Month: January 2020
US-Iran tensions in Iraq
The US assassination of Qasem Soleimani coupled with the Iranian missile retaliation against US bases in Iraq served as the underlying framework for the Atlantic Council’s event: US-Iran Tensions Rising with Iraq in the Middle: Analysis of Future Scenarios and Policy Implications. The event took place on Thursday January 9 and was divided into two segments: a panel discussion and two keynote speeches. The panel featured three regional experts: Atlantic Council Iraq Initiative Director Abbas Kadhim, Future of Iran Initiative Director Barbara Slavin, and Nonresident Senior Fellow Thomas S. Warrick. The panel was moderated by William F. Wechsler, the Director of Atlantic Council Middle East Programs.
Below are the highlights from the panel portion of the event:
Iraq: from bad to worse
While moderator Wechsler proclaimed that the US and Iran had walked back from the precipice of war, the panelists emphasized the precarious and dire situation the US, Iran, and Iraq are all currently in. Kadhim bluntly proclaimed that these attacks “could not have come at a worse time for Iraq.” Reports indicate that over 300 Iraqis have been killed and hundreds wounded from state violence responding to last fall’s protests. This caused disenchantment with the government, resulting in its resignation. Kadhim emphasized that this was the first time post-2003 that an Iraqi Prime Minister has resigned, plunging the nation into uncharted territory.
Kadhim provided two profound insights on the recent missile strike in Iraq and the Iraqi vote to expel US troops. To the first point he professed, “there is no such thing as US bases in Iraq — they are all Iraqi bases now,” underlining how detrimental the relationship between the US and Iran is for Iraq, particularly in terms of military development, economic rebuilding, and the creation of a new government. Secondly, Kadhim underlined Iraq’s energy dependence on Iran. He added that he believes the Iraqi government is reluctantly trying to get American troops out of Iraq because these troops are at risk. Kadhim emphasized many times that this is not in fact a hostile move on Iraq’s part, but more a security concern.
The panelists all noted that the attack occurred at a moment when Shia radicals can easily be mobilized, which could subsequently lead to the marginalization of Sunnis. This would provide ISIS with an ideal political climate to grow and multiply in.
Iran: hardliners strengthened
Wechler noted the incredibly quick ‘successes’ that Iran achieved in the region. Hours prior to the assassination of Soleimani, Iran was struggling to have a foothold in Iraq, even within Shia communities, but immediately after, Iran entirely reversed this situation. Iran has effectively accomplished its larger goal of expelling the US from Iraq while also uniting Iranians, with Soleimani revered as a martyr.
Slavin highlighted the nationalistic mourning process that is still continuing in Iran today, a week after Soleimani’s death. She cautioned that this sudden Iranian unification and the intense vilification of the US will carry a lot of weight in the upcoming February parliamentary elections. Iranian hardliners who oppose the US will be stronger candidates than ever. Warrick warned that Iran will ramp up covert intelligence within Iraq and will play a considerable role in intimidating and forcing the selection of new Iraqi leaders. There is little the United States can now do, but the possibility of a true Iraqi democracy is now in jeopardy.
Warrick succinctly presented the four possible attack vectors that Iran could utilize. The first vector is the symmetrical one. Iran is much more predictable than the media portrays it to be and theories of Iran performing recklessly are unfounded. Warrick noted that Iran has not chosen state-sponsored terrorism as a primary way to change US policy since 2011, when the IRGC initiated an attack in Saudi Arabia. The second vector is cyber threats. Iran has become versatile and quick in utilizing cyber warfare. Thirdly, Iran will mount disinformation operations . Lastly, Warrick fears Iran’s ability to influence operations, as referenced in this 2018 Wired Article. Slavin noted that regardless of which approach Iran takes, it should be assumed there will be continued Iranian covert actions in the region.
Geopolitics:
The tense US-Iran relationship has profound global implications. Slavin suggested that Turkey, Russia, and China will all gain more unrestricted power in the region. This will not only alter the landscape in Iraq but also in Syria and possibly the Gulf. Slavin noted the possibility of China sending its navy to patrol the Persian Gulf, challenging the role of the US in the region.
Slavin maintained that the US and Iran will have to engage in multilateral diplomacy, as she believes there is no chance of Iran sitting at a bilateral table with President Trump. Slavin also noted that there is no way for peace discussions to occur without sanctions relief, which are already being employed as a weapon of war. Kadhim strongly disagreed. Regardless of the terminology used to classify the relationship between the US and Iran, Slavin noted that last week changed the rules of engagement on Iraqi soil.
Following the panel discussion were two keynote speeches from Senator Murphy and Congressman Moulton. Read the Atlantic Council’s recap of their conversation here.
Stevenson’s army, January 12
– NYT has a long tick-tock on the days before and after the Suleimani killing. Most interesting to me are how strongly CIA Director Haspel pushed for the attack and how many officials admitted the lack of imminence of Iranian attacks.
– WSJ says US has threatened Iraq with loss of access to NY Fed accounts to handle oil sales if Iraq forces US troops to leave.
