Month: September 2019
No rush
Pristina’s Gazeta Express (Besnik Velija) asked me questions today. I replied:
Q: How do you see the decision of State Secretary to appoint Matt Palmer as a Special Envoy for Western Balkan and for the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia?
A: I suppose it signals one more push to settle things, especially between Pristina and Belgrad.
Q: What are your expectations from Matt Palmer, as a Special Envoy ?
A: Matt is a good soul, but I’m not sure he brings the full weight of the United States to the table: military, economic, and political as well as diplomatic. We’ll have to wait and see.
Q: There is reporting saying that US wants a solution until next summer. Do you see latest moves from the US, as a hurry for reaching a final solution between Prishtina and Belgrade? If yes, can that be good for the whole process?
A: Yes, the Americans are in a hurry, but that doesn’t mean Pristina should be. First it needs to hold a good election and form a government that can take a widely supported position to the dialogue. Serbian parliamentary elections are due by April 2020, which means any negotiation this winter will include enormous pressure from Europe and the US for an agreement that President Vucic can sell as a victory to his electorate. I think Pristina should not be expected to negotiate during the pre-electoral period in Serbia.
Q: There was also a declaration from Bundestag member, Peter Beyer, that even EU should appoint a Special Envoy for Western Balkan and for Kosovo and Serbia dialogue. Do you see these moves as an effort to show who leads the European policy?
A: Once the Americans appointed a Special Envoy I suppose it was inevitable that Europe would want one too. I’d prefer that both the US and EU get a common policy before appointing special envoys, but that is not the way it is proceeding.
Q: Who should be the main mediator on dialogue, Brussels or Washington, or both? What about ideas to involve Russia? (ex US ambassador at Belgrade, Cameron Munter said that Russian Ambassador at Belgrade, Alexander Bocan-Harchenko, is an expert and he could help on the dialogue process).
A: Brussels has most of the leverage, but Washington support is vital, especially in pressuring Pristina. I don’t think the Russians will be helpful to the mediation in any way. Moscow favors Belgrade and does not want to see a solution that would allow Kosovo to proceed to NATO membership. It will also want a high price for UN membership: likely US acceptance of the annexation of Crimea and perhaps recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. That will not help the negotiations.
Q: Senator Chris Murphy on a personal statement about the last visit in Kosovo, when he describe meeting with Kosovo politicians, said that they told on meeting at US embassy that they don’t know who to listen to, EU or USA , about the dialogue issue: “The leaders tell us that these days, the United States and Europe come to Pristina and give them different advice on how to break the impasse — they don’t know who to listen to. More fallout from the disastrous Trump foreign policy.”
A: Nothing good happens in the Balkans until Brussels and Washington speak in unison.
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Stevenson’s army, September 19
- SecState Pompeo says Iran committed an “act of war” and US is trying to form coalition at the UN to deter future attacks.
- President Trump wants more sanctions but not war. [Since US has already sanctioned 674 Iranian entities, it’s not clear what that will be.] US is withholding visas for about 40 of the 124 Iranians in the delegation to the General Assembly with Rouhani.
- Josh Rogin urges attacks in Syria. A quick poll found only 13% of Americans for military action.
- Bolton speaks out, at a private lunch.
- APSA classmate Paul Musgrave has a column about the new national security adviser.
- HFAC has arranged a closed door hearing with Amb. Khalilzad about Afghanistan peace talks.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Iran options
As the complexity of the attack on Saudi oil facilities becomes apparent, the odds that it was state-sponsored go up. Iran is the prime suspect. So if convincing evidence is provided, what would an appropriate response be? Here are some options:
- Military
An attack on Iranian oil-producing facilities would be the obvious, proportional response. But Iran already is unable to export all the oil is producing, so the immediate additional damage to Tehran’s finances would be minimal. A US attack would increase the price for what oil it is able to sell, helping Iran’s finances rather than hurting them while alienating oil importing countries.
The US could skip the niceities and proceed directly to an attack on Iran’s nuclear program. That would give Iran an incentive to move as quickly as possible to build a nuclear weapon, requiring repeated American attacks to prevent the crash program from achieving success. In the meanwhile, Iran would certainly retaliate against US assets in the Middle East and perhaps also in the US, where Hizbollah is thought to maintain a network of sleeper cells. Iran would also retaliate against Israel, perhaps using the same sophisticated cruise missiles used against the Saudi oil facilities.
Neither of these options is appealing. There are others: the US could attack, overtly or covertly, Iranians in Syria or Iranian proxies in many countries, it could mount a massive cyber attack, and it could combine those options with the above. All these lead in the direction of long-term instability in the Middle East.
2. Diplomatic
The US could take its evidence of Iranian origins of the attack to the Security Council to seek a condemnation of Iran and renewed multilateral sanctions. The condemnation Washington should be able to get if the evidence is good. But neither the Russians nor the Chinese are likely to go along with multilateral sanctions in the absence of a US move back to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA aka nuclear deal) and loosening of American unilateral sanctions.
President Trump, while begging for Iran to come back to the negotiating table, has been unwilling to loosen or suspend unilateral sanctions that are causing serious damage to the Iranian economy. Doing so would be a major concession. We know how he would feel about that. If ever Iran is to get weakening of the sanctions, it will need to provide Trump with a TV moment, which the Supreme Leader has been loathe to do.
