmentation of parliament, make reform difficult. “The euro is fundamentally flawed,” Lachman said. “A country with low productivity like Italy cannot survive in an economic policy straitjacket with a high productivity country like Germany.” A key issue is the lack of a European fiscal union. Germany requiring a balanced budget limits its expenditures in economic downturns, while Italy’s weak banking system and unsustainable finances hold it back. 

Lachman also mentioned Germany and the US trade war. “Germany has a highly export dependent economy” and cannot afford the resulting economic slowdown and falling exports. Adding a 25% tariff on German automobiles exported to the United States would be catastrophic.

On Brexit, Orphanides said a hard Brexit would be bad for the UK and the EU, but he accuses the EU of only negotiating deals that punish the UK for leaving instead of negotiating a win-win deal. To him the only light at the end of the tunnel is the possibility of stopping the clock on Brexit to keep negotiating or a second referendum. Lachman pointed out that both candidates to take over for Theresa May have talked about the UK leaving the EU on October 31 with or without a deal. 

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Basra protests and the future of Iraq

Posted in Nick Wade - June 10, 2019 - 0 Comment

June 6 the Middle East Institute hosted Akeet Abbas, professor at the American University of Iraq, Basma Alloush, advocacy and communications officer at the Norwegian Refugee Council USA, James “Mac” Skelton, director at the Institute of Regional and International Studies, and Bilal Wahab, fellow at The Washington Institute on Near East Policy for a panel on rising tension and unrest in Iraq in the wake of the 2018 Basra protests. Randa Slim, senior fellow and director of the Program on Conflict Resolution and Track II dialogues at the Middle East Institute moderated the discussion.

Skelton explained that the rhetoric of the Basra protestors was aimed at overturning the entire governance system. Protestors targeted not only government office buildings, but also political party offices. People felt that the traditional patronage system that operates through the party system has failed them because of rampant co-option of abundant resources (i.e. oil) in Basra. This vying for control is cyclical in nature between political parties. For example, currently the Hikma party “owns” the oil fields as well the Basra Oil Company (BOC), but before them it was the Dawa party.

According to Skelton, the resultant dynamic is “government dysfunction at every level.” So many actors capture the state that no project can be completed. Lack of electricity and clean water were among the rallying calls of protesters. Skelton also pointed to a closed network of jobs and opportunities as catalysts for the Basra protests.

Abbas explained that while protests were not a novel occurrence in Iraq, the 2018 protest in Basra was the first time that popular dissent gained traction within the Shia majority. Before Basra, the Shia elite did not take protests seriously, as it was easy to demonize Sunni fringe groups to retain legitimacy. The protests also called into question the effectiveness of the Prime Minister Abdul-Mahdi, who was elected because of his promise to root out corruption in Iraq. Abdul-Mahdi’s perceived inability to deliver on his promises sparked a movement in Basra headed by the Sadrists, which other groups soon joined. Abbas predicted that political reform is not possible if the task is left to the current political elite in Iraq. Rather, reform can only come from either or external or internal pressure. Abbas believes that internal pressure in the form of protests is the catalyst for change, given that the United States has all but washed its hands of governance in Iraq.

Alloush focused on the water network in Basra, and the ways that resource shortage contributes to unrest. Water shortage in Iraq is a regional issue—dams built upstream by Syria, Turkey, and Iran limit water flowing into Iraq by 50%. Climate change, drought, and contamination of the Tigris and Euphrates further exacerbate the waster issue. Furthermore, poor water management practices in cities like Basra ensure that contamination increases, and that clean water is not distributed. Alloush also noted that loss of rural livelihoods contributed to a rise in migration of rural youth to urban areas, but they lack the skills to be competitive in an already saturated urban job market, adding to discontent.

Wahab echoed Skeleton’s statements regarding the ineffectiveness of sectarian patronage networks. They are able to provide money, employment, and legitimacy to their supporters, but they were not able to provide governance. Political parties cannot provide resources like water, electricity, and production. Rather, only cohesive government can provide these things. This lack of governance is why protests in Basra targeted all political parties. Abbas complimented this point, mentioning that even the Popular Mobilization Units, credited with the defeat of ISIS, was not spared from citizen dissatisfaction.

