Month: September 2019
Stevenson’s army, September 7
As we’ll discuss in class, being in the minority in the House isn’t much fun. Little power. We’ll also discuss the extraordinary power of chairmen. They control their committee’s agenda and staff. NYT article says many House Republicans are leaving Congress because they’ve lost power and it isn’t as much fun.
I’m told that Boris Johnson’s friends call him “Alex,” short for his given name, Alexander. I wonder if any of those are left now. Anyway, the FT’s Simon Kuper has a revealing story on what the Europeans now think of Johnson and Brexit.
Politico got leaked draft presidential directive calling for shift in foreign aid primarily to supporters of US policies.
Several publications have stories about how Hong Kong developments are affecting president Xi. Good piece in NYT,
which also links to extraordinary Reuters story of leaked comments by Hong Kong’s leader.
WSJ says the Trump administration still wants to keep classified documents relating to Saudi involvement in the 9/11 attacks.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, September 6
In most administrations, the National Security Adviser, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense speak to each other often — in weekly breakfasts and/or lunches, by phone perhaps daily, and of course in White House meetings. CNN reports that relations between John Bolton and Mike Pompeo are so bad that they have gone weeks without speaking to each other outside of formal WH meetings. CNN also says that acting chief of staff Mulvaney has installed his own foreign policy team. Historically, there have been some strong rivalries among these officials, but they still consulted frequently on many issues. This is a dangerous situation if their personal conflicts prevent the Government from doing its basic security job.
Alice Hunt Friend of CSIS says that the border wall funding raid politicizes military spending in unfortunate ways. [I think the reprogramming is politically stupid and unjustified, but I actually think DOD under the circumstances made reasonable choices on where to take the money — mostly from activities that contractually and logistically were less urgent. They could have done it in even worse ways, such as taking the money only from Democratic districts or overseas.]
Americanized Brit Andrew Sullivan thinks Boris Johnson can pull it off.
At FP, another writer thinks Netanyahu maybe can’t, even if Likud wins the election Sept 17.
CSIS has papers on some of the splits between SASC and HASC in their NDAA bills, which they hope to reconcile before October 1. Here’s their paper on the space force.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Not a great deal
The Middle East Institute hosted a panel of four Afghanistan experts September 5 to assess the opportunities and hurdles of a US–Taliban deal. Until President Trump suspended negotiations this weekend, the two delegations were expected to approve a timetable for withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan. In return, the Taliban leadership was to deny terrorist groups like al Qaeda a presence on Afghan soil. The panel consisted of Javid Ahmad, a senior fellow the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center, Lt. General David Barno (ret.) a visiting professor at John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Jarret Blanc, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Laurel Miller the director of the Crisis Group’s Asia Program.
Here are the major takeaways from the event, which may or may not remain valid in the current situation:
- The Taliban are winning
The agreement is a peace agreement between the United States and the Taliban, with hopes that a subsequent peace process will start between the Afghan central government and the Taliban. According to Ahmad, the Taliban are winning on the battlefield and at the negotiation table. They will not sign an agreement unless they can have the basis of victory.
- The negotiations are generating uncertainty
There have been nine rounds of negotiations in Doha between the US and the Taliban. There is a growing sense that a deal will be made, but in the meanwhile uncertainty among Afghans does not help maintain stability. The agreement says little about implementation following US withdrawal. This ambiguity makes the future of Afghanistan uncertain.
- The US has already made a major concession
There is no ceasefire agreement. The US has agreed to negotiate with the Taliban even while they fight against the Afghan government. This reflects American warweariness: President Trump has clearly stated his disapproval of the current extent of America’s overseas commitments. The war in Afghanistan has lasted for 18-years and he is anxious to end it.
- The Taliban has no incentive to negotiate with the Afghan government once the US withdraws
Afghanistan’s forces are not as strong as the insurgents and will struggle to maintain the territory they currently control without US support. Blanc commented, “Why would they negotiate themselves out of power? Without the US present, the Taliban can continue their offensive.” The central government and the Taliban favor different political landscapes in Afghanistan – one democratic and one autocratic. Why would the Taliban share power with a democratic political institution if they can continue to conquer territory?
