Day: February 27, 2020
Iranian parliamentary “elections”
February 21 marked the 11th Iranian parliamentary election. The Wilson Center hosted an event After Parliamentary Elections: Iran’s Political Future on February 26 with a panel of scholars to interpret the aftermath . Robin Wright, a USIP-Wilson Center Distinguished Fellow served as the moderator, with panel participation from Ali Vaez, Iran Project Director at the International Crisis Group, Ariane Tabatabai, Visiting Assistant Professor at Georgetown University, and Kenneth Katzman, Specialist on Middle East Affairs at the Congressional Research Service.
Wright stated the facts that led it to be considered the “most rigged Iranian election in history”:
- 90 sitting members of parliament were disqualified for reelection,
- only 19 reformists won seats (down from 121 in the 2016 elections),
- conservatives and hardliners won 221 of the 290 seats, comprising 76% of parliament, compared to 29% in 2016.
- voter turnout was poor due to dissatisfaction with the government about the downing of the Ukrainian plane and the public health threat of coronavirus.
Significance of this Parliament
Vaez cautioned against interpreting these election results as unprecedented. In 2004, the Guardian Council used similar tactics to disqualify 80 members of the parliament and paved the road to Ahmadinejad’s election in 2005. Tabatabai noted that the hardline win comes at a time of lower voter turnout, illustrating the widening gap between the population and the regime.
Vaez speculates that the push for a government-selected parliament is due to the Supreme Leader’s desire to conduct structural reforms. It would be more challenging to introduce constitutional reforms with a parliament ideologically opposed.
Katzman emphasized that the regime is by no means on its back feet. Is continuing its aggressive, confident stance. He pointed to the steps officials took to fix the election as an example of their resounding confidence. He pointed to Lebanon and Iraq as examples where political protests have resulted in resignations and government concessions. This has not occurred in Iran despite popular dissatisfaction with the leadership.
Militarization of Politics
Tabatabai and Vaez both noted that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) made monumental gains in this election. The next speaker of the parliament could be a former commander of the Revolutionary Guards, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. Tabatabai thinks the Guards aim centralize and reassert power. Katzman noted the increased ability for the IRGC to influence and project power in the region with more parliamentary support.
Vaez noted that Parliament, Majles, does not play a monumental role in foreign policy , but it can impeach members of the cabinet and withhold approval, leading to a lame duck presidency.
Presidential Elections : Impact of US Election on Iran
Vaez suggests that the election of a hardline president in 2021 depends mainly on two factors,
- The new elected Parliament’s performance and
- the 2020 elections in the United States.
If there is a US president whom the Iranian government believes it can negotiate with, Vaez doubts that Iran will elect someone like Ahmadinejad. The panelists emphasized the close knit nature of these two elections and the monumental global impacts they will have.
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Big trouble
No one should minimize the health impact of COVID-19, the corona virus originating in Wuhan, China. It is spreading rapidly and will likely make a lot of people sick. The death rate is high–over 2%. It hits older people especially hard and kills younger people much less. President Trump’s effort to portray the virus as not so bad is deplorable.
That said, the impact is likely to depend on how the world reacts as much as on the virus itself. This is obviously true for public health measures: getting sick people isolated and treated correctly will surely lower the risks both to others and to them. The virus has already tested the Chinese and Iranian public health systems. While the initial Chinese reaction in Wuhan was inexcusably slow, WHO is praising China’s vigorous response since. In Iran, the response appears to have been much less effective. In both countries, the publics are unconvinced of their respective governments’ veracity. Health epidemics are going to prove a tough test for governments unused to telling the truth.
That applies to the US as well. President Trump has wisely delegated responsibility to Vice President Pence, whose credibility is far higher than his own. But Pence did not do well as Governor of Indiana in responding to HIV. Nor will he be free to do and say what he wants. His primary responsibilities will be to prevent the American experts Trump boasts about from saying anything to contradict the President and to take the rap if the virus spreads widely in the US. He can’t be fired, but he can be denied renomination.
There is also a risk of overreacting. In retrospect, it is clear that Washington and most of the rest of the world overreacted to 9/11, not only by grounding all aircraft immediately thereafter for longer than necessary but also by launching two wars that each have killed about as many Americans as the initial attacks, plus many thousands of Iraqis and Afghans. In the aftermath of dramatic events, officials want to err on the side of caution–there is no reward for taking additional risks. The World Bank has already cancelled a big conference in DC for next week, despite the absence of COVID-19 here. I suppose the reasoning was that people would be coming from abroad, but remote participation might well have reduced if not eliminated the risk they would have posed.
President Obama handled the Ebola outbreak well: he reacted quickly and did what was needed to keep it in Africa and deal with it there. It is already too late for containment in the current outbreak. The initial Chinese delay eliminated that possibility, and in any event Trump had already dismantled the White House apparatus set up for early reaction. Now we need to try to isolate those infected and ensure that we don’t overreact in ways that cause unjustifiable harm.
The damage to the stock market is already gigantic, though not necessarily irreversible: US markets have declined more than 10%. Only time will tell if that reflects weakening economic fundamentals, caused by disruption of supply chains as well as dampening demand, or is an overreaction. Certainly it illustrates that the United States has a great deal to lose from Chinese economic failure. Maybe a good deal more to lose than from Chinese success, which is vital to American industry and agriculture.
The virus is also having a political impact. Whatever WHO thinks, Chinese are complaining bitterly about their government’s response, and Iranians won’t be far behind. There is nothing wrong with that: citizens should expect their governments to protect public health and criticize them when they fail. But neither Iran nor China permits a serious challenge to their autocratic regimes. Excessive rigidity there could spawn dissent and even cause collapse.
The United States does allow a political alternative to come to power. That is potentially the silver lining. Kakistocracy is only tolerable if it doesn’t appear to matter. If the corona virus makes it clear that we can ill afford incompetence and mendacity, the Trump Administration could be in big trouble.
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