Month: January 2020
Better Middle East policy
On Wednesday January 8, the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) hosted an event titled The Land of Endless Wars: What Really Causes Instability in the Middle East? to showcase the recently published book co-edited by AEI Resident Scholar, Michael Rubin. The book, Seven Pillars: What Really Causes Instability in the Middle East? served as a launching point for the panel, which was comprised of three of the book’s authors and two editors: Michael Rubin, a Resident Scholar at AEI, Brian Katulis, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress and co-editor of the book, and A.Kadir Yildirim Fellow for the Middle East at the Baker Institute and chapter author.
The key takeaways from the discussion are consolidated here:
Reform Islam
Katulis, while noting the multiplicity of factors involved in ISIS’s rise to power, specifically credited its ability to exploit and act upon the failed responsiveness of local governance. Many of the seeds of instability were the result of local government’s failure to respond effectively to and engage with its people. All three panelists agreed that ISIS exploited religion to leverage and gain power, rather than focusing on the particularities of faith. Yildirim noted that the rise of religious-backed regimes was a result of the failure of secular ideologies, particularly their failure to deliver on promises. This failure, Yildirim claims, led to the rise of Islamist, Salafists, and other radical religious groups.
Yildirim underlined that Islam is not by nature different than other religions in terms of its ability to act as a stabilizing or disruptive force. The panelists largely agreed in their overall response to the moderator’s question regarding whether or not Islam needs reforming. While their individual interpretations and explanations varied, each agreed that reform is needed.
Katulis alluded to a more hands-off approach, stating that the United States should not play a substantive role in initiating reform. On the other hand, Rubin insinuated that the United States should help shine the international spotlight on different Muslim schools of thought. He used the example of Saudi Arabia as an Islamic thought producer that consistently receives more international attention than Moroccan schools of thought. Yildirim posited that there is a still a clash between modernity and Islam; many of the deep-seated issues with Islam are a result of this relationship. No panelist provided a clear, descriptive answer as to how best to ignite reform or what reform really consists of.
Revitalize diplomacy
The discussion around the role of diplomacy commenced with Rubin’s remark about the continual ripple effect of Benghazi and its aftermath. Rubin highlighted that one of the fallouts from Benghazi was that diplomats are more isolated. Katulis concurred and further emphasized that diplomats should be engaging with the public sphere as a method of completing one of their essential duties: identifying local social trends and sentiments. Instead of American diplomats engaging on the local level and establishing human connections and trust, it appears that the US government is focusing on military moves. This generates mutually reinforcing cycles of violence and mistrust.
Raising Voices, Not Forces
The panel touched upon the historic role of the United States military in the region, which led to the discussion of more recent interventions and if they are worthwhile. The moderator cited the expense of trillions of US dollars spent only to have more coups and unrest in the region. Katulis warned against the promotion of war, as wars increase the hardline interpretation of religion, allowing the cycles to feed off each other.
In connection with the aforementioned discussion of reforming islam, Rubin and Katulius emphasized that the US should help provide local safe spaces for reform and debate to take place in. In addition, the US should internationally condemn the imprisonment and execution of reformists who are vilified in these ‘safe spaces’ by oppressive regimes. The US should be mobilizing governments through outrage, rather than through military power.
Yildirim agreed, but added the caveat that these ‘safe spaces’ and the way in which they are created are important because of the constant anti-Western interventionist trope. In response to Yildirim’s caution against undermining the local government, Rubin countered that at some point you are damned if you do and damned if you don’t, thereby suggesting military use might be necessary at times despite it not being an ideal solution.
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Stevenson’s army, January 9
Iran and the US seem to be backing down the escalation ladder. Good. But enormous risks and opportunities for miscalculation remain. Prof. Edelman says maybe the US attacks have helped restore deterrence.