- The Taliban is not unified in their vision for the future
Afghan government and Taliban negotiators are scheduled to meet in Oslo, Norway later this month to discuss a potential peace process. The Taliban are sending 19 representatives to the negotiation table. However, only 5 of them are actual negotiators and the group is not fully representative of the organization. Miller discussed how neither the Taliban nor the Afghan government have a straight-forward agenda or clear objectives.
- Major US threats converge in Afghanistan
In the 2018 National Defense Strategy, the Trump Administration defined five key threats to US national security: Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and global terrorism. North Korea is the only one not involved in Afghanistan in one way or another. How can the United States preserve its national security interests without a foothold in such a geopolitically important country ? Barno said that there are two implications of US disengagement from Afghanistan: it will likely revert to harboring terrorist organizations and US influence on Pakistan and Iran will decrease. Before withdrawal, the US should have a reliable partner in Kabul to continue counter terrorism efforts throughout the region.
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Peace Picks | September 9 – 13
1. Countering Violent Extremism in Libya: A Peacebuilding Perspective | September 10, 2019 12:30 pm – 1:30 pm | The SETA Foundation at Washington D.C. | Register Here
Instability in Libya after the revolution that toppled the 42 years’ authoritarian rule of Muammar Gaddafi has become a golden opportunity for extremist groups, including DAESH, Ansar al-Sharia, and Madkhali Salafis, to gain territory and influence in the country. Concerned about rising radicalism and violent extremism in Libya, external actors have attempted to address as well as exploit this emerging problem. States, international organizations, and regional organizations have strived to play a decisive role in restoring Libyan stability but their efforts have proven insufficient. Libya has been driven into a bloody civil war due to political and social fragility and external interventions. Based on an extended study and field research, Dr. Talha Köse will present a CVE model based on the peacebuilding perspective. This event will feature the initial findings and summary of the SETA Foundation’s latest field research on Libya, “Countering Violent Extremism in Libya: A Peacebuilding Perspective” authored by Dr. Talha Köse, a researcher at SETA Istanbul, and Bilgehan Öztürk, a researcher at SETA Ankara. Please kindly join us for an important discussion on the external players’ perspectives on countering violent extremism in Libya. Speakers: Dr. Talha Köse, Senior Researcher at the Strategy Program of the SETA Foundation in Istanbul and Chair of the Political Science and International Relations Department at Ibn Haldun University Dr. Karim Mezran, Director of the North Africa Initiative and Resident Senior Fellow at Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East Moderator: Kilic B. Kanat, Research Director, The SETA Foundation at Washington D.C.
2. The counter-ISIS coalition: Diplomacy and security in action | September 10, 2019 | 2:00 PM – 3:30 PM | Brookings Institution, Falk Auditorium | Register Here
On September 10, 2014, the United States announced the formation of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. Since then, ISIS has lost nearly all the territory it once claimed authority over, simultaneously losing most of its sources of revenue. Even as the caliphate’s power has significantly waned, the fight continues in an effort rout out the remnants of the group. Today Coalition partners are dealing with the challenges of returning foreign fighters, securing and rebuilding territory formerly held by ISIS, and addressing the humanitarian challenges in communities who experienced ISIS’s brutality. On September 10, the Brookings Institution and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace will host an event commemorating the fifth anniversary of the founding of the Coalition, discussing the early days of the diplomatic and military efforts to bring together a diverse coalition of partner nations, how their efforts were organized, and recommendations on where the Coalition can go from here. General John Allen, president of Brookings, will be joined by Brett McGurk, nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie, in a conversation moderated by Susan Glasser. Following the discussion, the participants will take questions from the audience.
3. Qatar Inside and Out: A Close Look at the Gulf State’s Politics, Human Rights, and Foreign Policy | September 10, 2019 | 2:30 PM- 4:00 PM | Project on Middle East Democracy, Suite 617 | Register Here
The tiny Gulf state of Qatar, the world’s largest supplier of liquefied natural gas, is the wealthiest country in the world per capita. A close strategic partner of the United States, Qatar is home to the largest U.S. military base in the region, Al Udeid Airbase, and among the world’s top purchasers of American weapons. Criticism of U.S. policy toward Qatar has largely focused on its foreign policy, with its internal politics and human rights record receiving far less scrutiny. This relative lack of attention is curious, given the well-documented human rights abuses in Qatar, especially toward migrant workers, and the autocratic nature of its political system, an absolute monarchy. Please join us for a special Human Rights Watch-POMED event that will examine these domestic issues in the context of Qatar’s regional role and why they matter to the United States.