– Reuters says there is still no final text for US-China trade deal, due to be signed Wednesday.
– WaPo has article on Bernie Sanders’ foreign policy views.
– I’ve just finished reading an unsettling book detailing the history of xenophobia in America. I learned, for example, that Ben Franklin used Trumpian language against German immigrants — and then lost an election to the Pennsylvania assembly, leading him to move to Britain for a decade. Time and again, already arrived Americans demonized the newly arriving — Irish and Catholics and Italians and Jews and Eastern Europeans and Mexicans and now Muslims.
And once here, a NYT story tells us, even school history textbooks reflect regional prejudices.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Three days in Addis
You can’t learn much from three days in a country, but you can try to learn something. Here are my first impressions of Addis Ababa, based on walking 22 miles, talking to a few Ethiopians, and visiting both its Unity Park and its National Museum as well as its museum of the Red Terror.
First impressions count. Addis is a naturally beautiful city, built on hills at over 7500 feet. Wherever greenery has survived and the nearby mountains are visible, as from my hotel room, the city gives a warm and welcoming impression:
Walking in it is a different sensation. Vast areas are construction sites. Many of those are inactive, sometimes with 10 or 20 floors of reinforced concrete idle. I am told the uncertain political situation–Ethiopia is attempting a transition to multi-party democracy–has spooked some investors. Most of the active sites seem to be those with Chinese financing announced on placards reading “China Aid” or citing a Chinese bank or construction company.
The rest is mostly nondescript: small sidewalk shops (often without paved sidewalks) selling a bewildering variety of car parts, cosmetics, meat, clothes, and soft drinks, or larger shopping centers where the main tenant seems often to be a bank or finance company specializing in international cash transfers, in addition to shops selling cell phones, related paraphernalia, and other electronics.
Precious little of the city is more than a few decades old. The National Museum is showing its fifty or so years–frayed is not an exaggeration–but manages nevertheless to convey a narrative of pride in four directions:
- The Nobel Prize awarded last year to current Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, whose medal graces the museum entrance hall;
- The Ethiopian empire, whose weapons, crowns, and thrones occupy the central position on the ground floor;
- The peasants and warriors credited with liberating Ethiopia from Italian and Communist oppression, who are featured in paintings and sculpture;
- The prehistoric origins in Africa of humans and non-humans, with due emphasis on the more than 3 million-year-old partial skeleton of “Lucy,” discovered in the Afar region of Ethiopia in 1974.
The labeling of the exhibits in the pre-historic basement is particularly well done and focused on gradual evolution.
A similar focus is apparent in the more politically focused and beautifully renovated imperial-era buildings of Unity Park. It is a sometimes kitsch oasis where the admission fee to the festival on the day I visited was enough to guarantee that only upper middle class Ethiopian families were tolerating the hour-long wait to get through security. Past the live lions, playground, and small pavilions focused on each of Ethiopia’s regions, I found at the summit the graceful palace of Emperor Menelik II, Emperor Haile Selassie’s throne room, and a gargantuan banqueting hall, all handsomely restored.
The restoration includes a narrative on the sides of the throne room strikingly similar in form to the prehistoric one in the National Museum: gradual and peaceful evolution. On one side, the focus is on Ethiopia’s main religious traditions: Judaism, Orthodox Christianity, Islam, and Protestantism, with connections among them underlined. This is also the emphasis in retelling the legend of the Queen of Sheba and her son (by Solomon) Menelik, who is said to have taken the Arch of the Covenant from Jerusalem, in a room behind the throne.
On the other side, the focus is explicitly on Ethiopia’s state-building process, with each of its rulers since the 19th century given credit, even the Provisional Military Administration Council (DERG)’s President Mengistu, who ruled as a Communist dictator from 1977 to 1991:
The DERG gets its full due however in the basement, which was used to detain and torture its opponents during the Red Terror of 1977/78, when 30-50,000 Ethiopians were killed for political reasons. There is a separate Red Terror Martyrs Memorial Museum in town where the gruesome period is more grimly documented. The genocide trials of 1994/2006 found 72 people guilty, but Mengistu escaped and lives still in Zimbabwe. The DERG also presided over the disastrous famine of 1985/85, which killed more than a million people.
Leaving middle class Ethiopia and the historical narratives behind, I walked the streets again, struck by the contrast between the all too apparent poverty of the beggars and the sense of relative security an obvious Westerner nevertheless feels, only occasionally interrupted by a half-hearted attempt to follow or pester.
Ethiopia is in fact one of the poorest countries on earth, even after a decade-long boom of almost 10% growth from 2007/08 to 2017/18. Poverty is far more prevalent in the countryside than in the cities. Here in Addis some tiny percentage of the population is enjoying lavish weddings (I am told it is “wedding season” right after Orthodox Christmas) at the Sheraton and Hilton hotels, complete with spectacular wedding dresses, half a dozen well-accoutered bridesmaids, and stretch limos.