No one should be surprised if I find fault with many of Pres. Trump’s policies. But his behavior on Wednesday was deeply offensive. It has long been said that in war, truth is the first casualty. But on Wednesday the president decided to make a formal speech to the American people on a mater of great gravity, truly a matter of war and peace. He surrounded himself with senior national security officials, including many uniformed officers. And he lied and dissembled and misled us,the American people. His remarks were so far from honest and accurate that both the Washington Post and New York Times had “fact checker” articles pointing out the flaws. Over the years I’ve known several White House speech writers from both parties. All told me how hard they worked to guarantee that anything the president said in a formal address was carefully fact-checked and defensible. That’s obviously not the case in the Trump White House. It’s especially bad to use senior military officers as political props — enough to spark a backlash in the Pentagon
Two can play this game: Iran’s parliament has designated the US military as terrorists.
On other matters, WSJ says US is outmaneuvering Russia in the Balkans.
An the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, long a source of studies and recommendations critical of the PRC, has issued its latest annual report.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Moscow owns Syria
Bassam Barabandi writes:
Russian President Putin’s visit to Syria this week was planned along the lines of one last year, which also came in the Russian holiday season. Putin then gave a speech directly to the Russian soldiers at the Russian Hmeimim base, to which Syrian President Assad was asked to come without knowing Putin would be present. Assad’s role during both visits shows how marginalized he is. The main message sent to other countries is the vast extent of Russia’s influence in the areas the Assad regime controls, the government, and institutions.
Putin aimed in his more recent visit to respond to current events and to reduce Iran’s influence in Syria, as part of a tacit agreement among Western countries, Israel, and Russia to neutralize Syria as an arena for Iranian revenge for the killing of Iranian military commander Soleimani. Putin went to Damascus this time, but his main meetings were outside the media spotlight with Russian field commanders and Assad-regime Syrians close to Russia. Assad did not attend those two-hour long meetings. He only appeared after the fact accompanying Putin to the airport.
We can expect major changes within the Assad regime that will increase Russia’s influence and may lead to a violent confrontation with pro-Iranian loyalists. Putin’s failure to visit Assad at his palace was a signal that Russia is not wedded to the Syrian President. Such a visit would have constituted explicit recognition by Russia of the sovereignty of Syria and the legitimacy of Assad as its president. More importantly, it would have been a clear and strong message to all parties that Russia does not see a substitute for Assad as president in the next stage.
What happened was the opposite. Assad’s remarks were devoted to thanks to Russia and glorification of Putin and his forces. Russia now owns Syria, whose president has limited executive authority. Syrian decisions today come from Moscow. Even if Assad were to leave, this situation would persist. Syria’s dependency could extend for long decades to come, with or without Assad.
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Stevenson’s army, January 7
– More US troops are being sent to the Middle East, but they’re not allowed to have cellphones.
– Just in case, US is preparing sanctions against Iraq.
– Mike Pompeo, who says for sure he’s not running for the Senate, is now viewed as shadow secretary of defense.
– NSA O’Brien gets touted as especially close to Trump now.
-Another risk analysis firm has a good list of 2020 issues.
– Travel to Israel tops congressional visits.
– Evan Osnos has long piece on US-China relations.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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How Soleimani’s death affects Syria
Bassam Barabandi writes:
First: Let us not forget that Soleimani’s project was to drive away American forces from Iraq and Syria. He was in no hurry in Syria because he was busy building the foundations to enhance the Iranian political, military, security, economic, popular, and militia influence in Syria, and he surely achieved quite a lot in this field.
Second: Bashar al-Assad is closer to the Iranian axis than the Russian within the Syrian regime. The new IRGC commander may be forced to compel Assad to take decisions in the coming days to prove his loyalty to Iran and to demonstrate that the new commander is in control. This is one of the things that we should monitor in the coming days.
Third: The Assad regime is split, as never before, into two very distinct wings: pro-Iran and pro-Russia. The Iranian wing is led by Bashar al-Assad, who received his advice/ instructions directly from Qassem Soleimani, This was evident in Bashar’s visit to Tehran. Iran also has its own influence in the military and many officers are affiliated with it, but the most dangerous thing is the almost absolute influence of Iran in the countryside of Deir Ezzor Governorate on the West Bank of the Euphrates, in some areas surrounding Damascus, and local and non-local militias located in separate areas inside Syria.
