Month: February 2020
Stevenson’s army, February 26
– WSJ notes the return and buildup of US forces in Saudi Arabia.
– Some anti-JCPOA Senators are discussing a new deal with Iran.
– NYT explains why US & India failed to reach a trade deal this week.
– Australia warns of foreign spy threat.
– Graham Allison says US should prune some of its alliances.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Consensus is hard
Following elections in September and October, Tunisia is having difficulty forming a government. Presiding is a populist president without a political party who has in the past proposed radically overhauling the entire system, abolishing political parties, and creating a form of direct democracy.
On February 19, the Middle East Institute hosted a panel discussion on “The State of Tunisia’s Democratic Transition and the Power and Perils of Consensus Politics.” The discussion featured four speakers:
Daniel Brumberg, director of Democracy and Governance Studies at Georgetown University and a senior non-resident fellow at POMED,
Sharan Grewal, an assistant professor of government at the College of William & Mary,
Mohamed-Dhia Hammami, a scholar at Wesleyan University in the College of Social Studies and Government, and
Sabina Henneberg, a postdoctoral fellow in the African Studies Program at SAIS.
William Lawrence, a visiting professor of political science and international affairs at American University, moderated
Current context
Hammami attributed the difficulty of forming a government to the fragmented parliament and the president, whose lack of party affiliation contributed to the disarray. President Said designated Elyes Fakhfakh as the new prime minister because of Ennahda’s inability to gain enough votes to form a new government. Fakhfakh excluded Heart of Tunisia from his coalition because of Nabil Karoui’s corruption cases, scandals, and lobbying with the Israelis. Ennahda withdrew its support from Fakhfakh to call for a government of national unity. A new parliamentary election would be risky. President Said thus invited UGTT, which is a labor union with political legitimacy, to act as a mediator between Fakhfakh’s government and opposing parties.
Consensus politics
Brumberg indicated that social, ideological, political, and geographical divisions in the society show Tunisia’s divisions. Identity politics reflect concern of exclusion, make a majoritarian system difficult. For a diverse group to achieve consensus, parties have to postpone difficult issues, such as economic reforms, the need for a supreme court, and security reforms. Brumberg believes that there’s no alternative to deal with Tunisia’s pluralistic structure other than reaching a consensus. If Tunisians were to move beyond the consensus, to deal with the issues that have been postponed and approach a majoritarian system, it could be troubling for the entire state.
Grewal added that consensus politics was important from 2011 to 2014 during the establishment of the constitution. The transition to democracy should be done only once rules are set. The national unity government in 2015 continued the transition, thus postponing divisive issues. The parties thereby escaped blame for failed policies and avoided bringing back the polarization that plagued 2012-13.
Henneberg attributed the 2012-13 polarization to Ennahda’s inexperience, insecure domestic context, and the rise of opposition to the Egyptian Islamist government. She agreed that Tunisia required an inclusive consensus to write a successful constitution. This resulted in the establishment of the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet to overcome the polarization.
Ennahda’s concerns
Hammami argued that Ennahda is in favor of sustaining consensus politics, which helps it to survive. Ennahda’s support for including Heart of Tunisia in the parliament was due to the lack of consensus to pass political, security, and economic reforms. Grewal noted that Ennahda also has concerns about Fakhfakh, who might repolarize politics.
Stevenson’s army, February 25
– State Dept struggles to expand diversity.
– Bipartisan group struggles to restore Congressional powers in national security.
– Just Security reports new data base on war powers issues.
-New Army training team in Africa.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Idlib in crisis
The United Nations reported over 900,000 newly displaced Syrians in northwestern Syria since December 2019. This number is currently increasing due to the violence in Idlib. This tragic reality served as the foundation of the Middle East Institute’s event on February 21, 2020, titled The Crisis In Syria’s Idlib. The discussion was moderated by Alexander Marquardt, Senior National Correspondent at CNN, with participation from Charles Lister, Senior Fellow and Director of the Countering Terrorism and Extremist Program at the Middle East Institute, Elizabeth Tsurkov, Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and Doctoral student at Princeton University, and Zaher Sahloul, President and Founder at MedGlobal.
“Unprecedented” Situation: Idlib
The panelists accentuated the “unprecedented” nature of the current situation in Idlib. Unlike Syrians in other “de-escalation” zones, the residents of Idlib have nowhere to go. The Turkish border is closed. The 2.8 million people in Idlib are trapped, fearing for their lives. Tsurkov underlined that there is a genuine fear among the population in Idlib that they are all going to die. Lister believes there are close to 2 million people on the border, IDP camps have been entirely full for months, and people are forced to sleep outside in freezing fields.
Sahloul provided a more historical overview of the conflict in Syria, reemphasizing that the humanitarian crisis has been ongoing for over nine years. Assad’s tactics focus on attacking civilian infrastructure; this is an attack against humanity, as schools, markets, and hospitals are constantly being bombed and destroyed. The majority of people are not being killed by bombs, but by chronic disease and lack of available doctors and treatment facilities.
Tsurkov added that the people in Idlib do not want to stay and wait for the regime to capture them as they fear being placed in regime prisons, which essentially serve as “extermination sites.” She notes that even people who are employed by the Syrian government are afraid of remaining under regime control because they have seen what happens too often: execution.
