Day: March 31, 2020
Gulf arms trade
While the US and Western Europe remain major suppliers in arms trade to Gulf states, other regional and global powers have strengthened their relationships with Gulf states as well. On March 25, the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW) hosted a panel discussion on “Gulf Security in a Multipolar World: New Defense Ties Reflect Competition for Influence.” The discussion featured five speakers:
Jon Alterman: Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Alexandra Kuimova: Research Assistant, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Shana Marshall: Associate Director at the Institute for Middle East Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs
Bilal Saab: Senior Fellow and Director of the Defense and Security Program at the Middle East Institute
Pieter D. Wezeman: Senior Researcher, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Emma Soubrier: Visiting Scholar, the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, moderated
The West and the Gulf
Wezeman indicated that the US and Europe are major suppliers of weapons, training, technology, and manpower to Gulf states, especially to Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Kuimova added that the US, the UK, France and Germany have increased their domination over the Gulf market from 2015 to 2019.
Saab emphasized that there is decreased regional confidence in US security commitment to its Gulf partners. He listed three major breakdowns in their partnership:
- Bush administration’s planning for a never executed attack on Iran
- Obama administration’s nuclear deal with Iran
- Trump administration’s assassination of Soleimani
The US never consulted on these major regional moves with its Gulf allies. But the US is desperate to sell arms to the Gulf, especially now that there is a power competition with Russia and China. Alterman believes nevertheless that the Gulf aims to maintain a close relationship with the US.
Intraregional Dynamics
Marshall stated that intraregional movement of arms has continued throughout Gulf history. The Gulf finances arms transfers from the US and Europe to non-Gulf monarchies and authoritarian republics, including Jordan, Egypt, and Lebanon. There have also been smuggling and proliferation. Additionally, regional production forms a basis for intraregional trade. The GCC aims for domestic production for itself and its regional allies, loosening the West’s grip on regional arms and capital transfers. It also broadens the GCC’s geopolitical influence by increasing political and commercial activities. Marshall concluded that having its own indigenous defense industry for arms sales and transfer is an integral part of effectuating Gulf foreign policy.
Wezeman thinks that the development of arms industry shows a state’s desire to be a regional power with strategic independence. It’s difficult to be a self-sufficient arms industry due to the inability to produce all materials and technologies. State indigenous arms industries have to depend on their allies to some extent.
Other players
Wezeman stated that China and Russia have entered the Gulf market by offering niche products. They may play a bigger role in the future. Kuimova indicated they are among the top ten arms exporters in the world and have increased their interests in the Gulf through security collaboration and economic cooperation, including arms trade and investment. Although Gulf states haven’t placed any orders for S-400 missile system or the Sukhoi Su-35 aircraft with Russia yet, the number of Gulf states that receive China’s arms supplies has increased. Kuimova attributed Gulf states’ arms requests from China and Russia to three reasons:
- The Gulf lacks the domestic technological basis needed to design and produce advanced weapons.
- Western suppliers limit their weapons sales to the Gulf for political and humanitarian reasons. Russia and China request few such conditions.
- Duplication of sources allows the Gulf to benefit from competition in terms of prices and conditions.
Alterman stated that China is trying to have comprehensive strategic partnerships with Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran, and Egypt. While Russia is not a desirable alternative partner to the US in the region, China can be a supplement to the US. He listed China’s motivations as follows:
- The Chinese need to secure energy from the Middle East independently of the US.
- American hegemony isn’t in China’s interests. China’s rising profile in the Middle East can draw US attention away from the Western Pacific and put a wedge between the US, Europe, and China.
He emphasized that China focuses more on business than security. How China-Middle East relations will develop still remains an open question.
Here’s the video for this panel discussion:
Stevenson’s army, March 31
– The British missed it, too. They had a pandemic wargame and ignored the results.
-WSJ says hidden Chinese lending threatens emerging markets.
– DOD wants more of its budget secret.
– Report says Xi flattered Trump into dropping “Wuhan virus”
The uphill fight to vote by mail.
WH has released a 5g strategy report.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).