Iran options
As the complexity of the attack on Saudi oil facilities becomes apparent, the odds that it was state-sponsored go up. Iran is the prime suspect. So if convincing evidence is provided, what would an appropriate response be? Here are some options:
- Military
An attack on Iranian oil-producing facilities would be the obvious, proportional response. But Iran already is unable to export all the oil is producing, so the immediate additional damage to Tehran’s finances would be minimal. A US attack would increase the price for what oil it is able to sell, helping Iran’s finances rather than hurting them while alienating oil importing countries.
The US could skip the niceities and proceed directly to an attack on Iran’s nuclear program. That would give Iran an incentive to move as quickly as possible to build a nuclear weapon, requiring repeated American attacks to prevent the crash program from achieving success. In the meanwhile, Iran would certainly retaliate against US assets in the Middle East and perhaps also in the US, where Hizbollah is thought to maintain a network of sleeper cells. Iran would also retaliate against Israel, perhaps using the same sophisticated cruise missiles used against the Saudi oil facilities.
Neither of these options is appealing. There are others: the US could attack, overtly or covertly, Iranians in Syria or Iranian proxies in many countries, it could mount a massive cyber attack, and it could combine those options with the above. All these lead in the direction of long-term instability in the Middle East.
2. Diplomatic
The US could take its evidence of Iranian origins of the attack to the Security Council to seek a condemnation of Iran and renewed multilateral sanctions. The condemnation Washington should be able to get if the evidence is good. But neither the Russians nor the Chinese are likely to go along with multilateral sanctions in the absence of a US move back to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA aka nuclear deal) and loosening of American unilateral sanctions.
President Trump, while begging for Iran to come back to the negotiating table, has been unwilling to loosen or suspend unilateral sanctions that are causing serious damage to the Iranian economy. Doing so would be a major concession. We know how he would feel about that. If ever Iran is to get weakening of the sanctions, it will need to provide Trump with a TV moment, which the Supreme Leader has been loathe to do.
3. Political
Washington could resort to regime change efforts, likely clandestine, to try to collapse the Islamic Republic from within. This would entail extensive efforts to promote alternatives other than the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), the exile group that John Bolton and Rudy Giuliani favor. The MEK is entirely lacking in support inside Iran. In addition to padding Bolton and Giuliani’s bank accounts, it may be useful for economic sabotage and assassinations but does not have the traction with the Iranian people (not least due to its terrorist history) that would be required to topple the Supreme Leader.
The US could also promote minority political movements within Iran willing to challenge Tehran’s authority. There are Kurds, Baloch, Arabs, and others who would be useful in such an effort. A bare majority of Iranians are Persians. But ethnic civil war risks causing even more instability in the region than currently exists, which is saying something.
4. Economic
There are basically two ways to go on sanctions: tighten up the unilateral ones, or loosen them in an effort to get others to impose multilateral sanctions. Iran is feeling the pain of unilateral sanctions, but their response is clear: escalate to cause damage to the world economy so long as Iran is suffering. I suppose it is possible they will throw in the towel one day, but there is no telling when that day might come.
Getting others to go along with multilateral sanctions will be a hard sell for an Administration that pulled the plug on the JCPOA, which the Europeans, Russians, Chinese, and others liked. While it is conceivable that if they are convinced the attacks were Iranian that they would go along with multilateral sanctions without the US back in the JCPOA, it isn’t likely.
Bottom line: If the US wants multilateral sanctions, which look like the best option, and return of Iran to the negotiating table, President Trump is going to have to swallow a bitter pill: get the US back into the JCPOA. Otherwise, we can expect continued escalation from the Iranians. Better to reverse course now rather than after the next round of attacks. But it is unlikely Trump will do that.
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