The International community’s failure to respond
Lister in dismay noted that the UN is unable to act. A French proposed statement to declare Idlib a crisis could not pass in the Security Council due to a Russian veto. Assad has recaptured around 35-40% of northwestern Syria in under a year. The key regime objective has been achieved: to control the north/south M5 highway. The next objective, control of the east/west M4 highway has not yet been accomplished.
The panelists emphasized that Erdogan is feeling huge political pressure not to allow any refugees over the border. Turkey has lost 18 observation posts in Idlib, but Turkish-controlled forces did fire at Russian jets. Turkey has established an end of February deadline for the regime to withdraw from Idlib. The panelists doubted this aspiration will be achieved.
Sahloul emphasized that the UNHCR office warned nongovernmental organizations in Syria last year of an additional million displaced people predicted in the next year. Therefore, Sahloul argues, the UN should not be surprised. He cited the lack of UN observers in Idlib and the failure of the UN Secretary General to visit Idlib as evidence of UN disinterest.
What could/should happen?
Tsurkov believes that if the Russian and regime warplanes that conduct horrific bombing and displacement of civilians were threatened and risked being shot down, the bombing would stop. Therefore the US and international community should raise the stakes for Russia and Assad by not only intervening when chemical weapons are used, but also when civilians are bombed.
All the panelists suggested that Turkey should not stand alone in this crisis. While Turkey has made many deplorable policy decisions in Syria, Ankara is also currently the only force trying to stop the regime. Lister said that Turkey has no choice but to gradually escalate its force presence and strength in the region. Turkey has to find a way to force a stalemate or ceasefire.
The only alternative to regime or Turkish control of Idlib is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), whose ancestry includes Al Qaeda. In response to this alternative, Tsurkov professes that local support for HTS is limited and dwindling, due to its recent military losses, but Gaza-fication of Idlib (control by an extremist group) would be better than millions fleeing and mass slaughter.
She believes the only plausible alternative is Turkish-controlled Idlib. Sahloul emphasized that HTS would not be able to govern; it was tolerated only because of the stability it brought. Lister noted that HTS has been officially reaching out to conduct interviews with the international community so that its image can be more aligned with stability and governance than with terrorism. Or at least can be viewed as better than the alternative.
The panelists conclude that the the international community should be providing funds and urging the parties to achieve a ceasefire as a way of stabilizing the situation. Lister urges the US, at a minimum, to utilize diplomacy and put pressure on Russia.
Stevenson’s army, February 24
– Administration plans request for coronavirus health measures.
– Islamic State and Al Qaeda are teaming up in the Sahel..
– Big week for congressional hearings.
– Embarrassingly low turnout in Iran elections.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Paranoids have enemies
President Trump has embarked on a purge to rid the government of his real and imagined enemies, and even lukewarm supporters. National Security Council staff and members of the intelligence community are the current targets, but other agencies won’t be far behind. The State and Justice Departments have already been partly purged, not to mention the Environmental Protection Agency, the Interior Department, and others I may not have noticed.
The paranoia is at least partly justified. No one who has sworn to uphold the US Constitution can behold what Donald Trump is doing to it and not wonder whether loyalty is merited. Lots of things raise doubts:
- the many “acting” officials unconfirmed by the Senate,
- the appointment to lifetime judgeships of unqualified lawyers,
- the naming of grossly unqualified ambassadors to key posts,
- the second guessing of highly qualified prosecutors and intelligence analysts,
- the mixing of his family’s personal business with government responsibilities,
- the imposition of racist immigration policies,
- the failure to protect the November election from Russian interference, and
- the use of his private lawyer to seek dirt on political opponents using US aid as leverage.
The vast majority of US government employees will vote against Trump. For Trump, that is sufficient evidence of their disloyalty. He relishes the notion that the entire government bureaucracy is against him. Paranoia justifies his ignoring it, diminishing it, and circumventing it.
But let’s face it: there are surely a few US government employees, among the several million, who will take risks to bring him down, because they believe he is violating his oath of office and the law. The whistleblower who complained about his “perfect” phone call with Ukrainian President Zelensky is one. Former Ambassador to Kiev Yovanovitch is another, as is former “acting” ambassador Bill Taylor. Each put a career on the line to tell the truth about what they had seen and heard.
Let’s hope there are a few dozen more. There should be several in the Secret Service who can tell more tales about Trump’s billing for hotel rooms at his resorts. There will be a few at the State Department who can blow the whistle on excessive expenditures during his trip to India this week, not to mention his past trips abroad. Trump’s efforts to get his friends out of prison are surely not limited to his tweets about Roger Stone. Where are the judges and prosecutors who can tell us about other initiatives? We know the military was diverting flights so that crews could stay at one of Trump’s resorts in Scotland. What has happened with accountability for that, and how many other instances are still outstanding?
The less than nine months remaining before the November 3 election should be chock-a-block full of revelations, not only from inside the US government. Deutsche Bank’s romance with the failed Donald Trump is a rich vein, only partly mined so far. I hope the courts will finally order him to turn over his tax returns to the House of Representatives. The tales of Trump stiffing small contractors, while told repeatedly, bear more repetition, if only because they come from the same demographic that provides much of Trump’s base. We need an all-out effort to reveal the full dimensions of the scandal that is the Trump Administration. Even paranoids have enemies, who need to speak up and be counted.