The vacuum and confusion in Iranian decision-making will be very bad for the pro-Iranian wing within the Assad regime, as this wing contains Bashar al-Assad, the major weakness of the Assad regime as a whole.
We do not know how the newly appointed commander Ismail Qaani will look at Bashar Al-Assad, but if he is to lead a more institutionalized position, Assad’s position will be weaker and weaker, and it will not be unlikely with time to get rid of him in a settlement with the rest of the parties.
If Qaani adopts a more centralized policy, he will ask for more concessions from the pro-Iran wing in the regime, which will make Assad look more miserable and ridiculous than previously as part of Iranian messages to Russia and other countries that its influence remains strong in Syria.
Fourth: Russia may take advantage of this opportunity, as the conflict with the Iranian axis looks like a cold war, which is marked by some fierce confrontations that have not yet been resolved. Despite the relative stability in sharing influence between them, the instability of Syria makes the game of influence. Its redistribution always possible, just as was the case of influence between America and Turkey and between Turkey and Russia.
Soleimani’s viciousness will add to Russia’s influence in Syria, and it has to move quickly in several areas. It will ultimately lead to Iranian losses and Russian gains that cannot be appreciated now, but Russia will inevitably try to expand its gains as much as possible. Today, Hizbollah withdrew its forces from some areas in Zabadani, and pro-Russian forces took over.
Neither the Iranian administration nor Qaani and his aides are oblivious to Russia’s aspirations to reduce their influence. They know they must increase their support for the local and non-local militias that they finance. In order for them to achieve this as quickly as possible, Lebanese Hezbollah’s influence on other militia should increase to rectify the central decision vacuum.
Fifth: Iran’s focus on maintaining its influence in the areas under the Assad regime’s control will give comfort to the American spheres of influence, which will reduce the risk of fighting with Iranian militias in eastern Syria for now. If clashes take place, it will not be that Iran wants to expand its presence as much as it will be part of revenge propaganda for Qassem Soleimani. Consequently, the project of military resistance that the Iranian wing in the Assad regime is trying to activate against the American forces in the northeast will not be completed in the planned way in the short term.
Sixth: Turkey is the least affected by Soleimani’s absence in Syria, as opposed to its impact on its interests in Iraq and near-open intelligence cooperation in its struggle against Kurdish forces and political projects.
Seventh: The changes of Iran’s influence in Syria will not be visible in the short run, but rather, the real changes will be in the long-term erosion of Iran’s influence in Syria for the benefit of the other parties. Qaani will need demonstrate more power and influence over media and local coverage to proactively cover the losses.
Eighth: The Iranian project has been benefiting from the American presence in Iraq and Syria, as the Americans were carrying the biggest burden in confronting ISIS. The Iranians were claiming that they were resisting ISIS while they were building militias to control Iraq and to counter the Americans when ready. The Iranian direct escalation toward the US in Iraq started in October 2019, which may reflect that Iranian felt confident and strong enough to be in Iraq alone without other partners.
The real danger from ISIS will arise from Iranian pressure on the Iraqi government to get the American forces out of Iraq.
Many things can happen in the coming days/weeks that may affect Syria:
1. The Iraqi government is yet to make a decision to withdraw US forces from Iraq. Does this mean withdrawal from Iraq as a whole or will the American forces remain in the Kurdistan Regional Government? If it is from the entire country, then the question will be what is the future of the American forces in Syria? From a legal and logistical point of view, will the Iraqi government allow the Americans to use airspace and crossings to transport forces to and from Syria?
2. Legally, if the Iraqi parliament and the Iraqi government pass the decision to withdraw the American forces from Iraq, will this need a whole year from the minute the decision is made to be implemented? If yes, then the Americans will have that period of time to maneuver and their leverage in Syria will be limited.
