Month: October 2019
Stevenson’s army, October 9
– The Post has a good tick-tock on the Erdogan-Trump phone call. It sounds as if Trump wen through his talking points to rebuild US-Turkish relations — trade, F-35s, WH visit next month — then Erdogan warned Trump of planned Turkish military moves in Syria, and Trump changed his policy. Right afterwards, WH put out a press release on the call. You know the rest.
Prof. Edelman has a good piece criticizing the US action.
NYT reveals a hitherto secret Russian organization whose mission is said to be to destabilize Europe.
Then there’s the impeachment mess. The WH Counsel sent a letter basically stonewalling all impeachment-related subpoenas. In federal court, DOJ argued that the Supreme Court precedent requiring Nixon to surrender his tapes doesn’t apply to President Trump.
As this recent CRS report shows, congressional subpoenas can be enforced by criminal action if DOJ agrees to take the case [as they already haven’t in the case of Trump] or by civil action through the courts, which can take years.
While there have been some high profile executive refusals of subpoenas in recent years — firing district attorneys under GW Bush and “fast and furious” raids under Obama — remember Obama administration complied with Benghazi hearings. And then this:
Schiliro, the former director of legislative affairs under President Obama and a former staff director of the House Oversight Committee, also pointed to the past:
Twenty years ago Rep Dan Burton, as Chair of the House Oversight Committee, issued 1,052 unilateral subpoenas over six years to the Clinton Administration and the Democratic Party. No matter how unreasonable many of those subpoenas were, either the information was provided or a compromise reached. Every previous Administration has recognized the legitimate and constitutional role Congress has in oversight. This Administration is asserting a radical legal position based on nothing.
Stevenson’s army, October 8
It’s really unclear what administration policy in Syria is this morning. The president announced a pullout of US forces. When criticized, he said he would destroy the Turkish economy if they did something bad. State Dept said US hadn’t approved a Turkish invasion of Syria. DOD deleted SecDef Esper’s tweet saying the same thing. So consider these nuggets: An NSC person who listened in to the Trump-Erdogan phone call on Sunday said Trump got rolled. NYT defense correspondents say DOD has tried to months to keep the US presence in Syria out of Trump’s sight and may still keep several hundred troops there. Other sources hint the same.
The administration has forbidden Amb. Sondland to give planned testimony on Ukraine today, reinforcing the view that congressional oversight has been fundamentally blocked on many fronts.
A Chinese trade group is coming to talks in DC this week, but?/therefore? the administration announced sanctions on 28 individuals over Uighur abuses.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Stevenson’s army, afternoon edition
Why wait til morning when there are several really good articles to share?
– Politico says national security officials were blindsided by Trump’s Syria decision.
– Military author Mark Bowden found military officers troubled by Trump’s policies and behavior even before Syria.
-Here’s a chapter on Syria 2013 by former NSA Susan Rice.
-Peter Beinart reviews the Rice, Power, and Rhodes memoirs.
-Just Security has a primer on leaking to Congress.
– I also found interesting this piece on China at the UN.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Sickening
Today’s announcement of a unilateral withdrawal of US forces from northeastern Syria in response to Turkey’s request is the worst of many possible worlds: Ankara will take over the border area, much of which is predominantly Kurdish, precipitating a fight with the PYD Syrian Kurds, ending the Kurdish effort against the remnants of the Islamic State, and enabling the Syrian government to reassert its control over the natural and agricultural resources of the northeast, most of which do not lie along the border.
President Erdogan sought the American withdrawal, though he may be surprised if it is complete. I will be too. The US should be maintaining some counterterrorism forces in northeastern Syria. They could be nominally covert rather than overt. Or they could be maintained over the border in Iraq. The ability to strike quickly and accurately is important. But President Trump needs to be able to brag that he has ended at least one Middle East war and withdrawn American troops, so what is desirable in terms of national security may give way to what is politically convenient.
Turkey will now take on the brunt of the fight against the Islamic State as well as against the Syrian Kurdish forces that support the PKK insurgency inside Turkey. Ankara also intends to move large numbers of Syrian refugees (millions is the stated number) back into a part of Syria where few of them lived before. Whole cities will need to be built. This is a big increase in Turkish burdens. It remains to be seen how well Ankara does. Economic pressures will make it doubly difficult.
The Syrian Kurdish forces will presumably flee south, into territory that is mostly Arab, and turn to Damascus for protection. President Assad used Syrian Kurds against Turkey for many years and will support their efforts to promote insurgency against the Turkish presence in northern Syria. This will put the Russians in an awkward spot, as Moscow wants to maintain good relations with both Ankara and Damascus, but President Putin has proven skilled at that game so far. Iran will be happy to see Turkey discomforted.
The US withdrawal will in principle create an opportunity to improve Washington’s relations with Ankara, but the Turkish purchase of Russian air defenses and the consequent American refusal to sell F35 airplanes to Turkey remain as serious obstacles. It is difficult to see how that knot will get untied, though Erdogan is skilled at backing up when he sees a real need to do so. President Trump would likely give in easily on the F35s, but there Congress plays a decisive role.
