Escalation dominance
No American should mourn Qassem Suleimani, but his death at the hands of the US requires careful consideration of the consequences. By killing the commander of the Iranian Quds Force, the US has jumped many rungs of the escalation ladder in its confrontation with Iran, which had already heated up with US attacks on Iraqi militia forces earlier in the week. The Administration is betting that Tehran will recognize that the US is so dominant that it can gain little by responding. Washington is also signaling that it is prepared to withdraw its forces from Iraq, since that is a possible, perhaps likely, political consequence.
The first proposition is dubious. Iran prides itself on resistance to the US and has the capability to do serious harm to American interests in the Middle East and beyond. While it may be difficult for Tehran to kill an American military commander, it is not unthinkable. Nor is such a mirror image attack the only possibility. Iran and its proxies have killed many Americans in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. Tehran has capabilities that extend throughout the Middle East and into Europe, Latin America, and even the American heartland.
Ultimately US military power is vastly greater than Iran’s, which is piddling by comparison. But the US public is far from ready for a war with Iran in which we might lose thousands if not tens of thousands of troops and civilians, not to mention ships and planes. When it comes to breaking the will to fight, Iran is likely to be able to absorb far more punishment than the US. As many as half a million Iranians died in the eight-year Iran/Iraq war. Fewer than 7000 Americans have been killed since 2001 in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The killing of Iraqi Kataib Hizbollah commander al-Muhandis along with Suleimani puts the Iraqi government in a particularly difficult spot. No doubt there are lots of Iraqis who won’t mourn al-Muhandis in private, as he left a swathe of death and destruction, especially but not only among Sunnis. He had impeccable terrorist credentials from his time in Kuwait in the 1980s, but he was also credited by many Iraqis with helping to fight off and defeat the Islamic State after 2015. Besides, deadly American military action without Iraqi consent on Iraqi soil against Iraqi citizens can please few Iraqi politicians in public.
US withdrawal from Iraq, if that is what Iraqi politics are going to demand, would be a big prize for Iran, which seeks client states there and in Syria that will give it strategic depth and on-the-ground access to its Hizbollah proxies in Lebanon as well as proximity to the Israeli border. Like the US, Iran seeks to confront its adversaries outside its borders rather than inside. US withdrawal would enable it to do that and consolidate its projection of power all the way to the Mediterranean.
So President Trump has thrown the dice, betting that Iran will break and that Iraq won’t throw the Americans out. It may be churlish, but true, to mention that he got elected on pledges to avoid new conflicts in the Middle East. Not to mention that war with Iran is nowhere in the current Congressional Authorization to Use Military Force. It might almost make you think the President is trying to distract attention from the Senate’s impending impeachment trial. It wouldn’t be the first time he has taken a big risk for little apparent gain. Nor would it be the first time he put his personal electoral interests ahead of the nation’s security.