Speakers: Marti Flacks Deputy Director & Head of North America Office, Business and Human Rights Resource Centre Andrea Prasow Acting Washington Director, Human Rights Watch Kristian Ulrichsen Fellow for the Middle East, Baker Institute, Rice University David Weinberg Washington Director for International Affairs, Anti-Defamation League
Moderated by: Stephen McInerney Executive Director, Project on Middle East Democracy
4. Weaponizing Justice: Rule of Law and Cuba’s New Constitution | September 11, 2019 | 9:00 AM – 11:00 AM | Inter-American Dialogue, Suite 800 | Register Here
In April 2018, the Cuban National Assembly anointed Miguel Díaz-Canel as the country’s president, the first non-Castro to lead the island nation in almost 60 years. With new leadership came a new Constitution, which ostensibly reflects expanded due process protections for Cuba’s citizens. However, these constitutional rights coexist with a Criminal Code that is routinely employed by judicial authorities to silence dissent and punish political opposition. What kind of constitutionality exists in Cuba’s one-party state? What nominal rights exist, and are they respected? Does the new Constitution—effective as of April 2019—augur hopes for more freedom of expression and respect for the rule of law? To answer these questions and pursue a broader discussion on the administration of justice in Cuba, the Inter-American Dialogue is pleased to partner with the International Institute on Race, Equality and Human Rights to present “Weaponizing Justice: Rule of Law and Cuba’s New Constitution.” The discussion will include a presentation of the Institute’s new report, “Premeditated Convictions: An Analysis of the Situation of the Administration of Justice in Cuba.”
OPENING REMARKS Carlos Quesada Executive Director, International Institute for Race, Equality and Human Rights (@Raceandequality)
SPEAKERS Luis Carlos Battista Cuban-American lawyer and host of the Nuestra América Podcast (@lcbattisa) and Caitlin Kelly Legal Program Officer, International Institute on Race, Equality and Human Rights
MODERATOR Michael Camilleri Director, Peter D. Bell Rule of Law Program, Inter-American Dialogue (@camillerimj)
5. Pathways Out of Crisis: Views from Venezuelan Civil Society | September 12, 2019 | 9:30 AM – 11:30 AM | Woodrow Wilson Center | Register Here
As the political, economic, and social crisis in Venezuela deepens, civil society organizations are playing a vital role in resisting authoritarianism and defending fundamental rights. As Venezuela’s opposition engages in negotiations to achieve a transition, Venezuelan civil society is also advancing meaningful proposals for a democratic, peaceful solution that reflect urgent human rights and humanitarian needs on the ground. Please join us for a discussion of the latest in the country’s crisis, and of the role of the United States and the international community in supporting a peaceful return to democracy. Spanish to English translation will be provided.
Speakers: Feliciano Reyna President Acción Solidaria, Luz Mely Reyes Editor Efecto Cocuyo Marino, Alvarado Coordinator Venezuelan Program of Action Education in Human Rights (PROVEA), Beatriz Borges Executive Director Justice and Peace Center (CEPAZ), Alfredo Romero Executive Director, Foro Penal Venezolano Lowenthal Fellow, Wilson Center
6. Impact of the Arab Muslim Ban on Migration | September 12, 2019 | 12:00 PM – 2:00 PM | Gulf International Forum | Register Here
Nearly four years ago when the possibility of the current Administration was shrugged-off by many pundits and experts amongst the political elite, the already controversial Trump Presidential campaign on December 6, 2015 released a memo calling for, “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country’s representatives can figure out what is going on.” While the response among many to the proclamation was swift and oppositional, in some ways the eventually elected President Trump was able to deliver on parts of this promise when on January 27, 2017 the Trump Administration issued Executive Order No. 13769, effectively banning entry into the United States for those from countries including Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Since then there has been a struggle in the courts in which several aspects of the travel ban have been struck down, however many restrictions on travel for individuals from these countries remain in place. In response, in May 2019 legislation colloquially referred to as the “No Ban Act” was introduced in both chambers of Congress, a symbolic yet largely ineffectual means to undo the remaining aspects of the executive order. Meanwhile, the order is not alone in a series of measures enacted under the Administration that limit the ability of individuals from GIF’s region of focus from travelling to the United States, either as immigrants, asylum seekers or refugees. Where do efforts stand to overturn the Arab and Muslim ban? How has the ban affected people from Yemen, Iraq and Iran? What allowed Iraq to eventually be excepted from the ban? Has the ban had consequences for United States Foreign Policy in the Muslim World? In what ways has the grassroots community collaborated in order to challenge the ban? While none of these questions have easy answers, Gulf International Forum and the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee are pleased to invite you to this discussion, where our assembled panel of experts will address issues related to the Arab and Muslim ban’s effect on Gulf populations, and the efforts taken to address the mandates of the Trump Administration.