A negotiated US withdrawal might have avoided many of the difficulties that will now arise. But President Trump is proving inept at negotiations. The North Koreans have denounced their talks with the US over last weekend as “sickening.” So too is the decision to unilaterally withdraw from Syria.
Stevenson’s army, October 7
President Trump, following a conversation with Turkish President
Erdogan, announced withdrawal of remaining US forces in Syria,
reportedly against the advice of many advisers. Here’s WaPo’s story, and NYT’s.
Talks with North Korea broke down quickly this weekend. DPRK made blistering comments.
FP says Wagner Group of Russian mercenaries have been sidelined, but others remain.
Head of SouthCom says hundreds are in Venezuela. BTW, Venezuela will be the topic of our simulated SFRC hearing on Oct 23/24.
Kentucky favored by Transportation. No surprise.
Timothy Garton Ash has a good summary of Eastern Europe 30 years after the fall of the wall.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
A vote for change
Kosovo voted for a new parliament today. The results are striking: the two parties that formed most of the majority in the last parliament came in third and fourth. Two opposition parties came in first and second. The PDK (Democratic Party of Kosovo), which has been in government since independence, has declared it will go into opposition. The electoral mechanism seems to have functioned well, but official assessments won’t be available for a couple of days.
The leaders were the LDK (Democratic League of Kosovo), which led the non-violent protest movement before the 1999 war and has participated in government coalitions in the past, and VV (Self-Determination), which is a post-war movement that has never been in the government. At this writing, VV is claiming to have won. The cautious and moderate Isa Mustafa, a former prime minister, leads the LDK. The sometimes unruly and charismatic Albin Kurti leads VV. Many have thought they might govern together in the next coalition, but that was before they won virtually equal shares of yesterday’s vote. There are now presumably other arithmetic possibilities, so an intense negotiation is likely, taking weeks if not months unless the LDK and VV agree quickly on a prime minister and a government program.
Yesterday’s result was foreshadowed in National Democratic Institute polling from March, which concluded:
The research shows that citizens desire reforms that will foster social cohesion, economic opportunity, and the rule of law. Tackling corruption cuts across all of these areas and remains at the forefront of citizen priorities. On dialogue with Serbia to normalize post-war relations, citizens seek greater transparency and are not in favor of border changes to bring about a resolution. Generally, citizens seek greater efforts of political leaders to foster consensus to bring policy changes that will improve their lives.
The citizens wanted change and voted for it. Those who think the US and Europe are determined to maintain “stabilocracy” take note: Washington and Brussels will not be unhappy to see alternation in power.
The governing challenge will be a big one. Complaints about corruption in Kosovo in my experience focus on two levels:
- Grand corruption by political leaders and their families, who are known to control assets far larger than their salaries can have provided;
- More or less petty corruption via nepotism, especially in hiring for government positions.
I hope the new government, whoever enters it, will launch a major effort to document and prosecute grand corruption. Nepotism is going to be harder: Kosovo is a society in which extended family ties are still strong. Hiring your cousin is a familial obligation that many see as corrup only when others do it.
The dialogue with Serbia will be another priority, as both Brussels and Washington are pressing for complete normalization of relations between Pristina and Belgrade. But they are pressing for different solutions: Washington is looking for a land swap that its newly appointed Special Envoy will no doubt press; Brussels is looking for a solution that maintains Kosovo’s territorial integrity even if it compromises its sovereignty over Serb communities. This kind of split between the EU and the US is not a good omen.
Nor is the impending Serbian election, due by April next year. President Vucic is a skilled manipulator of Western thinking, even if he has presided over a years-long slide of Serbia in Russia’s direction. He will argue that Serbia has to “get something” in the negotiations with Kosovo because he needs a parliament that will have to ratify the outcome. In order to get a good deal, Pristina will need to be ready to walk away from a bad one, but that will be difficult if Brussels and Washington decide to back it.
One unfortunate wrinkle in the election results: over 90% of Serbs voted for a list controlled by Belgrade. Vucic regards this as a triumph. I regard it as betraying the unfortunate autocratic control Belgrade exercises among the Serbs of Kosovo. Maybe it is also evidence that Serbia can agree to just about anything on Kosovo without Vucic getting something.
Any government that wants to please the citizens of Kosovo will want to deliver economic results. Kosovo has not done all that badly in recent years:
That’s 2000 on the lower left and 2018 on the upper right. The World Bank appropriately puts this performance in perspective:
Kosovo is a lower-middle-income country which has experienced solid economic growth over the last decade. Kosovo is one of only four countries in Europe to experience growth in every year since the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008.
Like it or not, Kosovo’s economy is heavily dependent on the Balkans region, which in turn is heavily dependent on Europe. Growth at higher rates than in the recent past (about 4%) will require that the EU grow faster, but the next Kosovo government would do well to prepare for that day by increasing transparency and reducing grand corruption. That’s what change should mean on the economic front.