peacefare.net

Pause and reset

Drilon Gashi writes:

Stops and starts have riddled the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue. Right now, the US Administration is showing great interest and the European Union has renewed its commitment, but Washington and Brussels disagree on the content, leadership, and approach of the talks. There is also disagreement among Kosovo’s leaders. Ironically, the otherwise devastating coronavirus pandemic may offer just the pause and reset opportunity all the parties need.

A Brief History

Having started out as an EU initiative in 2011, the dialogue has had mixed results. There were early positive signals that EU mediation helped overcome a previous zero-sum logic, and that conditionality tied to EU accession would bring the sides closer. However, many of the 23 agreements achieved as of 2018 have only been partially implemented. Presidential talks in the past few years between Kosovo’s Hashim Thaci and Serbia’s Alexander Vucic have added the wrinkle of “border correction,” a euphemism for a land swap. While statements from the presidents are contradictory, they have discussed some sort of territorial swap, with Kosovo ceding part of its north to Serbia, which would cede a lesser par of its southwest to Kosovo.

The Debate on the Deal’s Content

The land swap has become contentious.

First the con: such ethno-national solutions often produce more problems than they solve and may embolden others in the region, namely Republika Srpska, to separate from Bosnia or join Serbia. A departure from the Ahtisaari Plan—the internationally sponsored agreement endorsing Kosovo’s independence and territorial integrity—could bring Kosovo’s independence into question, rather than help make it a universally accepted fact.

Second the pro: former US diplomat James Hooper argues that Kosovo will not be able to “fulfill its maximalist stance.” He claims that all solutions to conflict include “territorial components,” so Kosovo should be prepared to accept one that provides full normalization, including Serbian recognition and security guarantees, an end to the conflict, admission to the UN, and advancement in EU and NATO integration.

Kosovo gets little

Little of what Hooper suggests is proximate or achievable.

Serbia continues to refuse to recognize Kosovo’s independence and actively campaigns against it. It interprets the dialogue as a negotiation over Kosovo’s status, rather than normalizing relations. It has never said it would recognize Kosovo, but rather that it may accept its existence. That’s not normalization but a continuation of the status quo.

Kosovo cannot alone balance the military threat Serbia poses and thus it relies on the presence of US and European troops as part of the NATO-led forces in the country. The troop presence and the promise of NATO membership are firmer security guarantees than anything Belgrade will be willing to offer.

Serbia does not control Kosovo’s admission to the UN. The five veto-wielding members of the Security Council do. Two of them, Russia and China, have not warmed to Kosovo’s independence, and thus it is not clear how Serbian recognition—without Russia’s or China’s endorsement—will lead to Kosovo’s UN membership.

Serbia says it aims for a “face-saving compromise,” in which both it and Kosovo give something up. However, a primary Serb concern—the rights of Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo’s Serbian Orthodox Church—is already enshrined in Kosovo’s constitution and laws. Serbia seeks more: extraterritoriality for both Kosovo’s Serbs and Serb Orthodox Churches. That is not compromise.

It is not clear what Kosovo gains in a land swap of this sort.    

A Reset and New Momentum

Besides the content of the deal, there are other challenges. The EU has appointed a Special Envoy on Kosovo-Serbia normalization, Slovakian diplomat Miroslav Lajcak. The US also has its own Special Envoy on the talks, Richard Grenell, who is also Acting Director of US National Intelligence and Ambassador to Germany. It is not clear who is in charge. Past EU-US cooperation has been key to lasting progress in the region, but for now it is lacking.

Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti currently leads a caretaker government. He is a rival of President Hashim Thaci. The two rarely see eye-to-eye, especially on the talks with Serbia. Kosovo needs a new, fully empowered, government before it can re-engage in normalization with Serbia. The Constitutional Court and Assembly have both determined the government, not the President, should lead talks with Serbia.

The Constitutional Court may also need to decide whether a new government should be chosen through new elections or a new coalition agreement based on the October 2019 election. Kurti wants new elections, since his party’s popularity has grown. That would enable him to avoid a deal neither he nor the general public is privy to. Thaci prefers a new government based on the current parliament, which he hopes will back the kind of deal he wants.

Kosovo needs time to reconcile its government and president and to achieve the unity needed for normalization with Serbia. The EU and US need time to strengthen their collaboration. Serbia needs time not only to conduct its elections delayed due to the Covid-19, but also to come to terms with the need to acknowledge Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The corona virus provides the pause and reset everyone needs.

Drilon S. Gashi is an international development specialist based in Washington, D.C. He has spent three years working in Kosovo’s public and non-for-profit sectors, and holds a Master of International Affairs from Columbia University.