I for one feel privileged to be here and hope you enjoy these superficial first impressions. I plan for better and more after the next two weeks, when our 16 SAIS masters students plus a colleague and I will be talking with lots of Ethiopians about their current situation and the transition everyone I’ve spoken with is anticipating, full of hope.
Stevenson’s army, January 11
– An APSA Task Force has come up with a host of reasonable ideas for reforming Congress, including better staff pay, bringing back earmarks, and an end to votes on the debt limit. Here’s the report, and here a conference at Brookings where it was released.
-There’s pushback on Trump claims that Suleimani was readying attacks on four US embassies.
– Iraq is in the middle, trying to sort out relations with both US and Iran .
– WSJ has more details on backchannel communications between Iran and US.
– Taiwan’s president reelected in landslide.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
It’s already war, announced or not
The equation looks like a simple one: the US assassinated Quds force commander Soleimani as he left Baghdad airport, and Iran responded with a missile attack on an Iraqi base housing US forces. Now de-escalation is said to have taken hold. Tit-for-tat, yes, but not really war.
It’s not that simple, or that limited. In addition to the drone attack on Soleimani, the US apparently tried the same day to kill another Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander in Yemen, and a couple of days later Iranian forces in eastern Syria were under aerial attack. Washington has also increased sanctions on Iran. Tehran meanwhile has focused on trying to get the Iraqi parliament and government to evict the Americans as well as on unilaterally lifting all the constraints on their nuclear activities under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, or nuclear deal).
This is a multi-front contest, complicated further today by the revelation that the IRGC shot down a Ukrainian airliner shortly after it took off from Tehran airport. That has generated explicitly anti-regime protests inside Iran and a brutal crackdown, which is just what the Trump administration would have ordered up if it could. The discomfort of your enemy in moments of crisis is always welcome.
There are lots of things that haven’t happened yet, so far as we know. It is unclear whether the threshold of one thousand battle deaths arbitrarily required by scholars to classify a conflict as a war has been reached. If we went back to the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, that number might be breached in total US and Iranian casualties. We could still see more assassinations in both directions, cyber attacks, more attacks on Gulf oil shipping and facilities, protests and crackdowns in Lebanon and Iraq as well as Iran, attacks in Yemen, Bahrain, or Saudi Arabia, and attacks on or by Israel. We might also eventually see more salvos of cruise or ballistic missiles in one direction and the other.
It is already war, declared or not. President Trump knows the American people don’t support war against Iran and he won’t try to convince them otherwise. He intends simply to proceed, announcing only the good news (from the American perspective) and citing non-existent intelligence, like the plans for attacks on four embassies that no one in the intelligence community has confirmed. Maximum pressure, initiated with sanctions, now includes “kinetic” measures ordered by the President with no authorization from Congress to use military force.
Iranian maximum resistance will not be limited either. Iran will use its proxies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen to pressure America’s friends and allies even as it tries to keep the Europeans, Russians, and Chinese on board the nuclear deal, or what remains of it. Iran can also hit American assets again, not only in Iraq but also elsewhere in the Middle East and even in Latin America as well as inside the US. President Trump wanted to restore deterrence with the Soleimani assassination; there is no reason to believe he has succeeded.
The House Democrats effort to restrain the President will fail. Even if the “concurrent resolution” passes in the Senate, it will be non-binding. The President will veto any binding measure. So we are stuck with a war few Americans or Iranians want conducted by a President who doesn’t care and a Supreme Leader who doesn’t either. Each is concerned with preserving his own hold on power. We need better sense to prevail in both countries, before the de-escalation lull ends and disaster come ever closer.
Stevenson’s army, January 10
– The House on Thursday voted 224-194 to force the president to cease military operations against Iran within 60 days. The measure was H Con Res 83, and that’s significant in many ways. As a concurrent resolution, it would never be presented to the president for approval or veto, even if the Senate passed identical language. But it was not necessary toothless. Ever since the Chadha immigration case in 1983, lawyers have assumed that the provision in the War Powers Resolution allowing Congress to force a withdrawal of troops from combat by concurrent resolution — instead of a joint resolution that the president could veto — was inoperative. This measure would test that assumption, if approved by the Senate [which seems unlikely]. The measure also provides conditions superseding its effect: Congress hereby directs the President to terminate the use of United States Armed Forces to engage in hostilities in or against Iran or any part of its government or military, unless—
(1) Congress has declared war or enacted specific statutory authorization for such use of the Armed Forces; or
(2) such use of the Armed Forces is necessary and appropriate to defend against an imminent armed attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its Armed Forces, consistent with the requirements of the War Powers Resolution.
Both support and opposition to the measure was bipartisan
A Cornell prof has a concise piece explaining why Congress hardly ever really wants to limit warmaking presidents — they don’t want to be held accountable.
NYT reports on the debate and Senate prospects.
The Iraqi premier has called for talks with US on troop withdrawal. WaPo looks at the consequences.
Navy Times has a good piece explaining how countries without diplomatic relations — like US & Iran — communicate with each other.
On WOTR, a CSIS analyst says we misunderstand the value of China’s ocean bases.
Retired AU prof has good ideas for strengthening State Dept.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).