Day: August 29, 2019
The Balkans stalled
I gave this interview to Vijesti.ba this morning:
Q: Another attempt to break Bosnia’s long-running political deadlock and form a new state-level government has failed. Milorad Dodik said that September 5 is the deadline to resolve the dispute, according to an agreement that was signed by Dodik himself, Bakir Izetbegović, Dragan Čović. If they fail to meet the deadline, Dodik has threatened Republic of Srpska will pull out of agreements that allowed the formation of ethnically-mixed armed forces, the state court and the national police agency. What consequences could cause such Dodik’s intention?
A: Dodik is determined to undermine the Bosnian state. I’m not sure what “pulling out” would really mean in practice at this stage, when the institutions mentioned already exist, but he could certainly make it difficult for them to function effectively.
Q: Western Balkans countries do not seem to be making any progress as the time passes by – a Beograd-Priština dialogue is still deadlocked, Bosnia’s state-level government hasn’t still been formed… Do you think United States should increase their engagement in the Western Balkans countries? And if yes – in what context?
A: I think the US needs a policy before I can answer the question about increased engagement. If that policy includes ethnically-based land swaps in Kosovo, I would oppose increased engagement because it would destabilize Bosnia and Macedonia and give Putin a big present in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. If it includes determination to make Bosnia and Herzegovina a functional state that can qualify for EU membership, I would be in favor.
Q: Serbian president Aleksandar Vučić recently met with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in New York. What do you see as a main goal of such Vučić’s visit?
A: Vucic is sitting on two stools, or three if you count Beijing. He wants to keep the US convinced that he is part of the solution in the Balkans and not part of the problem.
Q: Vučić says Serbia can’t recognize Kosovo in the current circumstances – “They will never get my signature to give the Albanians everything and Serbia nothing.” What is your comment?
A: I’ve outlined in detail what I think Serbia can “get.” First and foremost is removal of a significant barrier to EU accession. The rest is gravy.
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It’s not all about Washington and Brussels
Florian Bieber of the Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group (BiEPAG) has written an eminently sensible report on “Leadership Adrift: American Policy in the Western Balkans” based on a BiEPAG visit to Washington last spring. The subtitle really should have been “American and European Policy in the Western Balkans,” but I won’t insist too much.
The point is that neither Washington nor Brussels is approaching the Balkans with a clear concept and both are distracted by other issues, out of tune with each other, and divided at home. The results are dangerous. In both Kosovo and Bosnia there are signs of stagnation and retrogression. Even Macedonia, whose “name” problem seemed solved with the addition of “North” in front of it, is suffering a shaky moment with the arrest of its Special Prosecutor by less special prosecutors.
The “Quint” countries (that’s the US, France, UK, Germany and Italy) this month tried to unify their voices in a statement intended to restart the Kosovo/Serbia dialogue. They explicitly suggested a reasonable quid pro quo: Kosovo to suspend the tariffs it has imposed on Serbian imports and Serbia to suspend its campaign for “de-recognition” of Kosovo. This corresponds precisely to what Kosovo Prime Minister Haradinaj wants. It is unclear whether Serbian President Vucic, who met recently with Secretary of State Pompeo, is prepared to move in that direction.
The Quint called for urgent action. That really isn’t possible in the Serbia/Kosovo space, since the Kosovo Prime Minister has resigned in response to a summons from the Special Tribunal in The Hague. Elections are now scheduled for October 6. It would be nonsensical for anyone to expect real progress until there is a new parliament and government in Pristina. There too unity is a big issue: the next Kosovo government needs to go to Brussels with a platform for the dialogue agreed among its coalition at a minimum, and preferably by a much wider political group.
The Bosnia situation is more urgent. There no government has been formed for almost 11 months. The main issue appears to be (sorry about the pay wall) whether or not to proceed with the NATO membership process. The Serb member of the collective presidency is opposed. The Croat and Bosniak members are in favor. Fudging this is difficult, not least because the Serb member views NATO as an enemy, is in the pocket of the Russians, and is threatening to paralyze the country’s existing state institutions if he doesn’t get his way. The Croat and Bosniak have been unwilling to yield, as the people they represent regard NATO as a savior.
None of this registers on the Washington politograph. As Florian notes in his report, Washington is obsessed now with geopolitical challenges (that means jihadists as well as Moscow and Beijing, not democratization or rule of law, much less EU accession). Even in Brussels, Balkan problems are minor tremors. But the EU is worsening the situation, by making it appear that enlargement is over and maybe none of the Balkan countries will get in. That is a big mistake, one that my BiEPAG colleagues unfortunately ignore. French President Macron’s insistence on internal EU reform and nastiness about enlargement is a major factor in unsettling the Balkans.
That said, I share BiEPAG’s concern for increasing support to civil society and independent media. It is hard to see how the Balkans will climb out of the hole the region is in without new and more democratic leadership that is serious about taking advantage of whatever EU enlargement opportunities are offered. It’s not all about Brussels and Washington. Sarajevo, Pristina, and Belgrade are where the problems and most of the solutions lie.
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Stevenson’s army, August 29
Today the NYT does the hat trick with three important stories.
– Administration officials reveal [brag?] that US conducted a cyber attack on Iran in June that complicated Iranian efforts to target oil tankers.
– Background on Israel’s “shadow war” against Iran. Note that Israeli elections are Sept 17.
– US promises amnesty for Venezuela’s Maduro if he steps down.
– WP has background on South Korea’s ending of intelligence cooperation with Japan.
– Politico notes Hill complaints as administration slow walks military aid to Ukraine.
– I like this Lawfare piece recommending changes to IEEPA.– SecDef Esper and CJCS Dunford have first news conference in a year. Here’s the transcript.
– Finally, could Trump pull a Boris Johnson? Yes. Look at Article II section 3 of the Constitution. The president can call either house into session and “he may adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper.”
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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