Skelton offered some insights about the future. First, he noted that the issues that sparked protests in Basra in 2018 have not been resolved. Second, he notes that the Sadrists who incited the 2018 Basra protests did not expect to garner so much popular support. The unexpected popularity of the protests illustrate how unpredictable social movements in Iraq are. While Skelton is certain future protests will occur, the extent to which they will spread remains to be seen.

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Flim Flam 101

Posted in Daniel Serwer - June 9, 2019 - 0 Comment

President Trump’s threat of tariffs on Mexican imports to the US was never credible, as it would have devastated the US auto industry and American agriculture. It was a transparent bluff intended to raise the President’s personal visibility, as Senate minority leader Schumer said. Trump got nothing new in the one-page joint statement that resolved the “crisis.” The Mexicans had agreed months ago to the main provisions of the agreement he greeted as a “great deal.”

This is now a boringly familiar pattern. It was what Trump did with Canada and Mexico in renegotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement, which produced a “United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement” (USMCA). Aside from being the worst acronym in the lexicon, USMCA is no more than NAFTA 2.0, a much-needed update of a decades-old agreement. No big triumph, and the Administration is having a hard time getting it approved in Congress.

Bluff is also what Trump with North Korea when he threatened military action and settled instead for a one-page “best efforts” pledge that fell short of previous Pyongyang commitments to denuclearize. There has been no significant progress since, despite a second failed summit in Hanoi, as Kim Jong-un has moved to shore up relations with Russia and China, neither of which has much reason to do favors for Trump. North Korea remains as much, if not more, of a threat to the US as in did in January 2017 at Trump’s inauguration.

The pattern was similar in soon forgotten Venezuela. Trump’s threats against President Maduro caused a temporary “crisis” but led nowhere. Maduro is still in power in Caracas while the American-backed interim president has failed to gain significant support in Venezuela’s armed forces. With no possibility of even a vague one-page statement in sight, Trump has moved on to other targets.

Iran is getting the typical Trump treatment. While deploying military assets to the Gulf and allowing National Security Adviser Bolton to talk tough, President Trump and Secretary of State Pompeo have been begging for talks with Tehran. Pompeo has dropped his 12 preconditions. The President had never endorsed them. What the Administration wants now seems to be nothing more than an opportunity to sit at a table and berate Iran for building missiles and using proxies to project power in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. Any statement from such “talks” would be no more substantive than Trump got out of Mexico.

The Iranians are no fools and could teach a Flim Flam 101 of their own. All their threats to close the Strait of Hormuz fall in this category, as their own ships pass there, as well as those of other nations delivering Iranian oil. The Iranians no doubt know that the Trump Administration is incapable of negotiating anything like the 159 pages of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), aka Iran nuclear deal. If ever they agree to talk about missiles and the use of proxies, Tehran will no doubt ask for reciprocity: removal of US weapons from the Gulf and an end to US military support to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar.

Tehran knows those will be non-starters for the US. The only likely outcome of talks with the US would be an exchange of prisoners: Iranians held on criminal charges in the US for Americans (including Iranian Americans) held in Iran. Trump may decide that would be worth his while, as it would give him a much-needed boost on the international stage, where he is more pariah than hero. But I have my doubts he’ll be willing to pay the price for even that small gain: the Iranians will want relief from at least some of the sanctions that are tanking their economy.

Trump is a bad negotiator who follows a transparent pattern: threaten, cause crisis, settle for little, declare victory, take personal credit. It isn’t working. He has been unable to negotiate a single agreement worthy of presidential attention, and his threats are making other countries hedge their bets. The bullying with sanctions and tariffs is gaining nothing. It is instead undermining international confidence in the US and making other countries look elsewhere for leadership. Would you do business with a flim flam man who bullies?

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