3. If Iran and its militias attack US bases in northeastern Syria directly or indirectly – will that change the US calculation and cause the Americans to leave Syria? Or will they fight back? How will the SDF forces behave? And the Russians? And Arab clans?
4. The border between Syria and Iraq is another area that must be watch since the Popular Mobilization Forces are in control of most of the border areas, not only the crossings.
5. If the United States leaves for any reason in the coming months, what forces will fill the void? Iran or Russia?
6. Iran will be more stubborn in its positions regarding the Constitutional Committee, Idlib, and the countryside of Aleppo.
7. If the US forces stay in KRG areas against Baghdad wishes, will that step separate the KRG from Iraq? And how will this affect with the Kurdish areas in Syria?
8. A new understanding could be reached between Iran and the international community in which a process of negotiation on all files and concerns starts again, freezing the situation for a while.
9. A new political crisis could occur in Iraq between pro-Iranian parties and both the Kurds and the Sunni, who see the American are the only guarantors to protect them physically as well as their interests in the state. This may delay any decision to have a new prime minister and increase tension inside Iraq.
10. The difficult economic and social situation in Iran and the popular anti-regime movements in both Lebanon and Iraq will make Iranian decisions weaker than they claim and the size of the Iranian adventure much less than now hoped. The Iranian goal is survival of the regime. Any direct military confrontation with the US will weaken the regime without gaining any real benefits.
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Iran is winning this round
The big news of the day is that Tehran will maintain its commitment to International Atomic Energy Agency inspections even though it will no longer be bound by the operational limits in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran nuclear deal). Why would it do that?
Because it is smart. There are several benefits:
- It will give the Europeans, Russians, and Chinese reason not to withdraw from the nuclear deal, thus keeping them split from the Americans;
- It will make it clear to the international community how far they are willing to go in preparing the materials needed for nuclear weapons, and at what point they are prepared to stop if given some sanctions relief;
- It will give them the moral high ground while possibly continuing clandestine nuclear weapons design, much of which can be done by computers without nuclear materials.
Washington meanwhile is losing on several fronts. It has had to suspend anti-ISIS operations in Iraq and Syria, its claims of an imminent attack on US targets are less than credible, there are credible claims that Soleimani was carrying in Baghdad a peace overture to Saudi Arabia, and pressure to remove US forces from Iraq, or at least from Arab-controlled Iraq, is growing. The assassination of Soleimani has tamped down the anti-Iranian demonstrations in Iraq and has quieted the demonstrations against the Islamic Republic inside Iran as well. Even Riyadh is asking Washington to tone it down.
The Republican wizkids like Senator Rubio are speculating about US support for Kurdistan’s secession from Iraq, so that the American troops could stay there. But he forgets: Kurdistan has lost control of Kirkuk, without which its oil revenue is nowhere near sufficient to maintain it as an independent state, not to mention Turkey’s, Syria’s, and Iran’s reactions as well as China’s and Russia’s. Does Marco want the US to go to war to restore Kirkuk to Kurdistan’s control?
Donald Trump likes to upset the apple cart and create crisis, then pretend to resolve it, as he has done with the trade wars. This one won’t be an easy pretense. He has made Americans far less safe not only from Iranian attacks but also from ISIS and Al Qaeda, which are no doubt enjoying the relief. The only Iranians endangered so far other than Soleimani are Iranian-Americans, who are reportedly being stopped at our borders in droves and sent to secondary interrogation. I’ve been there and done that–it is not fatal–but it helps our enemies to claim that America only believes in equal rights for non-immigrant white people, which is pretty much the case for this Administration.
Hillary Clinton was correct when she said Donald Trump did not have the temperament to be president. Republicans in the Senate know that as well as anyone else. There is a good chance killing Soleimani will hurt Trump’s chances for re-election as well as Republican hopes of maintaining their majority in the Senate. It is high time they step up and provide the conditions for a serious and fair trial on the impeachment charges. John Bolton’s new-found willingness to testify if subpoened provides a golden opportunity. It would be truly ironic if Bolton and the Iranians were to be the causes of Trump’s undoing.
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