Month: August 2019
Stevenson’s army, August 31
In an extraordinary story, WaPo reports that John Bolton has repeatedly been excluded from invitations to presidential policy meetings on Afghanistan and even denied access to the Taliban negotiations documents. Bolton’s only denial of the story was that he and his staff did not leak. It’s unclear whether this story was prompted by Bolton supporters who want him to resign in protest of Administration policies or opponents who want to further marginalize him by making this known to the world. [It is not unusual for senior officials to fall in and out of favor with a president. Nor is it unusual for one faction to try to exclude opponents from policy meetings. People in the Clinton and Obama administrations, for example, told me of deliberately excluding Richard Holbrooke from meetings because he was deemed disruptive. But to sideline the person in charge of the interagency process from a key policy matter is not a good sign.]
Another puzzling development Friday was a presidential tweet with what appears to be a classified intelligence photo of an Iranian missile site along with a Trump statement that the US was not responsible for the failed launch. NYT has background on both matters, including a discussion of the law on covert actions.
WaPo had a piece discussing Gen. Mattis’ refusal to criticize President Trump, linking it to broader issues of civil-military relations and whether retired senior officers can adjust to political roles like SecDef. Civ-mil scholars like Professors Karlin and Peter Feaver are quoted.
CBO’s latest economic report has details on the impact of the trade wars on the US economy. See box 2.2 in the full report.
NYT tells the sad story of the rise and fall of the president’s personal assistant and how she built large groups of supporters and opponents by how she controlled access to the Oval Office.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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The Balkans stalled
I gave this interview to Vijesti.ba this morning:
Q: Another attempt to break Bosnia’s long-running political deadlock and form a new state-level government has failed. Milorad Dodik said that September 5 is the deadline to resolve the dispute, according to an agreement that was signed by Dodik himself, Bakir Izetbegović, Dragan Čović. If they fail to meet the deadline, Dodik has threatened Republic of Srpska will pull out of agreements that allowed the formation of ethnically-mixed armed forces, the state court and the national police agency. What consequences could cause such Dodik’s intention?
A: Dodik is determined to undermine the Bosnian state. I’m not sure what “pulling out” would really mean in practice at this stage, when the institutions mentioned already exist, but he could certainly make it difficult for them to function effectively.
Q: Western Balkans countries do not seem to be making any progress as the time passes by – a Beograd-Priština dialogue is still deadlocked, Bosnia’s state-level government hasn’t still been formed… Do you think United States should increase their engagement in the Western Balkans countries? And if yes – in what context?
A: I think the US needs a policy before I can answer the question about increased engagement. If that policy includes ethnically-based land swaps in Kosovo, I would oppose increased engagement because it would destabilize Bosnia and Macedonia and give Putin a big present in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. If it includes determination to make Bosnia and Herzegovina a functional state that can qualify for EU membership, I would be in favor.
Q: Serbian president Aleksandar Vučić recently met with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in New York. What do you see as a main goal of such Vučić’s visit?
A: Vucic is sitting on two stools, or three if you count Beijing. He wants to keep the US convinced that he is part of the solution in the Balkans and not part of the problem.
Q: Vučić says Serbia can’t recognize Kosovo in the current circumstances – “They will never get my signature to give the Albanians everything and Serbia nothing.” What is your comment?
A: I’ve outlined in detail what I think Serbia can “get.” First and foremost is removal of a significant barrier to EU accession. The rest is gravy.
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It’s not all about Washington and Brussels
Florian Bieber of the Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group (BiEPAG) has written an eminently sensible report on “Leadership Adrift: American Policy in the Western Balkans” based on a BiEPAG visit to Washington last spring. The subtitle really should have been “American and European Policy in the Western Balkans,” but I won’t insist too much.
The point is that neither Washington nor Brussels is approaching the Balkans with a clear concept and both are distracted by other issues, out of tune with each other, and divided at home. The results are dangerous. In both Kosovo and Bosnia there are signs of stagnation and retrogression. Even Macedonia, whose “name” problem seemed solved with the addition of “North” in front of it, is suffering a shaky moment with the arrest of its Special Prosecutor by less special prosecutors.
The “Quint” countries (that’s the US, France, UK, Germany and Italy) this month tried to unify their voices in a statement intended to restart the Kosovo/Serbia dialogue. They explicitly suggested a reasonable quid pro quo: Kosovo to suspend the tariffs it has imposed on Serbian imports and Serbia to suspend its campaign for “de-recognition” of Kosovo. This corresponds precisely to what Kosovo Prime Minister Haradinaj wants. It is unclear whether Serbian President Vucic, who met recently with Secretary of State Pompeo, is prepared to move in that direction.