3. Political
Washington could resort to regime change efforts, likely clandestine, to try to collapse the Islamic Republic from within. This would entail extensive efforts to promote alternatives other than the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), the exile group that John Bolton and Rudy Giuliani favor. The MEK is entirely lacking in support inside Iran. In addition to padding Bolton and Giuliani’s bank accounts, it may be useful for economic sabotage and assassinations but does not have the traction with the Iranian people (not least due to its terrorist history) that would be required to topple the Supreme Leader.
The US could also promote minority political movements within Iran willing to challenge Tehran’s authority. There are Kurds, Baloch, Arabs, and others who would be useful in such an effort. A bare majority of Iranians are Persians. But ethnic civil war risks causing even more instability in the region than currently exists, which is saying something.
4. Economic
There are basically two ways to go on sanctions: tighten up the unilateral ones, or loosen them in an effort to get others to impose multilateral sanctions. Iran is feeling the pain of unilateral sanctions, but their response is clear: escalate to cause damage to the world economy so long as Iran is suffering. I suppose it is possible they will throw in the towel one day, but there is no telling when that day might come.
Getting others to go along with multilateral sanctions will be a hard sell for an Administration that pulled the plug on the JCPOA, which the Europeans, Russians, Chinese, and others liked. While it is conceivable that if they are convinced the attacks were Iranian that they would go along with multilateral sanctions without the US back in the JCPOA, it isn’t likely.
Bottom line: If the US wants multilateral sanctions, which look like the best option, and return of Iran to the negotiating table, President Trump is going to have to swallow a bitter pill: get the US back into the JCPOA. Otherwise, we can expect continued escalation from the Iranians. Better to reverse course now rather than after the next round of attacks. But it is unlikely Trump will do that.
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Stevenson’s army, September 18
– NYT details the analysis of the attack on Saudi oil facilities. DOD is preparing a report — but how much can be revealed without divulging intelligence sources and methods?
– David Sanger notes that Trump faces a credibility gap with much of the rest of the world.
– It’s significant that many Senate Republicans urge caution and diplomacy, not military action. Except for Lindsey Graham, who now has a tweet war with Trump.
– I like what I see in new CFR report on how to maintain our technological edge.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Today is a rainy day
This tidbit from the Washington Post about the weekend attack on Saudi oil facilities is both telling and appalling:
U.S. officials are working under the assumption that the strikes did not emanate from Yemen and do not believe they were launched from Iraq, either…
While I am open to believing that the attacks came from Iran once evidence to that effect is published and thoroughly analyzed, there should be no assumptions in the investigation at this early stage, especially as Yemen’s Houthis have claimed responsibility. Nor should a US response be up to the Saudis, as President Trump suggested in a foolish “locked and loaded” tweet in which he said he was waiting to take military action for the Saudi assessment of responsibility.
Certainly the attack is consistent with what the Iranians have said they would do: respond to US sanctions by interfering with global energy supplies. Most of us, including me, believed this referred to stopping shipping through the strait of Hormuz, but that is just because we lack imagination. Taking down half of Saudi production capacity with a few missiles is much more clever: it doesn’t bring Iran directly into conflict with the US or block a passageway that Tehran uses as much as its Gulf neighbors. It is entirely possible that Iran, perhaps acting through the Houthis, was responsible.
But there is a long history of American wars starting or escalating with blame that was mis-assigned, too often intentionally:
- the explosion of the Maine that precipitated the Spanish-American war,
- the Gulf of Tonkin attack on the US Navy and the escalation of the Vietnam war,
- the claim that Saddam Hussein was developing nuclear weapons that led the US into a decade of disastrous engagement in Iraq.
Especially with a president facing the threat of impeachment at home and with few friends abroad, we need to be exigent about assignment of responsibility.
We also need to ask what will happen after an attack on Iran. Will the US be better off, or will the Islamic Republic gain? Its road to nuclear weapons is now short, less than a year, due to Trump’s withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Do we really want to risk pushing Tehran to a crash nuclear weapons program with a calibrated attack? What kind of military intervention would be required to prevent that course of action?
Regardless of who initiated the attack on Saudi Arabia, Washington should also be asking how it was allowed to happen. Is it possible that the hundreds of billions of dollars in military equipment the US has sold to Saudi Arabia is incapable of preventing such an attack? Or were the Saudis asleep at the switch? Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is, among many other things, Minister of Defense. We know however how reluctant Trump is to assign responsibility for any failures to him.
Fortunately, the US has time to respond: if oil prices spike, I trust we’ll draw down on the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), which will limit the spike and provide time to evaluate and repair the damage in Saudi Arabia. Those who have advocated selling oil from the SPR at low prices should note: best to save it for a rainy day. That’s today.
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Stevenson’s army, September 16
– WSJ says North Korea is making billions of dollars by its cyber activities.
– Joshua Rovner says cyber conflict should be viewed as an intelligence contest, not a military one.
– WaPo says risks of Venezuela-Colombia war is growing because of aid to FARC fighters and discussions about invoking Rio Treaty.
– WSJ reports numerous efforts to revise trade section 232 allowing national security tariffs. [Note: this will be an issue in next week’s exercise.]
– Heather Hurlburt says Bolton left the NSC system in tatters.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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