Economic sanctions work, but…

The continued use of US economic sanctions against Iran, Venezuela, North Korea and Cuba was the focus for a Brookings panel, Economic Sanctions: Assessing their use and implications for U.S. foreign policy on January 27. Moderated by James Goldgeier, Robert Bosch Senior Visiting Fellow, the panel included Suzanne Maloney, Senior Fellow Center for Middle East Policy, Energy Security and Climate Initiative, Jung H. Pak, Senior Fellow Center for East Asia Policy Studies, and Ted Piccone, Nonresident Senior Fellow Security and Strategy. 

Four Case Studies

Maloney believes the US uses sanctions in tandem with diplomacy with Iran, but usually is not joined by others. Two changes have occurred that altered the effectiveness of sanctions on Iran:  

1. After the 9/11 attacks, US sanctions became more targeted and were no longer only trade sanctions.
2. The energy market has shifted with increased production outside the Persian Gulf. 

US sanctions have not achieved their political goal of a dramatic reversal of core Iranian policy, but rather have only impacted the economy. Maloney argues that economic sanctions are effective in countries that already have dysfunctional economies, allowing the sanctions to compound structural problems. 

Pak, an expert on North Korea, claims that the US only started piling on sanctions on North Korea since 2016, focused on sectors like seafood, iron, oil. The targeted sanctions of 2005 on Banco Delta Asia, which was helping facilitate North Korean illicit financing measures, led to serious economic problems. This sanction signaled to other banks and investment funds that doing business with North Korea was risky.

Piccone emphasizes that Cuba is an example of ineffective US sanctions, since they did not achieve their specified target of dislodging the Communist regime and removing Castro from power even if they were successful in stifling the economy. The US failed with Cuba sanctions to gain multilateral support. Due to the devastated economy, Cubans suffered and migrated: over 10% of the Cuban population lives outside Cuba, with the majority residing in the US. 

Piccone contrasts Cuba sanctions with Venezuela, where the US shifted from targeted sanctions to sectoral ones, particularly on oil and gas. These sanctions amplified many of Venezuela’s existing economic problems. Sanctions effectiveness is closely tied to how dependent a country is on the US. 

All panelists emphasized that even economically ‘successful’ sanctions can still be rendered ineffective if the political goals behind the sanctions are not realized.

Credibility is important

Maloney underlines the importance of sustaining credibility with regards to sanctions. Even before the May 2019 JCPOA withdrawal, Iran felt that the US was not upholding its side of the deal, as there continued to be new sanctions placed on the country.

All the panelists noted how muddled sanctions can be when the US makes exceptions for a program like the JCPOA, but maintains other sanctions related to support for terrorism and human rights violations. Maloney suggests that these remaining sanctions deter international banks and investors and reduce investment in Iran. The US withdrawal from the agreement undermined US credibility. Piccone adds that the inconsistencies between US administrations only further confuse the aims of sanctions, particularly in the case of Cuba.