The Quint called for urgent action. That really isn’t possible in the Serbia/Kosovo space, since the Kosovo Prime Minister has resigned in response to a summons from the Special Tribunal in The Hague. Elections are now scheduled for October 6. It would be nonsensical for anyone to expect real progress until there is a new parliament and government in Pristina. There too unity is a big issue: the next Kosovo government needs to go to Brussels with a platform for the dialogue agreed among its coalition at a minimum, and preferably by a much wider political group.
The Bosnia situation is more urgent. There no government has been formed for almost 11 months. The main issue appears to be (sorry about the pay wall) whether or not to proceed with the NATO membership process. The Serb member of the collective presidency is opposed. The Croat and Bosniak members are in favor. Fudging this is difficult, not least because the Serb member views NATO as an enemy, is in the pocket of the Russians, and is threatening to paralyze the country’s existing state institutions if he doesn’t get his way. The Croat and Bosniak have been unwilling to yield, as the people they represent regard NATO as a savior.
None of this registers on the Washington politograph. As Florian notes in his report, Washington is obsessed now with geopolitical challenges (that means jihadists as well as Moscow and Beijing, not democratization or rule of law, much less EU accession). Even in Brussels, Balkan problems are minor tremors. But the EU is worsening the situation, by making it appear that enlargement is over and maybe none of the Balkan countries will get in. That is a big mistake, one that my BiEPAG colleagues unfortunately ignore. French President Macron’s insistence on internal EU reform and nastiness about enlargement is a major factor in unsettling the Balkans.
That said, I share BiEPAG’s concern for increasing support to civil society and independent media. It is hard to see how the Balkans will climb out of the hole the region is in without new and more democratic leadership that is serious about taking advantage of whatever EU enlargement opportunities are offered. It’s not all about Brussels and Washington. Sarajevo, Pristina, and Belgrade are where the problems and most of the solutions lie.
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Stevenson’s army, August 29
Today the NYT does the hat trick with three important stories.
– Administration officials reveal [brag?] that US conducted a cyber attack on Iran in June that complicated Iranian efforts to target oil tankers.
– Background on Israel’s “shadow war” against Iran. Note that Israeli elections are Sept 17.
– US promises amnesty for Venezuela’s Maduro if he steps down.
– WP has background on South Korea’s ending of intelligence cooperation with Japan.
– Politico notes Hill complaints as administration slow walks military aid to Ukraine.
– I like this Lawfare piece recommending changes to IEEPA.– SecDef Esper and CJCS Dunford have first news conference in a year. Here’s the transcript.
– Finally, could Trump pull a Boris Johnson? Yes. Look at Article II section 3 of the Constitution. The president can call either house into session and “he may adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper.”
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, August 28
– WSJ is filled with several important stories today.
– Excerpt of a book by former SecDef Mattis, due to be released next week.
– Hurricane relief funds are being diverted for border wall. In class, we can talk more about Congressional rules about transferring funds.
– US wants to block undersea data cable involving Chinese and US tech companies.
-US plans direct talks with Houthis about Yemen war.
– WaPo says niche publications are surging. That’s why it’s hard to research Congress through Google: all the inside information is behind paywalls that lobbyists are willing to fund.
– Defense News says SecDef Esper wants more US basing in Indo-Pacific.
– Lawfare, a site with good articles on legal aspects of national security, says Congress is concerned but unlikely to act on 5G.
– NYT has article by former FSO who wrote dissent channel message critical of Muslim ban and now feels she has to leave State Dept.
– Boris Johnson can also play constitutional games: he has asked the Queen to suspend Parliament.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Full control
Bassam Barabandi, a former Syrian diplomat, writes:
Talk in Syria is that a government-sponsored money laundering commission has unleashed a wave of investigations on 29 major business elites, including Dureid Assad, Jaber , Hamsho and most significantly Rami Makhlouf himself and his family (his brothers and his father).
Reports are that Rami Makhlouf’s offices at the free zone were raided by the money laundering commission. The scope of the investigations has sent shockwaves into Latakia too. Hamsho’s tender with the Education Ministry is supposedly under investigation
Source:
Analysis:
- The Assad regime is a big mafia and the the fight within the family was expected
- Assad does not want any center of power within his inner circle.
- All the businesspeople who are now under house arrest have created and sponsored local militias in the past 8 years. Some of these militias started challenging Assad forces, especially in Latakia and Hama.
- The regime may feel more confident to do such big step against the warlords after winning in Idlib. This step could be encouraged and/or pushed by Russia to counter Iranian economic influence.
- aSnctioning of Samer Foz was a clear message for the regime that his investments and assets outside Syria by using businesspeople as cover do not help or provide protection. So he is burning all the known names and their affiliations to make it harder for the West to sanction the new faces.
- Asaad wants to send the message that he and his family are in full control.
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