Croatia in context

I spoke this afternoon at a National Federation of Croatian Americans session on “Croatia’s Role in Southeastern Europe–Facing Instability in the Region.” Time was shorter than anticipated, so I started at 16. My assignment was to talk about the main issues beyond Croatia in the Balkans, but I got to the Bosnian Croats and Croatia at the end.

1. The world today is a disordered one. The unipolar moment that enabled so much of what the United States and Europe did in the Balkans in the 1990s ended with the attack on the World Trade Center in 2001.
2. There ensued a war on terror that initially enlisted much of the world in response: NATO triggered Article 5 and supported the US invasion of Afghanistan, but unanimity was quickly lost with the invasion of Iraq and the Sunni insurgency there, led by Al Qaeda and Ba’athist diehards.
3. The 2008 financial crisis further frayed international consensus: European growth has still not recovered while China’s rise accelerated, and high oil and gas prices gave Russia opportunities to reassert its great power status, which it has done with interventions in Ukraine and Syria.
4. The Greek financial crisis, Brexit, immigration, and the rise of the populist ethno-nationalist right within the EU and in the US have changed the basic parameters of our geopolitics.
5. Today we live in a world in which the liberal democratic consensus, based on free markets and the conviction that everyone is entitled to equal rights and opportunities, has frayed.
6. Russia, China, Turkey, and others are offering an alternative autocratic bargain: in exchange for unfettered long-term power, their leaders are offering state-sponsored economic growth and political stability, at least to those who identify with the majority ethnic group.
7. How does all this impact the Balkans?
8. First and foremost slow economic growth in Europe depresses the Balkans economies; the region can only thrive when the EU does.
9. Europessimism correlates closely with the business cycle. A revival of growth in Europe is vital for renewed interest in enlargement, which will provide the young labor Europe lacks and needs.
10. Second: Moscow’s trouble making is plaguing Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia. Croatia’s neighbors are facing concerted efforts to slow or block NATO and EU accession. Even Montenegro and North Macedonia are still targeted.
11. Moscow has re-introduced into the Balkans assassination, state disinformation and propaganda, and rent-a-riot techniques we all hoped had disappeared with the Soviet Union.
12. Third: China is offering financing for much-needed infrastructure.
13. Unlike many Westerners, I see lots of potential benefit in Beijing’s Belt and Road projects, but caveat emptor: China isn’t giving aid, it is financing projects it regards as beneficial to China on terms that can be onerous.
14. Fourth: Turkey, as a former colonial power in much of the Balkans and a near neighbor, naturally plays an important role in the region. But President Erdogan has taken a turn in the autocratic and Islamist direction.
15. His example is no longer as positive as once it was, and his efforts to get Balkan countries to capture and render his enemies are undermining rule of law in young Balkan democracies.
16. Let me turn now to put the focus on the Balkans themselves.
17. My view is that there are only two remaining war and peace issues in the region.
18. One is normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia.
19. The other is fixing the dysfunctional government we gave Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Dayton peace agreement.
20. Before anything can happen on normalization, Pristina needs a new government. I imagine that means the LDK and Vetevendosje will share power in a post-electoral coalition, perhaps supported by some lesser parties, including some representing minorities.
21. As far apart as the LDK and VV are on some issues and in electoral constituencies, they both grew out of the nonviolent protest movement in Kosovo and will be replacing a KLA coalition whose partners grew out of the violent rebellion.
22. I hope that betokens a renewed commitment to Kosovo statehood, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, as well as a broader coalition for the dialogue with Belgrade, along the lines of the platform that the last parliament prepared but the Kosovo constitutional court ruled was the responsibility of the government.
23. The Europeans and Americans will be pressing Pristina hard for an agreement with Belgrade in advance of Serbia’s April 2020 election. I see no advantage to Kosovo in giving in to this pressure.
24. Pristina will need to be ready to walk away from a bad deal in order to get a good one. A bad deal is one that in any way breaches the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; a good one will allow for ample decentralization and self-governance for minority communities.
25. Some of you will no doubt ask, but what does the appointment of two US envoys betoken about US policy on normalization?
26. The short answer is that I don’t know. I think it reflects more confusion than intention. But I won’t be surprised if the ethnic nationalist Ambassador Grenell, who has done his best to offend the German government, tries to revive the land swap idea that failed on its merits so miserably the last time around.
27. The failure of the EU to move ahead with accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia will undermine the credibility of Brussels and Washington in upcoming talks between Belgrade and Pristina.
28. But neither Tirana nor Skopje should give up hope. Both should do as Montenegro did with NATO membership and continues to do for EU membership: get ready, implement the needed reforms, improve your qualifications, so that when the political window opens you can move quickly in.
29. As for Bosnia and Herzegovina, I fear it will need to wait. The international community is simply incapable of dealing with two big issues at once.
30. Milorad Dodik will continue to fulminate about independence, somoe Croats will continue to dream of a third entity, and the Bosniaks will try to ignore both and defend the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
31. But until there is a concerted effort that gains the support of all three constituent peoples to enable the Sarajevo central government to negotiate and implement the acquis communautaire, I fear little will change.
32. That’s my message to Bosnian Croats: stop wasting effort on the third entity, which isn’t going to happen.
33. You own a third of the State, use it to help Bosnia and Herzegovina do the reforms necessary for EU accession.
34. Beyond that, Croatia can play a crucial role as an EU and NATO member state in keeping hope alive. I trust it will do that.