Day: January 23, 2020
The Middle East without Soleimani
Following the US assassination of Qasem Soleimani, who was an IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) general and the Quds Force commander, Iran retaliated against the US by launching a missile attack on US bases in Iraq. What further impact will Soleimani’s death have? And what will it mean for US interests in the region?
On January 22, Carnegie Endowment for International Studies hosted a panel discussion on The killing of Soleimani and the future of the Middle East. The discussion included three speakers: Rasha Al Aqeedi, the managing editor of Irfaa Sawtak (Raise Your Voice) and a research analyst of contemporary Iraqi politics and political Islam, Dexter Filkins, a journalist for The New Yorker, and Emile Hokayem, a senior fellow for Middle East Security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. The panel discussion was moderated by Karim Sadjadpour, a senior fellow with the Carnegie Middle East Program.
Soleimani projected Iran’s power in the region
Filkins described Soleimani as a “master spy” and “a man in the shadow.” His influence was pervasive. Lebanese people didn’t decide their government, Soleimani did. Assad was not running the war, Soleimani was. Soleimani was a product of the Iran-Iraq War, during which he worked on strengthening and allying with the Shia around the Middle East.
Hokayem depicted him as one of the most influential actors in the Levant for securing Iran’s long-term interests. Soleimani turned Hezbollah from a formidable insurgent group into a conventional actor with missile forces menacing Israel. He was implicated in Hariri’s assassination in 2005, led efforts to shore up the Assad regime in 2012, and was also involved in the Battle of Kirkuk in 2017.
Al Aqeedi noted that when ISIL (The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) took over Mosul in 2014, Soleimani reacted by forming security forces/militias to help Iraq, based on Iran’s interests. Since then, Soleimani had kept the US-trained Iraqi army as weak as possible, while strengthening and formalizing the Shia militias in Iraq. In 2017, Soleimani rallied the Iraqi army to forcefully retake Kirkuk and suppress the results of Kurdistan’s independence referendum.
Further retaliation?
Sadjadpour believes that the assassination has energized the radicals of the Iranian regime, who may intensify their repression, but the downing of the Ukrainian airline has constrained popular support for retaliation. Filkins doubts benefits to US interests from the assassination.
Al Aqeedi noted that if any Iranian retaliation targeted US embassies or Americans, the US may intensify its retribution against Iran. Hence, Iran and the US need to think twice before taking any further actions. Hokayem suggested Iran possesses lots of tools to retaliate, not necessarily against American targets but also against regional American proxies, such as Saudi Arabia.
Impacts
Hokayem emphasized that the assassination neither mitigates Iran’s threat to its regional rivals nor changes the ordering of the region. Iran has secured its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. He also claimed that the Trump administration doesn’t care much about Iraq. The US military presence was keeping a low profile even before the Iraqi parliament urged the government to expel foreign troops from its territory.
Al Aqeedi agreed with Hokayem that the US isn’t interested in being involved in the Iraqi protests. She underlined that the US presence in Iraq is not an occupation, and there is no US military base in Iraq. Hence, she argued that the current campaign against US presence in Iraq is a distraction from the protest, which targeted the IRGC. The Iraqi protesters are reluctant to be dragged into the US-Iran confrontation and want Iraq to avoid becoming a proxy for any external actors. Al Aqeedi is deeply concerned that Iraqi protesters are likely to encounter more violence from the IRGC and forces it controls.
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Stevenson’s army, January 23
-A trove of Cybercom documents has been declassified. They reveal interagency disputes over targeting ISIS. The National Security Archive, which gathers FOIA releases, has the documents here.
A Brookings analyst documents the unprecedented turnover of senior national security officials in the Trump administration.
No surprise, but lobbyists had a good year in 2019.
State Dept officials called as witnesses in the impeachment inquiry had staggering legal bills, only about 1/4 paid by the government.
North Korea has named a “hard-lined cantankerous” former military officer as its new foreign minister.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Optimism on Europe
With Brexit day around the corner on January 31, the Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) hosted a panel titled The Future of Europe: French and German Perspectives. The panel was a discussion between German Ambassador Emily Haber and French Ambassador Philippe Etienne, moderated by Rachel Ellehuus, the Deputy Director of the Europe Program at CSIS.
Despite the looming fate of Brexit, Haber was adamant to make numerous comments about the continued strength of the European Union and proclaimed that the European cause has actually become more popular. Haber noted that the European Union has always been at the crossroads, continually changing its narrative and sense of purpose. The construction and functionality of the European Coal and Steel Community was entirely different than the European Union of today, thus the Europe Union will be able to move on and reshape after the loss of the UK.
Over the past 11 years the EU has experienced multiple crises, including the euro crisis, the migration crisis, and Brexit. Haber argued that there exists a paradox in the effects of these crises, on the one hand they have led to a loss of confidence in the EU structure (sparking populist movements), while on the other they have strengthened governance structures. Haber emphasized that these structures create a protective barrier for the citizens, and it is these governance structures that will allow the EU member countries to combat larger issues of climate change and nuclearalization, for example.
Etienne emphasized that the France-Germany alliance is the backbone of the EU and is necessary for its functionality. He added that the most important characteristic of the EU is the will of the leaders and nations to achieve constructive compromises, not the actual member states.
Ellehuus inquired about the synergies and tensions that exist within the EU and the nation states’ agendas. Haber referenced the migration crisis as an exemplification of the confusion and possible tension between citizens, their governments, and the EU institutions. Due to the EU’s open borders policy, many governments wanted to discuss and solve the issue at the EU level rather than at their national level; however, this enraged many citizens as they felt their elected officials were not properly representing their desires.
Etienne added that the EU has an entire set of institutions, laws, and diplomatic processes that often make it confusing for citizens to comprehend and grasp its role. He accentuated that despite these confusions, the purpose of the EU is to protect its citizens and provide legitimacy to decision making processes. Both Etienne and Haber emphasized the benefits that the EU brings to the US as well as to its people. Ultimately, Etienne and Haber remained positive about the fate of the EU in this upcoming transition period.
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