Featured Speakers: Dania Thafer (moderator), Dr. Debbie Almontaser, Abed Ayoub Esq., Dr. Erdoan A. Shipoli, and Wa’el Alzayat
7. The Potential U.S.-Taliban Deal: A Step Forward for Peace in Afghanistan? | September 13, 2019 | 10:00 AM – 12:00 PM | United States Institute of Peace | Register Here
After nearly a year of extensive negotiations in Doha, the United States and the Taliban have reportedly agreed in principle on a deal addressing U.S. troop withdrawal and Taliban anti-terrorism guarantees. This is intended to be just the first step toward a durable peace in Afghanistan. Next, intra-Afghan dialogues are planned to arrive at a political settlement and a permanent cessation of hostilities. Adding further complications is the upcoming presidential election—currently scheduled for September 28—with key actors disagreeing about the sequencing of the polls and the peace process. At this pivotal juncture, USIP is bringing together a panel of distinguished experts to discuss what a U.S.-Taliban agreement means for the possibility of peace in Afghanistan. Recent Taliban attacks have raised questions about whether the group is serious about a political settlement or are simply looking to be rid of foreign troops. Prospects for a sustainable, inclusive peace forged through compromise among Afghan stakeholders hang in the balance.
Nancy Lindborg, welcoming remarks President and CEO, United States Institute of Peace Ambassador
Roya Rahmani, opening remarks Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the United States
Clare Lockhart, Director and co-founder, Institute for State Effectiveness Barnett Rubin Senior Fellow and Associate Director, Center for International Cooperation, New York University
Michael Semple Visiting Professor, Queen’s University Belfast, Institute for the Study of Conflict Transformation and Social Justice
Scott Worden, moderator, Director of Afghanistan and Central Asia Programs, United States Institute of Peace
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Putin’s dream President
Rachel Maddow last night did a particularly good job documenting President Trump’s efforts to comply with President Putin’s fondest dreams:
Trump is not merely mouthing belief in Putin. He is doing things to please him. Odds are that Russian money is part of the reason. Let’s hope the various ongoing investigations, in particular of Deutsche Bank, clarify that in the next few months.
The dismantling of NATO efforts to defend Europe is particularly worrisome, as it won’t generate the same kind of domestic political backlash that canceling construction projects in Virginia will. It will also more directly weaken deterrence of Russian aggression, not only in Ukraine.
Trump may not be a Russian agent, but he is certainly doing as much as the Congress will allow to serve Putin’s (not necessarily Russia’s) interests. But Vladimir’s popularity is waning in Russia like Trump’s in America and Boris Johnson’s in Britain. It will be a happy day when all three are out of power.
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Stevenson’s army, September 5
– Time magazine says SecState Pompeo opposes the pending US deal with the Taliban.
– Here’s a letter by former US officials critical of the agreement, too.
– The party committees in House and Senate seek contributions from their senior members. Somebody leaked information on the House Democrats’ problems getting payment.
-Karl Rove summarizes the party fights at the state level over redistricting.
– An AEI analyst says DOD is failing to do the right R&D. I think she may be right.
– I also agree with Dan Drezner’s analysis of Trump’s negotiating style.
– Yahoo News says a Dutch mole transferred the Stuxnet virus to Iran.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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