How Soleimani’s death affects Syria
Bassam Barabandi writes:
First: Let us not forget that Soleimani’s project was to drive away American forces from Iraq and Syria. He was in no hurry in Syria because he was busy building the foundations to enhance the Iranian political, military, security, economic, popular, and militia influence in Syria, and he surely achieved quite a lot in this field.
Second: Bashar al-Assad is closer to the Iranian axis than the Russian within the Syrian regime. The new IRGC commander may be forced to compel Assad to take decisions in the coming days to prove his loyalty to Iran and to demonstrate that the new commander is in control. This is one of the things that we should monitor in the coming days.
Third: The Assad regime is split, as never before, into two very distinct wings: pro-Iran and pro-Russia. The Iranian wing is led by Bashar al-Assad, who received his advice/ instructions directly from Qassem Soleimani, This was evident in Bashar’s visit to Tehran. Iran also has its own influence in the military and many officers are affiliated with it, but the most dangerous thing is the almost absolute influence of Iran in the countryside of Deir Ezzor Governorate on the West Bank of the Euphrates, in some areas surrounding Damascus, and local and non-local militias located in separate areas inside Syria.
The vacuum and confusion in Iranian decision-making will be very bad for the pro-Iranian wing within the Assad regime, as this wing contains Bashar al-Assad, the major weakness of the Assad regime as a whole.
We do not know how the newly appointed commander Ismail Qaani will look at Bashar Al-Assad, but if he is to lead a more institutionalized position, Assad’s position will be weaker and weaker, and it will not be unlikely with time to get rid of him in a settlement with the rest of the parties.
If Qaani adopts a more centralized policy, he will ask for more concessions from the pro-Iran wing in the regime, which will make Assad look more miserable and ridiculous than previously as part of Iranian messages to Russia and other countries that its influence remains strong in Syria.
Fourth: Russia may take advantage of this opportunity, as the conflict with the Iranian axis looks like a cold war, which is marked by some fierce confrontations that have not yet been resolved. Despite the relative stability in sharing influence between them, the instability of Syria makes the game of influence. Its redistribution always possible, just as was the case of influence between America and Turkey and between Turkey and Russia.
Soleimani’s viciousness will add to Russia’s influence in Syria, and it has to move quickly in several areas. It will ultimately lead to Iranian losses and Russian gains that cannot be appreciated now, but Russia will inevitably try to expand its gains as much as possible. Today, Hizbollah withdrew its forces from some areas in Zabadani, and pro-Russian forces took over.
Neither the Iranian administration nor Qaani and his aides are oblivious to Russia’s aspirations to reduce their influence. They know they must increase their support for the local and non-local militias that they finance. In order for them to achieve this as quickly as possible, Lebanese Hezbollah’s influence on other militia should increase to rectify the central decision vacuum.
Fifth: Iran’s focus on maintaining its influence in the areas under the Assad regime’s control will give comfort to the American spheres of influence, which will reduce the risk of fighting with Iranian militias in eastern Syria for now. If clashes take place, it will not be that Iran wants to expand its presence as much as it will be part of revenge propaganda for Qassem Soleimani. Consequently, the project of military resistance that the Iranian wing in the Assad regime is trying to activate against the American forces in the northeast will not be completed in the planned way in the short term.
Sixth: Turkey is the least affected by Soleimani’s absence in Syria, as opposed to its impact on its interests in Iraq and near-open intelligence cooperation in its struggle against Kurdish forces and political projects.
Seventh: The changes of Iran’s influence in Syria will not be visible in the short run, but rather, the real changes will be in the long-term erosion of Iran’s influence in Syria for the benefit of the other parties. Qaani will need demonstrate more power and influence over media and local coverage to proactively cover the losses.
Eighth: The Iranian project has been benefiting from the American presence in Iraq and Syria, as the Americans were carrying the biggest burden in confronting ISIS. The Iranians were claiming that they were resisting ISIS while they were building militias to control Iraq and to counter the Americans when ready. The Iranian direct escalation toward the US in Iraq started in October 2019, which may reflect that Iranian felt confident and strong enough to be in Iraq alone without other partners.
The real danger from ISIS will arise from Iranian pressure on the Iraqi government to get the American forces out of Iraq.
Many things can happen in the coming days/weeks that may affect Syria:
1. The Iraqi government is yet to make a decision to withdraw US forces from Iraq. Does this mean withdrawal from Iraq as a whole or will the American forces remain in the Kurdistan Regional Government? If it is from the entire country, then the question will be what is the future of the American forces in Syria? From a legal and logistical point of view, will the Iraqi government allow the Americans to use airspace and crossings to transport forces to and from Syria?
2. Legally, if the Iraqi parliament and the Iraqi government pass the decision to withdraw the American forces from Iraq, will this need a whole year from the minute the decision is made to be implemented? If yes, then the Americans will have that period of time to maneuver and their leverage in Syria will be limited.
3. If Iran and its militias attack US bases in northeastern Syria directly or indirectly – will that change the US calculation and cause the Americans to leave Syria? Or will they fight back? How will the SDF forces behave? And the Russians? And Arab clans?
4. The border between Syria and Iraq is another area that must be watch since the Popular Mobilization Forces are in control of most of the border areas, not only the crossings.
5. If the United States leaves for any reason in the coming months, what forces will fill the void? Iran or Russia?
6. Iran will be more stubborn in its positions regarding the Constitutional Committee, Idlib, and the countryside of Aleppo.
7. If the US forces stay in KRG areas against Baghdad wishes, will that step separate the KRG from Iraq? And how will this affect with the Kurdish areas in Syria?
8. A new understanding could be reached between Iran and the international community in which a process of negotiation on all files and concerns starts again, freezing the situation for a while.
9. A new political crisis could occur in Iraq between pro-Iranian parties and both the Kurds and the Sunni, who see the American are the only guarantors to protect them physically as well as their interests in the state. This may delay any decision to have a new prime minister and increase tension inside Iraq.
10. The difficult economic and social situation in Iran and the popular anti-regime movements in both Lebanon and Iraq will make Iranian decisions weaker than they claim and the size of the Iranian adventure much less than now hoped. The Iranian goal is survival of the regime. Any direct military confrontation with the US will weaken the regime without gaining any real benefits.
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